previous year, 1884, according to law. The challenge was overruled, and we think rightly. Of the 26 persons summoned to appear, 2, Faber and Coffin, seemed to have been clearly ineligible. These were discharged by the court. Another juror, G. W. Platt, was a resident of Paris township when the list of jurors was returned, and was not on the assessment roll of that township. At the time of the trial he had lived in Paris township only one year, but had lived in Lincoln township, in Linn county, over 16 years, and was on the assessment roll of Lincoln township in 1884. The neglect or refusal of officers to comply with the statute in the listing and selection of jurors must be affirmatively shown; and as, in this case, only three persons were upon the panel drawn as jurors who were not eligible to be returned on the jury-list, we do not think there was such a palpable disregard of the statute as to require the challenge to the array to have been sustained. Railroad Co. v. Davis, 34 Kan. 199; S. Č. 8 Pac. Rep. 146, 530. In the case of State v. Jenkins, 32 Kan. 477, S. C. 4 Pac. Rep. 809, the jury-list for 1883 was drawn directly from the assessment rolls of 1883, not from the preceding year, 1882, at all. Finally, it is claimed that said chapter 149 is not a law of the state. This, upon the alleged ground that it has never received the approval of the governor; that his objections thereto were never considered; and that the bill was never passed by a vote of two-thirds of each house, notwithstanding such objections. The facts are these: The act in question, known as "House Bill No. 367," entitled "An act to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors," etc., having, in the regular and constitutional mode passed both houses of the legislature, and having been properly signed by the proper officers of both houses, was, on March 7, 1885, regularly presented to the governor for his approval. On that day he approved and signed the same, and deposited it, at 10 o'clock of said March 7th, with the secretary of state. Subsequently the governor sent a message to the legislature stating that he had approved House Bill No. 367, but in his message he made objections to several sections of the bill, and attempted to give his own construction of some of the provisions thereof. It is very doubtful whether his interpretation of the act can be sustained. House Journal 1885, pp. 1221, 1222. Upon this state of facts we are clearly of the opinion that the act was properly approved and signed by the governor, and is a law, the constitutional provision bearing on the subject is section 14 of article 2, and is in these words: "Every bill and joint resolution passed by the house of representatives and senate shall, within two days, thereafter, be signed by the presiding officers, and presented to the governor. If he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it to the house of representatives, which shall enter the objections at large upon its journal, and proceed to reconsider the same. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members elected shall agree to pass the bill or resolution, it shall be sent, with the objections, to the senate, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the members elected, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the vote shall be taken by yeas and nays, and entered upon the journal of each house. If any bill shall not be returned within three days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to the governor, it shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the legislature, by its adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not become a law." This requires the governor, if he does not approve a bill, to return it to the house of representatives, which shall enter the objections at large upon its journal, and proceed to reconsider the same. By the provisions of article 4, c. 102, St. 1879, the secretary of state is charged with the safe-keeping of all enrolled bills and resolutions, and also of the laws of the state; and section 5 of article 1 of said chapter 102 specifically directs that the governor "shall cause all acts and joint resolutions which have become laws or taken effect by his approval or otherwise to be deposited in the office of the secretary of state without delay." There is no constitutional or statutory law which requires the governor to return to either house of the legislature any bill after it has received his approval and signature, nor is such the practice. As a matter of courtesy, the governor reports, through his private secretary, to the house of representatives his approval of the bill. This and nothing more. The bill in this case was never returned by the governor to the house of representatives, and the message which he transmitted to the house subsequently to his approval was never attached thereto, or made a part thereof. It is not claimed that the governor signed the bill through mistake, inadvertence, or fraud. On the other hand, the facts clearly show that he approved and signed the bill voluntarily, and that he deposited it with the secretary of state as a law of the state. After the bill, therefore, had been approved and signed by him, and he had deposited the same with the secretary, it passed beyond his control. Its status then had become fixed and unalterable, so far as he is concerned. His subsequent message was no part of his approval or signature, and whether his objections to the bill, and his construction thereof, after he had approved and deposited the same with the secretary of state, were good or bad, is wholly immaterial. The act in controversy was regularly passed by the legislature, was approved and signed by the governor, was deposited with the secretary of state, and therefore has received all the constitutional sanctions required to give it effect. Arts. 1, 4, c. 102, Comp. Laws 1879; Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) 184-188; People v. Hatch, 19 Ill. 283; Const. art. 2. The judgment of the district court must be affirmed. (All the justices concurring.) (35 Kan. 292) SANBORN, an Infant, by his Next Friend, etc., v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. Co. Filed May 7, 1886. 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO RAILROAD EMPLOYE-BOXING DANGEROUS MACHINERY. Where, in an action against a railroad company to recover damages for personal injury received by an employe in attempting to oil an iron punch driven by iron cog-wheels, which are six or seven feet from the ground or floor of the machine-shop, the evidence offered shows that it is not usual to box or fence such machinery, and that the machinery is so arranged with a tight and loose pulley that, if a person is going to oil or repair it, he can immediately stop the same by simply throwing the belt onto the loose pulley, held, that the failure or negligence to box or fence such cog-wheels is not of itself culpable negligence on the part of the company.1 2. SAME-AVOIDING DANGER-PRESUMPTION-YOUTH. A young man of the age of seventeen years and seven months is presumed to have sufficient capacity to be sensible of danger, and to have the power to avoid it: and this presumption will stand until overthrown by evidence of the absence of such discretion as is usual with persons of that age. Error from Shawnee county. On February 17, 1883, Ray Sanborn, an infant, who sues by his next friend, Charlotte Sanborn, commenced his action against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company to recover damages, and in his petition alleged "That on the nineteenth day of February, 1881, and prior thereto, the defendant had been, was, and is the owner of and operating a railroad in Shawnee county, Kansas, and certain machinery connected with its said road, situate at the city of Topeka, in said county, among or a part of which it owned and operated a certain iron punch' run and operated by steam by said defendant as aforesaid; that plaintiff was, at the time of the grievances hereinafter stated, in the employment of the defendant, and hired to serve said defendant in and about said machinery, and was of tender years, to-wit, seventeen years of age, and ignorant and unskilled in operating and working such machinery, and was on said date in the employment of said defendant, under the charge and direction of H. S. Benton, the foreman, in operating said machinery, as agent, and in the employment of said defendant, and as such authorized and empowered by said defendant to operate said machinery, and to govern and control the men and other employes, including plaintiff, in the employment of said defendant then and there being; that said defendant, by its foreman and employe, well knowing that plaintiff was unskilled and ignorant in operating said machinery, negligently ordered and directed plaintiff to oil and lubricate parts of certain cogs belonging to said machinery employed in operating said iron punch, as aforesaid, which said cogs were, by the negligence and mismanagement of said defendant and its employes, left in an exposed, unprotected, and dangerous condition, and the said plaintiff, in obedience to said order of Benton on said date, using ordinary skill and judgment, and without any fault and neglect, while in the act of supplying the cup of said cogs, had his right hand and arm caught by and between said cogs, and then and there crushed, mutilated, and wounded in such a manner as to, and he did, suffer amputation of said arm below the elbow, and which said accident was caused by the negligence and mismanagement of defendant and its employes by not then and there having said cogs boxed up and cov 1See note at end of case. ered and protected as the same should and could have been, and by not having the said machinery otherwise properly constructed and adjusted, as defendant was required to do, and in consequence of the said negligence and mismanagement of said defendant, and its agents and employes, plaintiff has become and is rendered a permanent cripple, and in consequence of said injury plaintiff became sick, sore, and disordered, and so remained for a long space of time, to-wit, three months, during all of which time plaintiff suffered and endured great pain, and thereby plaintiff was forced to and did then and there lay out large sums of money, aniounting in the whole to two hundred dollars, in and about being ministered to and treated in said sickness, lameness, and disorder, and also thereby plaintiff incurred other and further divers expenses, damages, and injuries, all and total amounting to the great sum of ten thousand dollars, for which plaintiff asks judgment, costs, and other relief as by law in such cases provided. "A. B. JETMORE, of Counsel." "H. P. VROOMAN, Attorney for Plaintiff. On March 13, 1883, the company filed the following answer, omitting court and title: "Now comes the defendant, and for answer to the petition of plaintiff in the above-entitled cause “(1) Denies each and every material allegation therein contained. "(2) For a second and further defense the defendant says that the injuries, if any, received by said plaintiff were occasioned wholly by his negligence, (gross,) and without fault of the said defendant, its agents, or servants. "(3) For a third and further defense defendant says that the injuries, if any, received by said plaintiff were occasioned wholly by the negligence of said plaintiff, or his co-employes and fellow-servants, and without fault of the said defendant. "Wherefore, said defendant prays judgment for costs. "GEO. R. PECK, "Attorneys for Defendant." On April 4, 1883, the plaintiff moved the court to strike out the second and third paragraphs of the answer of defendant, which motion, upon the hearing thereof, was overruled. Subsequently the plaintiff filed a reply to the second and third paragraphs of the an swer. Trial had at the January term of court for 1884. Upon the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the defendant interposed a demurrer thereto, which was sustained by the court, and the jury discharged. Plaintiff thereupon filed a motion for a new trial, which, upon hearing, was overruled. Plaintiff excepted to the rulings of the court upon the demurrer to the evidence, and the motion for a new trial, and brings the case here. H. P. Vrooman and Jetmore & Son, for plaintiff in error. HORTON, C. J. Action by Ray Sanborn, by next friend, for a personal injury. The petition alleged that Ray Sanborn was ordered by H. S. Benton, the foreman of the boiler-shop of the railroad company at Topeka, to oil and lubricate parts of certain cogs belonging to or running an iron punch in the shop of the company; that, while in the act of supplying the cup of the cogs with oil, his right hand and arm were caught by and between the cogs, and so mutilated that amputation of the arm below the elbow was necessary; that the accident was caused by the negligence and mismanagement of the company in not having the cogs boxed up and protected as the same should and could have been, and in not having the machine otherwise properly constructed and adjusted as the company was required to do. There is no evidence in the record tending to show that the company was guilty of any negligence in failing to cover or further protect the cogs of the wheels where Sanborn was injured, and no evidence whatever tending to show that the iron punch, and all the machinery connected therewith, was not properly constructed and adjusted. John M. Stebbins, a witness called by the plaintiff, among other things, testified "That he was a boiler-maker by trade, and had worked in that business for forty years; that, at the time of the injury complained of, he was working as a mechanic in the boiler-shop of the railroad company at Topeka, and had been working in the shop for that company about fifteen months; that he knew of the accident very soon afterwards, but did not see it; that there were two punches somewhat similar in the shop,-a heavier punch and a lighter punch; that anybody in the shop who desired could use the small punch; that it was used for general purposes, like punching 1-4 inch, 5-16, 1-2 inch, and 3-8 holes; that the pinion wheel was between five and six feet from the floor; that a shaft driving the punch runs across near the top of the machine; that right in the rear of the pinion wheel is a journal, with a cup on it; that in the top there is a recess where oil is put, and holes to let the oil down to the journal; that to put the oil in you have to put it into the oil-holes; that Sanborn could have oiled the machine from the ground, but by getting on a box that was there, he was able to reach more easily where the oil-box was; that if he had used his left hand there would have been no danger; that he had operated other machines propelled with wheels and cogs like the iron punch; that he had had experience with such machines, -as much as any ordinary man that works in the business; that there was no way in which a person could be caught and injured in the wheel when standing in front of the punch; that a person could oil it just as easy that way; that if a person would get something to stand on in front he would be perfectly safe; that, where the belt runs, a double wheel comes up; that there is a tight and loose pulley with the machine; that when the belt is on the loose pulley it does not run the machine; that by using the shifter' a person can put the belt onto the tight or loose pulley; that a person standing in front could stop the machine; that a person standing upon a box for the purpose of oiling on top could reach up, and shove the 'shifter' and stop the machine; that a person could stop the machine to oil it, but this was not the usual method; that before the accident there was no ordinary mode of protecting the machinery." Joseph Heslett, called by the plaintiff as a witness, testified"That he is a machinist, and had been among machines all his life; that he was acquainted with the iron punch where the accident happened, and was acquainted with the construction of machines similar to that one; that he was in the machine-shop when Sanborn was hurt, but about 400 yards away; that there was no necessity for protecting such machinery; that when such machinery is down on the floor, or working on the floor, it is usual to protect |