ject will be effected by the principle of apportionment, which is an operation upon states, and not on individuals; for each state will be debited for the amount of its quota of the tax, and credited for its payments. This brings it to the old system of requisitions. An equal rule is doubtless the best. But how is this to be applied? to states or to individuals? The latter are the objects of taxation, without reference to states, except in the case of direct taxes. The fiscal power is exerted certainly, equally, and effectually on individuals; it cannot be exerted on states. The history of the United Netherlands, and of our own country, will evince the truth of this position. The government of the United States could not go on under the confederation, because congress were obliged to proceed in the line of requisition. Congress could not, under the old confederation, raise money by taxes, be the public exigencies ever so pressing and great. They had no coërcive authority; if they had, it must have been exercised against the delinquent states, which would be ineffectual, or terminate in a separation. Requisitions were a dead letter, unless the state legislatures could be brought into action; and when they were, the sums raised were very disproportional. Unequal contributions or payments engendered discontent, and fomented state jealousy. Whenever it shall be thought necessary or expedient to lay a direct tax on land, where the object is one and the same, it is to be apprehended that it will be a fund not much more productive than that of requisition under the former government. Let us put the case. A given sum is to be raised from the landed property in the United States. It is easy to apportion this sum, or to assign to each state its quota. The constitution gives the rule. Suppose the proportion of North Carolina to be eighty thousand dollars. This sum is to be laid on the landed property in the state; but by what rule, and by whom? Shall every acre pay the same sum, without regard to its quality, value, situation, or productiveness? This would be manifestly unjust. Do the laws of the different states furnish sufficient data for the purpose of forming one common rule, comprehending the quality, situa

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tion, and value of the lands? In some of the states there has been no land tax for several years; and where there has been, the mode of laying the tax is so various, and the diversity in the land is so great, that no common principle can be deduced and carried into practice. Do the laws of each state furnish data from whence to extract a rule whose operation shall be equal and certain in the same state? Even this is doubtful. Besides, subdivisions will be necessary; the apportionment of the state, and, perhaps, of a particular part of the state, is again to be apportioned among counties, townships, parishes, or districts. If the lands be classed, then a specific value must be annexed to each class. And there a question arises, How often are classifications and assessments to be made? Annually, triennially, septennially? The oftener they are made, the greater will be the expense; and the seldomer they are made, the greater will be the inequality and injustice. In the process of the operation a number of persons will be necessary to class, to value, and assess the land; and after all the guards and provisions that can be devised, we must ultimately rely upon the discretion of the officers in the exercise of their functions. Tribunals of appeal must also be instituted to hear and decide upon unjust valuations, or the assessors will act ad libitum, without check or control. The work, it is to be feared, will be operose and unproductive, and full of inequality, injustice, and oppression. Let us, however, hope that a system of land taxation may be so corrected and matured by practice as to become easy and equal in its operation, and productive and beneficial in its effects. But to return. A tax on carriages, if apportioned, would be oppressive and pernicious. How would it work? In some states there are many carriages, and in others but few. Shall the whole sum fall on one or two individuals in a state, who may happen to own and possess carriages? The thing would be absurd and inequitable. In answer to this objection, it has been observed that the sum, and not the tax, is to be apportioned; and that congress may select in the different states different articles or objects from whence to raise the apportioned

sum. The idea is novel. What, shall land be taxed in one state, slaves in another, carriages in a third, and horses in a fourth; or shall several of these be thrown together, in order to levy and make the quotaed sum? The scheme is fanciful. It would not work well, and, perhaps, is utterly impracticable. It is easy to discern that great, and, perhaps, insurmountable, obstacles must arise in forming the subordinate arrangements necessary to carry the system into effect; when formed, the operation would be slow and expensive, unequal and unjust. If a tax upon land, where the object is simple and uniform throughout the states, is scarcely practicable, what shall we say of a tax attempted to be apportioned among, and raised and collected from, a number of dissimilar objects? The difficulty will increase with the number and variety of the things proposed for taxation. We shall be obliged to resort to intricate and endless valuations and assessments, in which everything will be arbitrary, and nothing certain. There will be no rule to walk by. The rule of uniformity, on the contrary, implies certainty, and leaves nothing to the will and pleasure of the assessor. In such case, the object and the sum coïncide, the rule and the thing unite, and, of course, there can be no imposition. The truth is, that the articles taxed in one state should be taxed in another; in this way the spirit of jealousy is appeased, and tranquillity preserved; in this way, the pressure on industry will be equal in the several states, and the relation between the different subjects of taxation duly preserved. Apportionment is an operation on states, and involves valuations and assessments, which are arbitrary, and should not be resorted to but in case of necessity. Uniformity is an instant operation on individuals, without the intervention of assessments, or any regard to states, and is at once easy, certain, and efficacious. All taxes on expenses or consumption are indirect taxes. A tax on carriages is of this kind, and of course is not a direct tax. Indirect taxes are circuitous modes of reaching the revenue of individuals, who generally live according to their income. In many cases of this nature the individual may be said

to tax himself. I shall close the discourse with reading a passage or two from Smith's Wealth of Nations.

"The impossibility of taxing people in proportion to their revenue, by any capitation, seems to have given occasion to the invention of taxes upon consumable commodities; the state, not knowing how to tax directly and proportionably the revenue of its subjects, endeavors to tax it indirectly by taxing their expense, which it is supposed in most cases will be nearly in proportion to their revenue. Their expense is taxed by taxing the consumable commodities upon which it is laid out." Vol. iii. page 331.

"Consumable commodities, whether necessaries or luxuries, may be taxed in two different ways; the consumer may either pay an annual sum on account of his using or consuming goods of a certain kind, or the goods may be taxed while they remain in the hands of the dealer, and before they are delivered to the consumer. The consumable goods which last a considerable time before they are consumed altogether are most properly taxed in the one way; those of which the consumption is immediate, or more speedy, in the other; the coach tax and plate tax are examples of the former method of imposing; the greater part of the other duties of excise and customs, of the latter." Vol. iii. page 341.

I am, therefore, of opinion that the judgment rendered in the circuit court of Virginia ought to be affirmed.

IREDELL, J. —I agree in opinion with my brothers who have already expressed theirs, that the tax in question is agreeable to the constitution; and the reasons which have satisfied me can be delivered in a very few words, since I think the constitution itself affords a clear guide to decide the controversy.

The congress possess the power of taxing all taxable objects, without limitation, with the particular exception of a duty on exports.

There are two restrictions only on the exercise of this authority : —

1. All direct taxes must be apportioned.

2. All duties, imposts, and excises must be uniform.

If the carriage tax be a direct tax, within the meaning of the constitution, it must be apportioned.

If it be a duty, impost, or excise, within the meaning of the constitution, it must be uniform.

If it can be considered as a tax, neither direct, within the meaning of the constitution, nor comprehended within the term "duty, impost," or "excise;" there is no provision in the constitution, one way or another; and then it must be left to such an operation of the power as if the authority to lay taxes had been given generally in all instances, without saying whether they should be apportioned or uniform; and in that case I should presume the tax ought to be uniform; because the present constitution was particularly intended to affect individuals, and not states, except in particular cases specified; and this is the leading distinction between the articles of confederation and the present constitution.

As all direct taxes must be apportioned, it is evident that the constitution contemplated none as direct but such as could be apportioned.

If this cannot be apportioned, it is, therefore, not a direct tax, in the sense of the constitution.

That this tax cannot be apportioned is evident. Suppose ten dollars contemplated as a tax on each chariot, or post-chaise, in the United States, and the number of both in all the United States be computed at one hundred and five, the number of representatives in congress.

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This would produce in the whole one thousand and fifty dollars. The share of Virginia, being parts, would be one hundred and ninety dollars. The share of Connecticut, being parts, would be seventy dollars. Then suppose

Virginia had fifty carriages, and Connecticut two. The share of Virginia being one hundred and ninety dollars, this must, of course, be collected from the owners of carriages, and there would, therefore, be collected from each carriage three dollars