vious that several millions per annum would thereby be added to the available industry of South Carolina? the effect of which would assuredly be, to change the entire face of affairs in this State, by enhancing the profits of the agriculturists, accumulating capital, giving a fresh impulse to commerce, and producing a vivifying influence upon every department of industry, the happy consequences of which would be experienced by every inhabitant of the State. We present this strong view of the subject, to shew the manifest justice of the claim which South Carolina now sets up to have this system of raising revenue by duties upon imports restricted within the narrowest limits, and to shew how utterly impossible it is for us to consent to have it extended beyond the indispensable wants of the government, either for the purpose of affording protection to the industry of others, or of distributing the proceeds among individuals or States.

Grievous, however, as the oppression unquestionably is, and calculated in the strong language of our own Legislature, "to reduce the Plantation States to POVERTY and UTTER DESOLATION," it is not in this aspect that the question is presented in its most dangerous and alarming form. It is not merely that Congress have resorted for unwarrantable purposes to an oppressive exercise of powers granted to them by the Constitution; but that they have usurped a power not granted, and have justified that usurpation on principles, which, if sanctioned or submitted to, must entirely change the character of the Government, reduce the Constitution to a dead letter, and on the ruins of our confederated republic, erect a consolidated despotism," without limitation of powers." If this be so, there is no man who is worthy of the precious heritage of liberty derived from our ancestors, or who values the free institutions of his country, who must not tremble for the cause of freedom, not only in this country, but throughout the world, unless the most prompt and efficient measures are at once adopted, to arrest the downward course of our political affairs, to stay the hand of oppression, to restore the Constitution to its original principles, and thereby to perpetuate the Union.

It cannot be denied that the Government of the United States possesses no inherent powers. It was called into being by the

States. The States not only created it, but conferred upon it all its powers, and prescribed its limits by a written charter called the Constitution of the United States. Before the Federal Government had thus been called into being, the several States unquestionably possessed as full sovereignty, and were as independent of each other as the most powerful nations of the world; and in the free and undisputed exercise of that sovereignty, they entered into a solemn compact with each other, by which it was provided, that for certain specified objects, a General Government should be established with strictly limited powers; the several States retaining their sovereignty unimpaired, and continuing to exercise all powers not expressly granted to the Federal Government.

In the clear and emphatic language of Mr. Jefferson, "the several States composing the United States of America, are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to the General Government, but by a compact under the style and title of the Constitution of the United States, they constituted a General Government for special purposes, delegated to that Government certain definite powers, reserving each State to itself the residuary mass of right to their own self-government, and whensoever the General Government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force." That such is the true nature of the Federal compact, cannot admit of a reasonable doubt, and it follows of necessity, that the Federal Government is merely a joint agency, created by the States,that it can exert no power not expressly granted by them, and that when it claims any power, it must be able to refer to the clause in the charter which confers it. This view of the Constitution of the United States, brings the question of the constitutionality of the Tariff within the narrowest limits.

The regulation of domestic industry, so far as Government may rightfully interfere therewith, belonged to the several States before the Constitution was adopted, or the Union sprang into existence; and it still remains exclusively with them, unless it has has been expressly granted to the Federal Government. If such a grant has been made, it is incumbent on those claiming,

*See Kentucky Resolutions of 1778.

under it, to point out the provision in the Constitution which embraces it. It must be admitted that there is not a clause or article in that instrument, which has the slightest allusion either to manufactures or to agriculture: while, therefore, the "regulation of commerce" is expressly conferred on the General Government, the regulation of every branch of domestic industry is reserved to the several States, exclusively, who may afford them encouragement, by pecuniary bounties, and by all the other means, not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States. To say that the power to regulate commerce embraces the regulation of agriculture, and manufactures, and all other pursuits of industry, (for they all stand upon the same footing,) is to confound the plainest distinctions, and to lose sight of the true meaning and intent of the grant in question. Commerce is, in general, regulated by treaties with foreign nations; and, therefore, it was deemed necessary that this power should be confided to the General Government: but agriculture, manufactures, and the mechanic arts, can only be wisely ordered by municipal regulation. Commerce is one object of legislation, manufactures another, agriculture a third; and if the regulation of commerce implies an unlimited control over every thing which constitutes the object of commerce, it would follow, as a matter of course, that the Federal Government may exert a supreme dominion over the whole labor and capital of the country. This would transform our confederated Government, with strictly limited powers, into an absolute despotism, and of the worst sort, where, under the forms of a free Government, we should have the spirit of a despotic one. This view of the subject, we should deem perfectly conclusive, even if it could not be shewn that the power in question, so far from being granted, was purposely withheld from the Federal Government, by the framers of the Constitution; and that there are provisions of the Constitution, from which it may be fairly inferred, that it was intended to be reserved to the States respectively. It appears from the history of the proceedings of the Convention which framed the Constitution, that the subject of the protection of manufactures, was several times brought distinctly to the view of that body, and that they did not see fit to grant to the Federal Government the power in question. In the original proposition,

to confer on Congress the power to impose "duties, imposts, and excises," was embraced "prohibitions and restraints," which may well be supposed to be intended to embrace the protection of manufactures; but it is is remarkable, that these words were omitted in the Report of the Committee, on that clause. On the 18th of August, a motion was made, "to establish rewards and immunities, for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures;" but this proposition also failed. On a subsequent day, it was moved, that there should be "a Secretary of Domestic Affairs, &c., whose duty it should be to attend to matters of general police, the state of agriculture and manufactures, the opening of roads and navigation, and facilitating of intercourse through the United States; and that he shall, from time to time, recommend such measures and establishments as may tend to promote these objects." This proposition likewise failed, the Constitution containing no provision in conformity therewith.

Now, as it is utterly impossible, that these several propositions, embracing imposts, duties, prohibitions and restraints, and the encouragement of manufactures, could have been disposed of, without bringing the whole question of domestic manufactures fully into view, it must follow, that, as no power was given to Congress over manufactures, while the power to regulate commerce is expressly conferred, it was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution, to entrust this power to Congress. Although repeatedly urged to confer such a power, they constantly refused it; and the Constitution, as finally ratified, contains no provision, whatever, upon the subject. In the Report of Luther Martin, a delegate from Maryland, made to the Legislature of his State, an explanation is given of the proceedings of the Convention, in relation to this matter, which removes every shadow of doubt, with regard to the true meaning and intent of the framers of the Constitution, in relation to the protection of manufactures. It appears from this statement, that, as the encouragement of manufactures had been refused to be conferred upon the Federal Government, it was the desire of Mr. Martin and others, to reserve to the states all the means which they supposed to be necessary for affording effectual encouragement to manufactures within their own limits. Among those it was pre

sumed "that there might be cases in which it would be proper for the purpose of encouraging manufactures to lay duties to prohibit the exportation of raw materials, and even in addition to the duties laid by Congress on imports for the sake of revenue, to lay a duty to discourage the importation of particular articles into a State, or to enable the manufacturer here to supply us on as good terms as could be obtained from a foreign market."* Here it will be seen that it is positively stated by Mr. Martin that the power given to Congress to impose duties upon imports, was given expressly "for the sake of revenue," and was not considered as extending to any duty "to discourage the importation of particular articles, for the purpose of encouraging manufactures," and that it was considered that unless the several States should possess this power as well as that of prohibiting the exportation of certain raw materials, they would not be enabled to extend that complete protection to their own manufacturers which might be deemed indispensable to their success. "The most, however," says Mr. Martin, "which we could obtain, was, that this power might be exercised by the States, by and with the consent of Congress, and subject to its control." Thus, then, it manifestly appears, that in relation to manufactures, the framers of the Constitution positively refused to confer upon the Federal Government, any power whatever;-that the power to lay duties, &c., was conferred for the sake of revenue alone, and was not intended to embrace the power to lay duties "to discourage the importation of particular articles, to enable the manufacturers here to supply us on as good terms as could be obtained from a foreign market ;" and finally, that the whole subject was left in the hands of the several States, with the restriction, "that no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any impost or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws." This power, it appears, was expressly inserted for the purpose of enabling the States to protect their own manufactures; and this, it seems, was the only provision which friends of domestic industry could obtain. It is vain to allege that the powers retained by the States on this subject, are inadequate to the effectual accom

*Yates's Secret Debates in the Convention, p. 71.