any attempt of the enemy to occupy that ground. It was, however, thought essential, in order to avoid the absolute dissolution of the present undisciplined army, in the event of their being forced from their lines by the enemy, to appoint a place of general rendezvous; and the Welsh mountains near Cambridge, and the rear of the line at Roxbury, were fixed on. In the mean time great vigilance was used in watching the enemy. All the whale boats, for several miles along the coast, were collected, and employed in keeping a look out by night on the water; and express horses were kept in perpetual readiness at the different stations for the purpose of communicating the most prompt intelligence of any movement which might be discovered.

The two armies continued to work on their fortifications without seriously molesting each other. Slight skirmishes occasionally happened, in which very little execution was done; and although the Americans made some advances towards the enemy, no attempt was made to dislodge them.

This state of apparent inactivity was ill suited to the enterprising temper of the Commander in Chief, and was very reluctantly submitted to. The situation of America appeared to him to require great efforts to destroy totally the army now in Boston, before it should be strengthened by the reinforcements which might be expected in the ensuing

spring.

spring. Such an event, he persuaded himself, would decide the contest. It would give to the British nation and minister such evidence of the vigour and determination of the colonies, as would induce them to desist from the further prosecution of the war, while it would encourage and unite all America in the common cause. If, on the other hand, this measure should not be adopted, the affairs of the united colonies appeared to him to wear a very serious aspect. A very powerful armament would certainly arrive in the spring, and the duration of the war could not be calculated. He perceived with pain the immense expenses unavoidably incurred, the amount of which could not be diminished; and seeing no solid revenues to support them, he was extremely apprehensive that the finances of his country must sink under such a burden. He reflected too, that

his present army must soon dissolve, and he could not look with unconcern at the very critical situation in which that event would place him.

Under these impressions, he thought much ought to be risked to obtain so desirable an object as the destruction of the army now in Boston; and with this view, he frequently reconnoitred the situation of the enemy, and was assiduous in collecting every information respecting their strength. The result of his observations and enquiries seems to have been a strong inclination to the opinion, that

to

to carry the works of the enemy by storm, though very hazardous, was not absolutely impracticable. He therefore determined to call the attention of his general officers to this subject, and having previously communicated to them in a letter the points he wished them to consider, they were as sembled in council for the purpose of deciding on the meditated attack. They were unanimously of opinion, that, "for the present, at least, the attempt should not be made." This resolution having been formed, the original plan of keeping up the blockade, and strengthening the camp, was persevered in.

In the mean time the distress of the British army, for fresh meat and vegetables, became very considerable. They could not receive these articles in the ordinary mode from the country; and they could not spare such a number of troops for distant excursions, as might safely penetrate far enough to obtain adequate supplies. Some small parties sailed from Boston, probably with this object; but they met, wherever they appeared, with such opposition from the militia and minute men, as to be obliged to return to their ships, frequently without having obtained such ample supplies as their situation required. To guard against these plundering parties, required a degree of exertion and activity on the part of the inhabitants of the sea coast, which they soon found extremely harrassing; and

the

the governors of the different colonies were urgent that detachments from the main army should be ordered to protect them from these predatory incursions. Although it was impossible to spare the troops demanded; yet the refusal to comply with these requests occasioned no inconsiderable degree of irritation. So difficult is it for those who view only a part of a system to judge rightly of the whole; and so certain is it that the great plans formed for the general safety must be deranged, if partial interferences be permitted. These demands of particular protection were so importunate, and the unavoidable refusal to comply with them was so ill received, that it was deemed necessary by Congress, to pass a resolution, declaring that the army before Boston was designed only to oppose the enemy at that place, and ought not to be weakened by detachments for the security of other parts of the country. At Newport, in Rhode Island, the committee sought to secure the town by entering into a compromise with Captain Wallace, who commanded the ships of war on, that station, in which it was stipulated that he should be furnished with provisions, on condition of his sparing the town, and committing no depredations on the country. This compromise, while it secured those who had entered into it, interfered with the general plan of distressing the enemy, by withholding from them all supplies of provisions,

and

and set an example which it was feared would be followed to a most pernicious extent.

Although afterwards the assembly of Rhode Island, in imitation of the other colonies, passed an act for inflicting capital punishment on those who should be convicted of holding any traiterous correspondence with the ministry of Great Britain, or any of their agents; or of supplying the English army or navy with provisions or other necessaries; yet they excepted from the operation of this act, those who should furnish supplies of provisions to Captain Wallace, under his agreement with the town council of Newport. General Washington at length deemed it necessary to interfere, and to represent in a letter addressed to the governor of that province, the mischief to be apprehended from so dangerous a practice.

While the blockade of Boston was thus perseveringly maintained, and every effort used to distress the enemy in that place, the transactions on other parts of the continent were calculated to attract the utmost attention.

In July, Georgia had entered into the opposition made to the claims of the British Parliament to tax America, and had chosen delegates to represent that province in Congress; after which, the style of the Thirteen United Colonies was assumed, and by that title the English provinces, confederated, and in arms, were thenceforward designated.

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