Thatcher v. West River National Bank. standing that it was to be negotiated to the bank to enable the Leather Company to raise money upon it. It was also clearly shown by other evidence that the bank did discount the note indorsed in blank by Sprague, as agent, and paid the money for it; and there was no evidence of a contrary tendency. We think it, therefore, wholly immaterial whether the bank had notice, or not, of the circumstances under which, and the purpose for which it was given, and of the other facts relied upon in the defense. Had the directors of the bank, knowing the nature of the previous transactions between defendant and the Leather Company, been present and heard and known the whole arrangement between Sprague and the defendant when the vote was given, the bank would still be entitled to recover. See Charles v. Marsden, 1 Taunt. 224; Smith v. Knox, 3 Esp. 46; Thompson v. Shepherd, 12 Metc. 311; Brown v. Mott, 7 Johns. 361; Lord v. Oceen Bank, 20 Penn. St. 384; Grant v. Ellicott, 7 Wend. 227; Renwick v. Williams, 2 Md. 356; Molson v. Hawley, 1 Blatchf. 409; Caruthers v. West, 11 Q. B. 143. The want of consideration, and the assurance of Sprague that the note would be taken care of, do not affect the right of the bank as indorsee, though taking it with notice. Mere accommodation paper is generally at least, without consideration, and such assurances, express or implied, are always given or relied upon, when such accommodation paper is given. Such facts might constitute a good defense as against the party for whose accommodation it is given; but to allow them to defeat a recovery by an indorsee who advances money upon it-when that is the purpose for which it is given-would defeat the very purpose for which such paper is made, and render the transaction absurd. As between the defendant and the indorsee, the defendant took the risk of Sprague's assurances being made good, and his remedy is upon him or the party he represented. These conclusions render it unnecessary to notice the defendant's requests to charge with reference to the want of consideration, and the question of notice, or the charges given upon these points. The Circuit Court was right in holding that there was no evidence tending to show that the Leather Company had any interest in the money sought to be recovered in this suit. A copy of the note with the indorsement, accompanied the declaration, and the note and indorsement were read in evidence without objection, and no evidence was given tending to disprove the Howell v. The Village of Cassopolis. indorsement. The court was therefore right in refusing to charge that it was necessary to prove the indorsement in any other way. We see no error in the record, and the judgment must be affirmed, with costs. The other justices concurred. HOWELL V. THE VILLAGE OF CASSOPOLIS. (35 Michigan, 471.) National bank stock - Taxation. " By general law of a State, shares of stock in National banks were to be taxed in the township where the bank was located, except that where a stockholder resided in another township in the same county, his shares were to be there taxed. A village charter authorized the taxation of all property, real and personal, within the limits of said village." Held, not to authorize a tax on shares of stock in a National bank located in such village, owned by a resident of another township in the same county. HIS was an action to recover back a tax of one dollar and fifty THUS cents, levied by the village on the National bank stock of the plaintiff, who was a resident of another township in Cass county. The tax was paid under protest to save plaintiff's property from sale on seizure by the village marshal by virtue of process to enforce the payment of such tax. Judgment passed for defendant, and the plaintiff brings the case up for review. Howell & Carr, for plaintiff. L. H. Glover, for defendant. CAMPBELL, J. The village of Cassopolis levied taxes on the National bank stock of plaintiff, who was a resident of another township in the same county, claiming the right to do so because the bank was located in the village. The charter of the village authorizes the taxation of "all property, real and personal, within the limits of said village," if not exempt from taxation for county and township purposes. The general laws of the State provide for the taxation of National bank stock in the township where the bank is located, except that Howell v. The Village of Cassopolis. where a stockholder resides in another township in the same county, he is taxable in his own township. Laws 1875, p. 185. Before the act of 1875 no shares of non-residents of the place where the bank was located were taxable there, unless against nonresidents of the State. C. L., § 974. The National Banking Law allows the stock in the hands of individuals to be taxed in such manner and place as the State may determine, subject only to two conditions, one of which is, that the rate shall not be greater than that of taxation on other moneyed capital of citizens, and the other, that non-residents of the State holding stock shall be taxed in the city or town where the bank is located. R. S. of U. S., § 5219. The State legislation is therefore valid, and the only question is, whether the village charter authorizes taxation of stock in the hands of owners, not residing in Cassopolis, but in another town in Cass county. There is no proper sense in which the stock of a non-resident can be regarded as personal property within the village, unless some statute has so declared. If the bank itself could be taxed, no doubt its personal property would be within the village, because following the domicile. But intangible property, like stock, must always follow the domicile, unless separated from it by positive law. The only laws of this State which create this separation define its extent, and do not authorize it as against residents of the same county who reside in another township. The act of Congress only requires it in case of non-residents of the State, and as to all State residents, authorize the State to determine its own policy. The statutes are too plain to require construction. It would be contrary to all sound rules of construction to adopt an interpretation which should change the operation of the general taxing laws in particular localities, unless where there is a plain intent to do so. In the present case the intent is, we think, quite as plainly opposed to any such discrimination, and except for the general laws, stock of non-residents of the village could not be taxed at all. The judgment below must be reversed, and judgment rendered on the finding in favor of the plaintiff in error for one dollar and fifty cents damages, with costs of both courts. The other justices concurred. Commissioners of Rice County v. Citizens' National Bank of Faribault. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF RICE COUNTY V. CITIZENS' NATIONAL BANK OF FARIBAULT. (23 Minnesota, 280.) National bank - Taxation of banking-house. Under a statute requiring shares in National banks to be taxed at their actual value without reduction for real estate, the banking-office and lot, owned and occupied as its place of business by a National bank created, is not liable to assessment and taxation as real estate eo nomine against the bank.* proceedings under the tax law of 1874, to enforce the payment of delinquent taxes in Rice county, the defendant interposed a defense to the tax assessed upon its banking-house in the city of Faribault, and returned as delinquent. In its answer the defendant averred that it was a National bank, organized under the act of Congress; that the real estate in question consisted of land which was purchased, and a building thereon which was erected, with money forming part of defendant's capital stock, for its immediate accommodation in the transaction of its business; that such land and building thereupon became and are a part of the defendant's capital stock, included in the 800 shares into which such capital stock is divided; that all said shares were assessed and taxed, in 1874, to the holders thereof, at their full value in money, without deduction of the value of such real estate therefrom, and all the taxes as assessed on such shares were duly and fully paid; and that the taxes in question, which were assessed in 1874 on the before-mentioned real estate, were assessed on property which had already been duly assessed and taxed at its par value, for the same year, and the taxes on which had been fully paid. At the trial in the District Court for J., it was agreed that the facts were as the court made a decision, pro forma, and tax, and, upon defendant's request, certified the case to this court, under Laws of 1874, chapter 1, section 120. Rice county, before LORD, stated in the answer, and sustaining the assessment *See City National Bank v. Paducah, ante, p. 300; People ex rel. Gallatin National Bank v. Commissioners, post. Commissioners of Rice County v. Citizens' National Bank of Faribault, Gordon E. Cole, for defendant. Geo. P. Wilson, Attorney-General, and Geo. N. Baxter, for plaintiff. CORNELL, J. Is real property, lawfully owned and used as a place for the transaction of its business by a bank created and existing under the National Banking Law, taxable eo nomine against the bank, under Laws 1874, chapter 1, it being conceded that the specific provisions of that statute require the assessment and taxation of all the shares comprising the entire capital stock of the association in the name of the respective shareholders, and at their actual cash value, without any deduction on account of the real property so held by the bank, and in which a portion of its capital is invested? This is the sole question for consideration in this case, and its determination depends upon the character and effect of that statute. The general policy of the law is to avoid duplicate taxation. No one subject of taxation ought to be required to contribute more than once to the same public burden, while other subjects of taxation, belonging to the same class, are required to contribute but once.. In the exposition of any tax law, therefore, a construction leading to any such result should be avoided, unless the cogency of some express provision or unavoidable implication of the statute compels its adoption. Says Judge COOLEY, in his valuable treatise on the law of Taxation: "It is a fundamental maxim in taxation that the same property shall not be subject to a double tax payable by the same party, either directly or indirectly; and when it is once decided that any kind or class of property is liable to be taxed under one provision of the statute, it has been held to follow, as a legal conclusion, that the Legislature could not have intended the same property should be subject to another tax, though there may be general words in the law which would seem to imply that it may be taxed a second time." Cooley on Taxation, 165, and authorities cited in the notes. Especially should this rule obtain in the courts of a State whose Constitution contains an express provision requiring equality and uniformity in the imposition of taxes upon property, according to a cash valuation. The aggregate capital stock of any corporation is but the representative of its entire property, including the corporate franchise, and the actual cash value of the former depends wholly upon the |