eral regulation, it is a judicial action. The question to be decided here does not depend upon a choice between the two classes dealt with in Salem v. Eastern Railroad, 98 Mass. 431, 96 Am. Dec. 650, and in Nelson v. State Board of Health, 186 Mass. 330, 71 N. E. 693, and for these reasons: We are of opinion, in the first place, that it is within the power of the Legislature to protect and preserve edible fish in the rivers and brooks of the commonwealth, and for that purpose, if they think proper, to forbid any sawdust being discharged into any brook containing such fish. The right to run a sawmill on the bank of a brook or a river is, like all rights of property, subject to be regulated by the Legislature, when the unrestrained exercise of it conflicts with other rights, public or private. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 54; Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N. E. 390, 2 L. R. A. 81, 12 Am. St. Rep. 560. The defendants' contention that they have a prescriptive right to discharge sawdust into the river, even if it kills or injures the fish therein, which prescriptive right cannot be taken away or impaired without compensation being made therefor, means this, and nothingmore: Where the Legislature, up to the passage of the act here in question (St. 1890, p. 106, c. 129), had not regulated the business of sawing wood on the banks of streams having in them edible fish, and where, in the absence of such regulation, the defendants had discharged sawdust into the stream for 30 years, the people have lost the power to regulate the conflicting rights of sawmills on the bank of the stream and to preserve fish in the stream itself. The statement of the proposition is enough to show that there is nothing in it. The decision in Attorney General v. Revere Copper Co., 152 Mass. 444, 25 N. E. 605, 9 L. R. A. 510, relied on by the defendants, is confined to the gaining of prescriptive rights with respect to property owned by the public under a statute of limitations, which puts the property rights of the publiceerth on the same basis as those of individuals. We are of opinion, in the second place, that in case the Legislature thought that in regulating the conflicting rights of individuals to run sawmills on the banks of a river on the one hand, and of the public, on the other hand, to have fish live and increase in the same stream, it was not worth while to forbid sawdust being discharged into every stream in which there were edible fish, they could leave to a board having peculiar knowledge on the subject the selection of the brooks and rivers in which the fish were of sufficient value to warrant the prohibition or regulation of the discharge of sawdust. The right of the Legislature to delegate some legislative functions to state boards was considered by this court in Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 66 N. E. 607. And, further, in case the Legislature thought that an act which. forbade any sawdust to be discharged into any of the streams selected by the board was an unnecessarily stringent one, they could, in our opinion, leave it to the board to settle in each particular case the practical details required to harmonize best these two conflicting rights. The power thus delegated to the board of fitting the details of regulation to the particular circumstances of each case is of the same character as that long exercised by the fish and game commissioners and their predecessors, the board of inland fisheries, in prescribing the details of the construction of the fishways to be constructed in dams where by law fishways have to be maintained. See St. 1866, pp. 231, 232, c. 238, §§ 2, 6; St. 1867, p. 741, c. 344; Pub. St. 1882, c. 91, § 4. See, also, 3 Province Laws, 1745-46 (State Ed.) c. 20, p. 267. These acts provide that the board, after examination of dams upon rivers where the law requires fishways, is to determine whether the fishways in existence are sufficient, and to prescribe by an order in writing what changes or repairs, if any, shall be made, and at what times the fishways are to be kept open, and to give notice thereof to the owners of such dams. The action of the fish commissioners under these acts is unquestionably legislative in character, and we cannot doubt that their action under them, exercised and acquiesced in by the public for this length of time, is valid. The result is that in our opinion the action of the board in the case at bar was the working out of details under a legislative act. The board is no more required to act on sworn evidence than is the Legislature itself, and no more than in case of the Legislature itself is it bound to act only after a hearing, or to give a hearing to the plaintiff when he asks for one; and its action is final, as is the action of the Legislature in enacting a statute, and, being legislative, it is plain that the questions of fact passed upon by the Legislature in adopting the provisions enacted by them cannot be tried over by the court. This court has been recently asked to try over the expediency of compulsory vaccination in an action under a statute requiring it. Com. v. Jacobson, 183 Mass. 242, 66 N. E. 719, 67 L. R. A. 935. On its declining to do so an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, and its refusal to do so was held to be correct. Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643. See particularly page 30 of 197 U. S., page 363 of 25 Sup. Ct. (49 L. Ed. 643). See, also, Devens, J., in Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co., 144 Mass. 531, 11 N. E. 929, 59 Am. Rep. 113. The practical result is that the defendants are forbidden to conduct their sawmill as they had conducted it for 30 years by a board who have not heard evidence and have refused the defendants a hearing, that the action of the board is final, and that no compensation is due to them. This result may seem strange. But it is no less strange than the practical results in cases which are decided law. Take the case before the court in Nelson v. State Board of Health, 186 Mass. 330, 71 N. E. 693, namely, a farm on the banks of a pond used as the water supply of a town. The state board of health can pass a general regulation under section 113, c. 75, Rev. Laws, forbidding privies within a specified distance from its shore; and, if the defendant had a privy there for 30 years, his right to maintain it would cease, al though the order was made without hearing; and the action of the board is final. On the other hand, if the board had proceeded, under section 118, to investigate this particular privy, the defendant would have been entitled to a hearing, and, on appeal, to a jury, as provided by section 119. Again, take, for example, the regulation of a local board of health in question in Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co., 144 Mass. 523, 11 N. E. 929, 59 Am. Rep. 113, requiring all rags arriving at the port of Boston from any foreign port to be disinfected at the expense of the owner before being discharged. The power of the local board of health to declare these rags a nuisance per se, so as to impose upon the owner without trial the expense of disinfecting them, was established by this court in that case. Had the local board undertaken to investigate the particular rags in question in Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co., under their jurisdiction to inquire into sources of filth, and they had been authorized under that act to abate the nuisance if they found the rags to be a nuisance, by ordering them to be disinfected at the expense of the defendant, they would have had to give the defendant a hearing on notice, and from their decision the defendant would have had a right to a trial by jury. That is what was decided in Salem v. Eastern Railroad, 98 Mass. 431, 96 Am. Dec. 650. That is to say, on the one hand, where the law is general and the question is whether under it the defendants are committing a nuisance, the facts are determined by judicial action; on the other hand, the determination of the same facts is legislative in case the Legislature decides to make the thing a nuisance per se. And where it is legislative it is final, and no hearing is necessary; and where, as is the case here, it is made in the exercise of the police power, no compensation is due. The delegation of such legislative powers to a board is going a great way. But the remedy is by application to the Legislature, if a remedy should be given. In our opinion it is within its constitutional. power, and the court can give no remedy. For similar cases, where the use which can be made of property has been left to the final determination of boards, see Newton v. Joyce, 166 Mass. 83, 41 N. E. 116, 55 Am. St. Rep. 385; Com. v. Roberts, 155 Mass. 281, 29 N. E. 522, 16 L. R. A. 400. See, also, in this connection, In re Wares, Petitioners, 161 Mass. 70, 36 N. E. 586. The difference between the majority and the minority of the court in Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100, 10 L. R. A. 116, 23 Am. St. Rep. 850, was on the construction of the act there in question. Exceptions overruled.32 32 "It is urged that there was denial of due process of law in failing to accord plaintiff in error a hearing before the board of tea inspectors and the Secretary of the Treasury in establishing the standard in question, and before the General Appraisers upon the re-examination of the tea. Waiving the point that the plaintiff in error does not appear to have asked for a hear COMMONWEALTH v. KINSLEY. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1882. 133 Mass. 578.) FIELD, J. The defendant was complained of for unlawfully keeping, in a building occupied by him in Millbury, a table for the purpose of playing at pool for hire, gain and reward, without authority or license therefor. If a pool room becaus hearing Rnom It he is By Gen. St. c. 88, §§ 69-72, as amended by St. 1880, c. 94, the selectmen in towns are authorized to grant licenses for such a table, but "such license may be revoked at the pleasure of the authority leable for subsegt granting it"; and all persons are prohibited, under a penalty, from Reepqa pool table keeping such a table without a license. operaty it) wo a license. A license had been duly granted to the defendant, and it had been revoked by the selectmen without giving him notice of their intention to revoke it; but they had given the town clerk a certificate of the vote revoking the license; and he had informed the defendant of its contents, and thereafterwards the defendant "allowed a pool table to be used for hire upon his premises." The defendant contends that this revocation was inoperative, because it was made without giving Paint him an opportunity to be heard, and that, if the statutes purport to authorize a revocation without notice, they are in this respect unconstitutional and void. The keeping of a pool table for hire is one of many things affecting the public morals, which the Legislature can either absolutely prohibit or can regulate, and one common form of regulation is by requiring a license. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license was that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity or privilege within the meaning of these words in Declaration of Rights, art. 12. Commonwealth v. Blackington, 24 Pick. 352; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597; Commonwealth v. Colton, 8 Gray, 488; Commonwealth v. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70; Commonwealth v. Adams, 109 Mass. 344; Commonwealth v. Fredericks, 119 Mass. 199. ing, and assuming that the statute did not confer such a right, we are of opinion that the statute was not objectionable for that reason. The provisions in respect to the fixing of standards and the examination of samples by government experts was for the purpose of determining whether the conditions existed which conferred the right to import, and they therefore in no just sense concerned a taking of property. This latter question was intended by Congress to be finally settled, not by a judicial proceeding, but by the ac tion of the agents of the government, upon whom power on the subject was conferred." Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 355 (48 L. Ed. 525) (1904). It is immaterial in what manner the defendant obtained knowledge that his license had been revoked. Without considering whether the defendant would be liable to the forfeiture imposed by Gen. St. c. 88, § 70, if he had not had either notice or knowledge that his license had. been revoked, after such knowledge he would clearly be liable. St. 1876, c. 147,33 has no application to this case. Exceptions overruled. MARTIN v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1888. 23 Neb. 371, 36 N. W. 554.) Error to district court, Lancaster county. George Martin was indicted for selling liquors without a license. Case tried upon a stipulation of facts. Judgment for the State, and defendant brings error. of indicted for silly wo liceuse. His license had been re REESE, C. J. Plaintiff in error was convicted of the crime of selling voked won thang intoxicating liquors in violation of law, not having a license there for. ** * on fod of stat, whud error on the 13th day of April, 1887, by which he was permitted to use holder had It appears by the record that a license was issued to plaintiff in said that when a sell intoxicating liquors until the second Tuesday in April, 1888, but competed of Sunday, the 12th day of the same month. This conviction was har on violate law goog the police court, and on the 27th day of June the police judge certified his bed his lice the conviction to the city council. At a subsequent meeting of the shd be revored y that on the 22d day of June, 1887, he was convicted of selling liquor on in Hie council, we presume, although the date is not given, the resolution revoking the license was adopted without any notice having been given mayor & counci to plaintiff in error of the contemplated action of the council. The Juld this emper section of the statute under which this action was had is section 92 of the law governing cities of the first class (Comp. St. 1887, c. 13a), ministerial du which is as follows: "Sec. 92. The mayor and council may, by ordinance, license, restrain, regulate, or prohibit the selling or giving away of malt, spirituous, or vinous, mixed or fermented, intoxicating liquors, the license not to extend beyond the municipal year for which it shall be granted, and to determine the amount to be paid for such license not less than the minimum sum required by any general law upon the subject; * * * provided, that any permits issued to a druggist may be revoked by the council at pleasure; and further, that any license issued 33 This statute provides that licenses granted to keepers of billiard saloons under Gen. St. c. 88, shall be signed by the clerk of the city or town in which they are granted, shall be recorded by him, and shall continue in force until the 1st day of May next ensuing, unless sooner revoked, and that, when revoked, the clerk of the city or town shall give written notice of such revoca. tion to the holder of the license. [amen the cal] on cd be exercued u grauls ne the Accord: Child & Beplus, 17 R. I. 230, 21 Atl. 539, 12 L. R. A. 57 (1891). Jack license for desobed to police of regulating Saffic. No express pors to revoke but revocable liceuse granted, fomento luder orde col reserved the it no specific restrictno on front to city & legist of ponor to liceuss "The leceuse is in the nature of a privilege to perform a public service of function for re ward, which service or funct. for the public good to secure it or duly refficient perfo certa crine o must be subject to cesta regul. These regulTM must he obeyed; ... the porn to revare the le is sughly important, ruce the licensed may be not only disobed but obornate or incorr Is it unreast: won where ord: prescribes no procedure but leaves it to mayor's des Held partly on authy of p/c not unreas! specially or license poorly & for liceur It said Quesnaese aftern: thearg and better suit our notion of proper preced solusares. The ponsollere was ferse for |