"an: May a Ry Co appeal san asstily bd of supervisors to Co. Ch. - Held to depend on that this & contains no forouron for an appeal the decis an appeal & the decis" of the ad, either to the Bd of Super mors or Circ. Ch But of the Bd were to refuse to make the reducts we are welined of these that the decioned be reviewed on Cert!" ps) Ever a const! fromo" for an eppeal is not self-executy. "Now is the rt of appeal recog 202 Mulah. It is the creature of staty for ugof fact as to mom the finding determinati of the de: as towtral mactet "55. 517 disability it must follon that the fieldgs & determinatus of the Les по Le's in 6 by are final. It is grace of construcn, & où a new reglite its remedy is given by that, & there is no hono for a reviewvorappist OTION 65.- APPEAL from the determinati those who administer the Statute create the right such determin" is usually final. In such a case an advers Stadtte lign cutus decis? Cannathe or come by appeal or orgl pits to act of gusts that thycause of disabled ha beascertamedly litin much it! I made pranzo tung BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF BUREAU COUNTY v. CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. Co. (Supreme Court of Illinois, 1867. 44 Ill. 229.) * * Mr. Justice BREESE delivered the opinion of the court.1 on them by these statutes, presented their list or schedule of their Stat therefor in appealis gave Ad of Supervisors act as Bdofloqualign CBQ appealed to Count Circ Ch's Stat vs rais & its Assess Bds up that stat strict compliance with the statute, which the clerk laid before the unk since Const board of supervisors when they met to equalize the assessments in that county. This schedule presented an aggregate valuation of gave 99 There is no right to appeal from administrative orders to a court, unless given by statute. Brown v. District Council of Narragansett, 21 R. I. notae Held Const! Orler Stat did it onotratta Red 503, 42 Atl. 270. 44 Atl. 932 (1899). See, also, Ohio & Miss. R. Co. V. Lawrence Order te abatears penal County, 27 Ill. 50 (1861) Karb v. State, 54 Ohio St. 383, 43 N. E. 920 (1896). A right to appeal was held to exist by implication in Sawyer v. State Board of Health, 125 Mass. 182 (1878). See, now, Rev. Laws Mass. c. 75, § 119, and Nelson v. State Board of Health, 186 Mass. 330, 71 N. E. 693 (1904). An official power of supervision, etc., involves a right to entertain appeals the superorg $1. (Magwire v. Tyler, 1 Black, 195, 202, 17 L. Ed. 137 [1861]), unless negatived by the course of legislation. See Butterworth v. United States, 112 U. S. 50, 5 Sup. Ct. 25, 28 L. Ed. 656 (1884). But as a rule there is no right to appeal from the head of a department to the chief executive. Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Ops. Attys. Gen. 462 (1860); Bollman's Case, 10 Ops. Attys. Gen. 526 (1863); Las Animas Grant, 15 Ops. Attys. Gen. 94, 100 (1876). For a very comprehensive provision, giving a right of appeal, see Comp. St. Neb. 1909, § 7153 (Code Civ. Proc. § 580): "A judgment rendered, or final order made by a probate court, justice of the peace, or any other tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court, may be reversed, vacated, or modified by the district court." So, also, there is a general right of appeal from decisions of the boards of county commissioners to the circuit courts in Indiana. See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Board of Com'rs of Tippecanoe County, 45 Ind. 501 (1874). The General Administrative Act of Prussia (July 30, 1883) provides (section 127): Against police orders of local police authorities, unless expressly otherwise provided by law, there shall lie a remonstrance to [certain specified superior administrative officers]. Against the decision in the last resort of such administrative officers there shall lie an action in the supreme administrative court. The action can be founded only on the allegation: (1) That the contested decision violates the rights of the plaintiff by not applying or by misapplying the existing law or administrative regulations issued by the competent authorities; or (2) that the facts did not exist which would have justified the issuing of the order. 1 A portion of the opinion only is printed. Arg ab necessitate Appeal needed to preserve und wipts Const changed. Availing of the act of 1861, by which an appeal is allowed to the circuit court from the action of the board of supervisors, the company took an appeal to the circuit court of Bureau county, and, by change of venue, the cause was transferred to La Salle county, in the circuit court of which county, at the March term, 1866, such proceedings were had as resulted in a deduction by that court of the per cent. thus imposed by the board of supervisors, leaving the schedule of the company as originally presented to the county clerk intact. To reverse this judgment, the county of Bureau bring the case here by appeal, and assign various errors, which we have fully considered. The first question they make is that the circuit court had no jurisdiction of the appeal, that it was a case not provided for by the fundamental law; and we are referred to that clause of the Constitution conferring judicial power in support of the position. Section 1 of article 5 declares that the judicial power of the state shall be vested in one Supreme Court, in circuit courts, in county courts and in justices of the peace; provided, that inferior local courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction may be established by the General Assembly in the cities of this state, but such courts should have a uniform organization and jurisdiction in such cities. By section 8 of the same article it is provided that there shall be two or more terms of the circuit court held annually in each county of this state, at such times as shall be provided by law; and said courts shall have jurisdiction in all cases at law and equity, and in all cases of appeal from all inferior courts.2 It is argued with great force and ability that, inasmuch as the board of supervisors is in no sense a court of any description, an appeal cannot lie to the circuit court from any of its determinations, and consequently the act of 1861, allowing an appeal by a railroad company from their determinations, is unconstitutional and void. Much ingenious, forcible and persuasive argument has been used by appellants here in support of this view, but we are not convinced by it. Even if we had a doubt of the power of the Legislature to make this enactment, we should be constrained, under repeated rulings of this court, to solve the doubt in favor of the Legislature; for this court has declared that it is only in a very clear case, where the violation of the Constitution is plain and palpable, that we will so pronounce. Lucas v. Harris, 20 Ill. 165; People ex rel. v. Auditor, 30 Ill. 434; City of Chicago v. Larned, 34 Ill. 203. In considering the legislation of this state of a character analogous to this act of 1861, we are by no means convinced of the want of power in the Legislature to allow this appeal. It may be the board of supervisors of a county is not a court in the legal acceptation of that term, but it has power conferred upon it, by the wanton and 2 The Constitution of 1870 (article 6, § 12) says: "Such appellate jurisdiction as is or may be provided oy law." unjust exercise of which the most vital interests of parties before it may be rendered totally valueless. Perilous indeed would be their condition, if those great interests were at the mercy of irresponsible men, bent, it may be, on inflicting injury for which they could not atone. It is going a great way to say that any act of the Legislature a co-ordinate department of the government, and whose speciality is the enactment of laws-that any one of their enactments has no foundation in the Constitution, an instrument which the lawmakers are sworn to support, and which we must not suppose they have violated, in the absence of the clearest proof. Hence courts have always approached this subject with great delicacy, and have ever manifested a disposition to sustain the law, in the absence of an entire conviction of its unconstitutionality. This much of respect is certainly due to that department of the government, and this court has always most cheerfully extended it, and ever will. To insist that a board of supervisors is not a court does not de- But legn has cide the question, as we think. In our legislation, several acts may be found giving an appeal to the circuit court in cases confessedly not originating in the exercise of judicial power by a court, as, for example, in the case of the trial of the right of property by a sheriff's jury. The case of Rowe v. Bowen, 28 Ill. 118, was such a case, in which we held that an appeal lies in many cases not growing out of judicial proceedings, as upon assessments of damages by commissioners for roads, or for city improvements. So, also, in the case. of the establishment of a road by commissioners, as was held in the case of County of Peoria v. Harvey, 18 Ill. 364. So, where the statute gives an appeal from an assessment of damages for a right of way. Joliet & Chicago R. R. Co. v. Barrows, 24 Ill. 562. The case of Ohio & Mississippi R. Co. v. County of Lawrence, 27 Ill. 50, occurring before 1861, very distinctly intimates that legislative action was necessary to uphold the appeal, and if that existed the right to appeal was free from doubt. The act of 1861 gives an appeal in express terms. In view of this legislation, and these judicial decisions, it is too late to urge a want of jurisdiction in the circuit court to try the appeal from the board of supervisors, and we must hold that the jurisdiction was complete under the act of 1861, and that statute is not in conflict with any provision of the Constitution, considered in the light of long-continued analogous legislation under it. In counties. not adopting township organization, individual taxpayers had an appeal from the county assessor to the county court, and from that court, through the Auditor of Public Accounts, to the Supreme Court. Scates' Comp. 1040. Railroad companies are entitled to as much favor in this regard as individuals, and we have no difficulty in deciding the circuit court had full jurisdiction of the appeal. * * * other appeal fol or bodies CITY OF AURORA v. SCHOBERLEIN. A dismissed or appeals unde, Shat ~ act of Bad of ture Commers lu discharg the (Supreme Court of Illinois, 1907. 230 Ill. 496, 82 N. E. 860.) Appeal from circuit court, Kane county. Proceeding by the City of Aurora against Adam Schoberlein, as Fire Marshal. From the judgment, the City appeals. Reversed. CARTWRIGHT, J. On July 10, 1905, written charges against appellee, fire marshal of the city of Aurora, were presented to the board of fire and police commissioners of said city in pursuance of section. 12 of an act entitled "An act to provide for the appointment of a board of fire and police commissioners in all cities of this state having a population of not less than seven thousand nor more than one hundred thousand, and prescribing the powers and duties of such board,” in force April 2, 1903. Laws 1903, p. 97. After an investigation, at which appellee was heard in his own defense, the board found him guilty as charged and made an order removing him from office. Within 10 days after the entry of the order appellee filed with the secretary of the board a bond for an appeal to the circuit court of Kane county, in which said city is located, and on November 21, 1905, the secretary transmitted to the court a transcript of the proceedings before the board, in compliance with section 18 (page 100) of said act, which purports to allow an appeal to the circuit court from any order of a board created under the act. The record recites that appellant filed its motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that section 18 is unconstitutional and void, and the court denied the motion. No bill of exceptions was taken at the time, and there was no extension of time for tendering such a bill. The appeal was subsequently called for trial before another judge, the pr's appeal and the court ordered a trial de novo, against the objection of appel under Stat had resulted in a reve at by the Ct of the oder dismiss hum lant, and called a jury against like objection. The files of the proceeding consisted of the written charges, the evidence produced before the board, and the order of removal, and the jury were sworn to try the issues joined and a true verdict render according to the evidence. Both parties introduced testimony relating to the charges, and at the conclusion of the evidence the court, on motion of appellee, instructed the jury to find him not guilty. A verdict of not guilty was thereupon returned, and the court entered an order reversing the order of the board removing appellee from office, and ordered the board forthwith to reinstate and re-employ him as fire marshal, and to allow him to perform the duties and services connected with that office and collect the salary and compensation allowed therefor, and also rendered judgment against appellant for costs. From that judgment an appeal was prosecuted to this court, and among other assignments of error is one that the circuit court had 8 Only a portion of the opinion of Cartwright, J., is printed. no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and that section 18 of said act authorizing an appeal is unconstitutional and void. * * * The board of fire and police commissioners of the city of Aurora the Bd being an is a branch of the executive department of the city government, and all the acts and powers of the board are purely ministerial or execu adm- body con tive. The Legislature could not confer upon the board any judicial efien jou pomm power whatever. By article 3 of the Constitution the powers of the the egr under government are divided into three distinct departments, the legisla-Const. of Ill. tive, executive, and judicial, and it is provided that no person or collection of persons, being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as thereinafter expressly directed or permitted. By section 1 of article 6 the judicial powers are vested in certain courts, and a board of fire and police commissioners cannot assume or exercise any part of the ju dicial power. George v. People, 167 Ill. 447, 47 N. E. 741. Nei- ghe ponesto remove ther does the act purport to give to such boards any judicial power. They are authorized by statute to remove an officer for cause, after a cause is not a no title риб hearing and an opportunity to make a defense, and that authority feet porn implies the power to judge of the existence and sufficiency of these yi cause; but there is no such thing as title or property in a public of- r propene a fice, and the removal of an officer is not the exercise of judicial power. Donahue v. Will County, 100 Ill. 94; Stern v. People, 102 Ill. 540. No right of life, liberty, or property was involved or adjudicated before the board in this case. Although the exercise of the power of removal involved judgment and discretion, it was not a judicial act. It has been said that where an act is the result of judgment and discretion and a decision upon the facts it is of a judicial nature; but there is a clear distinction between such acts and the exercise of judicial power which adjudicates upon and protects the rights and interests of individuals and to that end construes and applies the law. An appeal is a step in a judicial proceeding, and in legal contem- no appeal when nodices" y a proper sense: First, the decision of a judicial tribunal; and, second. Judicial plation there can be no appeal where there has been no decision by a judicial tribunal. Two things are essential to an appeal, in its a superior court invested with authority to review the decision of the inferior tribunal. Elliott on Appellate Procedure, § 15. There have been cases where the jurisdiction of courts has been sustained in what were called appeals from inferior bodies having nonjudicial powers, such as the case of establishing a road by commissioners involving an appraisement of damages (County of Peoria v. Harvey, Cases as bump 18 Ill. 364), or an assessment of damages for a right of way (Joliet cases involog & Chicago Railroad Co. v. Barrows, 24 Ill. 562), or the trial of a right to property levied upon and claimed by a third party before a gns of wh the Ch sheriff and jury (Rowe v. Bowen, 23 II. 116), or an assessment of has org jn property for taxation (Bureau County v. Chicago, Burlington & |