Their proximate and principal motive in the prosecution of this distinct object, was the welfare of the subjects of their charity themselves. They expected, at all events, materially to improve both the condition and character of whatever number should become colonists: and they had sanguine hopes of not only finding this number, sooner or later, so considerable as to mark in itself a great achievement of benevolence; but also of rousing to general effort in their own behalf, by the agitation of this and every other scheme of improvement, and especially by the result of their experiment on the African shores, the colored population of the country at large. It formed no objection to colonization, that, while it would benefit the blacks, it would also benefit the whites from among whom they were taken. But they had also ultimate inducements, in their nature more contingent, but whose conclusiveness could well be left to the trial of time, without at all effecting the practicability of their plan itself, or the importance of the primary arguments in its favor. They believed that the colonial system would exercise, in a degree proportionate to its extension, a highly beneficial influence on the native Africans, and towards the suppression of the slave-traffic; and that it would effect slavery in this country in the same way. But above all, whatever good they should do, of any description, they hoped to induce far more. They hoped to "illustrate the feasibility of the scheme," * by collecting information, and rousing attention; by purchasing territory; by testing the willingness of the blacks to emigrate; by engaging various interests and classes in support of the cause; and, in fine, by establishing, as a model, a prosperous colony on the African coast. These things are accomplished. Let the Society now maintain what they have done, and let them do as much more as they are able. It remains for higher agents to avail themselves of the system, and to amplify it, as they think best. * Blackford's Address. 1833.] Sir James Mackintosh's Ethical Philosophy. 311 ART. IV. A General View of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, chiefly during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. By the Rt. Hon. SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH, LL. D., F. R. S., M. P. Philadelphia. Carey & Lea. 1832. By George Ripley THE present work, which was originally published as a Preliminary Dissertation to one of the volumes of "The Edinburgh Encyclopædia," one or two years before the decease of Sir James Mackintosh, forms an appropriate and beautiful monument to his memory. It is, probably, the most perfect specimen of the intellectual treasures which were stored in his highly endowed mind, that will be given to the possession of his survivors. His life was too much distracted by the discharge of numerous and important public trusts, to allow him a steadfast devotion to those literary and philosophical pursuits, for which he always manifested a peculiar predilection. It is a striking proof of his aptitude for profound study and thought, on the most abstract subjects, that, sustaining, as he did, an eminent rank among the distinguished politicians of the day, ready with the efforts of his pen and his tongue on the great national questions, which, during a large part of his life, were of paramount interest, and entering, with keen relish, into the pleasures of the extensive society, in which his remarkable colloquial powers and admirable disposition made him a general favorite, he should notwithstanding have given the most complete and satifactory view of the progress of ethical science, which the modern literature of England can boast. His reputation, as a writer on this subject, had before depended on casual efforts, which, though made amid the hurry and interruption of business, always display the hand of a master. His contributions to "The Edinburgh Review," on Madame de Staël's "Germany," and Dugald Stewart's "Dissertations," are, certainly, among the finest specimens of philosophical criticism contained in our language. The present work is distinguished by a similar affluence of rare learning, acute and delicate discrimination of thought, great force of argument, and singular candor and urbanity in the discussion of systems, which are at war with the opinions of the author himself, and which it is his pose pointedly to condemn. pur We cannot say so much of the style of Sir James 312 Sir James Mackintosh's Ethical Philosophy. [Jan. Mackintosh, as the expression of philosophical reasoning. It is elaborate to excess; but too visibly elaborate to be perfectly agreeable; and in many instances, his love of condensation betrays him into obscurity. In those passages which contain a long train of reasoning, the transition from one step to another, is usually far from being evident; and the enunciation of the propositions upon which he depends, as well as of the conclusions at which he arrives, is presented in such abstract terms, that we are often uncertain, whether we have rightly apprehended his meaning. We miss the variety and playfulness of illustration, which make the style of Hume so attractive, and which will always give him the rank of a most entertaining as well as acute writer on subjects of abstract speculation. Neither do we find any resemblance to the full and graceful flow of transparent diction, by which Dugald Stewart is quite as favorably distinguished as by the variety of his learning and the soundness of his understanding. With these abatements, which we could not in conscience omit, we regard Sir James Mackintosh as entitled to a high rank among the philosophical writers of the present and the last age, who have given an imperishable charm to the fruits of deep speculation, and erected a splendid monument to their names, in the history of English literature. It is not our intention to enter into any detail respecting the contents of this work. It will undoubtedly be read by all who have any taste for the inquiries which it pursues; and as a guide through the labyrinth, which has been constructed from the various theories of morals, proposed by different authors, we do not know where they will find a more valuable companion. The attention of Sir James Mackintosh has evidently been directed, with strong interest, to the celebrated question respecting the relation of Utility to Virtue. Some of his most important suggestions are in elucidation of this topic, but, after all that he has said, we do not perceive that he has exhausted the subject, or, indeed, that he has presented it in the most satisfactory lights of which it is susceptible. He must be entitled to the credit of noticing certain distinctions, the neglect of which has introduced great confusion into the discussion of this question; but whether they satisfactorily explain the difficulties which have attended it, we must confess that we are entirely in doubt. Thus, he clearly perceives and states the distinction between the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Criterion of Moral Actions. He maintains that we may have a perception of moral qualities, independent of the Utility of the actions to which they belong; this is one thing; but the actions which give us such perceptions, agree in conducing to the welfare of mankind, or in their utility; this is another thing; and the two facts are neither to be confounded, nor placed in opposition to each other. The first relates to the nature of the feelings, with which right and wrong are contemplated by human beings; and the second to the nature of the distinction between right and wrong in human conduct. So that he admits, that we may have the emotion of moral approbation, without reference to the perception of utility; while we are taught by experience that all actions which excite this emotion, have the common element of utility. By this admission, he escapes the odious and absurd consequences which are charged upon those moralists who make the essence of utility and of virtue one and the same thing; but he does not make out, to our conviction, the grounds upon which that identity can be avoided. Again, Sir James very justly argues, that the perception of utility is unfit to be an immediate incentive and guide to right action, and is adapted only to be the general test of virtuous dispositions and sentiments; that it is a legitimate criterion of these last, he confidently maintains; but, as we think, he fails in pointing out why it is a suitable standard for the one and not for the other. After all the ingenuity which he has exercised upon the subject, we cannot see that he has extricated it from the difficulty in which he found it, and the reason is, that he was misled by an imperfect conception of the true relation between virtue and utility. Indeed, we do not know any writer who appears to have viewed this point in all its bearings, and thence arrived at satisfactory conclusions. It is with great diffidence, then, that we approach it; and begging the patience of our readers, we proceed to offer such remarks as have been suggested by our own reflections. The first point which it is necessary to consider in this discussion, is the nature of the feelings, with which we regard the distinctions of Right and Wrong in human conduct. It is a question of pure psychology, and is to be determined by an 40 appeal to our own consciousness, as much as the nature of any mental pleasure or pain whatever. Is, then, the mental feeling consequent upon the perception of Right and Wrong, the same as that which arises upon the perception of utility, or the want of it? Is our perception of the Useful and the Right, one and the same thing? If so, then the essence of virtue and utility are identical. We have only to ask whether an action is Useful, and the true answer to the question will determine whether or not it is Right. But on the other hand, is not the perception of the Right essentially distinct from that of the Useful, as distinct as the perception of beauty in the starry heavens is from that of the sphericity of the orbs, which compose them? We maintain that it is. We are conscious, that when we contemplate a virtuous action, we experience a different emotion from that which arises upon the sight of a useful one. The two emotions may be, indeed they usually are, excited by the same object, since a virtuous action is almost always useful, but they can be resolved into different feelings with as much certainty, as the red and violet rays are divided in the prismatic spectrum. We might safely leave this point, if it had not been so much disputed, with the consciousness of each of our readers, assured that he would no more confound the two emotions produced respectively by the Useful and the Right, than he would the heat of a fire with the sensation of burning, or the form and color of a rose, with the perception of its fragrance. But we beg leave to look a little further at it together. Do not the Useful and the Right differ in the kind of impression, which they produce upon the mind, inasmuch as the one is addressed principally to the understanding, and the other always terminates upon the feelings? The perception of utility in an action or object is related to the intellect. The powers of discrimination are exercised to ascertain its existence. We compare, reflect, and judge, whether the act is useful or not, and the result is the conviction of the understanding. And there, generally, so far as utility is concerned, the mental operation terminates. In some cases, it is true, the perception of utility is succeeded by the sentiment of admiration, for instance, when we view a useful work of art of extraordinary ingenuity, but here, it is the skill of the artificer, which we admire, not the usefulness of the |