trick; and that the father, being her tenant, could not dispute her title.

Satterlee took the cause to the supreme court of Pennsylvania, where it was decided, that, under the title by which Matthewson and Satterlee originally held, called a Connecticut title, the relation of landlord and tenant could not exist; and the court reversed the decision below and awarded a new trial.

Immediately after this decision the legislature of Pennsylvania passed a law enacting that the relation of landlord and tenant should exist under a Connecticut title as under any other.

When the cause came on again in the court of common pleas, this law was held binding, and verdict and judgment were again given for Mrs. Matthewson. To the opinion of the court which produced this verdict a bill of exceptions was taken, and the case tried again before the supreme court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the judgment of the court below. Satterlee (the son, the father being dead) then brought the cause to the supreme court of the United States, on a writ of error, alleging the act of Pennsylvania, before referred to, to be unconstitutional.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Judge Washington as follows:

THIS is a writ of error to the supreme court of Pennsylvania. An ejectment was commenced by the defendant in error in the court of common pleas against Elisha Satterlee to recover the land in controversy, and, upon the motion of the plaintiff in error, he was admitted, as her landlord, a defendant to the suit. The plaintiff at the trial set up a title under a warrant dated the 10th of January, 1812, founded upon an improvement in the year 1785, which, it was admitted, was under a Connecticut title, and a patent bearing date the 19th of February, 1813.

The defendant claimed title under a patent issued to Wharton in the year 1781, and a conveyance by him to John F.

Satterlee, in April, 1812. It was contended on the part of the plaintiff, that, admitting the defendant's title to be the oldest and best, yet he was stopped from setting it up in that suit, as it appeared in evidence that he had come into possession as tenant to the plaintiff some time in the year 1790. The court of common pleas decided in favor of the plaintiff upon the ground just stated, and judgment was accordingly rendered for her. Upon a writ of error to the supreme court of that state, that court decided, in June, 1825, (13 Sergeant and Rawle's Reports, 133,) that, by the settled law of Pennsylvania, the relation of landlord and tenant could not subsist under a Connecticut title; upon which ground the judgment was reversed, and a venire facias de novo was awarded.

On the 8th of April, 1826, and before the second trial of this cause took place, the legislature of that state passed a law in substance as follows, namely, "that the relation of landlord and tenant shall exist, and be held as fully and effectually between Connecticut settlers and Pennsylvania claimants as between other citizens of this commonwealth, on the trial of any cause now pending, or hereafter to be brought within this commonwealth, any law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding."

Upon the retrial of this cause in the inferior court, in May, 1826, evidence was given conducing to prove that the land in dispute was purchased of Wharton by Elisha Satterlee, the father of John F. Satterlee, and that by his direction the conveyance was made to the son. It further appeared in evidence, that the son brought an ejectment against his father in the year 1813, and by some contrivance between those parties, alleged by the plaintiff below to be merely colorable and fraudulent, for the purpose of depriving her of her possession, obtained a judgment and execution thereon, under which the possession was delivered to the plaintiff in that suit, who immediately afterwards leased the premises to the father for two lives, at a rent of one dollar per annum. The fairness of the transactions was made a question on the trial, and it was asserted

by the plaintiff, that, notwithstanding the eviction of Elisha Satterlee under the above proceedings, he still continued to be her tenant.

The judge, after noticing in his charge the decision of the supreme court in 1825, and the act of assembly before recited, stated to the jury the general principle of law, which prevents a tenant from controverting the title of his landlord by showing it to be defective, the exception to that principle where the landlord claims under a Connecticut title, as laid down by the above decision, and the effect of the act of assembly upon that decision, which act he pronounced to be binding on the court. He, therefore, concluded, and so charged the jury, that, if they should be satisfied, from the evidence, that the transactions between the two Satterlees before mentioned were bonâ fide, and that John F. Satterlee was the actual purchaser of the land, then the defendants might set up the eviction as a bar to the plaintiff's recovery as landlord. But that, if the jury should be satisfied that those transactions were collusive, and that Elisha Satterlee was in fact the real purchaser, and the name of his son inserted in the deed for the fraudulent purpose of destroying the right of the plaintiff as landlord; then the merely claiming under a Connecticut title would not deprive her of her right to recover in that suit.

To this charge, of which the substance only has been stated, an exception was taken, and the whole of it is spread upon the record. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff; and judgment being rendered for her, the cause was again taken to the supreme court by a writ of error.

The only question which occurs in this cause, which it is competent to this court to decide, is, whether the statute of Pennsylvania, which has been mentioned, of the 8th of April, 1826, is or is not objectionable, on the ground of its repugnancy to the constitution of the United States. But before this inquiry is gone into, it will be proper to dispose of a preliminary objection made to the jurisdiction of this court, upon the ground, that there is nothing apparent on this record to

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raise that question, or otherwise to bring this case within any of the provisions of the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act of 1789.

Questions of this nature have frequently occurred in this court, and have given occasion for a critical examination of the above section, which has resulted in the adoption of certain principles of construction applicable to it, by which the objection now to be considered may, without much difficulty, be decided.* One of those principles is, that, if it sufficiently appear from the record itself, that the repugnancy of a statute of a state to the constitution of the United States was drawn into question, or that that question was applicable to the case, this court has jurisdiction of the cause under the section of the act referred to; although the record should not, in terms, state a misconstruction of the constitution of the United States, or that the repugnancy of the statute of the state to any part of that constitution was drawn into question.

Now it is manifest from this record, not only that the constitutionality of the statute of the 8th of April, 1826, was drawn into question, and was applicable to the case, but that it was so applied by the judge, and formed the basis of his opinion to the jury, that they should find in favor of the plaintiff, if in other respects she was entitled to a verdict. It is equally manifest that the right of the plaintiff to recover in that action depended on that statute; the effect of which was to change the law, as the supreme court had decided it to be in this very case in the year 1825. (13 Sergeant and Rawle, 133.)

That the charge of the judge forms a part of this record is unquestionable. It was made so by the bill of exceptions, and would have been so without it, under the statute of the 24th of February, 1806, of that state; which directs, that, in all cases in which the opinion of the court shall be delivered, if either party require it, it is made the duty of the judges to reduce

* 2 Wheaton's Reports, 363; 4 Wheaton's Reports, 311; 12 Wheaton's Reports, 117.

the opinion, with their reasons therefor, to writing, and to file the same of record in the cause. In the case of Downing v. Baldwin, (1 Sergeant and Rawle, 298,) it was decided by the supreme court of Pennsylvania, that the opinion so filed becomes part of the record, and that any error in it may be taken advantage of on a writ of error without a bill of exceptions.

It will be sufficient to add that this opinion of the court of common pleas was, upon a writ of error, adopted and affirmed by the supreme court; and it is the judgment of that court upon the point so decided by the inferior court, and not the reasoning of the judges upon it, which this court is now called upon to revise.

We come now to the main question in this cause. Is the act which is objected to repugnant to any provision of the constitution of the United States? It is alleged to be so by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, for a variety of reasons; and particularly, because it impairs the obligation of the contract between the state of Pennsylvania and the plaintiff who claims title under her grant to Wharton, as well as of the contract between Satterlee and Matthewson; because it creates a contract between parties where none previously existed, by rendering that a binding contract which the law of the land had declared to be invalid; and because it operates to divest and destroy the vested rights of the plaintiff. Another objection relied upon is, that, in passing the act in question, the legislature exercised those functions which belong exclusively to the judicial branch of the government.

Let these objections be considered. The grant to Wharton bestowed upon him a fee simple estate in the land granted, together with all the rights, privileges, and advantages which, by the laws of Pennsylvania, that instrument might legally pass. Were any of those rights, which, it is admitted, vested in his vendee or alienee, disturbed, or impaired, by the act under consideration? It does not appear from the record, or even from the reasoning of the judges of either court, that they were in