Rogers v. Kennay, 11 Jur. 14 687 Romain v. Board &c. Muscatine County, 1 Morris (Iowa) 357 286 Root v. Fellowes, 60 Mass. 29 506 Ross v. McCaldin, 195 N. Y. 210 336 Royal Aquarium &c. Soc. v. Parkinson, L. R. 1 Q. B. 431 2 Rumford Nat. Bank v. Arsenault, 108 Maine 241 404 Savery v. Busick, 11 Iowa 487 484 Schmidt v. New York Mut. F. Ins. Co., 67 Mass. 529 364 Schwinn v. Perkins, 79 N. J. L. 515 164 Scott v. Shearman, 2 W. Bl. 977 563 Southern Bell Tel. & T. Co. v. Glawson, 140 Ga. 507 903 Starr v. Taylor, 4 McCord L. (S. Car.) 413 115 State v. Whitaker, 114 N. Car. 818 266 State ex rel. Mackey v. District Court, 40 Mont. 359 Upton v. Wells, 1 Leon. 145 United States v. Dashiel, 70 U. S. 688 United States Cement Co. v. Cooper, 172 Ind. 599 Van Horn v. Hann, 39 N. J. L. 207 Waite v. Dolby, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 406 Washburn v Allen, 77 Maine 344 Waters v. Gooch, 6 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 586 778 425 810 126 803 867 288 737 393 170 West v. Ratledge, 4 Dev. L. (N. Car.) 31 281 Western & A. R. Co. v. Brown, 102 Ga. 13 384 Wetzel v. Hancock County, 143 Ill. App. 178 307 White v. Improved Property Holding Co., 140 App. Div. (N. Y.) 520 322 Whitney v. Hopkins, 135 Pa. 246 515 Whitney v. Wellesley & B. St. R. Co., 197 Mass. 495 Wilson v. Abrahams, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 207 Wilson v. Louisiana Purchase Exp. Com. 133 Iowa 586 Wood v. Stoddard, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 194 440 41 746 473 358 747 577 420 Worth v. Newlin (N. J. Eq.), 36 Atl. 30 Young v. Ashburnsham, 3 Leonard's Rep. 161 Zahorka v. Geith, 129 Wis. 498 850 191 418 476 496 CHAPTER I. THE COURT. IN RE STEELE. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, N. D. ALABAMA, 1907. 156 Fed. 853.1 HUNDLEY, J.: The word "court" originally meant only a yard, palace, or garden, and according to Cowell it meant "the house where the king remained with his retinue; also the place where justice was administered."-Anderson's Law Dictionary. So, in early history, the court meant the place where the king was domiciled, because the king was actually the fountain and dispenser of justice. The earlier courts were merely assemblages in the courtyard of the baron or of the king himself by those whose duty it was to appear at stated times or upon summons. This idea of the place predominating as the designation of a court caused Blackstone to adopt Coke's definition that "a court is a place where justice is judicially administered." 3 Blackstone's Commentarie 24. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Alabama, in Ex parte Branch & Co., 63 Ala. 384, adopted the definition that a court is "a place where justice is administered." This definition has been held to be too narrow, and the definition given by a majority of judicial decisions is that: "A court is a tribunal duly constituted, and present at the time and place fixed by law for judicial investigation and determination of controversies." 2 Century Dictionary, p. 1312; 8 A. & E. Encyc. of Law, p. 22. A court is also held to be "an incorporeal being, which requires. for its existence the presence of the judge." 8 A. & E. Encyc. of Law, p. 22; State v. Judges, 32 La. Ann. 1261; Lawyers Tax Cases, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.) 650; Mason v. Woerner, 18 Mo. 570; Hobart v. Hobart, 45 Iowa 503; Matter of Terrill, 52 Kan. 29, 34 Pac. 457, 38 Am. St. Rep. 327. It has been further held that: "The court is not the judge or judges as individuals, but only when at the proper time and place, they exercise judicial powers." 2 23 Blackstone's Commentaries, ch. 4; 2 Lowell's Government of England, pt. 7, p. 439; Stephen's Commentaries (15th ed.), bk. 5, ch. 4; Constitution of United States, Art. III, 11th Amendment; 1 Kent's Commentaries, lectures 14 to 17; Bryce's American Commonwealth (2d ed.), chaps. 22, 23, 42; United States Judicial Code, Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. at Large 1087 and amend ROYAL AQUARIUM SUMMER AND WINTER GARDEN SOCIETY v. PARKINSON. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, 1892. Law Reports (1892), 1 Queen's Bench, 431.3 LORD ESHER, M. R.: In this case the action was for a slander upon the plaintiffs in the way of their business, and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs for 250l. We are now asked to enter judgment for the defendant on several grounds. The statement complained of was made by the defendant at a meeting of the London. County Council, of which he is a member, when the question before such meeting was whether a license for music and dancing should be granted to the plaintiffs. He expressed a very strong opinion that it should not be granted, and in expressing such opinion he used very strong language. He said, in effect, that he had been to the Aquarium and had seen there an indecent performance-a performance. which was the most indecent that could be imagined. He described it as a performance between two figures dressed as a male and a female. Even if it had been so, to call the performance described the most indecent that could be imagined seems to me nonsense. But it turned out that the figures were not dressed as a male and female, but as two males, so that all this story of gross indecency was nothing but the defendant's own imagination. The jury appear in effect to have found that he stated what he knew to be untrue. The question for us on this appeal is whether, upon the evidence, the case for the plaintiffs can be supported. It was argued, in the first place, on behalf of the defendant, that he was exercising a judicial function when he spoke the words complained of, and therefore was entitled to absolute immunity in respect of anything he said. It is true that, in respect of statements made in the course of proceedings before a court of justice, whether by judge, or counsel, or witnesses, there is an absolute immunity from liability to an action. The ground of that rule is public policy. It is applicable to all kinds of courts of justice; but the doctrine has been carried further; and it seems that this immunity applies wherever there is an authorized inquiry which, though not before a court of justice, is before a tribunal which has similar attributes. In the case of Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby the doctrine was extended to a military court of inquiry. It was so extended on the ground that the case was one of an authorized inquiry before a tribunal acting judicially, that is to say, in a manner as nearly as possible similar to that in which a court of justice acts in respect of an inquiry before it. This doctrine has never been extended further than to courts of justice and tribunals acting in a manner similar to that in which such courts act. Then The reporter's statement of the facts, the arguments of counsel and portions of the judgments are omitted, as is the concurring opinion of Lopes, L. J. L. R. 8 Q. B. 255; L. R. 7 H. L. 744, and see People v. Van Allen, 55 N. Y. 31 (1873). |