In re Wild. est court no rate of interest upon loans to a corporation is fixed or limited. It follows, that the transaction in question was within the prohibition of the National Banking Law, and that the bank, eo instanti, it made the loan upon the terms exacted, incurred the forfeiture of the entire interest which the notes received, carried with them, or which was agreed to be paid thereon. Discounting the notes did not render it less true, that the notes themselves carried with them the principal loaned and the interest agreed to be paid, which, with the bonds also given, necessarily included all the pecuniary benefit agreed to be paid as compensation for the loan, whatever form the transaction was made colorably to assume. The bankrupt, as mere accommodation indorser or security, is, upon familiar principles of equity, entitled to all the protection which his principal (the Canal Company) would have if the notes in question were sought to be enforced against it. I do not say that he can recover back money paid by the Canal Company, but he has a right to inquire whether, in view of the forfeiture of the entire interest by the bank, there is any thing due to the bank upon the notes which he indorsed, and thereby to ascertain whether, and to what extent the two notes now in question are without consideration. It is claimed, by the assignee of the bankrupt, that treating the entire interest as forfeited, the bank has already been paid the whole of the principal of the loan. I am not fully satisfied that a small sum, part of such principal, is not still due. Upon the proofs taken, the account would seem to stand thus: DR. Loan. Less the interest or discount included in the notes given therefor from time to time...... CR. Cash payment by Canal Company. Coupons paid Canal Company. Note paid Cash paid on giving the note for $73,902.51, which according to the testimony made up the whole amount, $76,532.19. Carried forward $150,000 00 27,117 26 $122,882 74 $88,750 00 58,476 67 12,798 90 2,629 68 $162,655 25 $122,882 74 Brought forward... In re Wild. Cash paid on renewal of the note for $73,902.51, when the $75,000 note, now in question, was given... From which are to be deducted sundry charges to which these payments appear to have been in part applied, viz.: Another note for $25,000, and interest....$25,452 80 .... $162,655 25 $122,882 74 3,902 51 $166,557 76 113 25 47,038 57 119,519 19 Leaving a balance of principal due when the notes in question were indorsed by the bankrupt... $3,363 55 To this extent, of $3,363.55, without interest, it would seem the claim of the receiver should be allowed, but the estate of the bankrupt is entitled to have the collateral security held by the receiver of the bank, or the proceeds thereof, applied to this balance, in exoneration of the estate of the bankrupt, on a sale of a portion of which, by order of the District Court, it appears, by the order appealed from, $23,663.30 has been already realized. I by no means make this statement of the account as a final and conclusive statement. The proofs on the part of the bank do not appear to have been put in with a view to the statement of an account upon the principle affirmed in this opinion. The value of the collateral security held by the receiver, or the proceeds of that portion thereof which appears to have been deposited in the Trust Company, under the order of the District Court ($23,663.30), may be, and probably are, so clearly greater than any balance which a more accurate statement of the account would show to be due, upon the principles of this opinion, that any further expense of taking proofs and stating the account would be improvident and wasteful. But, if insisted upon, a reference may be had to state such account. The order appealed from must be modified to conform to the foregoing opinion. Everett P. Wheeler and Francis S. Silvester, for the assignee. United States v. Taintor. UNITED STATES V. TAINTOR. (11 Blatchford, 374.) Indictment for embezzling and misapplying funds of bank-Evidence of — Intent. The cashier of a National bank was indicted under section 55 of the act of ,1864 (13 Stat. at Large, 116), for embezzling, abstracting and willfully misapplying the moneys and funds of the bank" with intent to injure or defraud the association." Held, that the intent to injure or defraud was conclusively presumed upon proof of the act charged, and that therefore evidence was not admissible to prove that the cashier used the funds with the knowledge and consent of the president, and some of the directors of the bank, and on account of and for the benefit of the bank.* (Circuit Court, Second Circuit, Southern District of New York.) NDICTMENT of Taintor, cashier of the Atlantic National Bank, under section 55 of the act of 1864 (13 Stat. at Large, 116), for embezzling, abstracting and willfully misapplying the moneys and funds of said bank "with intent to injure or defraud the association. On the trial the prosecution proved that the defendant took the moneys and funds of the bank and used them in stock speculations carried on in his own name by depositing the same with a stock broker as "margins" for stocks bought on his account. *See Matter of Van Campen, ante, p. 185; State v. Tuller, post; Commonwealth v. Tenney, post; Commonwealth v. Barry, post, and cases cited. The Revised Statutes provide as follows: "Sec. 5209. Every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, or agent of any association, who embezzles, abstracts, or willfully misapplies any of the moneys, funds, or credits of the association; or who, without authority from the directors, issues or puts in circulation any of the notes of the association; or who, without such authority, issues or puts forth any certificate of deposit, draws any order or bill of exchange, makes any acceptance, assigns any note, bond, draft, bill of exchange, mortgages, judgment, or decree; or who makes any false entry in any book, report, or statement of the association, with intent, in either case, to injure or defraud the association or any other company, body politic or corporate, or any individual person, or to deceive any officer of the association, or any agent appointed to examine the affairs of any such association, and every person who with like intent aids or abets any officer, clerk, or agent in any violation of this section, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be imprisoned not less than five years nor more than ten." United States v. Taintor. For the purpose of disproving the allegation that the acts were done with intent to injure or defraud the association, evidence was offered on behalf of the defendant to prove that the moneys and funds were so used with the knowledge and approbation of the president and some of the directors of the bark, and that all the said transactions were intended for the account and benefit of the bank, and were believed by the defendant to be sanctioned by the president and some of the directors, although there was no formal resolution of the board of directors authorizing or approving them. This evidence was excluded and the defendant was committed. A motion for a new trial was now made, and was heard by WOODRUFF, BLATCHFORD and BENEDICT, JJ. George Bliss, district attorney, for the United States. A. Oakey Hall and James C. Carter, for defendant. BENEDICT, J. The ruling called in question upon this motion involved two propositions, namely, that the guilty intent charged in the indictment was shown by the proof of the acts done by the defendant; and, further, that the facts offered to be proved by the defendant would not, in law, avail to negotiate that intent. It has hardly been doubted upon this motion, that the first of the proposition is correct. The correctness of the second is strenuously denied, and is now to be determined. It is a general rule of law, that a man must be held to intend the necessary consequences of his acts. This rule is applicable as well to cases of crime as in civil causes, for, whatever proves intent anywhere proves it everywhere. It has often been so applied. Furthermore, in certain cases, and these criminal, the proof of guilty intent afforded by evidence of acts knowingly done has been held to be conclusive, and not overthrown by proof of any other facts; and this class of cases has not been limited to acts mala in se, nor to crimes at common law. On this argument it was conceded that, by virtue of the rule in question, the guilty intent is conclusively shown by proof of the act done, where the nature of the act is such that a guilty intent is so clearly manifested thereby as to admit of no question. It appears to us that the rule, even thus limited, covers the present case and justifies the decision made at the trial. For, the act done by the defendant was clearly unlawful, and he is precluded from denying knowledge United States v. Taintor. that it was so. He was an officer of an association created under a statute which does not permit any person to make such a use of the funds of the association as were here made. Furthermore, the act of the defendant rendered the association liable to a forfeiture of its charter. Still further, it cast upon the bank a risk which attached at the instant of the doing of the act, and this a risk notoriously great, extraordinary in character, and outside of the bounds of proper commercial use. It placed the capital of the bank beyond the control of the officers of the association, and it was an unlawful dealing with the money of a corporation belonging to a class of institutions whose welfare is intimately connected with the public welfare, which are liable to be depositaries of the public moneys, and which cannot justly be considered to be merely private pecuniary trusts. The act of the defendant, therefore, necessarily involved injury, not only to the association, but also in a proper sense, to the public. An act having such characteristics, and involving such consequences when knowingly done, discloses moral turpitude, and cannot be innocent. It may, therefore, well be held, that proof of such an act proves conclusively an intent to injure, because, when knowingly done, it affords no opportunity for justification or legal excuse, and manifests so clearly a general guilty intent as to make it of no consequence what other particular intent co-existed therewith, and to preclude inquiry as to such other intent, or into the motives which impelled to its commission. A generous motive is not inconsistent with a guilty intent, and proof of the one does not disprove the other. Our opinion, therefore, is, that the circumstances offered to be proved by the defendant would not tend to disprove the guilty intent charged in the indictment. But it is contended that the phraseology of the statute under which the indictment is framed, requires proof of something more than the general guilty intent necessarily involved in such a misapplication of the funds of a National bank, inasmuch as it couples with the words "embezzle, abstract, and willfully misapply," the words "with intent to injure or defraud the association," and thus requires the presence of a corrupt motive, a design to cheat the association out of money, in order to constitute the offense. It is unnecessary to determine whether the latter words, as here used, are intended to be taken in connection with the words "embezzle, abstract, or willfully misapply," because this has been assumed by |