cessary, for the preservation of this army and the fulfilment of the ostensible views of government, that we immediately return by orderly marches to such a position (Chataugy) as will secure our communication with the United States, either to retire into winter quarters or to be ready to strike below." In pursuance of this opinion the army has returned by slow marches to this place, and now awaits the orders of the government. Its condition will be stated by the bearer, colonel King, who can give you, upon every point, more full and perfect information, than could be contained in a written detail. I have the honour to be, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. HAMPTON. The hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War. Head-Quarters of the Army, District No. 9, seven miles above Ogdensburg, Sir, November 6, 1813, in the evening. I address you at the special instance of the secretary of war, who, by bad roads, worse weather, and ill health, was diverted from meeting me near this place, and determined to tread back his steps to Washington from Antwerp on the 29th ultimo. I am destined to and determined on the attack of Montreal, if not prevented by some act of God; and to give security to the enterprise, the division under your command must co-operate with the corps under my immediate orders. The point of rendezvous is the circumstance of greatest interest to the issue of this operation, and the distance which separates us, and my ignorance of the practicability of the direct or devious roads or routes on which you must march, make it necessary that your own judgment should determine that point. To assist you in forming the soundest determination and to take the most prompt and effectual measures, I can only inform you of my intentions and situation in one or two respects of first importance. I shall pass Prescott tonight, because the stage of the season will not allow me three days to take it; shall cross the cavalry at Hambleton, which will not require a day, and shall then press forward and break down every obstruction to the confluence of this river with Grand river, there to cross to the isle Perrot, and with my scows to bridge the narrow inner channel, and thus obtain foothold on Montreal island, at about twenty miles from the city; after which our artillery, bayonets, and swords must secure our triumph or provide us honourable graves. Inclosed you have a memorandum of my field and battering train, pretty well found in fixed ammunition, which may enable you to dismiss your own, but we are deficient in loose powder and musket-cartridges, and therefore hope you may be abundantly found. On the subject of provisions, I wish I could give as favourable information; our whole stock of bread may be computed at about 15 days, and our meat at 20. In speaking on this subject to the secretary of war, he informed me that ample magazines were laid up on lake Champlain, and therefore I must request you to order forward two or three months supply by the safest route in a direction to the proposed scene of action. I have submitted the state of our provisions to my general officers, who unanimously agree that it should not prevent the progress of the expedition; and they also agree in opinion, that if you are not in force to face the enemy you should meet us at St. Regis, or its vicinity. I shall expect to hear from, if not to see you, at that place on the 9th or 10th instant, And have the honour to be, respectfully, &c. JAS. WILKINSON. To Major-General W. Hampton, &c. P. S. I was preparing an express which I should have despatched to-morrow but for the fortunate call of colonel King. A copy. JOHN HOOMES, Aid-de-camp. Sir, Head-Quarters, Four Corners, November 8, 1813. I had the honour to receive, at a late hour last evening, by colonel King, your communication of the 6th, and was deeply impressed with the sense of responsibility it imposed of deciding upon the means of our co-operation. The idea suggested as the opinion of your officers, of effecting the junction at St. Regis, was most pleasing, as being the most immediate, until I came to the disclosure of the amount of your supplies of provision. Colonel Atkinson will explain the reasons that would have rendered it impossible for me to have brought more than each man could have carried upon his back; and, when I reflected that, in throwing myself upon your scanty means, I should be weakening you in your most vulnerable point, I did not hesitate to adopt the opinion, after consulting the general and principal officers, that by throwing myself back on my main depot, where all the means of transportation had gone, and falling upon the enemy's flank, and straining every effort to open a communi cation from Plattsburg to Cognawauga, or any other point you may indicate on the St. Lawrence, I should more effectually contribute to your success than by the junction at St. Regis. The way is, in many places, blockaded and abatised, and the road impracticable for wheels during winter; but, by the employment of pack horses, if I am not overpowered, I hope to be able to prevent your starving. I have ascertained and witnessed the plan of the enemy is to burn and consume every thing in our advance. My troops and other means will be described to you by colonel Atkinson. Besides their rawness, and sickliness, they have endured fatigues equal to a winter campaign in the late snows and bad weather, and are sadly dispirited and fallen off; but, upon this subject I must refer you to colonel Atkinson. With these means, what can be accomplished by human exertion, I will attempt, with a mind devoted to the general objects of the campaign. A copy. W. HAMPTON. JOHN HOOMES, Aid-de-camp. To Major-General Wilkinson. Sir, Head-Quarters, Plattsburg, November 12, 1813. I have the honour to inclose the copy of a letter I have received from general Wilkinson, and of my reply. The forage at Chataugy had been nearly consumed before the expedition down the river; and in the return of the army, enough only could be found to subsist the horses and teams two or three days. All accounts concurred in the report, that general Wilkinson had not commenced his operations against Kingston, and that no descent down the river was intended. Hence the necessity for sending off the cavalry, artillery, and provision teams to Plattsburg for subsistence; and hence also, the impossibility of a junction at St. Regis with more provisions than must have been consumed on the march to that place. General Wilkinson had no spare transportation for us; and the junction would have reduced the stock of provisions to eight or ten days for the whole. The alternative was adopted under the impression of absolute necessity. The army has approached on this route to the road leading to Chazey, a few miles from the lines, where I shall join it to-night. I can only repeat what I said in my letter to general Wilkinson, "that what can be accomplished by human exertion shall be attempted to meet the objects of the campaign." But I should be uncandid not to own, that many circumstances are unpropitious. The force is dropping off by fatigue and sickness to a most alarming extent. My returns yesterday report the effectives at little more than half their original state at Chataugy; and, which is more discouraging, the officers, with a few honourable exceptions, are sunk as low as the soldiers, and endure hardship and privation as badly. In a word, since the show, produced by clothing, movements, &c. has worn off, all have assumed their native rawness. Fatigue and suffering from the weather have deprived them of that spirit, which constituted my best hopes. What confidence can the best officer (and I have a few surpassed by none) feel under such circumstances? It is painful to hold up to you this picture, but it is but too faithfully drawn. The quarter-master-general has been ordered to procure on hire 400 waggons, and I shall attempt to open a communication on the direct route from the town of Champlain. Success, under the circumstances I have mentioned, must depend upon the efforts and force opposed to me. The demonstration, however, can but produce a partial good. On the route I took, the enemy burnt and consumed every thing before him, and this I understand to be his general plan. If the same course precede the advance of general Wilkinson, and my feeble force should be foiled, the consequences are much to be dreaded. But the rubicon is now passed, and all that remains is to push for the capitol. I have the honour to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, W. HAMPTON. General John Armstrong, Secretary of War. Extract of a letter from Major-General Hampton to the Secretary of War, dated Chazey, November 15, 1813. "I have the honour to inclose you the copy of a letter I received the last evening from general Wilkinson, by colonel Atkinson, whom I had sent to him for the purpose of settling the plan of our proposed joint operations. Of the consistency of this letter with that of the 6th instant, and my answer, or of the insinuation it contains, I shall say nothing. Upon so plain a case, and an attempt so unworthy the occasion, common sense will afford every explanation I could wish. I shall make the necessary arrangements for placing the troops in winter quarters, and commence my journey to the southward." Sir, Head Quarters, near Cornwall, (U. C.) I this day had the honour to receive your letter of the 8th instant by colonel Atkinson, and want language to express my sorrow for your determination not to join the division under your command with the troops under my immediate orders. As such resolution defeats the grand objects of the campaign in this quarter, which, before the receipt of your letter, were thought to be completely within our power, no suspicion being entertained that you would decline the junction directed, it will oblige us to take post at the French Mills, on Salmon river, or in their vicinity, for the winter. I have the honour to be, respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant, Major-General Hampton. J. WILKINSON. Correspondence between the Secretary of War and Major-General Wilkinson. Submitted to the President by the Secretary of War, on the 23d July, and communicated to General Wilkinson on the 5th of August, 1813. The time at which we have reason to expect an ascendancy on lake Ontario has arrived. If our hopes on that head be fulfilled, though but for a short period, we must avail ourselves of the circumstance, to give to the campaign a new and increased activity. For this purpose our forces on the Ontario should be concentrated, because neither section of them, as they are now divided, is competent to any great object. The point of concentration is more doubtful: 1st, If at fort George, our utmost success can but give us the command of the peninsula, which, if general Harrison succeeds against Malden, will be of diminished interest, both to us and to the enemy: to us, because Malden will more completely cover our western frontier and controul the savages than forts George and Erie: to the enemy, because Malden lost, our inroad upon the peninsula, will but have the effect of shortening, not of dividing, the enemy's line of operations; in a word, success at this point will not give to the campaign a character of decisive advantage. 2d, If, on the other hand, we make Sackett's Harbour the point of concentration, Kingston may become the object |