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act of congress by which the city of Washington was authorized to establish the lottery. It then states that the lottery was regularly established by virtue of the act, and concludes with referring to the court the questions, whether the act of congress be valid ? whether, on its just construction, it constitutes a bar to the prosecution ? and, whether the act of assembly, on which the prosecution is founded, be not itself invalid ? These questions were decided against the operation of the act of congress, and in favor of the operation of the act of the state.
If the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act be inspected, it will at once be perceived that it comprehends expressly the case under consideration.
But it is not upon the letter of the act that the gentleman who stated this point in this form founds his argument. Both gentlemen concur substantially in their views of this part of the case. They deny that the act of congress on which the plaintiff in error relies is a law of the United States ; or, if a law of the United States, is within the second clause of the sixth article.
In the enumeration of the powers of congress, which is made in the eighth section of the first article, we find that of exercising exclusive legislation over such district as shall become the seat of government. This power, like all others which are specified, is conferred on congress as the legislature of the union; for, strip them of that character, and they would not possess it. In no other character can it be exercised. In legislating for the district, they necessarily preserve the character of the legislature of the union ; for it is in that character alone that the constitution confers on them this power of exclusive legislation. This proposition need not be enforced.
The second clause of the sixth article declares that “this constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land."
The clause which gives exclusive jurisdiction is unquestionably a part of the constitution, and as such binds all the
United States. Those who contend that acts of congress made in pursuance of this power do not, like acts made in pursuance of other powers, bind the nation, ought to show some safe and clear rule which shall support this construction, and prove that an act of congress, clothed in all the forms which attend other legislative acts, and passed in virtue of a power conferred on and exercised by congress as the legislature of the union, is not a law of the United States, and does not bind them.
One of the gentlemen sought to illustrate his proposition, that congress, when legislating for the district, assumed a distinct character, and was reduced to a mere local legislature, whose laws could possess no obligation out of the ten miles square, by a reference to the complex character of this court. It is, they say, a court of common law and a court of equity. Its character, when sitting as a court of common law, is as distinct from is cha racter, when sitting as a court of equity, as if the powers belonging to those departments were vested in different tribunals. Though united in the same tribunal, they are never confounded with each other.
Without inquiring how far the union of different characters in one court may be applicable, in principle, to the union in congress of the power of exclusive legislation in some places, and of limited legislation in others, it may be observed, that the forms of proceedings in a court of law are so totally unlike the forms of proceedings in a court of equity that a mere inspection of the record gives decisive information of the character in which the court sits, and consequently of the extent of its powers. But if the forms of proceeding were precisely the same, and the court the same, the distinction would disappear.
Since congress legislates in the same forms, and in the same character, in virtue of powers of equal obligation, conferred in the same instrument, when exercising its exclusive powers of legislation, as well as when exercising those which are limited, we must inquire whether there be anything in the nature of this exclusive legislation, which necessarily confines the operation of the laws made in virtue of this power to the place with a view to which they are made.
Connected with the power to legislate within this district is a similar power in forts, arsenals, dock-yards, &c. Congress has a right to punish murder in a fort, or other place, within its exclusive jurisdiction ; but no general right to punish murder committed within any of the states. In the act for the punishment of crimes against the United States, murder committed within a fort, or any other place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, is punished with death. Thus congress legislates in the same act, under its exclusive and its limited powers.
The act proceeds to direct that the body of the criminal, after execution, may be delivered to a surgeon for dissection, and punishes any person who shall rescue such body during its conveyance from the place of execution to the surgeon to whom it is to be delivered.
Let these actual provisions of the law, or any other provisions which can be made on the subject, be considered with a view to the character in which congress acts when exercising its powers of exclusive legislation.
If congress is to be considered merely as a local legislature, invested, as to this object, with powers limited to the fort, or other place, in which the murder may be committed, if its general powers cannot come in aid of these local powers, how can the offence be tried in any other court than that of the place in which it has been committed ? How can the offender be conveyed to, or tried in, any other place ? How can he be executed elsewhere? How can his body be conveyed through a country under the jurisdiction of another sovereign, and the individual punished, who, within that jurisdiction, shall rescue the body?
Were any one state of the union to pass a law for trying a criminal in a court not created by itself, in a place not within its jurisdiction, and direct the sentence to be executed without its territory, we should all perceive and acknowledge its incompetency to such a course of legislation. . If congress be not equally incompetent, it is because that body unites the powers of local legislation with those which are to operate through
the union, and may use the last in aid of the first ; or because the power of exercising exclusive legislation draws after it, as an incident, the power of making that legislation effectual, and the incidental power may be exercised throughout the union, because the principal power is given to that body as, the legislature of the union.
So, in the same act, a person who, having knowledge of the commission of murder, or other felony, on the high seas, or within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or other place or district of country, within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall conceal the same, &c., he shall be adjudged guilty of misprision of felony, and shall be adjudged to be imprisoned, &c.
It is clear that congress cannot punish felonies generally, and, of consequence, cannot punish misprision of felony. It is equally clear that a state legislature, the state of Maryland, for example, cannot punish those who, in another state, conceal a felony committed in Maryland. How, then, is it that congress, legislating exclusively for a fort, punishes those who, out of that fort, conceal a felony committed within it ?
The solution and the only solution of the difficulty is that the power vested in congress, as the legislature of the United States, to legislate exclusively within any place ceded by a state, carries with it, as an incident, the right to make that power effectual. If a felon escape out of the state in which the act has been committed, the government cannot pursue him into another state, and apprehend him there, but must demand him from the executive power of that other state. If congress were to be considered merely as the local legislature for the fort or other place in which the offence might be committed, then this principle would apply to them as to other local legislatures; and the felon, who should escape out of the fort, or other place, in which the felony may have been committed, could not be apprehended by the marshal, but must be demanded from the executive of the state. But we know that the principle does not apply; and the reason is that congress is not a local legislature, but exercises this particular power, like all its other pow
ers, in its high character as the legislature of the union. The American people thought it a necessary power, and they conferred it for their own benefit. Being so conferred, it carries with it all those incidental powers which are necessary to its complete and effectual execution.
Whether any particular law be designed to operate without the district or not depends on the words of that law. If it be designed so to operate, then the question, whether the power so exercised be incidental to the power of exclusive legislation, and be warranted by the constitution, requires a consideration of that instrument. In such cases the constitution and the law must be compared and construed. This is the exercise of jurisdiction. It is the only exercise of it which is allowed in such a case. For the act of congress directs that “no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal, in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said constitution, treaties," &c.
The whole merits of this case, then, consist in the construction of the constitution and the act of congress. The jurisdiction of the court, if acknowledged, goes no farther. This we are required to do without the exercise of jurisdiction.
The counsel for the state of Virginia have, in support of this motion, urged many arguments of great weight against the application of the act of congress to such a case as this ; but those arguments go to the construction of the constitution, or of the law, or of both, and seem, therefore, rather calculated to sustain their cause upon its merits than to prove a failure of jurisdiction in the court.
After having bestowed upon this question the most deliberate consideration of which we are capable, the court is unanimously of opinion that the objections to its jurisdiction are not sustained, and that the motion ought to be overruled.