THE following difcourfe is a kind of remonftrance in behalf of king William and his friends, against the proceedings of the house of commons; and was published during the recefs of parliament in the fummer of 1701, with a view to engage them in milder measures when they should meet again.

At this time Lewis XIV. was making large strides towards univerfal monarchy; plots were carrying on at St. Germains; the Dutch had acknowledged the duke of Anjou as king of Spain, and kingWilliam was made extremely uneafy by the violence with which many of his ministers and chief favourites were purfued by the commons; the king, to appease their refentment, had made feveral changes in his miniftry, and removed fome of his most faithful fervants from places of the highest truft and dignity: this expedient, however, had proved ineffectual, and the commons perfifted in their oppofition; they began by impeaching William Bentinck, earl of Portland, groom of the ftole; and proceeded to the impeachment of John Somers, baron Somers of Evesham, first lord keeper, afterwards lord chancellor; Edward Ruffel, earl of Orford, lord treasurer of the navy, and one of the lords commiffioners of the admiralty; and Charles Mountague, earl of Halifax, one of the commiffioners of the treafury, and afterwards chancellor of the exchequer. Its general purport is to damp the warmth of the commons by fhewing, that the meafures they purfued had a direct tendency to bring on the tyranny, which they profeffed to oppofe; and the particular cafes of the impeached lords are paralleled in Athenian characters.

Α

DISCOURSE

OF THE

CONTESTS and DISSENTIONS

BETWEEN THE

NOBLES and the COMMONS

IN

ATHENS and R'OME;

With the Confequences they had upon both thofe STATES.

I

Si tibi vera videtur,

Dede manus, & fi falfa eft, accingere contra. LUCR.

Written in the Year 1701.

CHAP. I.

Tis agreed, that in all government there is an abfolute unlimited power, which naturally and originally feems to be placed in the whole body, where-ever the executive part of it lies. This holds in the body natural; for where-ever we place the beginning of motion, whether from the head, or the heart, or the animal fpirits in general, the body moves and acts by a confent of all its parts. This unlimited power, placed fundamentally in the body of a people, is what the best

legiflators

legiflators of all ages have endeavoured, in their several fchemes or inftitutions of government, to depofite in fuch hands as would preferve the people from rapine and oppreffion within, as well as violence from without, Most of them feem to agree in this, that it was a trust too great to be committed to any one man or affembly, and therefore they left the right ftill in the whole body; but the administration or executive part in the hands of the one, the few, or the many, into which three powers all independent bodies of men seem naturally to divide; for by all I have read of those innumerable and petty commonwealths in Italy, Greece, and Sicily, as well as the great ones of Carthage and Rome, it seems to me, that a free people met together, whether by compact, or family-government, as foon as they fall into any acts of civil fociety, do of themselves divide into three powers. The firft is that of fome one eminent fpirit, who, having fignalized his valour and fortune in defence of his country, or by the practice of popular arts at home, comes to have great influence on the people, to grow their leader in warlike expeditions, and to prefide, after a fort, in their civil affemblies; and this is grounded upon the principles of nature and common reason, which in all difficulties or dangers, where prudence or courage is required, do rather incite us to fly for counfel or affistance to a fingle perfon, than a multitude. The second natural divifion of power is of fuch men, who have acquired large poffeffions, and consequently dependencies, or defcend from ancestors who have left them great inheritances, together with an hereditary authority. These eafily uniting in thoughts and

opinions,

opinions, and acting in concert, begin to enter upon measures for fecuring their properties, which are best upheld by preparing against invafions from abroad, and maintaining peace at home; this commences a great council or fenate of nobles for the weighty affairs of the nation. The laft divifion is of the people, whofe part of power is great and indisputable, whenever they can unite either collectively, or by deputation, to exert it Now the three forms of government, fo generally known in the schools, differ only by the civil administration being placed in the hands of one, or fometimes two, (as in Sparta) who were called kings; or in a senate, who were called the nobles; or in the people collective or representative, who may be called the commons. Each of thefe had frequently the executive power in Greece, and fometimes in Rome: but the power in the laft resort was always meant by the legislators to be held in balance among all three. And it will be an eternal rule in politicks among every free people, that there is a balance of power to be carefully held by every state within itself, as well as among feveral ftates with each other.

:

The true meaning of a balance of power, either without or within a state, is beft conceived by confidering, what the nature of a balance is. It fuppofes three things First, the part which held, together with the hand that holds it; and then the two scales, with whatever is weighed therein. Now confider several ftates in a neighbourhood; in order to preferve peace between these states, it is neceffary they should be formed into a balance, whereof one or more are to be directors, who are to divide the reft into equal scales, and upon

occafion

HOW