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Two years later, sir, in a yet more dangerous crisis upon the Reform Bill, which the Commons had rejected, and when civil commotion and discord, if not revolution, were again threatened, and it became necessary to dissolve the Parliament, and for that purpose to secure the consent of a King adverse to the dissolution, the Lord Chancellor of England, one of the most extraordinary men of the age, by perhaps the boldest and most hazardous experiment ever tried upon royalty, surprised the King into consent, assuring him that the further existence of the Parliament was incompatible with the peace and safety of the kingdom; and having, without the royal command, summoned the great officers of State, prepared the crown, the robes, the King's speech, and whatever else was needed, and, at the risk of the penalties of high treason, ordered also the attendance of the troops required by the usages of the ceremony, he hurried the King to the Chamber of the House of Lords, where, in the presence of the Commons, the Parliament was dissolved, while each House was still in high debate, and without other notice in advance than the sound of the cannon which announced his Majesty's approach. Yet all this was done in the midst of threatened insurrection and rebellion; when the Duke of Wellington, the Duke of Cumberland, and other noblemen, were assaulted in the streets, and their houses broken into and mobbed; when London itself was threatened with capture, and the dying Sir Walter Scott was hooted and reviled by ruffians at the polls. It was done while the kingdom was one vast mob; while the cry rang through all England, Ireland, and Scotland, that the bill must be carried through Parliament or over Parliament; if possible, by peaceable means; if not possible, then by force; and when the Prime Minister declared in the House of Commons that, by reason of its defeat, "much blood would be shed in the struggle between the contending parties, and that he was perfectly convinced that the British Constitution would perish in the con flict." And, sir, when all else failed, the King himself at last gave permission in writing, to Earl Grey and the Lord Chancellor, to create as many new peers as might be necessary to secure a majority for the reform bill in the House of Lords.

Such, sir, is British statesmanship. They remember, but we have forgotten, the lessons which our fathers taught them. Sir, it will be the opprobrium of American statesmanship forever that this controversy of ours shall be permitted to end in final and perpetual dismemberment of the Union.

I propose now, sir, to consider briefly the several propositions before the House, looking to the adjustment of our difficulties by constitutional amendment, in con- ઈ nection also with those which I have myself had the honor to submit.

Philosophically or logically considered, there are two ways in which the work before us may be effected: the first, by removing the temptation to aggress; the second, by taking the power away. Now, sir, I am free to confess that I do not see how any amendment of the Constitution can diminish the powers, dignity, or patronage of the Federal Government, consistently with the just distribution of power between the several departments; or between the States and the General Government, consistently with its necessary strength and efficiency. The evil here lies rather in the administration than in the organization of the system; and a large part of it is inherent in the administration of every government. The virtue and intelligence of the people, and the capacity and honesty of their representatives in every department, must be intrusted with the mitigation and correction of the mischief. The less the legislation of every kind, the smaller the revenues, and fewer the disbursements; the less the Government shall have to do, every way, with debt, credit, moneyed influences, and jobs and schemes of every sort, the longer peace can be maintained; and the more the number of the employees and dependents on Government can be reduced, the less will be the patronage and the corruption of the system, and the less, therefore, the motive to sacrifice truth and justice, and to overleap the Constitution to secure the control of it. In other words, the more you diminish temptation, the more you will deliver us from evil.

But I pass this point by without further remark, inasmuch as none of the plans of adjustment proposed, either here or in the Senate, look to any change of the Constitution in this respect. They all aim-every one of them at checking the POWER to aggress; and, except the amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. ADAMS,] which goes much further than mine in giving a negative upon one subject to every slave State in the Union, they propose to effect their purpose by mere constitutional prohibitions. It is not my purpose, sir, to demand a vote upon the propositions which I have myself submitted. I have not the party position, nor the power behind me, nor with me, nor the age, nor the experience which would justify

me in assuming the lead in any great measure of peace and conciliation; but I believe, and very respectfully I suggest it, that something similar, at least, to these propositions will form a part of any adequate and final adjustment which may restore all the States to the Federal Union. No, sir; I am able now only to follow where others may lead.

I shall vote for the amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. ADAMS,] (though it does not go far enough,) because it ignores and denies the moral or religious element of the anti-slavery agitation, and thus removes so far, at least, its most dangerous sting-fanaticism-and dealing with the question as one of mere policy and economy, of pure politics alone, proposes a new and most comprehensive guarantee for the peculiar institution of the States of the South. I shall vote also for the Crittenden propositions---as an experiment, and only as an experiment-because they proceed upon the same general idea which marks the Adams amendment; and whereas, for the sake of peace and the Union, the latter would give a new security to slavery in the States, the former, for the self-same great and paramount object of Union and peace, proposes to give a new security also to slavery in the Territories south of the latitude 36° 30'. If the Union is worth the price which the gentleman from Massachusetts volunteers to pay to maintain it, is it not richly worth the very small additional price which the Senator from Kentucky demands as the possible condition of preserving it? Sir, it is the old parable of the Roman sybil; and to-morrow she will return with fewer volumes, and it may be at a higher price.

I shall vote to try the Crittenden propositions, because, also, I believe that they are perhaps the least which even the more moderate of the slave States would under any circumstances be willing to accept; and because north, south, and west, the people seem to have taken hold of them and to demand them of us, as an experiment at least. I am ready to try, also, if need be, the propositions of the border State committee, or of the peace congress; or any other fair, honorable, and reasonable terms of adjustment which may so much as promise even, to heal our present troubles, and to restore the Union of these States. Sir, I am ready and willing and anxious to try all things and to do all things "which may become a man, to secure that great object which is nearest to my heart.

But, judging all of these propositions, nevertheless, by the lights of philosophy and statesmanship, and as I believe they will be regarded by the historian who shall come after us, I find in them all two capital defects which will, in the end, prove them to be both unsatisfactory to large numbers alike of the people of the free and the slave States, and wholly inadequate to the great purpose of the reconstruction and future preservation of the Union. None of them-except that of the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. ADAMS,] and his in one particular only-proposes to give to the minority section any veto or self-protecting power against those aggressions, the temptation to which, and the danger from which, are the very cause or reason for the demand for any new guarantees at all. They who complain of violated faith in the past, are met only with new promises of good faith for the future; they who tell you that you have broken the Constitution heretofore, are answered with proposed additions to the Constitution, so that there may be more room for breaches hereafter. The only protection here offered against the aggressive spirit of the majority, is the simple pledge of power that it will not abuse itself; nor aggress, nor usurp, nor amplify itself to attain its ends. You place in the distance, the highest honors, the largest emoluments, the most glittering of all prizes; and then you propose, as it were, to exact a promise from the race horse that he will accommodate his speed to the slow-moving pace of the tortoise. Sir, if I meant terms of equality, I would give the tortoise a good ways the start in the race. My point of objection, therefore, is, that you do not allow to that very minority which, because it is a minority, and because it is afraid of your aggressions, is now about to secede and withdraw itself from your Government, and set up a separate confederacy of its own, you do not allow to it the power of self-protection within the Union. If, Representatives, you are sincere in your protestations that you do not mean to aggress upon the rights of this minority, you deny yourselves nothing by these new guarantees. If you do mean to aggress, then this minority has a right to demand self-protection and security.

But, sir, there remains yet another, and a still stronger objection to these several propositions. Every one of them proposes to recognize, and to embody in the Constitution, that very sort of sectionalism which is the immediate instrumentality of the present dismemberment of these States, and the existence of which is, in my judgment, utterly inconsistent with the peace and stability of the Union. Every

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one of them recognizes and perpetuates the division line between slave labor and free labor, that self-same "geographical line, coinciding with the marked principle, moral and political," of slavery, which so startled the prophetic ear of Jefferson, and which he foretold, forty years ago, every irritation would mark deeper and deeper, till, at last, it would destroy the Union itself. They one and all recognize slavery as an existing and paramount element in the politics of the country, and yet only promise that the non-slaveholding majority section, immensely in the majority, will not aggress upon the rights or trespass upon the interests of the slaveholding minority section, immensely in the minority. Adeo senuerunt Jupiter et Mars?

Sir, just so long as slavery is recognized as an element in politics at all—just so long as the dividing line between the slave labor and the free labor States is kept up as the only line, with the disparity between them growing every day greater and greater-just so long it will be impossible to keep the peace and maintain a Federal Union between them. However sufficient any of these plans of adjustment might have been one year ago, or even in December last when proposed, and prior to the secession of any of the States, I fear that they will be found utterly inadequate to restore the Union now. I do not believe that alone they will avail to bring back the States which have seceded, and therefore to withhold the other slave States from ultimate secession; for surely no man fit to be a statesman can fail to foresee that unless the cotton States can be returned to the Union, the border States must and will, sooner or later, follow them out of it. As between two confederacies—the one non-slaveholding, and the other slaveholding-all the States of the South must belong to the latter, except possibly Maryland and Delaware, and they of course could remain with the former only upon the understanding that just as soon as practicable slavery should be abolished within their limits. If fifteen slave States cannot protect themselves, and feel secure in a Union with eighteen anti-slavery States, how can eight slave States maintain their position and their rights in a Union with nineteen, or with thirty, anti-slavery States? The question, therefore, is not merely what will keep Virginia in the Union, but also what will bring Georgia back. And here let me say that I do not doubt that there is a large and powerful Union sentiment still surviving in all the States which have seceded, South Carolina alone perhaps excepted; and that if the people of those States can be assured that they shall have the power to protect themselves by their own action within the Union, they will gladly return to it, very greatly preferring protection within to security outside of it. Just now, indeed, the fear of danger, and your persistent and obstinate refusal to enable them to guard agaiast it, have delivered the people of those States over into the hands and under the control of the real secessionists and disunionists among them; but give them security and the means of enforcing it; above all, dry up this pestilent fountain of slavery agitation as a political element in both sections, and, my word for it, the ties of a common ancestry, a common kindred, and common language; the bonds of a common interest, common danger, and common safety; the recollections of the past, and of associations not yet dissolved, and the bright hopes of a future to all of us, more glorious and resplendent than any other country ever saw; ay, sir, and visions, too, of that old flag of the Union, and of the music of the Union, and precious memories of the statesmen and heroes of the dark days of the Revolution, will fill their souls yet again with desires and yearnings intense for the glories, the honors, and the material benefits, too, of that Union which their fathers and our fathers made; and they will return to it, not as the prodigal, but with songs and rejoicing, as the Hebrews returned from the captivity to the ancient city of their kings.

Proceeding, sir, upon the principles which I have already considered, and applying them to the causes which, step by step, have led to our present troubles, I have ventured with great deference to submit the propositions which are upon the table of the House. While not inconsistent with any of the other pending plans of adjustment, they are, in my judgment, and again I speak it with becoming deference, fully adequate to secure that protection from aggression, without which there can be no confidence, and therefore no peace and no restoration for the Union.

There are two maxims, sir, applicable to all constitutional reform, both of which it has been my purpose to follow. In the first place, not to amend more or further than is necessary for the mischief to be remedied; and next, to follow strictly the principles of the Constitution, which is to be amended; and corollary to these I might add that, in framing amendments, the words and phrases of the Constitution ought so far as practicable to be adopted.

I propose, then, sir, to do as all others in the Senate and the House have done, so far -to recognize the existence of sections as a fixed fact, which, lamentable as it is, can no longer be denied or suppressed; but, for the reasons I have already stated, I propose to establish four instead of two grand sections of the Union, all of them well known or easily designated by marked, natural, or geographical lines and boundaries. I propose four sections instead of two; because, if two only are recognized, the natural and inevitable division will be into slaveholding and non-slaveholding sections; and it is this very division, either by constitutional enactment, or by common consent, as hitherto, which, in my deliberate judgment and deepest conviction, it concerns the peace and stability of the Union should be forever hereafter ignored. Till then there cannot be, and will not be, perfect union and peace between these United States; because, in the first place, the nature of the question is such that it stirs up, necessarily, as forty years of strife conclusively proves, the strongest and the bitterest passions and antagonism possible among men; and, in the next place, because the non-slaveholding section has now, and will have to the end, a steadily increasing majority, and enormously dis proportioned weight and influence in the Government; thus combining that which never can be very long resisted in any Government-the temptation and the power to aggress.

Sir, it was not the mere geographical line which so startled Mr. Jefferson in 1820; but the coincidence of that line with the marked principle, moral and political, of slavery. And now, sir, to remove this very mischief which he predicted, and which has already happened, it is essential that this coincidence should be obliterated; and the repeated failure, for years past, of all other compromises based upon a recognition of this coincidence, has proved beyond doubt that it cannot be obliterated unless it be by other and conflicting lines of principle and interests. I propose, therefore, to multiply the sections, and thus efface the slave-labor and free-labor division, and at the same time, and in this manner, to diminish the relative power of each section. And to prevent combinations among these different sections, I propose, also, to allow a vote in the Senate by sections, upon demand of one-third of the Senators of any section, and to require the concurrence of a majority of the Senators of each section in the passage of any measure in which, by the Constitution, it is necessary that the House, and therefore, also, the President, should concur. All this, sir, is perfectly consistent with the principles of the Constitution, as shown in the division of the legislative department into the two Houses of Congress; the veto power; the twothirds vote of both Houses necessary to pass a bill over the veto; the provisions in regard to the ratification of treaties and amendments of the Constitution; but especially in the equal representation and suffrage of each State in the Senate, whereby the vote of Delaware, with a hundred thousand inhabitants, vetoes the vote of New York, with her population of nearly four millions. If the protection of the smaller States against the possible aggressions of the larger States required, in the judgment of the framers of the Constitution, this peculiar and apparently inequitable provision, why shall not the protection, by a similar power of veto, of the smaller and weaker sections against the aggressions of the larger and stronger sections, not be now allowed, when time and experience have proved the necessity of just such a check upon the majority? Does any one doubt that, if the men who made the Constitution had foreseen that the real danger to the system lay not in aggression by the large upon the small States, but in geographical combinations of the strong sections against the weak, they would have guarded jealously against that mischief, just as they did against the danger to which they mistakenly believed the Government to be exposed? And if this protection, sir, be now demanded by the minority as the price of the Union, so just and reasonable a provision ought not for a moment to be denied. Far better this than secession and disruption. This would, indeed, enable the minority to fight for their rights in the Union, instead of breaking it in pieces to secure them outside of it.

Certainly, sir, it is in the nature of a veto power to each section in the Senate; but necessity requires it, secession demands it, just as twice in the history of the Roman Commonwealth secession demanded and received the power of the tribunitian veto as he price of a restoration of the Republic. The secession to the Sacred Mount secured, just as a second secession half a century later restored, the veto of the tribunes of the people, and reinvigorated and preserved the Roman constitution for three hundred years. Vetoes, checks, balances, concurrent majorities-these, sir, are the true conservators of free Government.

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But it is not in legislation alone that the danger or the temptation to aggress is to be found. Of the tremendous power and influence of the Executive I have already spoken. And, indeed, the present revolutionary movements are the result of the apprehension of executive usurpation and encroachments to the injury of the rights of the South. But for secession because of this apprehended danger, the legislative department would have remained, for the present at least, in other and safer hands. Hence the necessity for equal protection and guarantee against sectional combinations and majorities to secure the election of the President, and to control him when elected. I propose, therefore, that a concurrent majority of the electors, or States, or Senators, as the case may require, of each section, shall be necessary to the choice of President and Vice President; and lest, by reason of this increased complexity, there may be a failure of choice oftener than heretofore, I propose also a special election in such case, and an extension of the term in all cases to six years. This is the outline of the plan; the details may be learned in full from the joint resolution itself; and I will not detain the House by any further explanation now.

Sir, the natural and inevitable result of these amendments, will be to preclude the possibility of sectional parties and combinations to obtain possession of either the legislative or the executive power and patronage of the Federal Government; and, if not to suppress totally, at least, very greatly to diminish the evil results of national caucuses, conventions, and other similar party appliances. It will no longer be possible to elect a President by the votes of a mere dominant and majority section. Sectional issues must cease, as the basis at least of large party organizations. Ambition, or lust for power and place, must look no longer to its own section, but to the whole country; and he who would be President, or in any way the foremost among his countrymen, must consult, henceforth, the combined good and the good will, too, of all the sections, and in this way, consistently with the Constitution, can the "general welfare" be best attained. Thus, indeed, will the result be, instead of a narrow, illiberal, and sectional policy, an enlarged patriotism and extended public spirit.

If it be urged that the plan is too complex, and therefore impracticable, I answer that that was the objection in the beginning to the whole Federal system, and to almost every part of it. It is the argument of the French Republicans against the division of the legislative department into two Chambers; and it was the argument especially urged at first against the entire plan or idea of the electoral colleges for the choice of a President. But, if complex, I answer again, It will prevent more evil than good. If it suspend some legislation for a time, I answer, The world is governed too much. If it cause delay sometimes in both legislation and the choice of President, I answer yet again, Better, far better, this than disunion and the ten thousand complexities, peaceful and belligerent, which must attend it. Better, infinitely better this, in the Union, than separate confederacies outside of it, with either perpetual war or entangling and complicated alliances, offensive and defensive, from henceforth forever. To the South I say, If you are afraid of free State aggressions by Congress or the Executive, here is abundant protection for even the most timid. To the Republican party of the North and West I say, If you really tremble, as for years past you would have had us believe, over that terrible, but somewhat mythical, monster-the SLAVE POWER-here, too, is the utmost security for you against the possibility of its aggressions. And from first to last, allow me to say that, being wholly negative in its provisions, this plan can only prevent evil, and not work any positive evil itself. It is a shield for defense; not a sword for aggression. In one word, let me add that the whole purpose and idea of this plan of adjustment which I propose, is to give to the several sections inside of the Union that power of self-protection which they are resolved, or will some day or other be resolved, to secure for themselves outside of the Union.

I propose further, sir, that neither Congress, nor a Territorial Legislature shall have power to interfere with the equal right of migration, from all sections, into the Terrritories of the United States; and that neither shall have power to destroy or impair any rights of either person or property, in these Territories; and, finally, that new States, either when annexed or when formed out of any of the Territories, with ' the consent of Congress, shall be admitted into the Union, with any constitution, republican in form, which the people of such States may ordain. And now, gentlemen of the South, why cannot you accept it? Government has never yet, in any way, aggressed upon your rights.

The Federal
Hitherto, in-