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CAPTURE OF FORT STEADMAN.

537

south of the Appomattox. If that fort should be carried, and possession obtained of the high ground in its rear, the National army would thereby be cut in two, and Lee would have control of the military railway from City Point to Hatcher's Run. This would doubtless open a gate through which the Confederate army might pass, and, by forced marches, escape across the Roanoke, join Johnston, and crush Sherman by a single overwhelming blow. The risk was great, but the value of the advantage sought justified the attempt.

Lee assigned to the duty of assaulting Fort Steadman, the two divisions. of Gordon's command, with a larger portion of Bushrod Johnson's in support. He massed behind them all of his disposable force, to the number of twenty thousand men, ready, in the event of a successful assault, to pounce through the open door. They were well supplied with ammunition and provisions for a long struggle.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 25th," Gordon advanced to the assault. Fort Steadman was garrisoned by the Fourteenth New York Artillery. They had no suspicion of danger near. erates advanced cautiously, but rapidly, over the narrow space between the works, and seized about half a mile of the picket line. Then two brigades (Crook's and Ransom's) dashed forward, and before the garrison were fairly awake to danger, they were pouring over the parapets into the fort. It was a complete surprise, and the assailants met no resistance. A

INTERIOR OF FORT STEADMAN.1

"March, 1865. The Confed

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part of the garrison fled, and the remainder were made prisoners. The Third Brigade of the First Division of the Ninth Corps, met a similar fate. The guns, abandoned without a struggle, were immediately turned upon redoubts near, known as batteries Nine, Ten, and Eleven, and the connecting line of intrenchments, compelling their instant evacuation. That was the moment when Lee's army might have passed through and crowned the hill in the rear with their guns and men. It did not, and the golden moment was lost forever. The troops were not ordered forward, or failed to promptly respond. The victors attempted to extend their conquest. On the left of Fort Steadman was a large work called Fort Haskell, commanded by Major WoerThis they assailed, but were repulsed, when the guns of Fort Steadman poured a rapid storm of shot and shell upon it. Woermer responded

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1 This was the appearance of a portion of the interior of Fort Steadman, when the writer sketched it, about a month after the attack. It shows the form of the quarters and the bomb-proofs proper. Both the former and the latter were made of timbers, and covered with from four to six feet of earth. The fort was in a grove of fine large trees.

538

PREPARATIONS FOR A GRAND ADVANCE.

in kind, and the assailants were held at bay. Other Confederate columns, pressing through the gap at Fort Steadman, were subjected to a murderous fire of artillery; and to this was soon added the presence of General Hartranft's division of the Ninth Corps, which came upon them in a counter assault. The Confederates were too few to withstand the attack, while the ground between them and their own lines was so swept by an enfilading fire of the National artillery, that it would be almost sure death to those who should attempt to make the passage. The consequence was, that about nineteen hundred men surrendered rather than to attempt it.' Others, who tried to reach their lines, were cut down in great numbers. Fort Steadman and the other works were recovered, and more, for General Meade, satisfied that Lee must have weakened his whole line, for this movement, ordered an advance along the front of the Second and Sixth Corps, to the left of Fort Steadman. The result was, that the strongly intrenched picket line of the Confederates was seized and permanently held by the Nationals. The failure at Fort Steadman, and the losses, greatly disheartened Lee and his troops. It was evident that there was hardly the shadow of a hope for escape.3

Grant's instructions for a general advance on the 29th, prescribed a movement of nearly the whole army, by its left, for the purpose of turning Lee's right with overwhelming force, and compelling him to evacuate Petersburg; also, to insure the success of the cavalry of Sheridan in efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville railroads, now Lee's only avenues of supply. The right of Lee's intrenched line, which ran southwestward from Petersburg, crossed Hatcher's Run at the Boydton plank road,' and thence extended westward parallel with the run, and along the White Oak road. This line covered Lee's communications by the South Side railway, directly. About four miles west of the termination of this line, was a detached one, also stretching along the White Oak road, and covering a strategic point at the junction of several highways from the north and south with the White Oak road, which formed what was called the Five Forks. It was against these intrenchments, and the men who held them, that the grand turning column was to march, and did march, on the morning of the 29th. Three divisions of the Army of the James, under Ord, had already been withdrawn from the northern side of the river, and transferred to the left of the lines before Petersburg, leaving the remainder of Ord's command in charge of General Weitzel. The troops thus transferred, consisted of two divisions of the Twenty-fourth Corps, under General Gibbon; one division of the Twentyfifth, led by General Birney, and a small division of cavalry, under General McKenzie. They took position on the left of the National intrenched line, lately occupied by the Second and Fifth Corps. The Ninth Corps, under General Parke, and the force under General Weitzel, were left to hold the

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March, 1865.

& March 27.

1 The Confederates lost, in this operation, besides the men captured, about 800 killed and wounded. The ́ational loss was a little over 900, of whom only 68 were killed, 337 wounded, and 506 missing.

In this operation, the Nationals lost a little more than 1,100 men, of whom only 52 were killed. The Confederates lost 834 prisoners, and a number in killed and wounded fully equal to that of the Nationals.

3 At the time of this attempt of Lee to break through the National line, General Meade was on a temporary visit to City Point. President Lincoln was there also, and he and General Grant saw a part of the engagement. Two days afterward, as we have observed, General Sherman came up from North Carolina by water, and held a conference at Grant's head-quarters, with the President and leading army officers.

See map on page 354.

LEE'S RIGHT MENACED.

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539 extended line of the National intrenchments, full thirty-five miles in length. Wide discretion was given to these commanders concerning attacks on the Confederate lines during the grand movement by the left. "I would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders," the General-in-chief said, "that in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officers of the army to which they may belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of their action." All dismounted men were ordered to report to General Benham, at City Point, who was left in charge of the immense depository of supplies at that place.

Sheridan crossed the Appomattox from Bermuda Hundred, passed to the rear of the army before Petersburg, and early on the morning of the 29th, marched down the Jerusalem plank road,' and turning "March, 1865. westward, pushed on by way of Reams's Station, to Dinwiddie Court-House, where, at five o'clock in the afternoon, he halted for the night.

Meanwhile, the corps of Warren and Humphreys (Fifth and Second) had moved at a very early hour. The former started at three o'clock in the morning, and marching well to the left, crossed Rowanty Creek › March 29. (which is formed by the junction of Hatcher's Run and Gravelly Creek), and soon turning to the right, marched northward along the Quaker road. Humphreys passed Hatcher's Run by the Vaughan road, four miles above Warren's crossing-place, and also turning northward, followed the line of that stream. On nearly parallel roads the two corps moved against the flank of the Confederate intrenchments, over a very tedious way, with great toil, in consequence of heavy rain. Very little opposition was experienced until Warren, when within two miles of the Confederate works, encountered a line of battle. A sharp contest ensued, the brunt of which fell upon Chamberlain's brigade of Gibbon's division, which was in front. The Confederates were repulsed, with a loss of many killed and wounded, and one hundred made prisoners. Warren lost three hundred and seventy men. He bivouacked that night in front of the Confederate works covering the White Oak road, after drawing fire from them. Humphreys had a more difficult march, but meeting skirmishers only; and he had not reached the works when night compelled him to halt. Dinwiddie Court-House, where Sheridan was resting, was only six miles distant from Warren and Humphreys. The Union line was practically unbroken from that point to the Appomattox.

It had been arranged for Sheridan to cut loose from the rest of the army on the morning of the 30th, for the purpose of making the contemplated raid on the South Side and Danville railways; but Grant changed his plan. He said in substance, in a note to Sheridan, "I want to end the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. Leave the railways at present; push around the enemy in the morning and get to his rear, and we will act all together, as one army, until we shall see what can be done with the forces before us." Dispositions were made accordingly.

Lee now fully comprehended the immediate perils that menaced him, for he saw that his only lines of communication with the rest of the Confederacy

1 See map on page 354.

540

TROOPS AT DINWIDDIE COURT-HOUSE.

might be cut at any hour. He also perceived the necessity of strengthening his right, to avert the impending shock of battle. He also felt the necessity of maintaining his extended line of works covering Petersburg and Richmond. Ignorant of the fact that Grant had withdrawn a greater portion of the Army of the James from the north side of the river, he left Longstreet's corps, eight thousand strong, to guard the defenses of Richmond, until it was too late. Mahon's division, of Hill's corps, was kept in front of the National lines at Bermuda Hundred, while the divisions of Wilcox, Pickett, Bushrod Johnson, and the remnant of Ewell's corps, commanded by Gordon, held the lines before Petersburg. Drawing from these as many as prudence would allow, Lee concentrated a force about fifteen thousand strong, and with these and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, he hastened, during the stormy night of the 29th and 30th, to place them in position in front of the Fifth and Second Corps. All night long they toiled in the drenching rain, and were not ready for battle when the day dawned. Fortunately for them, the

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rain made the roads so almost impassable, that Grant's infantry, * March 30, though ready to strike, did little more that day than to perfect their formation and connection. Sheridan sent a part of his cavalry, under Devin, supported by General Davies, to the Five Forks; but the works there were too strongly armed and manned to be ridden over, and his troops, drenched by rain and soiled by mud, were driven back to Dinwiddie Court-House, where they encamped that night.

and

The storm had ceased on the morning of the 30th,' but the March. ground was so wet and soft, that Grant proposed to remain quiet a little longer. Lee had determined otherwise. He was in a desperate strait, it was important for him to act without unnecessary delay. He had reso Ived to make another effort to break through the National line at the point where he had massed the great body of his troops. His cavalry, which had been posted far to his right, on Stony Creek, and had become isolated by Sheridan's sudden advance to Dinwiddie Court-House, had made a wide circuit westward, and were coming in, so that, on the morning after the storm, he was prepared to strike. Warren's corps was then westward of the Boydton road, and pressed on the extreme right of the Confederate works on the White Oak road.

The divisions of Ayres, Crawford, and Griffin were en echelon, Ay res in front, and Griffin in the rear. Sheridan was too far distant to form a covering for Warren's flank. In this delicate and exposed position, the Fifth Corps, with skirmishers out in the direction of the White Oak road, and with Winthrop's brigade, of Ayres's division, well advanced in sup port of them, received an unexpected and stunning blow. It fell upon Ayres's rear, causing his division to go back in great confusion upon Crawford's, which was broken in consequence of the recoil. There was, for a brief space, promise of perfect success for Lee, but his hopes soon faded. Griffin's division stood firm. It stemmed the torrent of assailants, while Ayres and Crawford rallied their columns behind it, and very soon Warren was enabled to assume the offensive. He made a counter-charge, and in so doing was nobly supported by Miles's division, sent by Humphreys from the Second Corps, who marched in on Warren's right, and struck the Confederates on their left flank. They were driven back behind their intrench

LEE STRIKES FOR SAFETY.

541 ments on the White Oak road, after a heavy loss, especially in men made prisoners. In this charge, Chamberlain's brigade of the Fifth Corps was specially distinguished. Humphreys tried to carry the Confederate works covering the intersection of the Boydton and White Oak roads, and also those on Hatcher's Run, but failed.

Lee now sought to strike another blow, quickly, at a supposed weaker point, which was the extreme left of Grant's line, held by Sheridan, who, while Warren and the Confederates were battling farther to the right, had boldly pushed forward the troops of Devin and Davies to the Five Forks. They captured the works there, and so held the key to the whole region that Lee was striving to protect. Lee sent the divisions of Pickett and Bushrod Johnson to regain this key-point. They struck the Union cavalry holding it, so severely, that they were driven out, and hurled back in confusion toward Dinwiddie Court-House. By a vigorous pursuit, with cavalry and infantry, but with much difficulty, the Confederates interposed between the troops of Devin and Davies and Sheridan's main body, at Dinwiddie CourtHouse. This compelled Devin to make a long, circuitous march, by the Boydton road, to rejoin his chief. The movement was mistaken by the Confederates for a forced retreat, and they attempted pursuit, when Sheridan, with the brigades of Gregg and Gibbs, charged upon their flank, and compelled them to give up the chase. Devin soon rejoined the main body, upon which the Confederates fell with vigor, expecting to drive them. They were foiled by Sheridan, who dismounted his men and placed them behind light breast works, from which they gave their antagonists such a deadly musket fire that the latter recoiled. Before the Confederates could rally for another attack, darkness came and fighting ceased.

Before midnight, Sheridan was satisfied that Lee was withdrawing his troops from the front of the Union cavalry, and felt quite at ease. The feeling at head-quarters was quite otherwise. It was an anxious night there. Only the fact, that the cavalry had been driven back from the Five Forks, and had been attacked at Dinwiddie in force, was known. It was supposed that Sheridan could not maintain his position, and Warren was directed to hasten to his relief, with the Fifth Corps. Ayres's division was first started, but in consequence of the destruction of a bridge over Gravelly Run, it did not reach Dinwiddie Court-House until dawn, just as the rear guard of the retreating Confederates was leaving.

April 1, 1865.

On the arrival of Ayres, Sheridan started in pursuit, directing the former to follow in support. At seven o'clock he was joined by Warren, with the other two divisions of the Fifth Corps. Ranking Warren, Sheridan became commander of the whole. Leaving the Fifth Corps at the point where he had joined the cavalry, about half way between Dinwiddie Court-House and the Five Forks, Sheridan pressed boldly on toward that point, with cavalry alone, and by two o'clock had driven the Confederates into their works there, where they were enveloped by the overwhelming number of horsemen. While thus holding them, he ordered Warren forward to the White Oak road, on his right, so as to be fully on the Confederate left, and directed

1 These were Pickett's division, Wise's independent brigade of infantry, and Fitzhugh Lee's, Rosser's, and W. H. Lee's commands.

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