REPORT ON THE MILITIA SYSTEM. JANUARY 5, 1832. The report of Gen. Dix, as Adjutant-General, was made to the Legislature of New York in 1832. It was called forth by a reference to him for examination of two bills, which were introduced at the previous session. The object of both was to dispense with military parades as useless, and both proceeded upon the assumption that the militia system, beyond a mere formal organization, was an unnecessary burden. The report treats these attempts to diminish in any degree the exercises of the militia as a fatal inroad on the efficiency of the system. The importance of retaining the organization of the militia, of keeping up its drills, inspections, and reviews, is maintained as an indispensable preparation for war, and as the chief security of the country against internal disorder and violence. The attacks upon the system were not confined to the legislature, but were set on foot in the principal cities by mock organizations, which were paraded through the streets in fantastical dresses in derision of the militia. The views presented in the report have found a striking vindication in the existing civil war. Without the aid of the militia regiments, which rushed to the defence of the Capital at the first note of alarm, the government might have been overturned or expelled from its seat by the insurgents. Congress has passed but one general act for the organization of the militia that of 1793. It is still in force. The arguments in the following report are, therefore, as applicable to the subject now as they were when they were presented to the Legislature of New York thirty years ago; and the defence of the whole system as an essential ingredient in the political organization of the State, in regard to domestic as well as foreign exigencies, will not be unacceptable at a period in which the public mind is directed with so much solicitude to the true sources of the national order and safety. - STATE OF NEW YORK, TO THE HONORABLE THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. IN obedience to your resolution of the 21st of April last, directing the Adjutant-General to report, at the next session of the legislature, upon a bill entitled "An act to reduce the parades and rendezvous of the militia, and to amend the provisions of chapter ten, part one, of the Revised Statutes, so far as to conform them to this act"; and in obedience to your resolution of the 23d of the same month, referring to him a bill entitled "An act to amend the tenth chapter of the first part of the Revised Statutes, relating to the militia and the public defence," he has the honor to submit the following report: In the examination of the bills thus submitted to him, he has endeavored to confine himself as strictly as possible to the specific provisions which they contain; but such is their connection with the government of the militia, and the principles on which the system is founded, that he has considered it within the scope of the reference to present some general views of the whole subject; and he trusts that he will not be deemed to have exceeded the just limits of the duty assigned to him, if those views shall be found to illustrate the matters referred. In adverting to the origin and uses of the militia of the United States as a military institution, it cannot fail to strike the observation that it is as peculiar in its character as the civil institutions of which it is designed to be the protection and support. In most other countries it is a practical rule of government to limit as much as possible the influence of all, who live under it, over its measures and movements, and to arm and discipline such only as are in its pay and under its control. The spirit of our political organization, on the other hand, is, by extending as far as practicable the right of suffrage, to subject the measures and operations of government to the influence of the greatest possible number, and, by arming and disciplining every citizen, to be prepared to sustain in all emergencies, by the united force of the whole community, a system instituted for the benefit of the whole. The theory of this part of the system is, that every citizen shall be armed, and that he shall be instructed also in the use of arms. The reasonings by which the utility of such a social organization is supported are so unanswerable, that it is doubted by the most sagacious observers whether our civil liberties could be maintained for a length of time without the influence and protection of a militia. The same causes which would render such a force dangerous to the existence of an arbitrary government render it indispensable to the existence of ours. That this was the opinion of the original parties to the Constitution of the United States, is apparent from the second article of the amendments of that instrument, which assumes that "a well-regulated militia” is necessary to the security of a free state," and declares that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed"; showing that the militia was designed by those who had the largest share in its institution, not merely as a support to the public authority, but, in the last resort, as a protection to the people against the government itself. The militia system is to be regarded, therefore, not only as a part of the political constitution of the State, but as an eminently republican feature of that constitution, fitted equally with its civil features to maintain and give effect to the principles upon which it is founded. So intimately, indeed, are they all interwoven with each other, that the connection which exists between them could not be dissolved without impairing the strength of the whole fabric. The particular uses for which the militia is designed are declared by the Constitution of the United States to be "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." The testimony of all history shows that the best regulated governments are liable to disturbances, which the civil arm alone is incompetent to quell. For the purpose of preserving the public order, therefore, a military force of some description is necessary. In most countries the civil authority is upheld by a regular force; and if the militia system were to be abolished, the army would necessarily be employed for this purpose by the Federal government, and the States would have no agency in maintaining the supremacy of their own laws. But it is a striking illustration of the genius of our institutions, that, although we have at no period been without a standing army, the few insurrections which have interrupted our domestic tranquillity have been suppressed by the citizens themselves. Indeed, the nature of our political system and the spirit of the people are such that the employment of any other than a militia force on these occasions would inevitably have the effect of rendering every contest more protracted and sanguinary. A regular force, in the permanent service of the central government, is apt to be regarded, however unjustly, as an instrument of power without affinity with the mass of citizens; and when employed against any portion of the people, it assumes from that very circumstance the aspect of oppression. But to a body of insurgents the spectacle of a military force depending upon the separate authority of the State, drawn from among themselves, and composed of those who have participated in the very evils which they are seeking to redress, presents a moral example of forbearance, order, and submission to the laws, which must have a powerful influence in allaying the violence of their resolutions. With the established militia system, an overwhelming force may be embodied on the most sudden emergency in any quarter of the country; and it is one of the most salutary consequences of the employment of this species of force, that the military mass is dissolved as readily as it is created, without leaving a vestige behind it to commemorate the disgrace of the vanquished and perpetuate exasperation of feeling. If a portion of the regular army had been employed in suppressing the recent disturbance at Providence, it may justly be questioned whether the public order would have been so promptly reëstablished, or the laws so soon and so silently have resumed their sway. But the most important relation in which the militia can be considered, is that which it bears to the public defence. The modern practice in Europe of maintaining large standing armies for defensive purposes in time of peace makes it necessary for countries contiguous to each other to be constantly equipped in the same armor with which they are liable to be assailed. Such a state of martial preparation is highly unfavorable to national wealth, by withdrawing from the productive departments of industry a large number of laborers; it is exceedingly expensive and burdensome to the community from which the means of maintaining it are drawn; and it is in principle unfriendly to popular liberty, by arraying on the side of the government large masses of armed men under its absolute control. Our geographical position happily dispenses in a great degree with this species of military preparation, and enables us to rest our public safety upon the people themselves, withdrawing none permanently from the ordinary pursuits of industry in peace, bringing in time of war the highest possible enthusiasm and spirit to the defence of our possessions, and through all vicissitudes insuring to popular liberty its most certain protection. The policy of the United States is eminently pacific; the genius of our institutions, the divisions of our industry, our habits, and the spirit of society are all averse to external acquisition; our schemes of aggrandizement have a reference only to the development of our own resources upon our own soil, by force of the enterprise and industry of our own citizens. The militia system is peculiarly fitted to cherish this spirit of peace, and to eradicate every other inconsistent with it: it is calculated for defence only, and not for offence or conquest. Standing armies, on the other hand, are calculated for offence as well as protection; and one of the evils of maintaining a large regular force is, that it invites to conquest by inspiring a consciousness of the ability to execute its purposes. It would seem to be unwise, therefore, whether we look to the most profitable employment of our resources, the security of our popular liberties, or the removal of all |