of party, and, with all that, a coward. Would it be any won der then, when Lepidus was ruined, if he, in his familiar correspondence, had expreffed himself with bitterness against Lepidus and all that belonged to him? Would it be any wonder, if such a man had rejoiced and exulted in the misfortune of his adverfary; or if his fears had carried him even to wifh deftruction and extirpation to a family, whofe recovery might have proved the ruin of him and his! But, after all this, Cicero is an author who fhould be quoted with fome care; for, whether from these reafons, or any other, as his public conduct was a scene of contradictions, fo he contradicts himself in his writings too. Of this, I recollect an inftance to the very point: In his book De Natura Deorum, he pofitively fays, that no man could bear to live in a country, where the fon and the grandfon should be punished for the crimes of their grandfather and father. If, therefore, I fhould allow the Honourable Gentleman, that his letter to Brutus was (as it is not) a genuine letter, which would be the best authority? Cicero, in a familiar letter, in an unguarded, heated, fearful ftate? Or Cicero in his study, writing upon the moft ferious fubject, and upon the exprefs fubject; and ufing the utmost care, and the utmost re flection, to deliver down a system of religion or morality to future ages?

The learned Gentleman then goes on to inform us, that the laws of Greece bore hard upon the innocent; and that the children of Themistocles were difinherited and banished for the crimes of their father. Firft, as to this, there is no example upon earth will ever weigh with a reasonable man to do that which is, in itself, either cruel or unjuft. And next, as to the laws of Greece, the Gentleman means, and muft mean chiefly, the laws of the Athenians; for of the laws of the other Grecian ftates we know but little; and as to thefe laws of the Athenians, they have been univerfally confidered, in all ages, as the most severe and unjust that ever any people eve lived under, excepting those of their neighbours, the Macedo

nians and the Perfians, who extirpated whole families for the crime of one fingle offender. But even here, as to Themistocles, the learned Gentleman is again miftaken; for the children of Themistocles were not banished for their father's crime. Themistocles was accused of a mifprifion of treafon, in not divulging what he knew of the confpiracy of Paufanius against the Greeks in favour of the Perfians. Whether he was guilty of this crime or not, did never appear; for he was never tried for it. He fled, his children fled to him, and so became participes crimines. They abandoned their own country, and were therefore punished for their own fault; they retired to Perfia, and made themselves fubject to another State, where they obtained diftinguished privileges and great eftates. Plutarch particularly tells us this, and that their defcendants particularly enjoyed thefe privileges in Magnefia which they received of Xerxes, even in his own time, which was near fix hundred years after.

I now come to fpeak of our ancient and modern Conftitution, with which the Honourable Gentleman fays this claufe is perfectly confiftent. Perhaps I may be thought too venturous, when I contest this point with a Gentleman fo eminent in his profeffion; but, Sir, I think I am well founded in maintaining the contrary. As to our Conftitution, we feldom hear it talked of with common fenfe. You may find, in what men commonly call our Conftitution, arguments and examples for any thing you will. Nothing is fo vague and unfettled as our Conftitution was for many centuries. If a man ftands up for the prerogative, he may quote you powerful precedents from the reigns of Richard the IId, and other Princes like him: another man, to enforce popular and romantic projects of reformation, may quote upon you things equally extravagant on another fide, by turning his eye upon our hiftories in times when popular fury has overborne this Government. my own part, therefore, I never knew how to ascertain the Conftitution of this Country in any degree, but in two periods; the Saxon times before the Conqueft; the present Æra fince

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the Revolution. The intervening space between these two was all confusion; a chaos of contradictions in the regulations of this State; an eternal ftruggle for uncertain power between. the Barons and the Crown, the Crown and the people, or the people against both.

Lord Perceval, May 3, 1744.

MEN will always be more governed by their paffions than their reafon; and it is fo difficult to foresee and determine what is most for the public good, that men are apt to determine that to be the most for the public good, which beft fuits with their own private views and paffions. This is the cause, that where the people have too great a fhare of the Government in their hands, the peace of the State must always be disturbed with parties and factions and as the vulgar, great as well as fmall, have generally very little forefight, and are violent in the pursuit of every paffion, this always, at last, furnishes the leader of some party or faction, with means to overturn the conftitution of their Government, and to ufurp to himself a sole and arbitrary power.

I could demonftrate this theorem, Sir, from obfervations upon the history of almost all the Commonwealths that ever had a being, and are now no more; but as the Roman History is best known, and moft adapted to this purpose, I fhall confine my obfervations to this history alone. After the expulfion of their Kings, and the establishment of a republican form of government, the people got, it is true, immediately, a very great share in the government, by the law that introduced an appeal to the people; for which the chief promoter got the name of Publicola. By this, and by the election of their annual Magistrates, the people had, I say, a very great share of the government: but for many years it was in appearance only; for the Senate and chief Patricians, even after the Tribunes of the people were inftituted, had fo much influence among the people, that they preserved in their own hands the whole of the Administration, by getting the people to chufe

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fuch Magiftrates as they directed, and to make fuch decrees upon appeals as they thought proper and juft: but the people, fpirited up by popular leaders, were every day aiming at getting more and more power into their hands; and by the fame means the influence of the Senate and the chief Patricians, grew every day lefs and lefs. The first conqueft the people made upon the Senate, was that of obtaining the establishment of the Tribunes, with most extraordinary powers: and the next they made was, the obtaining a law for the allowing of marriages between Patricians and Plebeians. About the fame time, they got introduced the custom of chufing Military Tribunes in the place of Confuls, because the Patricians would not allow that any Plebeian could be chofen a Conful, whereas a Plebeian might be chofen a Military Tribune; and by means of this difpute, the Commonwealth came to be governed for many years by Military Tribunes inftead of Confuls; though fuch was the modefty of the people, that for above fifty years after this fort of magiftracy was first introduced, no Plebeian could get himself chofen a Military Tribune. But the greateft conqueft which the People of Rome ever obtained over the Senate and Patricians, was the law for rendering a Plebeian capable of being chosen a Conful; for from that time the influence of the Senate diminished very fast, and the people began to grow every day more licentious.

Thus, Sir, a way being opened for popular leaders, whether Patrician or Plebeian, to arrive at the chief dignities and magiftracies of the State, and the people having got almost entirely into their own hands the conferring of those honours, and repeating them as often as they pleased, a popular leader at laft put an end to the liberties of the people for a time; and foon after him, another popular leader put an end to them for ever. When I fay this, every Gentleman muft fuppofe, I mean Caius Marius, and Julius Cæfar, names well known to those who are verfed in the Roman Hiftory. Marius, though of mean extraction, even among the Plebeians, raifed himfelf to fuch

favour among the people of Rome, by his fuccefs in war, and by patronizing every popular law proposed, that he was chosen Conful for three years fucceffively, which enabled him to continue himself by force or corruption in the same high office for three years more, in spite of all that the Nobles of Rome could do againft him. I fay Nobles, Sir; for by admitting Plebeians into all high offices, the diftinction between Patricians and Plebeians had by this time begun to be forgot, and the distinction that came in its place, was that of the Nobles and the People. It is true, the Nobles, by the help of Sylla's army, got the better of Marius, and drove him into exile in Africa; but the very next year, Sylla being gone with his army into Greece, against Mithridates, Marius returned, and joining with Cinna, after a terrible flaughter of the Nobles, he seized upon the city and government by an armed force, which his party held by the fame means after his death, till Sylla returned with his army. from Afia; and after several victories, destroyed all the heads of that party, and restored what was called the party of the Nobles, referving, however, to himself a dictatorial power.

Did thefe misfortunes, Sir, render the people of Rome more wife? Did they from thence learn not to aim at more power than they knew how to make use of, or not to put more confidence in their pretended patriots than they deserved? No, Sir, prefently after Sylla's death, Julius Cæfar, though he was of noble extraction, put himself at the head of the popular party, and patronized every proposition that tended to increase the power of the people because from the experience of what happened in Sylla's time, he faw, that that was the only party that would fupport him in, as well as raife him to arbitrary power. By patronizing Agrarian, and fuch other laws, he recommended himself to great favour amongst the people; and as he knew that military glory and a good army were necessary to raise him to the highest pinnacle of power, he made use of that favour for obtaining the government of Tranfalpine Gaul; to which he got, by the fame favour, the province of Cifalpine Gaul afterR 4 wards