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I AM one of those, and I believe there are a great many more, who are against the fecond reading of this Bill, presented by a Noble Duke (the Duke of Marlborough) for the better fecuring the conftitution, by preventing the Officers of the land forces from being deprived of their commiffions, otherwise than by judgment of a Court-martial. I did not, it is true, rife up immediately after the Motion was made, to give my reafons for being against a second reading, because I thought the Bill was of a nature fo very extraordinary, and the objections to it so strong and evident, that I thought it unneceffary for me, or any other Lord in this House, to give himself or the Houfe the trouble of explaining them: but fince the Noble Lord who fpoke laft, infifts fo much upon it, in order to fatisfy him, I fhall give him some of those reasons which prevail with me to be against a second reading of the Bill now before us: and if either that Noble Lord, or any other, can give fufficient anfwers to those reasons, I fhall moft readily join with those Noble Lords who are for reading this Bill a fecond time.

With me, my Lords, one of the principal objections against the Bill is, that I look upon it as an open and a direct attack upon the Prerogative of the Crown. It is an attack upon a Prerogative, which his Majefty and his ancestors have enjoyed ever fince our monarchy had a being; and we all know how nearly connected the Privileges of this House are with the Prerogative of the Crown: we know, my Lords, that the last open and direct attack that was made upon the Prerogative of the Crown, ended in the total fubversion of our monarchy, and an entire diffolution of this House; and therefore I cannot but be furprized, to see a Bill of this nature brought first into this House: if fuch a Bill had passed the other House, and had been fent up to us from thence, I do not doubt but that every one of your Lordships would have eafily feen through the design; you would have seen the fnare that was laid against the monarchical establishment of our government, upon which the Privileges of every Lord in the nation abfolutely depend. This

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would have given your Lordfhips a juft claim; and this, I doubt not, would have made you receive fuch a Bill in the manner it deserved.

I have often heard, my Lords, of a compact between the King and the people; and a compact, upon which, it is faid, our conftitution and government depend; if there be any fuch, the nature of it must certainly be mutual. On the one part, our Kings are obliged not to ufurp, or encroach upon the liberties of the people: but furely there must be a counterpart, and by that there must be an obligation on the part of the people. not to ufurp or encroach upon the Powers and Prerogatives of the Crown for it would be a very unjuft compact, if, on the one hand, the King was most strictly tied down, and, on the other hand, the people left at full liberty to encroach as often, and as far as they pleased, upon the Prerogatives of the Crown. This cannot be the cafe; the compact must be mutual; and as his prefent Majefty has never once attempted, nor defires, in the leaft to encroach upon the Liberties or the Privileges of the people, it would be very unjust and unfair in us, to make any encroachment upon him. Nay, it would be moft unwife, and might be attended with the moft fatal confequences; for a breach of covenant on one fide, would diffolve all the covenants on the other, which would at once unhinge the whole of our conftitution.

It has always been thought neceffary, my Lords, to give our Kings the fole power of naming, preferring, and reforming at pleasure the Officers of our armies, in order to give our Kings that power and influence over our armies; which is abfolutely necessary for supporting and promoting a proper military discipline among them, without which they would be of no ufe against a foreign enemy, and might foon become most oppresfive to the people, for whofe fafety they were raifed and maintained. This power was thought fo neceflary at the time of the Revolution, and it was then thought to be of fo little danger to the freedom of the conftitution, that at that time, when the VOL. I.

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liberties of the People were fully confidered, when every thing was removed that could be of dangerous confequence to them, there was not the leaft mention made of taking this Power from the Crown, or even of laying it under any reftraints and I do not know any thing that has happened, which can give us the leaft ground for being of an opinion different from that, which was the opinion of our ancestors at that time.

The happiness of our Constitution, my Lords, depends upon that equal Divifion of Power, which is established amongst the three Branches of our Legiflature: the executive Power, and the defending of the People against their enemies, is now, and always has been, entrusted solely with our King; it must always be absolutely necessary to give our Kings proper Powers for these purposes: the fupreme and ultimate determination of all disputes about property is lodged folely in this House; and the raifing of money for the public use, or laying Taxes upon the People, is what now seems to be principally the province of the other House. Thus the three Branches of the Legislature are a check upon one another, which prevents its being in the power of any one of them to opprefs the People, or to deftroy the other two. Under this Establishment we have been happy for many ages, under this the nation has grown up to a very high pitch of riches and power; and while this Eftablishment continues, it is more than probable, we shall always be happy.

But, my Lords, by the Bill now before us, we are to establifh a fourth Power, a new fort of Power, which, I am perfuaded, will foon become independent of the other three. This is making a moft confiderable alteration in the Conftitution; an alteration that may be attended with fuch fatal confequences, that it makes me tremble to think of it: to eftablish a General for life at the head of a well-difciplined army, commanded by Officers who could not be removed but by the confent of one another, would foon put it in the power of

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that General to make himself master of both King and Parliament: the tranfition from Dux to Rex would foon become eafy to him; by this the Conftitution might be entirely overthrown, and the nation might be involved in a multitude of calamities.

It is true, my Lords, that by what is propofed in the Bill now before us, an Officer may ftill be removed from his Command in the Army, upon an Addrefs of either Houfe of Parliament; but as the Parliament cannot always be kept fitting, this Address could not be speedily obtained: and if an Officer fhould be difcovered to be conspiring the overthrow of the Government, and fhould, notwithstanding, be continued in his Commiffion, and in the poffeffion of that power in the army which he had, by virtue of his Commiffion, till the next Seffion of Parliament, both Houses might, perhaps, address for turning him out: but his power in the Army might, perhaps, by that time be fo well established, that it would be out of the power of both King and Parliament to divest him of his Command and as for a trial by CourtMartial, I believe it would not be fo much as pretended, that a fentence could be got against fuch an Officer, or indeed, against any Officer who had a great influence in the army: it is not to be prefumed that Officers would be ready to condemn one another, unless it was for a crime which they themselves could no way approve of, efpecially when they knew that they could not be removed by any other authority.

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Since then, my Lords, I can see no manner of occafion for the Regulation now proposed; fince I am of opinion, that it would be great injury done to his Majefty, that it would tend to destroy all military difcipline in the Army, and would greatly endanger, if not totally fubvert our happy Conftitution, I cannot therefore agree to the giving it a fecond reading.

Lord Hervey, Jan. 17, 1734.

THE Honourable Gentleman who spoke firft for the Motion, has indeed made the beft excufe for the Miniftry that can be

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made, Ministers are but men, fometimes weak men; and though it would be unjust to suppose them endued with a spirit of prophecy, yet, I think, they fhould at least be poffeffed of a tolerable fhare of prudence. I fhould not, indeed, wonder, if one or two Measures went wrong upon a Minister's hand, through unavoidable accidents; yet I think it strange, that every Measure should go wrong; that not one of the numerous expedients that have been fet on foot for fecuring the tranquillity of Europe, or providing for the fecurity of Great-Britain, should prove effectual. Sir, I own this gives me strong apprehenfions of what I am not inclined to express on the occafion. I own that I was apt to think, that the round of Negociations and Treaties we have been carrying on for these ten or twelve years paft, with all the Powers of Europe, might have procured us, at least, fome refpite from a burden which our forefathers never knew; I mean, Sir, that of a standing Army. I call it a ftanding Army, because it has continued for these many years; and we have always been told the fame things over and over again, as reasons why it is continued. I have, during many years, told the House every Seffion, that we should have a return of the very fame reasons next Seffion; but Gentlemen never seemed to believe me, though they have hitherto found my words but too true. Now, Sir, as the fame causes have fubfifted for above these forty years, without being any worse for the wearing, I am apt to think that they may fubfift forty years longer; and while the fame caufes fubfift, the fame effects muft follow: fo that in reality a ftanding Army may be thought as much a part of our Conftitution, as the more lawful Prerogative, or Privilege, which either Prince or People may claim. But, Sir, though even the Gentlemen who are most converfant in Public Affairs, will, I believe, be puzzled to find out one new argument in favour of a standing Army, yet there is nothing eafier than to bring twenty against it. The reafon of this, Sir, is because it produces but one fingle good, which is the fecurity of the Administration; but

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