Lynch v. Clarke. BERNARD LYNCH v. JOHN CLARKE and JULIA LYNCH. J. L. was born in the city of New-York in 1819, of alien parents, during their temporary sojourn in that city. She returned with them the same year to their native country, and always resided there afterwards. It was held, that she was a citizen of the United States. The rule of the common law, by which aliens are precluded from inheriting lands, still prevails in the state of New-York.(a) The right to real estate by descent, is governed by the municipal law of this state, and the legislature may enable aliens to inherit. But while the law remains as it now is, the question on the right to inherit, must turn upon the alienage or citizenship of the person claiming to be the heir. The right of citizenship, as distinguished from alienage, is a national right or condition. It pertains to the confederated sovereignty, the United States; and not to the individual states. It is more important and more deeply felt in reference to political rights, than to rights of property. Under the Constitution of the United States, the power to regulate naturalization is vested in Congress, and since Congress has legislated upon the subject, the states have no power to act in regard to it. Neither the common law, nor the statute law of the state of New-York, can determine whether Julia Lynch was or was not an alien. The policy and legislation of the American Colonies, from the earliest times until the revolution, was adapted to foster immigration, and to bestow upon foreigners all the rights of natural born subjects. And this policy continued unchanged in the thirteen original states, while they were united by the Articles of Confederation. The uniform course was, to extend, not to abridge, the right of citizenship. The common law, by which all persons, born within the king's allegiance, became subjects, whatever were the situation of their parents, became the law of the colonies, and so continued while they were connected with the crown of Great Britain. It was thus the law of each and all of the states, at the Declaration of Independence, and so remained until the national constitution went into effect, that a child born within their territory and ligeance respectively, though of alien parents who were abiding temporarily; thereby became a citizen of the state of which he was a native. The Constitution of the United States, as well as those of all the thirteen old states, pre-supposed the existence of the common law, and was founded upon its principles, so far as they were applicable to our situation and form of governAnd to a limited extent, the principles of the common law prevail in the United States, as a system of national jurisprudence. ment. (a) Modified by a recent statute. Laws of 1845, Chap. 115. Lynch v. Clarke. The subject of alienage, under the national compact, became a national subject, which must be controlled by a principle co-extensive with the United States. And as there is no constitutional or congressional provision declaring citizenship by birth, it must be regulated by some rule of national law; and from the necessity of the case, that rule must have been coeval with the existence of the Union. The law on this subject, which prevailed in all the states, became the governing principle or common law of the United States, when the union of the states was consummated, and their separate legislation on the point was terminated. It is therefore the law of the United States, that children born here, are citizens, without any regard to the political condition or allegiance of their parents. Children of ambassadors are, in theory, born within the allegiance of the sovereign power represented, and do not fall within the rule. By the law, as established in Great Britain, as well as in this country, there is, of necessity, in many cases, a double allegiance. Thus, where the citizens of the one country, are naturalized in the other; and where issue are born in the one, of parents who are citizens of the other country. Such is the law of Spain and Portugal. By the common law, children born abroad of English parents, were subjects of the The stat. 25 Edward 3, St. 2, De natis ultra mare, was declaratory of the old common law. crown. Semble, that children of citizens of the United States, although born in foreign countries, and not within the provisions of the act of Congress of 1802, are nevertheless, citizens of the United States. The benign policy of this country in reference to immigrants, traced historically, and its wisdom and justice maintained. The principal point, sustained by reference to the legislation of the states, by state papers, and by the opinions of eminent statesmen and judges, and writers on constitutional law. The rule of the national or public law considered. It is derived from the civil law, and is not uniformly held in countries, the jurisprudence of which is founded upon that system; nor is it clearly defined in theory. The legislation of Congress relative to naturalization, stated historically and at large, by Radcliff arguing for the complainant. July 6, 7, 8. 10, 11, and 12, 1843; May 6, July 19, and Sept. 17, 1844. Decided November 5, 1844. THE bill in this cause was filed by Bernard Lynch against John Clarke and Julia Lynch, for the purpose of obtaining a declaration that Clarke was seised of the celebrated Congress Spring and the adjacent lands, at Saratoga Springs, in trust as to an undivided moiety thereof, for Thomas Lynch, formerly of the city of New-York, deceased; and that the complainant was entitled to all the equitable interests which T. Lynch had in the property. The bill also sought a decree for a conveyance of Lynch v. Clarke. the property, and for an account of the rents and profits since the death of T. Lynch. The case made by the bill, briefly stated, was as follows: T. Lynch and Clarke were partners in New-York, from 1808 till the death of the former, in 1833. They were very intimate, and reposed entire confidence in each other; and Clarke being unmarried, lived in the family of Lynch. Their firm was Lynch & Clarke, and their business for 20 years or more, was dealing in soda and mineral waters. They first brought the water of the Congress Spring into general notice. After making a trial of the public taste for the water, they resolved to secure the control of the fountain. This object was effected between 1822 and 1830, with some difficulty, and at great cost. Early in 1823, they obtained the transfer, in the name of Clarke, of a lease for a term of years, of the Congress Spring. On the 6th of January, 1823, they procured a deed, (which was also taken in the name of Clarke,) of 97 acres of land, somewhat removed from the spring, but the intervening land was ultimately purchased by them. The consideration of this deed was $700, and it was paid by Lynch & Clarke. On the 18th of June, 1823, they obtained from the then owners of the Congress Spring lot, a lease in the name of Clarke, for thirteen years, at an annual rent of $30. From this time forward, they enlarged their dealings in the Congress Spring water to an immense extent, and continued the same actively till the death of Lynch. On the 22d of April, 1826, the owners conveyed the lot on which the spring is situated, to Clarke, for the consideration of $7,500, which was paid by Lynch & Clarke. On the 16th of June, 1829, they obtained a conveyance of the adjoining tract, the line of which was within a few feet of the spring. This purchase was made because they were apprehensive that some change in the subterranean current of the water might remove the spring to this land. The tract contained about 245 acres; it was conveyed to Clark, and the price was $16,000. Of this sum, $6,000 was paid down, and the residue in two equal annual instalments with annual interest; and the whole was paid by the checks of the firm. Lynch v. Clarke. On the 3d of February, 1830, they obtained a conveyance of another tract lying between their first and second purchases. The price was $1,500, and was paid by the firm. The deed was executed to Clarke. The reason for taking the deeds in Clarke's name was, that he was unmarried and could convey portions, when sold, with facility; whereas the wife of Lynch was intemperate, and often made difficulty when called upon to join in the execution of deeds. The contemporary conveyances of other lands belonging to the firm were taken in Clarke's name. Soon after the purchase of the Spring, Clarke removed to Saratoga Springs, and has since resided and superintended the operations there. They were conducted in the name of the firm. Lynch remained in New-York, where the principal sales of the water were made, and the business continued there in the same name. The Spring became very profitable, so that before Lynch's death, and from thence to the present time, the net income from it exceeded $20,000 a year. Thomas Lynch died in June, 1833, intestate, and without issue. He left no heirs in this country, and all his relatives were aliens. The complainant, Bernard Lynch, who was his brother, came to the United States in 1834, and was naturalized in 1839. The legislature of this state, in 1841, passed an act entitling him to the real estate of Thomas Lynch, in the same manner as if Bernard had been a citizen at the death of Thomas; saving, however, the claims of heirs of Thomas, and the existing rights of Julia Lynch. Julia Lynch was a daughter of Patrick Lynch, who was a brother of Thomas, and died in Ireland before the death of Thomas. Julia came from Ireland to this country with her uncle, Bernard, in 1834. She was then about 15 years of age. In 1839, the legislature of this state passed an act for her benefit, similar in its provisions to the subsequent act for the relief of the complainant, except that the only saving in it was in favor of heirs at law of Thomas Lynch. The bill alleged that Julia had never been naturalized, and was not entitled to any part of the real estate; and if she were Lynch v. Clarke. And that Mr. Clarke, set up a claim that he entitled, it was to one fourth part only. since the death of Thomas Lynch, had was the exclusive owner of the Congress Spring, and of all the lands purchased as before mentioned. Mr. Clarke, in his answer, stated that the purchases at Saratoga were all made in his own name, and at his risk, and for his sole benefit. That Lynch had from the outset, refused to participate in the adventure, and for many years decried it. That a considerable part of the purchase money was paid out of the funds of the firm, but that the money was loaned to him by the firm, with the concurrence of Lynch, and he had repaid it all to the firm and to Lynch's administrator. He also alleged that Julia Lynch was a citizen of the United States, and inherited all the real estate of Thomas Lynch. Julia Lynch, in her answer, insisted that she was a native born citizen, and as such inherited all the real estate whereof Thomas Lynch was seised, or to which he was equitably entitled. She moreover claimed that by the act of the legislature in her favor, she was entitled to the whole property to the exclusion of the complainant. Replications were filed to the answers, and the cause was brought to a hearing on a voluminous mass of documentary and other evidence. As the case turned upon the citizenship of Julia Lynch, at the time of her uncle's death, it is deemed needless to state any part of the testimony relative to the purchases of the property, and the alleged resulting trust therein in favor of Thomas Lynch. The testimony bearing upon the citizenship of Julia Lynch, was thus summed up by the court upon deciding the cause. Her parents were British subjects, domicilled in Ireland. They came to this country in 1815, remained till the summer of 1819, and then returned to Ireland. Julia was born in the city of New-York, in the spring of 1819. Her parents took her with them on their return, and she remained in Ireland till after the death of Thomas Lynch. During the sojourn of her father here, Thomas hired a farm for him and paid the rent. Her |