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yards or open spaces in the populous and defined districts within a city, and such an enactment every citizen would be bound to obey; and, where sued for a penalty, it would be no defense to a party who had violated the law to show that in his particular case, owing to exceptional circumstances, the regulation was unnecessary or unreasonable.

The will of the Legislature would stand as the reason for the rule, and, being general, no one, however situated, could escape its obligation, unless, indeed, he could establish that, passing beyond the police power, it involved some right of person or property protected by the Constitution. In other words, where the Legislature, in the exercise of the police power, enacts a regulation defining the duty of citizens, either in respect to their personal conduct or the use of their property, the reasonableness of the thing enjoined or prohibited is not an open question, because the supreme legislative power has determined it by enacting the rule. See Dill. Mun. Corp. § 328, and cases cited. But where the Legislature, as in the present case, enacts no general rule of conduct, but invests a subordinate board with the power to investigate and determine the fact whether, in any special case, any use is made of property for purposes of storage, dangerous on account of its liability to originate or extend a conflagration, not prescribing the uses which it permits or disallows, then we are of opinion that in such cases the reasonableness of the determination of the board, or of the order prohibiting a particular use in accordance with such determination, is open to contestation by the party affected thereby, and that he is entitled when sued for a disobedience of the order, to show that it was unreasonable, unnecessary, and oppressive. It was not necessary in this case that the defendant should have been notified (as he was not) of the investigation made of his premises by the appointees of the fire commissioners, or that he should have been afforded an opportunity to be heard before the order was made. Health Department of City of New York v. Rector, etc., of Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833, 27 L. R. A. 710, 45 Am. St. Rep. 579. But we think he was entitled to contest, in the action for the penalty, the reasonableness of the order made and the facts upon which it proceeded. People v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, 140 N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320, 23 L. R. A. 481, 37 Am. St. Rep. 522; Health Department of City of New York v. Rector, etc., of Trinity Church, supra; City of Salem v. Eastern R. Co., 98 Mass. 431, 96 Am. Dec. 650.

* * *

For the denial of this right, we think the judgment should be

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11 See, also, Chatfield v. New Haven (C. C.) 110 Fed. 788 (1901).

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(Supreme Court of United States, 1827. 12 Wheat. 19, 6 L. Ed. 537.)

Error to the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors of the State of New York.

Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the court.1

12

This is a writ of error to the judgment of the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors of the State of New York, being the highest court of that state, and is brought here in virtue of the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act of 1789, c. 20. The original action was a replevin for certain goods and chattels, to which the original defendant put in an avowry, and to that avowry there was a demurrer, assigning nineteen distinct and special causes of demurrer. Upon a joinder in demurrer, the Supreme Court of the state gave judgment against the avowant; and that judgment was affirmed by the high court to which the present writ of error is addressed.

The avowry, in substance, asserts a justification of the taking of the goods and chattels to satisfy a fine and forfeiture imposed upon the original plaintiff by a court-martial, for a failure to enter the service of the United States as a militiaman, when thereto required

proper standards been adopted, is a question we are not called upon to consider. The sufficiency of the standards adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury was committed to his judgment, to be honestly exercised, and if that were important there is no assertion here of bad faith or malice on the part of that officer in fixing the standards, or on the part of the defendant in the performance of the duties resting on him.” Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 496, 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 355, 48 L. Ed. 525 (1904).

Other cases in this collection illustrating the appeal to the courts against administrative action in the matter of public health and safety or order: Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942, 66 L. R. A. 907, 102 Am. St. Rep. 983 (1904); Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 80, 50 Am. Rep. 3 (1883); Craig v. Charleston, 180 Ill. 154, 54 N. E. 184 (1899); Chicago v. Chic. City R. Co., 222 Ill. 560, 78 N. E. 890 (1906); Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 25 Sup. Ct. 18, 49 L. Ed. 169 (1904); Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 397 (1836); Waye v. Thompson, L. R. 15 Q. B. D. 342 (1885); Hutton v. Camden, 39 N. J. Law, 122, 23 Am. Rep. 203 (1876); Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661 (1868); People v. Board of Health of Yonkers, 140 N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320, 23 L. R. A. 481, 37 Am. St. Rep. 522 (1893); Hartman v. Wilmington, 1 Marvel (Del.) 215, 41 Atl. 74 (1894); Health Dept. v. Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833, 27 L. R. A. 710, 45 Am. St. Rep. 579 (1895); Salem v. Eastern R. Co.,

12 Only a portion of the opinion of Story, J., is printed.

by the President of the United States, in pursuance of the act of the 28th of February, 1795, c. 101. It is argued that this avowry is defective, both in substance and form; and it will be our business to discuss the most material of these objections; and as to others, of which no particular notice is taken, it is to be understood. that the court are of opinion that they are either unfounded in fact or in law, and do not require any separate examination.

For the more clear and exact consideration of the subject, it may be necessary to refer to the Constitution of the United States, and some of the provisions of the act of 1795. The Constitution declares. that Congress shall have power "to provide for calling forth the militia, to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions," and also "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States." In pursuance of this authority, the act of 1795 has provided "that whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth such number of the militia of the state or states most convenient to the place of danger, or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion, and to issue his order for that purpose to such officer or officers of the militia as he shall think proper." And like provisions are made for the other cases stated in the Constitution. It has not been denied here that the act of 1795 is within the constitutional authority of Congress, or that Congress may not lawfully provide for cases of imminent danger of invasion, as well as for cases where an inva

98 Mass. 431, 96 Am. Dec. 650 (1868); Reynolds v. Schultz, 27 N. Y. Super. 282 (1867); King v. Davenport, 98 Ill. 305, 38 Am. Rep. 89 (1881); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 29 Sup. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed. 195 (1908); Wilcox v. Heming, 58 Wis. 144, 15 N. W. 435, 46 Am. Rep. 625 (1883); Queen v. Wood, 5 El. & Bl. 49 (1855).

Other cases illustrating the appeal to the courts against administrative action in the matter of refusal or revocation of licenses: Bassett v. Godschall, 3 Wilson, 121 (1770); Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94, 65 Am. Dec. 489 (1856); Dolan's Appeal, 108 Pa. 564 (1885); Thompson v. Koch, 98 Ky. 400, 33 S. W. 96 (1895); Hopson's Appeal, 65 Conn. 140, 31 Atl. 531 (1894); State v. District Court, 19 Mont. 501, 48 Pac. 1104 (1897); Gage v. Censors, 63 N. H. 92, 56 Am. Rep. 492 (1884); Com. v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 578 (1882); Martin v. State, 23 Neb. 371, 36 N. W. 554 (1888); King v. Venables, 2 Ld. Raym. 1405 (1725); People v. McCoy, 125 Ill. 289, 17 N. E. 786 (1888); People v. Department of Health, 189 N. Y. 187, 82 N. E. 187, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 894 (1907); State v. Lamos, 26 Me. 258 (1846); U. S. v. Douglass, 19 D. C. 99 (1890); Dodd v. Francisco, 68 N. J. Law, 490, 53 Atl. 219 (1902); People v. Board of Commissioners, 59 N. Y. 92 (1874); Lillienfeld v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 818, 23 S. E. 882 (1896); Baldwin v. Smith, 82 Ill. 162 (1876); State v. Justices, 15 Ga. 408 (1854); People v. State Board Dental Examiners, 110 Ill. 180 (1884); Ill. State Board Dental Exam. v. People, 123 Ill. 227, 13 N. E. 201 (1887); State v. Chittenden, 112 Wis. 569, 88 N. W. 587 (1902); In re Sparrow, 138 Pa. 116, 20 Atl. 711 (1890); Gross' License, 161 Pa. 349, 29 Atl. 25 (1894); Harrison v. People, 222 Ill. 150, 78 N. E. 52 (1906); Devin v. Belt, 70 Md. 352, 17 Atl. 375 (1889).

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sion has actually taken place. In our opinion there is no ground for a doubt on this point, even if it had been relied on, for the power to provide for repelling invasions includes the power to provide against the attempt and danger of invasion, as the necessary and proper means to effectuate the object. One of the best means to repel invasion is to provide the requisite force for action before the invader himself has reached the soil.

The power thus confided by Congress to the President is, doubtless, of a very high and delicate nature. A free people are naturally jealous of the exercise of military power; and the power to call the militia into actual service is certainly felt to be one of no ordinary magnitude. But it is not a power which can be executed without a correspondent responsibility. It is, in its terms, a limited power, confined to cases of actual invasion, or of imminent danger of invasion. If it be a limited power, the question arises, by whom is the exigency to be judged of and decided? Is the President the sole and exclusive judge whether the exigency has arisen, or is it to be considered as an open question, upon which every officer to whom the orders of the President are addressed may decide for himself, and equally open to be contested by every militiaman who shall refuse to obey the orders of the President? We are all of opinion that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen belongs exclusively to the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons. We think that this construction necessarily results from the nature of the power itself, and from the manifest object contemplated by the act of Congress. The power itself is to be exercised upon sudden emergencies, upon great occasions of state, and under circumstances which may be vital to the existence of the Union. A prompt and unhesitating obedience to orders is indispensable to the complete attainment of the object. The service is a military service, and the command of a military nature; and in such cases every delay, and every obstacle to an efficient and immediate compliance, necessarily tend to jeopard the public interests. While subordinate officers or soldiers are pausing to consider whether they ought to obey, or are scrupulously weighing the evidence of the facts upon which the commander in chief exercises the right to demand their services, the hostile enterprise may be accomplished without the means of resistance. If "the power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion, are (as it has been emphatically said they are) natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the confederacy," these powers must be so construed as to the modes of their exercise as not to defeat the great end in view. If a superior officer has a right to contest the orders of the President upon his own doubts as to the exigency having arisen, it must be equally the right of every inferior officer and

soldier; and any act done by any person in furtherance of such orders would subject him to responsibility in a civil suit, in which his defense must finally rest upon his ability to establish the facts by competent proofs. Such a course would be subversive of all discipline, and expose the best-disposed officers to the chances of ruinous litigation. Besides, in many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is imminent danger of invasion might be of a nature not constituting strict technical proof, or the disclosure of the evidence might reveal important secrets of state, which the public interest, and even safety, might imperiously demand to be kept in concealment.

If we look at the language of the act of 1795, every conclusion drawn from the nature of the power itself is strongly fortified. The words are, "whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion, etc., it shall be lawful for the President, etc., to call forth such number of the militia, etc., as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion." The power itself is confided to the Executive of the Union, to him who is, by the Constitution, "the commander in chief of the militia, when called into the actual service of the United States," whose duty it is to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," and whose responsibility for an honest discharge of his official obligations is secured by the highest sanctions. He is necessarily constituted the judge of the existence of the exigency in the first instance, and is bound to act according to his belief of the facts. If he does so act, and decides to call forth the militia, his orders for this purpose are in strict conformity with the provisions of the law; and it would seem to follow as a necessary consequence that every act done by a subordinate officer, in obedience to such orders, is equally justifiable. The law contemplates that, under such circumstances, orders shall be given to carry the power into effect; and it cannot therefore be a correct inference that any other person has a just right to disobey them. The law does not provide for any appeal from the judgment of the President, or for any right in subordinate officers to review his decision, and in effect defeat it. Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts. And, in the present case, we are all of opinion that such is the true construction of the act of 1795. It is no answer that such a power may be abused, for there is no power which is not susceptible of abuse. The remedy for this, as well as for all other official misconduct, if it should occur, is to be found in the Constitution itself. In a free government the danger must be remote, since, in addition to the high qualities which the Executive must be presumed to possess, of public virtue, and honest devotion to the public interests, the

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