If the bank could not sue a person who was a citizen of the same state with any one of its members, in the circuit court, this disability would defeat the power. There is, probably, not a commercial state in the union, some of whose citizens are not members of the Bank of the United States. There is, consequently, scarcely a debt due to the bank for which a suit could be maintained in a federal court, did the jurisdiction of the court depend on citizenship. A general power to sue in any circuit court of the United States, expressed in terms obviously intended to comprehend every case, would thus be construed to comprehend no case. Such a construction cannot be the cor

rect one.

We think, then, that the charter gives to the bank a right to sue in the circuit courts of the United States, without regard to citizenship; and that the certificate on both questions must be in favor of the plaintiff.

9 Wh. 910.

POSTMASTER GENERAL v. EARLY AND OTHERS.

JANUARY TERM, 1827.

[12 Wheaton's Reports, 136-152.]

EARLY was postmaster at Savannah, and with the other defendants executed a bond to pay over postages received by him. He did not do this, and was sued with his coöbligors in the circuit court for the district of Georgia by the postmaster general in his own name. He pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground, that, as the postmaster general had sued in his own name, the United States was not a party to the suit. The opinions of the circuit judges being opposed, the case was certified to the supreme court, the opinion of which was delivered by Chief Justice Marshall, as follows:

THE postoffice department was established at the commencement of the Revolution, under the superintendence of a postmaster general, who was authorized to appoint his deputies, and was made responsible for their conduct. Soon after the adoption of the present government, in September, 1789, congress passed a temporary act, directing that a postmaster general should be appointed, and that his powers, and the regulations of his office, should be the same as they last were, "under the resolutions and ordinances of the last congress. The power of appointing deputies, therefore, and the responsibility for their conduct, still remained with the postmaster general.

This act was continued until the first day of June, 1792. In February, 1792, an act was passed detailing the duties and powers of the postmaster general, and fixing the rates of postage. It directs his deputies to settle at the end of every three months, and to pay up the moneys in their hands; on failure to do which, it becomes the duty of the postmaster general "to

cause a suit to be commenced against the person or persons so neglecting or refusing. And if the postmaster general shall not cause such suit to be commenced within three months from the end of every such three months, the balances due from every such delinquent shall be charged to and recoverable from him." This act was to take effect on the first of June, 1792, and to continue for two years. In May, 1794, a permanent act was passed. It retains the provision requiring the postmaster general to settle quarterly with his deputies, but omits that which makes it his duty to cause suits to be instituted within three months after failure.

In March, 1799, the subject was again taken up, and congress passed an act which retains the clause making it the duty of the deputy postmasters to settle their accounts quarterly, and reinstates that which directs the postmaster general to cause suits to be instituted against delinquents; substituting six months in the place of three after the expiration of the quarter, under the penalty of being himself chargeable with the arrears due from such delinquent. This act declares that all causes of action arising under it may be sued before the judicial courts of the several states and of the several territories of the United States.

In April, 1810, congress passed an act for regulating the postoffice establishment, which enacts, among other things, that all suits, thereafter to be brought for the recovery of debts or balances due to the general postoffice, should be instituted in the name of "the postmaster general of the United States." This act also authorizes all causes of action arising under it to be sued in the courts of the states and territories.

In March, 1815, congress passed "An Act to vest more effectually in the State Courts, and in the District Courts of the United States, Jurisdiction in the Cases therein mentioned."

This act enables the state courts to take cognizance of all suits arising under any law for the collection of any direct tax or internal duties of the United States. The fourth section contains this clause: "And be it further enacted, that the dis

trict court of the United States shall have cognizance, concurrent with the courts and magistrates of the several states, and the circuit courts of the United States, of all suits at common law, where the United States, or any officer thereof, under the authority of any act of congress, shall sue, although the debt, claim, or other matter in dispute, shall not amount to one hundred dollars." On these several acts the question of jurisdiction depends.

The suit is brought for money due to the United States; and at any time previous to the act of 1810, the suit for the money, had no bond been taken, might have been brought in the name of the United States. It is not certain, that, independent of the bond, it could have been instituted in the name of any other party. The courts of the United States had, of course, jurisdiction. The laws make it the duty of the postmaster general to "cause suits to be instituted," not to bring them; and it was not until March, 1799, that congress authorized these suits to be instituted in the state courts. It is obvious that the right to institute them in those courts, anterior to the passage of that act, was doubted, at any rate, was not exercised; for it could not have been deemed necessary to give expressly the power to sue in those courts, had the power been admitted to exist, and been commonly exercised. We must suppose, then, that these suits were usually instituted in the courts of the United States; and no doubt could be entertained on the question of jurisdiction, if they were brought, as they certainly might have been, in the name of the United States.

The act of 1810 directed that all suits for debts, or balances, due to the general postoffice, should be brought in the name of the postmaster general. The manner in which this change in the style of the suit might affect jurisdiction was not noticed, and no provision was made for this new state of things. Those debts and balances which were due to the general postoffice were not due to the officer personally, but to the office, and were to be sued for and collected for the United States. The

money belonged to the nation, not to the individual by whose agency it was to be brought into the treasury. The whole course of opinion and of legislation on this subject is, that, although, for convenience, and to save expense to the debtors, recourse may be had to the state courts for the recovery of small sums, yet a right to resort to the courts of the union in suits for money due to the United States was never intended to be relinquished. If the effect of any provision in a statute be to abolish this jurisdiction, it must be an effect which was neither intended nor foreseen. That construction which will produce a consequence so directly opposite to the whole spirit of our legislation ought to be avoided, if it can be avoided without a total disregard of those rules by which courts of justice must be governed.

If the question had rested solely on the act of 1810, it is probable that the aid of the legislature might have been thought indispensable to the jurisdiction of the federal courts over suits brought for the recovery of debts and balances due to the general postoffice. But it does not rest solely on that act. The act of 1815 contains a clause which does, we think, confer this jurisdiction. It cannot be doubted that this clause vests jurisdiction expressly in the district courts, in all suits at common law where any officer of the United States sues under the authority of any act of congress. The postmaster general is an officer of the United States, who sues under the authority of the act of 1810, which makes it his duty to sue for debts and balances due to the office he superintends, and obliges him to sue in his own name.

It has been contended that this clause, if it gives jurisdiction, gives it only where the demand is under one hundred dollars. We do not think the words will sustain this criticism.

The right to take cognizance of suits brought by any officer of the United States, under authority of any act of congress, is first given in general words, comprehending sums to any amount. The limitation which follows is not a proviso that the sum shall not exceed the sum of one hundred dollars; it is no