Extract of a Letter from Mr. Adams to the Secretary of State, dated St. Petersburg, 26th June, 1813. "On the 15th instant, I had an interview with the chancellor, count Romanzoff, at his request, when he informed me that he had received answers from Mr. Daschkoff to the despatches of which Mr. Harris was the bearer. That the president had accepted the emperor's offer of mediation, and that Mr. Daschkoff had sent him a copy of your answer to him, expressive of that acceptance. He then put into my hands your letter to Mr. Daschkoff of March 11, with the tenor of which he appeared to be much gratified; and which he said he should immediately transmit to the emperor. At the same time English newspapers had been received here, mentioning the appointment of Messieurs Gallatin and Bayard, but intimating strongly the determination of the British government to reject the mediation. A few days after, I received from a friend the National Intelligencer of 15th April, containing an editorial paragraph concerning the appointment of those gentlemen, which I communicated to the court on the 22d. I observed to him, that however the British government might think proper to act on this occasion, that of the United States would at least have manifested in a signal manner, at once its earnest and constant desire for a just and honourable peace, and its sense of the motives which had induced the emperor's offer. That the president could not have adopted a measure better adapted to do honour to his majesty's proposal, than by the appointment of two persons among the most distinguished of our citizens, to co-operate on the part of the United States, in accomplishing the emperor's friendly and benevolent purpose; and that if it should eventually fail of being successful, at least the true and only source of its failure would be known. That he had received, since he saw me last, despatches from count Lieven. That the British minister, in terms of much politeness, had intimated to him, that there was no sovereign whose mediation they should more readily accept than that of the emperor, but that their differences with the United States were of a nature involving principles of the internal government of the British nation, and which it was thought were not susceptible of being committed to the discussion of any mediation. The count added, that it would remain to be considered, whether after this, and after the solemn step taken by the government of the United States, it would be advisable to renew the offer to the British ministry, and give them an opportunity for a re-consideration. It was possible that further reflection might lead to a different resolution, and he should submit the question to the emperor's determination. Different circumstances furnished other materials for deliberations." Message from the President of the United States, transmitting a Letter from the Secretary of War, accompanied with sundry Documents; in obedience to a Resolution of the 31st of December last, requesting such Information as may tend to explain the Causes of the Failure of the Arms of the United States on the Northern Frontier. To the House of Representatives of the United States. I transmit to the house of representatives a report of the secretary of war, complying with their resolution of the 31st of December last. Sir, January 31st 1814. JAMES MADISON. REPORT. War Department, January 25, 1814. In compliance with the resolution of the house of representatives of the 31st of December last, requesting such information, (not improper to be communicated) as may tend to explain the causes of the failure of the arms of the United States, on the northern frontier, I have the honour to submit the following documents, and to offer to you, sir, the assurance of the very high respect with which I am your most obedient and very humble servant, The President. JOHN ARMSTRONG. Correspondence between the Secretary of War and Major General Dearborn, &c. Note presented to the Cabinet on the 8th February, 1813, by the Secretary of War. The enemy's force at Montreal and its dependencies has been stated at 16,000 effectives. It more probably does not exceed 10 or 12,000. The militia part of it may amount to one-sixth of the whole. Is it probable that we shall be able to open the campaign on lake Champlain with a force competent to meet and dislodge this army before the 15th of May? I put the question on this date, because it is not to be doubted but that the enemy will then be reinforced, and, of course, that new relations in point of strength will be established between us. Our present regular force on both sides of lake Champlain does not exceed 2400 men. The addition made to it must necessarily consist of recruits, who, for a time, will not be better than militia; and when we consider that the recruiting service is but beginning, and that we now approach the middle of February, the conclusion is, I think, safe, that we cannot move in this direction and thus early (say 1st of May), with effect. It then remains to choose between a course of entire inaction, because incompetent to the main attack, or one having a secondary but still an important object; such would be the reduction of that part of Upper Canada lying between the town of Prescott, on the St. Lawrence and lake Erie, including the towns of Kingston and York, and the forts George and Erie. On this line of frontier the enemy have, Making a total (of regular troops) of 2100 Kingston and Prescott, and the destruction of the British ships at the former, would present the first object; York and the frigates said to be building there, the second; George and Erie the third. The force to be employed on this service should not be less than 6000 effective regular troops, because in this first enterprise of a second campaign nothing must, if possible, be left to chance. The time for giving execution to this plan is clearly indicated by the following facts: 1st, The river St. Lawrence is not open to the purposes of navigation before the 15th of May: And 2d, Lake Ontario is free from all obstruction arising from ice by the 1st day of April. Under these circumstances we shall have six weeks for the expedition before it be possible for sir George Prevost to give it any disturbance. Should this outline be approved, the details for the service can be made and expedited in forty-eight hours. Extract of a Letter from the Secretary at War to MajorGeneral Dearborn, dated War Department, February 10, 1813. "I have the president's orders to communicate to you, as expeditiously as possible, the outline of campaign which you will immediately institute and pursue against Upper Canada: "1st, 4000 troops will be assembled at Sackett's Harbour. "2d, 3000 will be brought together at Buffaloe and its vicinity. "3d, The former of these corps will be embarked and transported under convoy of the fleet to Kingston, where they will be landed. Kingston, its garrison, and the British ships wintering in the harbour of that place will be its first object. Its second object will be York, (the capital of Upper Canada,) the stores collected and the two frigates building there. Its third object, forts George and Erie, and their dependencies. In the attainment of this last, there will be a co-operation between the two corps. The composition of these will be as follows: "The time for executing the enterprise will be governed by the opening of lake Ontario, which usually takes place about the first of April. "The adjutant-general has orders to put the more southern detachments in march as expeditiously as possible. The two brigades on lake Champlain you will move so as to give them full time to reach their place of destination by the 25th of March. The route by Elizabeth will, I think, be the shortest and best. They will be replaced by some new-raised regiments from the east. VOL. III. 6 "You will put into your movements as much privacy as may be compatible with their execution. They may be masked by reports that Sackett's Harbour is in danger, and that the principal effort will be made on the Niagara in co-operation with general Harrison. As the route to Sackett's Harbour and to Niagara is for a considerable distance the same, it may be well to intimate, even in orders, that the latter is the destination of the two brigades now at lake Champlain." Sir, I fear the very large magazines of provisions on lake Champlain will be unsafe, unless a considerable part is removed at some distance from the store, or a considerable force is assembled at Burlington and its vicinity by the time the two brigades shall move. Another motive for having a large force on that lake, will be, that of preventing the enemy from sending almost his whole force from Lower Canada to Kingston, as soon as our intentions shall be so far known as to afford satisfactory evidence of our intentions in relation to the conquest of Upper Canada; and unless an imposing force shall menace Lower Canada, the enemy's whole force may be concentrated in Upper Canada, and require as large a force to operate against them as would be necessary to operate towards Montreal. It may be advisable to draw out a body of New Hampshire militia to serve for a short time in Vermont. You will judge of the expediency of such a measure; but I do not believe that there will be a sufficient body of new-raised troops in season for taking the place of the two brigades. I this day received a letter from colonel Porter, in which he informs me that general Winchester had arrived at Niagara, with such of his troops as had escaped the tomahawk, and that they were crossing over on parole; he states, that at the close of the action, every man who by wounds or other causes were unable to march, were indiscriminately put to death. Such outrageous conduct will require serious attention, especially when British troops are concerned in the action. I am, sir, your obedient servant, H. DEARBORN. Honourable John Armstrong, Secretary of War. |