every thing, they argue, inferentially, that they have no laws. But if ever there were a people, that seem to be protected with care and circumspection from all arbitrary power, both in the executive and judicial department, these are the people that seem to be so protected.

I could show your lordships that they are so sensible of honor, that fines are levied and punishment inflicted according to the rank of the culprits, and that the very authority of the magistrate is dependent on their rank. That the learned counsel should be ignorant of these things is natural enough. They are concerned in the gainful part of their profession. If they know the laws of their own country, which I dare say they do, it is not to be expected that they should know the laws of any other. But, my lords, it is to be expected, that the prisoner should know the Gentoo laws: for he not only cheated Nobkissin of his money to get these laws translated, but he took credit for the publication of the work as an act of public spirit, after shifting the payment from himself, by fraud and peculation. All this has been proved by the testimonies of Mr. Auriol and Mr. Halhed, before your lordships.

We do not bring forward this book as evidence of guilt or innocence, but to show the laws and usages of the country, and to prove the prisoner's knowledge of them.

From the Gentoo we will proceed to the Tartarian government of India, a government established by conquest, and therefore not likely to be distinguished by any marks of extraordinary mildness towards the conquered. The book before me will prove to your lordships, that the head of this government (who is falsely supposed to have a despotic authority) is absolutely elected to his office. Tamerlane was elected; and Ghinges Khân particularly valued himself on improving the laws and institutions of his own country. These laws we only have imperfectly in this book; but we are told in it, and I believe the fact, that he forbad, under pain of death, any prince or other person to presume to cause himself to be proclaimed

great Khân or Emperor, without being first duly elected by the princes lawfully assembled in general diet. He then established the privileges and immunities granted to the Tunkawns, that is, to the nobility and gentry of the country, and afterwards published most severe ordinances against governors who failed in doing their duty, but principally against those who commanded in far distant provinces. This prince was in this case, what I hope your lordships will be, a very severe judge of the governors of countries remote from the seat of the government.

My lords, we have in this book sufficient proof that a Tartarian sovereign could not obtain the recognition of ancient laws, or establish new ones, without the consent of his parliament, that he could not ascend the throne, without being duly elected; and that when so elected, he was bound to preserve the great in all their immunities, and the people in all their rights, liberties, privileges, and properties. We find these great princes restrained by laws, and even making wise and salutary regulations for the countries which they conquered. We find Ghinges Khân establishing one of his sons in a particular office, namely, conservator of those laws; and he has ordered, that they should not only be observed in his time, but by all posterity; and accordingly they are venerated at this time in Asia. If then this very Ghinges Khân, if Tamerlane, did not assume arbitrary power, what are you to think of this man, so bloated with corruption, so bloated with the insolence of unmerited power, declaring that the people of India have no rights, no property, no laws; that he could not be bound even by an English act of parliament; that he was an arbitrary sovereign in India, and could exact what penalties he pleased from the people, at the expense of liberty, property, and even life itself. Compare this man, this compound of pride and presumption, with Ghinges Khân, whose conquests were more considerable than Alexander's, and yet who made the laws the rule of his conduct; compare him with Tamerlane, whose institutes I have before me. I

wish to save your lordships' time, or I could show you in the life of this prince, that he, violent as his conquests were, bloody as all conquests are, ferocious as a Mahomedan making his crusades for the propagation of his religion, he yet knew how to govern his unjust acquisitions with equity and moderation. If any man could be entitled to claim arbitrary power, if such a claim could be justified by extent of conquest, by splendid personal qualities, by great learning and eloquence, Tamerlane was the man who could have made and justified the claim. This prince gave up all his time, not employed in conquests, to the conversation of learned men. He gave himself to all studies that might accomplish a great man. Such a man I say might, if any may, claim arbitrary power. But the very things that made him great, made him sensible that he was but a man. Even in the midst of all his conquests, his tone was a tone of humility; he spoke of laws, as every man must, who knows what laws are; and though he was proud, ferocious, and violent, in the achievement of his conquests, I will venture to say no prince ever established institutes of civil government more honorable to himself, than the institutes of Timour. I shall be content to be brought to shame before your lordships, if the prisoner at your bar can show me one passage, where the assumption of arbitrary power is even hinted at by this great conqueror. He declares, that the nobility of every country shall be considered as his brethren; that the people shall be acknowledged as his children; and that the learned and the dervises shall be particularly protected. But, my lords, what he particularly valued himself upon I shall give your lordships in his own words: "I delivered the oppressed from the hand of the oppressor; and after proof of the oppression, whether on the property or the person, the decision which I passed between them was agreeable to the sacred law; and I did not cause any one person to suffer for the guilt of another."*

* Institutes of Timour, page 165.

My lords, I have only further to inform your lordships, that these institutes of Timour ought to be very well known to Mr. Hastings. He ought to have known, that this prince never claimed arbitrary power, that the principles he adopted were to govern by law, to repress the oppressions of his inferior governors, to recognise in the nobility the respect due to their rank, and in the people the protection to which they were by law entitled. This book was published by Major Davy, and revised by Mr. White. The Major was an excellent Orientalist, he was secretary to Mr. Hastings, to whom, I believe, he dedicated this book. I have inquired of persons the most conversant with the Arabic and Oriental languages; and they are clearly of opinion, that there is internal evidence to prove it of the age of Tamerlane; and he must be the most miserable of critics, who, reading this work with attention, does not see that, if it was not written by this very great monarch himself, it was at least written by some person in his court, and under his immediate inspection. Whether, therefore, this work be the composition of Tamerlane, or whether it was written by some persons of learning near him, through whom he meant to give the world a just idea of his manners, maxims, and government, it is certainly as good authority as Mr. Hastings's Defence, which he has acknowledged to have been written by other people.

From the Tartarian, I shall now proceed to the later Mahomedan conquerors of Hindostan, for it is fit that I should show your lordships the wickedness of pretending that the people of India have no laws or rights. A great proportion of the people are Mahomedans; and Mahomedans are so far from having no laws or rights, that when you name a Mahomedan, you name a man governed by law, and entitled to protection. Mr. Hastings caused to be published, and I am obliged to him for it, a book, called the Hedaia; it is true that he has himself taken credit for the work, and robbed Nobkissin of the money to pay for it; but the value of a book is not lessened because a man stole it. Will you be

lieve, my lords, that a people having no laws, no rights, no property, no honor, would be at the trouble of having so many writers on jurisprudence? and yet there are, I am sure, at least a thousand eminent Mahomedan writers upon law, who have written far more voluminous works than are known in the common law of England; and I verily believe more voluminous than the writings of the Civilians themselves. That this should be done by a people who have no property, is so perfectly ridiculous as scarcely to require refutation; but I shall endeavor to refute it, and without troubling you a great deal.

First, then, I am to tell you, that the Mahomedans are a people amongst whom the science of jurisprudence is much studied and cultivated, that they distinguish it into the law of the Khoran and its authorized commentaries; into the Fetfa, which is the judicial judgments and reports of adjudged cases; into the Canon, which is the regulations made by the emperor, for the sovereign authority in the government of their dominions; and lastly into the Rage ul Mulk, or custom and usage, the common law of the country, which prevails independent of any of the former.

In regard to punishments being arbitrary, I will with your lordships' permission read a passage, which will show you that the magistrate is a responsible person. "If a supreme ruler, such as the caliph for the time being, commit any offence punishable by law, such as whoredom, theft, or drunkenness, he is not subject to any punishment, (but yet if he commit murder he is subject to the law of retaliation, and he is also accountable in matters of property,) because punishment is a right of God, the infliction of which is committed to the caliph (or other supreme magistrate) and to none else; and he cannot inflict punishment upon himself, as in this there is no advantage, because the good proposed in punishment is that it may operate as a warning to deter mankind from sin, and this is not obtained by a person's inflicting punishment upon himself contrary to the rights of the individual, such