states as their patrimonies into the hands of ministers responsible to democracies, the ancient and dangerous conception of national honor is at least being modified. National interests, however, may be as dangerous internationally as national honor, and we have no proof that democracies, where they control foreign policies, are less insistent upon national interest than were their aristocratic or royal predecessors upon national honor. It remains to be proved that democracies are pacific.

Who is to decide, and how, as to what wars are aggressive and hence criminal? Mr. Levinson's requirements are (a) a code of International Law based upon the major premise that all (offensive) wars are criminal, but "limited to the controversies that arise between states;" and (b) an international court with compulsory jurisdiction,-including therein all (civilized?) states, -like the Supreme Court of the United States, "a ready-made exemplar for a real international court." For each a universal agreement is requisite. Such a court would necessarily have jurisdiction not only over all those controversies which in the absence of the code might lead to war, but also jurisdiction to determine when a state is guilty of the crime of aggressive war, and, it would seem, to declare the judgment of outlawry. He seems to dislike "the euphemistic word sanction." No legal sanction, he asserts, has been necessary to enforce the judgments made by the Supreme Court in the eighty-six cases of controversies between states, although the Supreme Court has intimated that some sort of legal sanction could and might be found to enforce its judgments.

But a controversy between states as developed under the Federal Constitution has not the remotest resemblance to the asserted power of an international court to declare a state a criminal and to assess against it the penalty of outlawry. No such ingenious construction was suggested between 1861 and 1865 when, under Union theory, the South made aggressive war upon the National Government; nor were the seceded states outlawed, for notwithstanding their secession, they were always a part of "an indestructible union of indestructible states." For a court to declare a state a criminal and to punish it would involve the creation of a super-state greater in power, than was the Federal Government during and since the Civil War.

As to the jurisdiction of a "real international court" over international controversies, Mr. Levinson is insistent; it is substitution of judicial settlement for war. Mr. Levinson se to argue that judicial settlement of controversies will supers all wars. The very kind of war, however, which the court w be called upon to declare a crime is the one for which jud settlement of the controversy was not permitted by the agg

sive state.

Mr. Levinson has little patience with the distinction betw justiciable and non-justiciable disputes, and he apparently fuses non-justiciable disputes with "matters affecting nati honor or the vital interests of a state." Nevertheless, distinction exists and is fundamental to the operation bot the League of Nations and of the World Court. The Cound the League of Nations is primarily for the consideration and justment of non-justiciable controversies, not by arbitra and award, nor by process and judgment, but by conciliatio And be it noted that Article 16 of the League Covenant vides for the outlawry of that state, a member of the Leag Nations, which resorts to war in disregard of its covenants u Articles 12, 13, and 15 (by refusing to submit to arbitration to inquiry by the Council or Assembly). Should a member so act, "it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an of war against all other members of the League, which he undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all t and financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse bet their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking s and the prevention of all commercial or personal intercours tween the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of other state, whether a member of the League or not." TH called boycott, but it is outlawry in very precise language. article has been called the heart of the Covenant. It is sp and not general, definite and not hazy, but in it Mr. Levi has, apparently, no confidence. Many others have no confic in it because it attempts more than can, considering the pr state of the world, be accomplished. During the Senate de on the Covenant this article was asserted to be in violati the Constitution, as it deprives Congress of the power to clare war.

In his mind the agency must be a "real court." The present Court will not do, because it has "no inherent power to hear or decide any controversy between nations unless they both consent." Why has the present Court no such inherent power? Simply because several states would not consent generally in advance to be sued without their consent specifically. How would Mr. Levinson force them to consent either generally or specifically? While compulsory jurisdiction was eliminated as a necessary feature of the Court, a state may engage to recognize it. There are forty-six states which have agreed to the statute of the Court, and of these, twenty have accepted its compulsory jurisdiction.

The example of "judicial child's play" which Mr. Levinson cites to show the absurdity of the present Court is inaccurately and misleadingly set forth. An advisory legal opinion was asked of the Court by the Council as to the existence of an international legal controversy between Finland and Soviet Russia. None was given because Russia had not given and would not give its consent to the Court's jurisdiction over any matter involving Soviet Russia, stating that any attempt to assert jurisdiction would be regarded by the Soviet Government as a hostile act. This was not judicial child's play but a decision absolutely sound, upon Mr. Levinson's own theory.

The League of Nations and the Court of International Justice are in existence. Together they afford a definite method for the outlawry of war. Mr. Levinson will have none of them. Instead he offers a phrase. May one not use his own characterization of earlier phrases and conclude that he has only added another, "a new opiate prepared for the people, to relieve them of the pain of war" until the next war comes?

OF

RE-MAKING GREECE

FRIDTJOF NANSEN

THE few great world personalities whose heroic stature has not been diminished by the petty bickerings that constitute post-war history, not one has commanded more affection, deep respect, and confidence among the nations than Fridtjof Nansen. His disinterested work in restoring 400,000 war refugees to their Russia is now a familiar story. Here the great explorer tells of the rehabilitation in Greece of desti

O'

F ALL the sore spots Europe there is none, seems to me, that can more readily healed, without polit interference of any sort, by the sav hand of the American people, t Greece. The land of Greece, hav suffered a collapse of its dreams territorial expansion, finds itself ca upon to absorb a sudden increas population, unprecedented since days of the Aryan migrations. Greeks are handling this situation to the utmost of their ab and their means. The American people have rendered, and rendering, effective help, and now your Henry Morgenthau gone to Greece to act as Chairman of the Commission that s find these refugees new homes and speed them on the wa self-support.

tute refugees from Asia Minor.

In their unfortunate military adventure the Greeks attem to go over to their kinsmen in Asia Minor, to answer the ca the descendants of the Greek Colonists of three thousand У ago who were tenants of the farms of the Near East centuries before the Turkish conquerors arrived. Orth Christians, they had learned to speak the Turkish tongue, they had resisted the Moslem religion. In their attempt t clude these kinsmen in a Greater Greece, the Greek armies f utterly. In their retreat they precipitated instead an a threatened for centuries, the evacuation en masse of the G population and their flight by hundreds of thousands acros Aegean to the old homeland of Hellas. Greece, utterly exhau after ten years of war and numbering only four and a half m inhabitants, now finds more than a million of these fugi within her newly compressed borders. Imagine the pro

which would be facing your United States, large and prosperous as you are, if you suddenly found yourselves, in a single year, confronted with an immigration of twenty-five to thirty million people, four-fifths of whom were completely dependent on charity?

It is not my purpose here to remind the United States of the agreement made with the Associated Powers in the winter of 1917-1918, by which your government agreed to advance to Greece a sum not to exceed fifty million dollars, to carry on military and naval operations. Although vouchers to the United States of expenditures amounting to upward of forty-eight million were passed, only fifteen million were actually paid. I need not rehearse the military and political complications which prevented further payment, but I only call attention to the fact that in one sense the United States has saved more money than you planned on Greece.

Many hundred thousand of the refugees came from parts of Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace that were not affected by the Greek military movement. Either they were driven out or they felt that the time had come. They came to Greece because Greece was the only country ready to receive them.

The Greek Government made a stupendous effort to help the refugees. The foreign relief agencies did the same. The League of Nations took action at once and asked me as High Commissioner for Refugees to do what I could to help them, and I at once went to Constantinople and Greece and within a few days got some grain for immediate relief. Again the Americans added another chapter to the record of the marvellous relief work they have carried out since the war. The Near East Relief saved thousands of lives through their child feeding and the American Red Cross fed last winter about 800,000 refugees until they retired from the field on the 30th of June.

Undoubtedly but for the work of the American agencies a catastrophe would have happened. Even so, there was terrible suffering and a great mortality. It is estimated that between seventy and a hundred thousand souls died last winter. There was also a danger of widespread epidemics amongst all these poor people living in concentration camps under the most unhealthy conditions. This danger was averted largely by the work of the