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As to the jurisdiction of a "real international court" ove international controversies, Mr. Levinson is insistent; it is substitution of judicial settlement for war. Mr. Levinson s super to argue that judicial settlement of controversies will all wars. The very kind of war, however, which the court w be called upon to declare a crime is the one for which jud settlement of the controversy was not permitted by the ag

sive state.

Mr. Levinson has little patience with the distinction bet justiciable and non-justiciable disputes, and he apparently fuses non-justiciable disputes with "matters affecting nat honor or the vital interests of a state." Nevertheless, distinction exists and is fundamental to the operation bo the League of Nations and of the World Court. The Coun the League of Nations is primarily for the consideration an justment of non-justiciable controversies, not by arbitr and award, nor by process and judgment, but by conciliati

And be it noted that Article 16 of the League Covenant vides for the outlawry of that state, a member of the Leag Nations, which resorts to war in disregard of its covenants Articles 12, 13, and 15 (by refusing to submit to arbitratio to inquiry by the Council or Assembly). Should a member so act, "it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed a of war against all other members of the League, which h undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all and financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse be their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking and the prevention of all commercial or personal intercour tween the covenant-breaking state and the nationals o other state, whether a member of the League or not." T called boycott, but it is outlawry in very precise language. article has been called the heart of the Covenant. It is s and not general, definite and not hazy, but in it Mr. Le has, apparently, no confidence. Many others have no conf in it because it attempts more than can, considering the state of the world, be accomplished. During the Senate on the Covenant this article was asserted to be in violat the Constitution, as it deprives Congress of the power clare war.

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In his mind the agency must be a "real court." The present Court will not do, because it has "no inherent power to hear or decide any controversy between nations unless they both consent." Why has the present Court no such inherent power? Simply because several states would not consent generally in advance to be sued without their consent specifically. How would Mr. Levinson force them to consent either generally or specifically? While compulsory jurisdiction was eliminated as a necessary feature of the Court, a state may engage to recognize it. There are forty-six states which have agreed to the statute of the Court, and of these, twenty have accepted its compulsory jurisdiction.

The example of "judicial child's play" which Mr. Levinson cites to show the absurdity of the present Court is inaccurately and misleadingly set forth. An advisory legal opinion was asked of the Court by the Council as to the existence of an international legal controversy between Finland and Soviet Russia. None was given because Russia had not given and would not give its consent to the Court's jurisdiction over any matter involving Soviet Russia, stating that any attempt to assert jurisdiction would be regarded by the Soviet Government as a hostile act. This was not judicial child's play but a decision absolutely sound, upon Mr. Levinson's own theory.

The League of Nations and the Court of International Justice are in existence. Together they afford a definite method for the outlawry of war. Mr. Levinson will have none of them. Instead he offers a phrase. May one not use his own characterization of earlier phrases and conclude that he has only added another, “a new opiate prepared for the people, to relieve them of the pain of war" until the next war comes?

ate States? Or would they have been in pari delicto? Dou Mr. Levinson would protest that a war like the Civil War the kind of war he would seek to outlaw. In a pamphlet al referred to, Mr. Levinson has asserted that his plan would serve the Monroe Doctrine, our tariff and revenue policies right to repel invasion, our right to expel aliens and all domestic and protective policies, the other nations to enjoy sponding rights and policies (sic!).

It is "the legality of international war" which is "the defect in the fabric of our civilization. It is unlawful criminal for an individual to kill another, but it is per lawful for a sovereign or a government to cause the death million individuals.' To the latter he objects, yet he doe claim that it could be conceived of as criminal to cause the of thousands in suppressing insurrection. Nor does he con as criminal the death in battle of more thousands in resi invasion. He does not appear to hold that a war of defens crime against civilization. Indeed, he has elsewhere ass that "the right of defense against actual or imminent (sic) a shall be preserved." To be sure he does not specifically nate defensive wars in the present article, but in previous ments he has confined his outlawry to "offensive war." He makes no distinction between wars of offense and war defense. War shall be made a crime by universal con Having been made so there will be no more wars. Nothing be more simple.

But no state ever engages upon an avowedly aggressive There is something having to do with "a decent respect to opinions of mankind" which makes those responsible for conduct of the affairs of a state extremely chary about enga in an avowedly offensive war against another state. Every going to war naturally seeks to put the odium upon its en If history were to take the theory of one-half those governm which have made war, it would record no offensive wars. took the theory of the other half, all wars would be record offensive. Germany declared that she waged a war of def only, that the invasion of Belgium was a necessary offen defensive measure. Austria declared war against Serbia alleged purposes of self-defense, one of those acts ag

"imminent attack" which Mr. Levinson admits are not to be outlawed. Who is to decide? What is to decide?

How is it to be decided (a) as a matter of law and (b) as a matter of fact, whether a war is one of offense or defense, or whether an attack is imminent? Here one is no longer in the rarified atmosphere of generalities or pious wishes, but upon the earth. If Mr. Levinson or any code commission can formulate in general terms a legal principle which will permit of the easy distinction in fact between offensive wars and those not offensive there will have been accomplished what Grotius could not do, since it would involve the formulation of the legal causes ("just,' Grotius called them) of all wars. One must never lose sight of the distinction, as old as Thucydides, between the causes of war and the occasions for war. The occasions for war are not infrequently specific invasions of legal right. The causes of war are not so easily marshalled.

Southey poked fun at the delightful tediousness of the Viennese professor who began his lectures on the Thirty Years War with the Deluge. From certain points of view the professor was right. In May, 1846, the Congress of the United States declared that war existed by "the act of Mexico" in crossing the Rio Grande by an armed force, entering territory which the United States claimed. The causes of the Mexican War run back to the earliest rivalries of the Spanish and English systems. What agreement is there as to the causes of the Great War? Each belligerent entered the war upon its own theory. Where lies the decision? Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht.

Mr. Levinson asserts that "it is impracticable to get rid of the causes of war and no substantial progress has ever been made in that regard." This is a broad statement which may be opposed by the recognition of the practical elimination of one hitherto vastly important cause of war, namely the claims of dynastic succession. Another is religion. Another is the recognition by states that certain questions may properly be settled by arbitration and judicial settlement. Great Britain and the United States so decided in the Treaty of Washington, and the Geneva Award was the result. Nations may agree upon a status quo, as the work of the Washington Conference bears witness.

The catalogue may be greatly extended if one resolutely de

termines to rid oneself of the fear-complex of the last war as has been observed, every peace has within it the cause of to come, something might be said, did space permit, abou possibility of reducing some causes of war by making peace another theory than Vae Victis. Franklin's generalization plausible but specious that "there never was a good war or a peace." There must be a peace of justice and not a peace of Mr. Levinson likens war to the duel, and the law of war t code duello, and says that "not a single, solitary cause of du has ever been removed to this day." Is this accurate? Du was a method of self-help once recognized by the state as la It was by judicial construction (not by statute) made a cri Common Law. Blackstone said, writing about 1760 and after death by duelling had been recognized as murder, tha requires such a degree of passive valor to combat the dre even undeserved contempt, arising from the false notio honor too generally received in Europe, that the strongest hibitions and penalties of the law will never be entirely effe to eradicate this unhappy custom, till a method be found compelling the original aggressor to make some other satisfa to the affronted party, which the world shall esteem eg reputable as that which is now given at the hazard of th and fortune, as well of the person insulted as of him who given the insult." Blackstone was in error. No new metho been devised but there have been, very naturally and properly, a decay in the mediaeval notion of "personal ho and such a modification of the ideas of "personal insult' "personal affront," by the growth of newer conceptions dignity and worth of the individual, where self-restraint equivalent of "passive valor," that the duel is now not me crime, but is absurd. Affairs of honor are reserved for ecc individuals of theatric tastes, if not of paranoiac tendenci

So with states: as other motives arise which displace questions of honor, the causes of war, like the causes of the will tend to disappear. While not admitting with Mr. Lev that "perhaps ninety-five per cent of the people of the civ world are against the 'institution of war"" (how such a stat can be proved is beyond comprehension), it may be asserte as the control of government has passed from those who reg