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repeating the debits of the savings banks are the debts of the last government, they have forgotten to put on the other side those funds which, save the account current of the treasury, cover exactly that debit? Equity would have dema ded that the 11,600,000 francs of rentes, or dividends on stocks, which the state had purchased to employ the deposits in their hands, should have been deducted from the 21 millions francs of rentes which were issued to reimburse the savings banks' depositions. When an involved estate is liquidated, the affairs should not be involved further by previously deducting all the credits to the profit of the liquidator. We do not think this rectification, which we have just made, can be contested; but even this is not all we have to say. The consolidation of the funds of the savings banks has been a deplorable operation; its net result, as we shall presently see, has been to leave 10 millions of rentes at the charge of the treasury, and to free it from a running account which, to the 24th February, 1848, had reached 65,703,000 francs. Ten milllons of rentes for a capital of 65 millions! why, this is borrowing at more than 15 per cent! We think no one would make such an operation unless he was forced to do so. But was there any vis major? If it is true that the revolution of February was struck with so great a discredit among the popular classes that every savings bank depositor with a unanimous, spontaneous movement determined to withdraw their deposits, we content ourselves with saying, it is a phenomenon unexampled in the history of our public credit, which, in the darkest hour of the Monarchy, was even never apprehended. The crisis of 1847that crisis of famine and of misery--left the credit of savings banks intact, and economy's treasury was called upon to repay but such sums as were necessary to keep starvation from the hearth. Nay, it is probable that even after the Revolution of February, the credits of the savings banks could have been saved; honesty (loyaute) would have saved it; a few payments in spe cie or bank notes to the first comers and the more timid depositors, would have saved it, by calming all fears; but they chaffered about the justice due to the unknown creditors of the savings banks; while they lavished the resources of the state on the workmen of the Ateliers Nationaux, they offered to the former treasury bonds or rentes depreciated more than 30 per cent; while the preambles of the decrees placed the savings banks under the pro tection of the honesty of the government, those same decrees were their warrants of bankruptcy. To appreciate the policy of the Provisional Gov ernment as to the savings banks, the report of M. Delessert should be read from beginning to end; the wrongs could not be exposed with greater temperance, the rights with greater force, nor the sufferings with greater sympathy. The establishment of savings banks is probably the brightest part of the patrimony of honor which Benjamin Delessert has left to his familythey accepted the heritage with a manner which shamed them of it. That report informs us, that if upon the first demands of payment, "they had adopted the only proper measure, that of giving rente at par," the difficulty of the moment would probably have been surmounted; "further, when the National Assembly had revived public confidence by adopting the rent at market value as the standard of reimbursement, the depositors, satisfied with this pledge of honesty, only asked to be allowed to keep their savings, in leaving them in the savings banks." But in rendering general and obligatory the reimbursement in rentes, which should have been left optional— for, adds M. Delessert, without this much-to-be-regretted error, the state would have had to bear sacrifices, but of comparatively little importance.

It is no part of our intention to demand the account from the Ministers of this period of these unjust or impolitic measures; we only wish the present Minister would leave the responsibility with them.

The consolidation of the treasury bonds had not urgency for excuse. A decree of the 16th March, 1848, ordained this composition with the state creditor, although the payments of the month of March were inconsiderable, the heaviest payments falling due only in April. To meet these payments. the late government had organized all the resources of the treasury. Cash to the amount of 200 millions was ready; the contracting of the loan promised further resources; the Northern Railway company was on the eve of repaying 20 millions; the reduction of the interest to 4 per cent could not arrest the avidity with which the treasury bonds were demanded. Why did the Provisional Government, heir to all these resources, adjourn its advance to its creditors? Because the first were soon dissipated, and the latter exhausted. On one side, more pressing demands than that of the treasury bonds absorbed all the cash on hand, for in a few days an enormous supplement was obliged to be added to the effective strength of the army, for there were the Ateliers Nationaux to be paid, and the Garde Mobile to be organized. On the other, the ordinary receipts fell with the most frightful rapidity; the contractors of the loan, who solicited discounts from the Monarchy, exposed themselves to a penalty of 25,000,000 by retiring from their contract with the Republic, and the office for the emission of treasury bonds was closed, from universal distrust. Whence came these enormous expenses, and this exhaustion of all receipts, this general discredit? To whom should their consequences, the ruinous consolidations, be imputed? Is it the Revolution of February? Is it the fault of those who governed it? It is between the two the choice must be made: for one thing is certain, the Minister of Finance has not the right to lay them at the charge of the Monarchy. The expense of the general service of the country has increased as the public debt: let us quote figures, for they speak with tones which cannot be misunderstood. We waive all comparison with the normal budget of the last government. We will take as the point of departure its last fiscal year, the which was accompanied by the most arduous circumstances, and under the plagues of inundation and famine. In 1847, the ordinary expenses (we omit nothing, save those arising from the great public works) reached 1,427 millions; the first budget of the Republic increased them to 1,629 millions. The Minister of Finance makes us fear that for the same expenses the second budget will not be less than 1,492 millions, and the third budget of ordinary expenses, the budget he has just presented, already demands 1,488 millions, without including any accidental expense, and may go higher, unless the absolute sacrifice of the sinking fund reduces it temporarily to 1,409 millions. The decrease of receipts has formed a sad contrast with the increase of expenses; in 1848 the indirect revenues returned 142 millions less than in 1847. We are unable to calculate the diminution 1849 will present, but in the exposé of the budget of receipts for 1850, the Minister of Finance proposes to compensate by a temporary resource of 65 millions, the probable reduction in the returns of the imposts. But it is in the midst of this unprecedented decline of the public revenue, that the Constituent Assembly has reduced the tax upon salt, and the rates of postage, and suppressed the inpost upon potable liquors, retrenching voluntarily the budget of receipts 160 millions, at a time it was already deficit in consequence of the vis major of political events. This is the greatest danger of our financial situation.

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Extraordinary expenses will cease with the circumstances which have created them; the return of the imposts will increase with public prosperity; a policy of order and peace will repair, to a degree, the ruin caused by long agitation; but the sources of public revenue, when once long closed, can never more be opened, and long suppressed imposts are as difficult to reimpose as they are hard to replace. The crusade against impost commenced under the Monarchy-it has been victorious under the Republic. The war to impost was when the electoral colleges were few-a common ground wherever much corruption was engendered; universal suffrage has not diminished its advantages to men of all parties. It is so easy and so popular to make war upon the imposts! Who does not think himself enriched by the reduction of taxes? Who but thinks more, much more, of his own revenue, than of the public receipts? Who reminds himself that a state which loses its receipts, loses at the same time its credit and its power--that an intimate connection exists between the prosperity of every one and the prosperity of the public? Alas! all of us resemble in some degree the savage Montesquieu speaks of -afraid famine will overtake us, we wish to cut down the tree and gather its fruit. But which is that impost which has no inconveniences--that does not incommode the production, circulation, or the consumption of goods and merchandise? Which is the impost that is irreproachable in its assessment or in its collection? None: imperfection is the original sin of all human institutions; we are strong to perceive, but we are impotent to remove this general taint. Shall we therefore never consent to accord our submission to faulty taxes and imperfect laws? The war to the impost has been carried on in a skilful manner, full of surprises and of stratagems. Care was taken never to attack the public revenue from the front--they laid snares for it. They did not wish, said they, to diminish the receipts of the state, but only to organize them better, and increase them. This tax is too high; do but diminish it two-thirds, and you will triple the consumption of the merchandise taxed: that tax is certainly founded in justice, but it is unjustly assessed; keep the tax, but change its form. Others said, that impost is unjust, it strikes the tax-payers unequally; without doubt the state has need of the tax, but it does not matter to it how the tax is raised, so it receives its money. Abolish then that tax, and replace it by another. Others said, the expenses are excessive, and assuredly can be reduced; reduce, therefore, the imposts. While in the midst of all these innovators, there were innovators with the newest ideas, who skilfully conjoined the question of the rights of property with the question of taxes, crying aloud Reform, while they whispered Revolution aside. This was the coalition of sophisms, which was engaged against the public revenue. Some of these sophisms already succeeded. What is the fruit of their victory? Take the reduction of the salt tax for example. What bright promises were not held out to us by those who persuaded us to take that "popular" step, so fatal to our finances? They did not think much of the good effects of a reduction of the tax upon salt destined for man's consumption. This insensible and limited reduction did not counterbalance, even in their eyes, the sacrifice of one of our best sources of revenue; but the reduction of the duty on salt destined to agricultural purposes was to do wonders. The increased consumption was to enrich the country, without diminishing the treasury revenues. The reduction was decreed. What did we see? The long stagnation of trade incident to the debate upon the reduction of the duty, for the first few months of the new régime induced a great activity, and promised an increase of revenue, and the party leaders

celebrated the triumph of this financial reform. Time soon dissipated all these illusions; the deficit monthly increased, and is now at the figure represented by the reduction of the tax.* The Minister of Finance has resigned himself to his fate, contenting himself with announcing that the revenues from salt will not exceed 27 millions for 1850, while they brought to the treasury 70 millions in 1847. We have paid 43 millions for an experiment which has wholly failed! They tell us the experiment has not yet concluded; England has been waiting twenty-five years, and nobody there now hopes anything from the good effects the tax will produce upon the agriculture of the country. I consulted upon one occasion a distinguished English statesman, who had devoted the leisure left him by the labors of a glorious administration, upon this subject; "Oh," said he, with a fine irony, "none of the persons engaged in the salt trade doubts the immense benefits to agriculture."

A similar deception seems to await us in all of our other financial experiments, and the revision of our taxes will excite more murmurs than they can calm, which is borne by habit, when new excited revolt. Does any one think that the new stamp tax will be thought lighter than the late rates of letter postage, and that the income tax will be more popular than the salt tax? We have ceded to the complaints of a portion of the community against the rigors of those taxes-what shall we respond to complaints of the whole nation against inquisitions upon our fortunes? We have seen, during days of riot, some octroi offices burned; the English Parliament, in 1816, burned all the papers relating to the income tax. Ah, if those taxes were still in existence, would any one be so bold as to place the two alternatives before the nation? And even now, does any one believe this question would be doubtful, if the Minister of Finance would employ all the resources of science and talent in redemanding the old impost he has displayed in defending the new impost, and the Assembly, interpreting the wishes of the tax-payers, would hesitate to repudiate all those changes which alter without assuaging the weight of taxation? Must we henceforth renew all our institutions frequently, and hold that if the twenty-four hours pass without introducing some change, the human mind has lost a day? These reformers used to reproach the most obstinate friends of stability, by saying they would have been conservators in chaos; we may reproach them, that even in Paradise they would have desired progress. If it is true that the spirit of innovation is the characteristic of our age, let the reformers, when they place before the public pretended abuses which they denounce, place also the reforms they propose, that the nation may choose between them. If the reforms are accepted by the people, they will immediately replace the abuses, and an interregnum-as fatal to imposts as to power-will be avoided. But what if the public should like the ills they know, rather than the remedies they are ignorant of? What if they should prefer the empire of the old rates of taxation, under which everything, salaries, profits, farm rents increased, to pursuing the new Utopias which, promising the reduction of all the taxes, have only so far reduced all the revenues?

S. DUMON, late Minister of Finance.

Table of the diminution, month by month, of the return of the salt tax, in 1849, compared with 1848:January diminution.......francs 187,000 May diminution .............................francs 3,171,000

February
March
April

66

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1,877,000 June 66

1,493,000 July 66
1,497,000

...............
................

3,161,000 3,148,000

Art. II-MERCANTILE BIOGRAPHY.

GEORGE HUDSON.

USE OF THE HISTORY OF POPULAR FOLLIES, AND THE LIVES OF THE LEADERS THEREIN-GEORGE HUDSON-BIRTH, ETC.-A LINEN-DRAPER-MUNICIPAL DIGNITIES ENJOYED BY HIM-HIS RAILROAD CAREER-INDOMITABLE ENERGY AND REMARKABLE SUCCESS-WISDOM AND PROPRIETY OF HIS COURSE TO 1845-EXTENT OF HIS RAILWAY COMMAND-VAST POPULARITY-THE MANIA OF '45HUDSON'S DECLENSION AND FALL-FIERCE REVULSION OF PUBLIC FEELING TOWARD HIM—QUESTION OF HIS TURPITUDE-PERSONAL CHARACTER-POLITICAL SYMPATHIES-QUESTION OF HIS REAL INFLUENCE IN EXCITING AND DIRECTING THE EXCITEMENT OF '45-HIS POWER THEREIN LESS THAN IS AWARDED HIM-REAL CAUSES OF THE MANIA-PROSPECT OF HUDSON'S REVIVIFICATION.

THE articles in the Merchants' Magazine under the above heading, are not intended solely to record the lives of men whose careers may be com mended as in all, or in most respects even, proper models for the formation of mercantile character. Such a course, would be to exclude some of the most fit subjects for study which could be presented to the attention of the young merchant. The biographies of the remarkable men who have been the originators and leaders of those gigantic Delusions which have drawn within their vortices the great heterogeneous multitude, whelming almost every other concern of life in the one universal absorbing passion of gain, are among the most valuable lessons furnished by human experience. The details of a Money-Mania furnish one of the most instructive chapters of Commercial History. Nowhere can we read more of that Human Nature, its weakness and its strength, its springs and its incentives, its modes, its motions, and its causes, all which it is so much the business of the merchant to understand. Nowhere do we discover more clearly the propelling forces by which the world is driven, and nowhere do we learn better to handle them. The province of legitimate trade has no clearer boundary-exposition than is here made; and there is, of course, no other practicable illustration in which the errors and dangers to which a commercial life is liable, are so palpable. We learn from the movement, even though it be as flagitious in inception as it may be ruinous in result, the line of mercantile tendencies, and the best order of mercantile system; we witness in the mover, whatever the judgment we pass upon his motives and conduct, the most elevated exertions of human energy, the finest combinations of operative plan, and the most efficient methods of execution. He must be a stolid merchant, who is not made in some way a better one, after reading the history of the Mississippi scheme, of the South Sea bubble, of the tulip phrensy of the Dutch, or who can find no instruction in the lives of Law, of Blunt, of Fordyce, and their associates in speculative fame.

Between Railroads and Commerce there is so intimate a connection; the former, with all its powers and results, is so peculiarly the agent of the latter, has received an influence so potential in the development, form, and character of modern trade, and promises such immense loan of power, and such vast achievements in behalf of the commercial future-that the history of the Iron Road, and the biographies of Railway projectors, Railway engineers, and Railway architects, must ever hold a prominent place in the annals of mercantile progress and the lives of mercantile men. To ignore the personal history of the "Railway King," whatever opinion we may have of his career, and of his actuating motives, and however just that opinion may be, would create an hiatus in the volumes, as marked, and as much becloud

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