CHAPTER LXIV

LOCAL EXTENSION OF RINGS AND BOSSES

To determine the extent to which the Ring and Boss system sketched in the preceding chapters prevails over the United States would be difficult even for an American, because it would require a minute knowledge of the local affairs of all the States and cities. Much more, then, is it difficult for a European. I can do no more than indicate generally the results of the inquiries I have made, commending the details of the question to some future investigator.

It has been pointed out that rings and bosses are the product not of democracy, but of a particular form of democratic government, acting under certain peculiar conditions. They belong to democratic government, as the old logicians would say, not simpliciter but secundum quid: they are not of its essence, but are merely separable accidents. We have seen that these

conditions are

The existence of a Spoils System (= paid offices given and taken away for party reasons).

Opportunities for illicit gains arising out of the possession of office.

The presence of a mass of ignorant and pliable voters.

The insufficient participation in politics of the "good citizens."

If these be the true causes or conditions producing the phenomenon, we may expect to find it most fully developed in the places where the conditions exist in fullest measure, less so where they are more limited, absent where they do not exist. A short examination of the facts will show that such is the

case.

It may be thought that the Spoils System is a constant, existing everywhere, and therefore not admitting of the application of this method of concomitant variations. That system does no doubt prevail over every State of the Union, but it is not everywhere an equally potent factor, for in some cities the offices are much better paid than in others, and the revenues which their occupants control are larger. In some small communities the offices, or most of them, are not paid at all.1 Hence this factor varies scarcely less than the others.

We may therefore say with truth that all of the four conditions above named are most fully present in great cities. Some of the offices are highly paid; many give facilities for lucrative jobbing; and the unpaid officers are sometimes the most apt to abuse these facilities. The voters are so numerous that a strong and active organization is needed to drill them; the majority so ignorant as to be easily led. The best citizens are engrossed in business and cannot give to political work the continuous attention it demands. Such are the phenomena of New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Brooklyn, St. Louis, Cincin-. nati, San Francisco, Baltimore, and New Orleans. In these cities Ring-and-bossdom has attained its amplest growth, overshadowing the whole field of politics.

Of the first two of these I need not speak in detail here, proposing to describe their phenomena in later chapters. Chicago, Baltimore, and New Orleans are little if at all better. I subjoin some remarks bearing on five other cities, with which I was (in 1887) favoured by leading citizens resident therein, in reply to interrogatories which I addressed to them. Knowing how apt a stranger is to imagine a greater uniformity than exists, I am anxious to enable the reader to understand to what extent the description I have given is generally true, and with what local diversities its general truth is compatible.

Cincinnati (Ohio), population in 1890, 296,908

"Our Ring is in a less formal shape than is sometimes seen, but dishonest men of both parties do in fact combine for common profits at the public expense. As regards a Boss, there is at this moment an interregnum, but some ambitious men are observed to be making progress towards that dignity. Rings are both the effect and the cause of pecu

1 For instance, the "selectmen " of a New England Town are not paid.

lation. They are the result of the general law of combination to further the interest of the combiners.

"Where a Ring exists it can always exclude from office a good citizen known to be hostile to it. But a good easy man who will not fight and will make a reputable figure-head may be an excellent investment.

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"The large cities are the great sufferers from the Spoils System, because in them power gives the greatest opportunity for profit and peculation. In them also it is easy to make a more or less open combination of keepers of tippling shops and the bummers,' etc., who congregate in them. Here, too, is the natural home of the class of vagabonds who will profess devotion to the party or the man who will pay them, and who combine to levy blackmail upon every candidate, and in turn are ready to stuff ballot-boxes, to buy votes, to repeat,' etc. These scoundrels live by politics' in their way, and force their services upon more prominent men, till there comes to be a sort of solidarity' in which men of national reputation find themselves morally compromised by being obliged to recognize this sort of fraternity, and directly or indirectly to make themselves responsible for the methods of these henchmen' and followers. They dare not break with this class because its enmity would defeat their ambitions, and the more unscrupulous of them make fullest use of the co-operation, only rendering a little homage to decency by seeking to do it through intermediates, so as not too disgustingly to dirty their own hands.

"In such a condition of things the cities become the prey of the 'criminal class' in politics, in order to ensure the discipline and organization in State and national politics which are necessary to the distinguished leaders for success. As a result it goes almost without saying that every considerable city has its rings and its actual or would-be bosses. There are occasional revolutions of the palace' in which bosses are deposed, or choked off,' because they are growing too fat on the spoils, and there is no such permanence of tenure as to enable the uninitiated always to tell what boss or what ring is in power. They do not publish an Almanach de Gotha, but we feel and know that the process of plunder continues. A man of genius in this way, like a Tweed or a Kelly, comes occasionally to the front, but even in the absence of a ruler of this sort the ward politicians can always tell where the decisive influences reside.

"The size of the city in which the system reaches full bloom depends upon its business and general character. Small towns with a proportionately large manufacturing population are better fields for rings than more homogeneous communities built up as centres of mercantile trade. The tendency however is to organize an official body of workers' in even the smallest community; and the selfishness of man naturally leads to the doctrine that those who do the work shall live by it. Thus, from the profits of rotation in office' and the exercise of intrigue and trick to get the place of the present incumbent, there is the facilis descensus to regarding the profits of peculation and the plunder of the public as a legitimate corrective for the too slow accumulation from legal pay. Certain salaries and fees in local offices are notoriously kept high, so that the

incumbent may freely bleed' for party use, or, what is the same thing, for the use of party bummers.' Thus we have had clerks of courts and sheriffs getting many times as much pay as the judges on the bench, etc. From this, jobbing in contracts, bribery, and unblushing stealing are reached by such easy steps that perhaps the local politician is hardly conscious of the progress in his moral education."

St. Louis (Missouri), population in 1890, 451,770

"There are always Rings in both parties more or less active according to circumstances.

"Two or perhaps three men are the recognized Bosses of the Democratic party (which is in the majority), one man of the Republican.

"The Rings are the cause of both peculation and jobbery, although St. Louis has had no big steal.'

"A good citizen seeking office would be excluded by the action of the Rings in our large cities, except in times of excitement, when good people are aroused to a proper sense of duty."1

Louisville (Kentucky), population in 1890, 161,129 —

"It can hardly be said that there is a regular Ring in Louisville. There are corrupt combinations, but they are continually shifting. The higher places in these combinations are occupied by Democrats, these being the ruling party, but they always contain some Republicans.

"The only Boss there is in Louisville to-day is the Louisville Gas Company. It works mainly through the Democratic party, as it is easier to bribe the Republican' negroes into the support of Democratic candidates than white Democrats to support Republicans.

"There is very little peculation in Kentucky now - no great disclosure for over five years; but there is a great deal of jobbery.

"The effect of the combinations is of course towards excluding good and capable men from office and to make room for mere favourites and local politicians." 2

Minneapolis (Minnesota), population in 1890, 164,738 (?)

"There has been for several years past a very disreputable Ring, which has come into power by capturing the machinery of the Democratic party, through (1) diligent work in the ward caucuses; (2) by its active alliance with the liquor dealers, gamblers, and so forth, and the support of lewd fellows of the baser sort,' regardless of national political preferences; (3) by a skilful and plausible championship of labor' and a capture of the labor vote.

"The Boss of this gang is thoroughly disliked and distrusted by the responsible and reputable element of his party in Minnesota, but they

1 My correspondent writes in 1892 that the above remarks are still equally applicable. Both parties remain under a despotic Ring rule.

2 The condition of Louisville was substantially the same in 1893.

tolerate him on account of his popularity and because they cannot break him down. He has operated chiefly through control of the police system. Instead of suppressing gambling houses, for example, he has allowed several of them to run under police protection, himself sharing in their large gains. Until recently the liquor saloon licenses have been $500 (£100) a year. He and the heads of the police department have allowed a number of places to retail liquor somewhat secretly outside the police patrol limits, within which we restrict the liquor traffic and from these illicit publicans the Ring has collected large sums of money.

"The Ring has seemed to control the majority in the Common Council, but the system of direct taxation and of checking expenditure is so open, and the scrutiny of the press and public so constant, that there has been little opportunity for actual plunder. In the awarding of contracts there is sometimes a savour of jobbery, and several of the councilmen are not above taking bribes. But they have been able to do comparatively little mischief; in fact, nothing outrageous has occurred outside of the police department. The Ring has lately obtained control of the (elective) Park Board, and some disreputable jobs have resulted. So there have been malpractices in the department of health and hospitals, in the management of the water system and in the giving away of a street railway franchise. But we are not a badly-plundered city by any means; and we have just succeeded in taking the control of the police out of the hands of the Ring officials and vested it in a Metropolitan Police Board, with excellent results. Two of the Ring are now under indictment of the county grand jury for malpractices in office."

St. Paul (Minnesota), population in 1890, 133,156 (?)—

"There is no regular Ring in St. Paul. It has for many years been in the hands of a clique of municipal Democratic politicians, who are fairly good citizens, and have committed no very outrageous depredations. The city is run upon a narrow partisan plan, but in its main policies and expenditures the views of leading citizens as formulated in the Chamber of Commerce almost invariably prevail.

"The Rings of Western cities (adds my informant) are not deliberately organized for plunder or jobbery. They grow out of our party politics. Certain of the worst elements of a party find that their superior diligence and skill in the manipulation of precinct and ward caucuses put them in control of the local machinery of their party organization. The success of their party gives them control of municipal affairs. They are generally men who are not engaged in successful trade or professional life, and make city politics their business. They soon find it profitable to engage in various small schemes and jobs for profit, but do not usually perpetrate anything very bold or bad."

I have taken the two cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul because they illustrate the differences which one often finds