will not allow us an oath for the preservation of the former, it may induce many people to think, they ought not to be allowed an oath for the preservation of the latter.

By this time, I hope, my Lord, all the inconveniencies pretended to arife from this Bill have vanifhed; and therefore I hall confider fome of the arguments brought to fhew that it is not neceffary. Here I muft obferve, that most of the arguments made use of for this purpose, are equally strong for a repeal of the laws we have now in being, against admitting Penfioners to fit and vote in the other Houfe. If it be impoffible to suppose, that a Gentleman of great eftate, and antient family, can, by a penfion, be influenced to do what he ought not to do; and if we muft fuppofe that none but fuch Gentlemen can ever get into the other Houfe, I am sure the laws for preventing Penfioners from having feats in that House, are quite unnecessary, and ought to be repealed. Therefore, if these arguments prevail with your Lordships to put a negative upon the prefent Question, I fhall expect to fee that negative followed by a Motion for the repeal of those laws. Nay, in a few Seffions, I fhall expect to fee a Bill brought in, for preventing any man's being a Member of the other House, but fuch as have fome place or penfion under the Crown. As an argument for fuch a Bill, it must be faid, that his Majesty's most faithful subjects ought to be chofen Members of Parliament, and that thofe Gentlemen will always be most faithful to the King that receive the King's money. I fhall grant, my Lords, that fuch Gentlemen will be always the most faithful, and the moft obedient to the Minifter; but for this very reason, I should be for excluding them from Parliament. The King's real intereft, however much he may be made by his Ministers to mistake it, must always be the fame with the People's; but the Minifter's intereft is generally distinct from, and often contrary to both: therefore, I fhall always be for excluding, as much as poffible, from Parliament, every man who is under the leaft inducement to prefer the intereft of the Minifter,

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to that of both King and People: and this I take to be the case of every Gentleman, let his eftate and family be what they will, that holds a penfion at the will of the Minister.

Those who say, they depend fo much upon the honour, integrity, and impartiality of men of family and fortune, feem to think our Conftitution can never be diffolved, as long as we have the shadow of a Parliament. My opinion, my Lord, is fo very different, that if ever our Conftitution be diffolved, if ever an abfolute Monarchy be established in this kingdom, I am convinced it will be under that shadow. Our conftitution consists in the two Houfes of Parliament being a check upon the Crown, as well as upon one another. If that check should ever be removed, if the Crown fhould, by corrupt means, by places, penfions, and bribes, get the abfolute direction of our two Houses of Parliament, our Conftitution will, from that moment, be deftroyed. There would be no occafion for the Crown to proceed any farther. It would be ridiculous to lay aside the forms of Parliament; for under that fhadow, our King would be more abfolute, and might govern more arbitrarily than he could do without it. A Gentleman of family and fortune would not, perhaps, for the fake of a penfion, agree to lay afide the forms of Government; because, by his venal service there, he earns his infamous penfion, and could not expect the continuance of it, if thofe forms were laid afide: but a Gentleman of family and fortune may, for the fake of a penfion, whilst he is in Parliament, approve of the most blundering measures, confent to the most exceffive and useless grants, enact the most oppreffive laws, pafs the most villainous accounts, acquit the moft heinous criminals, and condemn the most innocent perfons, at the defire of that Minifter who pays him his penfion. And if a majority of fuch House of Parliament confifted of fuch men, would it not be ridiculous in us to talk of our Constitution, or to say we had any liberty left?

This misfortune, this terrible condition we may be reduced to by corruption: as brave, as free a people as we, the Romans,

were reduced to it by the fame means; and to prevent fuch horrid catastrophe, is the design of this House.

If people would at all think, if they would confider the confequences of corruption, there would be no occafion, my Lords, for making laws against it. It would appear fo horrible, that no man would allow it to approach him. The corrupted ought to confider, that they do not fell their vote, or their country only: thefe, perhaps, they may difregard; but they fell likewise themfelves: they become the bond-flaves of the corrupter who corrupts them, not for their fakes, but for his own. No man ever

corrupted another, for the fake of doing him a fervice. And, therefore, if people would but confider, they would always reject the offer with difdain. But this is not to be expected. The hiftories of all countries, the hiftory even of our own country fhews, it is not to be depended on. The proffered bribe, people think, will fatisfy the immediate cravings of fome infamous appetite; and this makes them fwallow the alluring bait, though the liberties of their country, the happiness of their posterity, and even their own liberty, evidently depend upon their refufing it. This makes it neceffary, in every free State, to contrive, if poffible, effectual laws against corruption: and as the laws we now have for excluding Penfioners from the other House, are allowed to be ineffectual, we ought to make a trial, at leaft, of the remedy now propofed for though it should prove ineffectual, it will be attended with this advantage, that it will put us upon contriving fome other remedy that may be effectual; and the fooner fuch a remedy is contrived and applied, the lefs danger we fhall be expofed to of falling into that fatal diftemper, from which no free State, where it has once become general, has ever yet recovered.

Earl of Chesterfield, Feb. 22, 1740.

Agree with the Hon. Member who spoke firft, (Sir Robert

I on free, (Sir Robert

Walpole) that on his Majesty's happy Acceffion to the Throne, there ought to be no other contention amongst us, than who should moft contribute to his fervice, than who fhould express their duty and loyalty in the most respectful and the most extenfive manner. But then I hope he will agree with me, that this is to be done with fome regard to thofe we reprefent : that this is to be done, confiftent with the truft repofed in us; confiftent with that frugality which this House is bound to use, whenever the Crown is pleased to call upon it, to exercise its great power of giving money.

Now, notwithstanding what has been urged, I think we fhall fo far depart from the rule of frugality, as we exceed the revenue granted to his late Majefty, whether that exceeding fhall amount yearly to 93,000l. as computed at the highest by the Hon. Member, or to above 130,000l. as I have feen it more truly computed by another. For I remember very well, that the yearly fum of 700,000l. though now thought too little, was not obtained for his late Majefty, without a long and folemn debate; and it was allowed by every one that contended for it, to be an ample Royal revenue. Nor was it afked inconfiderately, and on a fudden; it was afked on mature deliberation, after the Queen's Civil Lift branches were found deficient; it was afked after many computations had been made of every charge requifite to fupport the honour and dignity of the Crown, and to maintain the present Royal Family; it was afked, after duly weighing what provifion would be fufficient to answer all the ordinary and extraordinary occafions of the Civil Government; what would be fufficient to answer all proper augmentations of falaries, all reasonable and charitable penfions, all fecret services at home and abroad, neceffary to carry on a juft and

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and wife Administration. It was afked by that Hon. Member himself and others, who were entering into great employments, who were going to taste of the Royal bounty, and who therefore could not poffibly be fufpected to have any defign of cramping his Majesty, by a too contracted and narrow revenue.

Nor does the late alteration in the Royal Family call for any increase of expence. For if the establishment for the Queen fhould be enlarged, whofe diftinguished character and many princely virtues, taken notice of in your Addrefs, entitle her to all degrees of grandeur, which any former Queen Confort ever enjoyed; I fay, if her Majefty's eftablishment fhould be enlarged, I prefume the establishment for Prince Frederick will be much inferior to that fettled on his present Majefty when Prince of Wales. Befides, our ardent wishes for his Majesty's conftant refidence in these kingdoms, and his Royal intentions of making us a great and happy people, give us hopes, that many perfonal, many particular expences in the late reign, efpecially thofe for frequent journies to Hanover, will be difcontinued and entirely cease.

Nor is it any objection to the reasoning of that time, when the 700,000l. was granted to the late King, or to the computation then made, that this fum is faid to have been found, by the experience of past times, to be not answerable to the neceffities of the Civil Government.

For this experience could not be found in the Queen's reign, because her Civil Lift branches feldom amounted to 600,000l. commonly to about 550,000l. and fometimes to very little above 500,000l. as appears by accounts formerly laid before this House and I will not suppose those accounts which were brought from the Treasury to be otherwife than true, in regard to my Hon. Friend. I ask pardon, I should have faid the Hon. Member, for there is no friendship betwixt us. But he muft give me leave to obferve, that when he afferts her Civil Lift Branches amounted to about 700,000l. yearly, he can only

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