the opposition in America should be known; in some degree, to the ancient habits of the eastern co lonies; and in some degree to the prejudices against a regular army, and a disinclination to believe in the superiority of a permanent and disciplined force.

It is probable that the hope was cherished, by many, that the Commissioners, who had been long expected, would bring with them propositions which would serve as the basis of an accommodation: and though the majority had taken up opinions in favour of independence, yet the minority was capable of impeding measures which seemed to exclude every idea of terminating the war but by the sword. In a private letter, written by General Washington, while attending Congress, in May, to a confidential friend, he declared the opinion, that nothing was to be expected from the Commissioners, and that the idea had only been suggested, to deceive America, and prevent her taking those measures which her situation rendered necessary. This," he added, "has been too effectually accomplished, as many members of Congress, in short, the representatives of whole provinces, are still feeding themselves on the dainty food of reconciliation; and though they will not allow that the expectation of it has any influence on their judgments, so far as respects preparations For defence, it is but too obvious that it has an opera

operation on every part of their conduct, and is a clog to all their proceedings. It is not in the nature of things to be otherwise; for no man, who entertains a hope of seeing this dispute speedily and equitably adjusted by Commissioners, will go to the same expense, and incur the same hazards, to prepare for the worst event, that he will who believes that he must conquer, or submit unconditionally, and take the consequences-such as confiscation and hanging."

Whatever might be the causes, it is certain that the American army was not in a condition to realize the hopes of the country, or the wishes of its Chief. It consisted, when General Howe landed on Staten Island, of not more than ten thousand men. This small force was not yet sufficiently furnished with arms, and the men were very sickly. The diseases which always afflict new troops, were probably, in some degree, increased by their being greatly exposed, in consequence of the want of tents. At the instance of the General, some regiments, stationed in the different states, were ordered to join him; and, in addition to the requisitions of men to serve till December, requisitions not yet complied with, the neighbouring militias were called into service for the present exigency. Yet, on the eighth of August, in a letter to Congress, he stated, that, "for the several ports on New York, Long, and Go vernor's Island, and Paulus-hook, the army

consisted only of seventeen thousand two hundred and twenty-five men, of whom three thousand six hundred and sixty-eight were sick; and that in case of an immediate attack, he could count certainly on no other addition to his numbers than a battalion from Maryland, under the command of Colonel Smallwood. This force was rendered the more inadequate to its objects, by being necessarily divided for the defence of posts, some of which were fifteen miles distant from others, with navigable waters between them."

"These things," continued the letter," are melancholy, but they are, nevertheless, true. I hope for better. Under every disadvantage, my utmost exertions shall be employed to bring about the great end we have in view; and so far as I can judge from the professions and apparent dispositions of my troops, I shall have their support. The superiority of the enemy, and the expected attack, do not seem to have depressed their spirits. These considerations lead me to think, that though the appeal may not terminate so happily as I could wish, yet the enemy will not succeed in their views without considerable loss. Any advantage they may gain, I trust, will cost them dear."

Soon after this letter, the army was reinforced by Smallwood's regiment, and by two regiments from Pennsylvania, with a body of New England and New York militia, which increased it to twenty

twenty-seven thousand men, of whom one-fourth were sick.

A part of this army was stationed on Long Island, where Major-General Green originally commanded; but he being, unfortunately, taken extremely, ill, was succeeded by Major-General Sullivan.. The residue occupied different stations on York Island, except two small detachments, one on Governor's Island, and the other at Paulus-hook ; and except a part of the New York militia, under General Clinton, who were stationed on the Sound towards New Rochelle, East and West Chester, in order to give some opposition to the enemy, in the event of a sudden attempt to land above Kingsbridge, and cut off the communication with the country.

As an attack from the enemy was daily expected, and it was believed that the influence of the first battle would be very considerable, all the vigilance and attention of the General was unremittingly exerted, to prevent, among his raw troops, those unmilitary and dangerous practices into which men, unused to the necessary restraints of a camp, will ever indulge; and to establish, as far as possible, those principles of subordination, and exact observance of orders, so essential to victory. He also used every expedient to rouse the latent sparks of that enthusiastic love of liberty, that indignation against the invaders of their country,

KK 3

try, and that native courage, which he believed now animated the bosoms of Americans; and which he greatly relied on as substitutes for discipline and experience. "The time," say his orders issued soon after the arrival of General Howe, "is now near at hand, which must probably determine whether Americans are to be free men or slaves; whether they are to have any property they can call their own; whether their houses and farms are to be pillaged and destroyed, and themselves consigned to a state of wretchedness, from which no human efforts will deliver them. The fate of unborn millions will now depend, under God, on the courage and conduct of this army. Our cruel and unrelenting enemy leaves us only. the choice of a brave resistance, or the most abject. submission. We have, therefore, to resolve to conquer, or to die. Our own, our country's honour, call upon us for a vigorous and manly exertion; and if we now shamefully fail, we shall become infamous to the whole world. Let us then rely on the goodness of our cause and the aid of the Supreme Being, in whose hands victory is, to animate and encourage us to great and noble actions. The eyes of all our countrymen are now upon us, and we shall have their blessings and praises, if happily we are the instruments of saving them from the tyranny meditated against them. Let us, therefore, animate and encourage each

other,