proper in form and the penalty named therein sufficient? Are the bondsmen residents of the municipality and financially responsible for their undertaking? If they are not satisfied as to any of these matters, it is their duty to reject the bond, and to acquaint the petitioner with the ground upon which they reject it, so the bond may be remedied, if possible. If these questions are found in the affirmative, it is the duty of the board to approve it. They have no power to_arbitrarily reject a bond without having any valid reason, or without assigning any good reason therefor. And we think the reason for rejecting a bond should appear of record. If not, then we shall have a common council rejecting a bond, each member of the body locking up in his own breast the reason therefor, and when called upon by a court to show the ground of their action, at liberty to assign any cause it may seem best, under the circumstances, whether it be the real cause at the time of their action or not. A person engaging in the sale of liquors is entitled to the same equal rights, under the law, as persons filing bonds under other circumstances, no matter what may be the opinion of individual members of the board, whose duty it is to approve the bond, as to the policy of the law or the character of the business; and no captious or arbitrary actions in depriving him of his rights can be tolerated by the courts. It was held by this court, in Parker v. Portland, 54 Mich. 308, 20 N. W. 55, that when the board have exercised their judgment and discretion in good faith, and passed upon the bond, mandamus would not lie to control their decision or action, if there was no abuse of their discretion; but there is no authority in that case to sustain the arbitrary action of this board, who acted without any legal judgment or discretion, but, in the language of one of the members, took their chances of disobeying the plain mandate of the statute, and who, when called upon to explain or justify their action, return to this court, in substance: "We did this because we had the right and power to do it, and it is no one's business what our reasons were for rejecting this bond." It was expressly held in Parker v. Portland that, when the rejection of a liquor bond "was the result of prejudice and caprice," it would be the duty of this court to grant relief. Such is plainly the case before us. * * * The respondents in this case have seen fit to rest their cause upon the broad ground that their action is above and beyond the criticism. of any other tribunal. Their answer assumes that they are the sole arbiters of the relator's right to engage in the business of selling liquor. Whether they have any good reason for their action for some cause they decline to inform us. In such case we can only assume that they have acted arbitrarily and without reason. To allow such action would be in plain violation of the statute, and a manifest disregard of the rights of the relator under it. The writ of mandamus must issue in this case to respondents to approve forthwith the bond presented by relator, with costs in her favor.50 STATE ex rel. COFFEY v. CHITTENDEN. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1902. 1902-10 Fr.647 112 Wis. 569, 88 N. W. 587.) MARSHALL, J. It is elementary that in mandamus proceedings to coerce a judicial officer or any person or board in the exercise of judicial or quasi judicial power, the sole legitimate purpose thereof is to set such person or board in motion; to command him or it to act, not how to act, to exercise the judicial power vested in him or it; not to control as to the conclusion to be reached. State v. Kellogg, 95 Wis. 672, 70 N. W. 300; State v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 623, 19 N. W. 1081, 51 L. R. A. 33; State v. Teal, 72 Minn. 37, 74 N. W. 1024; Merrill, Mand. 40. Where there is no reasonable ground to justify a decision by such officer or board other than one way, and there is a failure to act accordingly, the function of a mandamus proceeding is broad enough to remedy the mischief by compelling the making of such decision, in perfect harmony with the rule that the office thereof is not to control discretionary authority, but to compel the exercise thereof. State v. Johnson, supra. That is to say, if the law imposes the duty upon a judicial or quasi judicial body to do a particular thing upon determining that certain facts exist, and reasonable inquiry be made by it in respect to such facts, and from the information thus obtained there is no reasonable ground for any conclusion other than that the conditions precedent to the performance of such duty exist, and a decision is made to the contrary or performance thereof is refused, such conduct is not the exercise of discretionary power, but a refusal to exercise it-a refusal or neglect to perform a plain duty imposed by law; and, there being no adequate legal remedy, the way is open for the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court to award its writ of mandamus. It is plain that, in such a situation, the court does not deal with disputed facts. It acts upon the theory that the person or body in duty bound to find the facts in accordance with the evidence, in refusing to do so, goes beyond or refuses to exercise his or its jurisdiction, and is, on that ground. alone, a subject for coercion by mandamus. State v. Johnson, su 50 Accord: State ex rel. Adamson v. La Fayette Co., 41 Mo. 221 (1867). See, also, Ex parte Candee, 48 Ala. 386 (1872), disapproved in Ex parte Harris, 52 Ala. 87, 93, 23 Am. Rep. 559 (1875). 121 Pa517 51 Only a portion of the opinion of Marshall, J., is printed. 62 See a note in 6 Mich. Law Review, p. 242. f46ac123. Cal depr. rehears grauled not reported SECTION 55.-MANDAMUS IN THE COURTS OF THE S.1213, 1268,1270 ire Ct. of us. with states eault mand. KENDALL v. UNITED STATES ex rel. STOKES. THOMPSON, J. 3 * * * (Supreme Court of United States, 1838. 12 Pet. 524, 9 L. Ed. 1181.) The next inquiry is, whether the court below 54 had jurisdiction of the case, and power to issue the mandamus? This objection rests upon the decision of this court, in the cases of McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504, 3 L. Ed. 420, and McClung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598, 5 L. Ed. 340. It is admitted that those cases have decided that the Circuit Courts of the United States, in the several states, have not authority to issue a mandamus against an officer of the United States. * * * The result of these cases, then, clearly is that the authority to issue the writ of mandamus to an officer of the United States, commanding him to perform a specific act required by a law of the United Since his Const States, is within the scope of the judicial powers of the United States gar under the Constitution, but that the whole of that power has not been it in the fol porsed communicated by law to the Circuit Courts, or, in other words, that granted the Judicy ner hadn. vested I it was then a dormant power, not yet called into action, and vested in those courts, and that there is nothing growing out of the official in the to long created character of the party that will exempt him from this writ, if the act n the States Qn to be performed is purely ministerial. It must be admitted, under the doctrine of this court in the cases referred to, that unless the circuit court of this District is vested with broader powers and jurisdiction in this respect than is vested in the Hap Cucct for DC a Circuit Courts of the United States in the several states, then the manwider bords Pf. Theck oftcond have all the ts of The St CK & M + V damus in the present case was issued without authority. But in considering this question it must be borne in mind that the only ground on which the court placed its decision was that the constitutional judicial powers on this subject had not been imparted to those courts. * * * But let us examine the act of Congress of the 27th of February, And 1801, concerning the District of Columbia, and by which the circuit 53 For first part of opinion, see ante, p. 434. Only portions of the opinions of Thompson and Catron, JJ., are here printed. 54 The circuit court of the District of Columbia. every well-organized government, the judicial power should be coextensive with the legislative, so far, at least, as private rights are to be enforced by judicial proceedings. There is, in this District, no division of powers between the general and state governments. Congress has the entire control over the District, for every purpose of government; and it is reasonable to suppose that, in organizing a judicial department here, all judicial power necessary for the purposes of government would be vested in the courts of justice. The circuit court here is the highest court of original jurisdiction; and if the power to issue a mandamus in a case like the present exists in any court, it is vested in that court. Keeping this consideration in view, let us look at the act of Congress. The first section declares that the laws of the state of Mary: land, as they now exist, shall be and continue in force in that part of the District which was ceded by that state to the United States, which is the part lying on this side the Potomac, where the court was sitting. when the mandamus was issued. It was admitted on the argument that at the date of this act the common law of England was in force in Maryland, and, of course, it remained and continued in force in this part of the District; and that the power to issue a mandamus in a proper case is a branch of the common law cannot be doubted, and Cpmp to issue has been fully recognized as in practical operation in that state, in mind. the case of Runkel v. Winemiller, 4 Har. & McH. 448, 1 Am. Dec. 411. * * * There can be no doubt but that, in the state of Maryland, a writ Even banx' &~ of mandamus might be issued to an executive officer, commanding him to perform a ministerial act required of him by law; and if it would lie in that state, there can be no good reason why it should not lie in this district, in analogous cases. * * * Thus far the power of the circuit court to issue the writ of mandamus has been considered as derived under the first section of the act of 27th February, 1801. But the third and fifth sections are to be taken into consideration in deciding this question. The third sec- 30 sect of act tion, so far as it relates to the present inquiry, declares "that there qave and. Ch. B.C. shall be a court in this dictrict, which shall be called the circuit court of the District of Columbia; and the said court, and the judges thereof, shall have all the powers by law vested in the Cir- all the to: of as cuit Courts and the judges of the Circuit Courts of the United are ch States." And the fifth section declares "that the said court shall have cognizance of all cases, in law and equity, between parties, all cases oflawr both or either of which shall be resident or be found within the Dis-gz resedts or ines of NC. another trict." ** * * This, of course, means cases of judicial cognizance. That proceedings on an application to a court of justice for a mandamus are judicial proceedings cannot admit of a doubt; this is such a and that this is a case in law is equally clear. It is the prosecution of a suit to enforce a right secured by a special act of Congress, requiring of the Postmaster General the performance of a precise, def сам inite and specific act, plainly enjoined by the law. It cannot be denied but that Congress had the power to command that act to be done; and the power to enforce the performance of the act must rest somewhere, or it will present a case, which has often been said to involve a monstrous absurdity in a well-organized government, that there should be no remedy, although a clear and undeniable right should be shown. to exist. And if the remedy cannot be applied by the circuit court of this District, it exists nowhere. But by the express terms of this act the jurisdiction of this circuit court extends to all cases in law, etc. No more general language could have been used. An attempt at specification would have weakened the force and extent of the general words-all cases. Here, then, is the delegation to this circuit court of the whole judicial power in this District, and in the very language of the Constitution, which declares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under the laws of the United States, etc., and supplies what was said by this court in the cases of McIntire v. Wood and McClung v. Silliman, to be wanting, viz.: That the whole judicial power had not been delegated to the Circuit Courts in the states, and which is expressed in the strong language of the court, that the idea never presented itself to any one that it was not within the scope of the judicial powers of the United States, although not vested by law in the courts of the general government. * * * * * The judgment of the court below is accordingly affirmed. CATRON, Justice (dissenting). * On the merits, I think the Senate of the United States, and the Solicitor of the Treasury, construed the special act of Congress correctly, and that the Solicitor's award is a final adjudication, and conclusive of the rights of the relators. But the question whether the circuit court of this District had power to compel the Postmaster General, by mandamus, to enter a credit for the amount awarded, lies at the foundation of our institu tions. A question more grave or important rarely arises. Coercion, by the writ of mandamus, of the officers and agents of a government, is one of the highest exertions of sovereignty known to the British constitution and common law. It is truly declared to be one of the flowers of the King's Bench (3 Bl. Com. 110, note), and in England can only be enforced by that court, where the king formerly sat in person, and is now deemed to be potentially present. It is his command, in his own name, directed to a court, person or corporation, to do a particular thing therein specified, which appertains to their office or duty, as a means of compelling its performance. 3 Bl. Com. c. 7. The proceeding there, as here, is in the name of the government, and not that of the relators; it stands on the foot of contempt, and is intended to reform official delinquency. By the act of independence, this prerogative and portion of sovereignty, unimpaired, devolved on the different states of this Union; |