gave us yesterday and carry it to its logical conclusion, he would not entrust to the people the election of any of their officers. He would find that authority in the State was held, in most cases, to come from above. It was the "divine right of kings" theory. The early history on which he bases his theory is the history of the Theocracy, and he undertakes to show that that was an appointive system of the judiciary. But my friend, the doctor, before me, (Mr. Horton,) who seems to be fully as well posted in the Bible as any other delegate on the floor, took up the Bible argument and seemed to me to have the advantage of my friend from Philadelphia, (Mr. Gowen,) who replied to him. My friend from Bradford is more familiar with the Bible, as my friend from Philadelphia is more familiar with the railroad question, and the gentleman from Bradford draws from the sacred book an argument in favor of an elective judiciary. I cannot decide between them. I am not a theologian. I do not intend to dwell longer on this point than to say that when the gentleman from Philadelphia (Mr. Woodward) gets such a Governor as Moses, appointed in the same way that Moses was appointed, then I will go with him for an appointive judiciary. officers. I would like the gentleman Again, the learned gentleman from Dauphin, (Mr. MacVeagh,) to whose eloquence we all listen with such admiration, had, as I understood him, but one theory or one argument. In this I may le mistaken, because his oratory so delights me that at the end of it I find sometimes that I have not paid proper attention to the argument which is always so strong underneath that magnificent oratory. But if I understood him aright, he is one of those gentlemen who are so profound that they care nothing for prac tical results. He would ignore all our experience of the past twenty-two or twentythree years of a good elective judiciary, and would change our present system simply because it is wrong in theory to elect judges. He cares nothing for example-and he advances what seems to me to be rather a fanciful theory, that because judges of courts "are not political Officers" they are not "representatives of government" whose duty it is to express the will of a constituency; therefore they should not be elective. His idea is that the office of judge is not a political office, that the judge should not have political patronage, that they should not have political feelings as should other term "politician" you mean to exelade But, say these gentlemen, "you elect men who have distinct opinions in regard to government affairs, men who have their party affiliations, men who believe and hold to certain interpretations of the Constitution, men who have certain distinct ideas in regard to the proper foundations and management of government; if you intend by the term politician to include these men and exclude them from being judges of the courts, then I ask leave to differ. A man who is fitted for a position of that sort, who has the proper education, and knowledge, and training, and the proper turn of mind, will have pretty distinct political ideas and convic tions. But granting all that has been said to be true, that politicians of bad character will occasionally creep into the judicial office under the elective system, whose fault is it? The fault of the people who have to suffer from it, the fault of the bar who ought, in every case, to control these elections; and if the bar of any district permit a candidate for judicial position to get down into the slums of politics, and go to "low places and consort with low politicians," and act as the gentleman from Philadelphia (Mr. Temple) said yesterday they have acted in Philadelphia, the bar of that district is certainly very gravely at fault, because a man, no difference what his character or his position may have been before, if he commits such acts as those I have just mentioned, is totally unfit for the position of judge. I grant all this; but is a man who will go into the petty intrigues that are often necessary, and that have been necessary and have been practiced to get position by appointment, any better fitted for it? Will you, any less, have politicians on the bench if they are appointed? What is the history of this country, as far back, at least, as any of us recollect? When I talk of examples I, of course, do not expect to affect those who are so profoundly philosophical as the gentleman from Dauphin, (Mr. MacVeagh,) and who "care nothing for examples;" and my friend here on the right (Mr. Gowen) is so young that he does not recollect anything about the appointment of the judiciary. I am a little older. Mr. EWING. I will endeavor to conclude in the time that was taken from me by interruptions. My friend on my left (Mr. Temple) yesterday spoke of his impressions and his opinions having been greatly affected by his early training, by his instructor. No doubt we all get our opinions largely in that way. Well, among my earliest recollections of boyhood, in regard to the judiciary, was the appointment of a gentleman from New Hampshire to the supreme bench of the United States. He was one of the most bitter, uncompromis ing, unscrupulous partisans in the United States at the time of his appointment. He made a most excellent judge, however. But it impressed me very strongly at the time that an election would at least be no worse than an appointment Take the appointments on the supreme bench of the United States, and on the bench of the district courts throughout the United States, and so far as I know them, nine-tenths of them have been made for political reasons, and I might say for po litical reasons alone. And when you come to compare the local judiciary of this State with the appointments to the district courts of the United States in different places, I think the comparison is very favorable to the elective judiciary of this State. I believe the history of those appointments, from the earliest period of the government, is that political reasons have,to a great extent controlled; and I, for one, believe that the recent appointments in the United States courts are among the best that have been made within the past thirty years. When you have judges appointed, they will always be appointed from the political party of the Executive, so that I think we gain nothing there. There is just one point more that I wish to suggest here, in which I am glad to find myself agreeing with my friend on my right (Mr. Gowen.) The learned gentleman from Philadelphia (Mr. Woodward) yesterday claimed the authorship in the Convention of 1837 of the proposition which limited the term of the judges, and thought that to that alone, or to that principally, was traceable the improvement which he admitted had taken place in the judiciary of the State within the past twenty or thirty years. I beg leave to differ with him. In my opinion that is the worst feature of the whole system. 1 believe that when you put a man on the The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from bench, whether he be appointed or elected, Allegheny will proceed. he should never be subjected to the The CHAIRMAN. The Chair must remind the gentleman that his time has expired. Mr. TEMPLE. I suggest that his time be extended, and I make that motion. The motion was agreed to. temptation and test of having to look forward to a re-election, whether that time be for ten years or twenty years. The man who, when he first goes on the bench and is fit for it, is a man who usually has a good practice at the bar of his district, at least he should have; and while we have many judges who have not had this experience, yet as a rule I think it is the other way. It is a matter of entire indifference to him, financially, whether or not he have the position; but put him on the bench for ten or fifteen years; in that time he has lost his business; he has to a great extent lost his business capacity; and with very many of them, when it comes to the end of the term, it is a question of bread and butter, and it is a test to which no man ought to be subjected to endeavor to obtain either his reappointment or his re-election. I hope some gentleman will offer an amendment at the proper time which will change that feature of our judiciary system, and I shall vote for it very heartily. .Mr. CURRY. Mr. Chairman: I have listened with profound attention to the arguments offered by the gentlemen on both sides of the question now before us. I had not made up my mind until very recently in relation to how I should cast my vote, for the reason that I desired to gain all the information upon the subject, pro and con, that it was in my power to collect. I am forced to the conclusion that doctors and lawyers differ, and differ widely, upon the question now at issue. Many seem to be in favor of the supreme judges being appointed by the Governor. Others favor the idea of submitting their choice to a popular vote of the people. I recognize the tact that we are discussing one of the most important subjects that has been or will be brought before this Convention for its consideration. I look upon the judge that sits upon the bench as a man clothed with authority, and not the representative of any political party, and to a great extent holding within his judicial grasp the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth, and the liberties and property of the people. I look upon the Supreme Court as the last resort for Pennsylvania freemen; they should be composed of men of superior ability and unquestionable integrity; they should be kept entirely free from political bias and political influenee. One step further and we look into the face of the Judge of all men-He that shall deal justly with the human race. The judges of our circuit courts, and especially the judges of our Supreme Court, should recognize the responsibility assumed by them, and should be a transcript, as it were, from the Eternal Judge himself. Now, Mr. Chairman, our desire being to keep the judges pure as they ought to be; that they should be as free as possible from everything pertaining to deception, political intrigue or anything that would be calculated to stain their pure reputations, bring reproach upon their position or bias their judgment in making a decision, always remembering the fact that politicians, as a mass, are the most corrupt and most treacherous of all men that now infest our government; the question is, shall we elect or shall we have our supreme judges appointed? As I have said, that is a matter about which lawyers differ. The arguments for and against seem to be about balanced. If a convention of either party were called to nominate a candidate for supreme judge alone, there would be no danger that an unfit man would be nominated. Each party would strive to put forward, as a candidate, the most available man. Those most available for a position are sometimes defeated by the manipulations of political tricksters. Where common schools exist we might be able to select a competent person to fill the position; but it seems to me that the real danger exists in the fact that polical conventions nominate the judges at the same time that they nominate other State officers. Then comes the familiar operation of all politicians-a trade between different localities. The east says to the west: "You nominate our man for judge, and we in turn will nominate your man for Auditor General;" and in the strife between candidates for other nominations, the nomination for judge becomes a matter of trade. Availability is lost sight of. This has not yet occurred; but it very nearly happened once, in the convention of 1857. A man totally unfit came within a few votes of being nominated in a bargain and sale. There is no doubt, Mr. Chairman, that there are strong arguments that might be presented in favor of the elective system, and there are also strong arguments that can be presented on the other side, in favor of the appointment by the GoverBut when the question is asked, "which is best for the people ?" I answer, in my humble judgment, let us first elect a high-toned, honorable man, as our Chief nor. Executive, direct from the people, and then trust him to select those men who shall preside over the judicial department of our Commonwealth. In that way we shall have judges, as near as possible, directly elected by the people, by electing a competent man to exercise the office of Governor and vesting in him the power of appointment. But the question arises, will he not appoint men according to his own political inclinations? For example, will not a Republican Governor appoint Republican judges, and vice versa? Sir, I assert here to-day that it is a reflection upon the Chief Executive of our Commonwealth to make such an insinuation; and I am glad that we can refer to one case, particularly, in which a Democratic Governor appointed a Republican judge in the city of Philadelphia. I refer to Governor Shunk. If he, in his judgment, thought that was best, I ask may we not trust other Governors that may succeed the present one to do the same thing?. For my part, Mr. Chairman, in representing a people who act and think for themselves, and in connection with the majority of my colleagues, I shall vote in favor of vesting the power of appointment of our supreme judges in the Gov ernor. Mr. WORRELL. Mr. Chairman: I rise to advocate the elective system. The proposed change in our organic law is not demanded by an existing necessity. The arguments in favor of an appointed judiciary are not-supported by facts and experience. They rest upon speculative theories of possible evil, which, under our present Constitution, may arise in the remote future. The elective principle has been triumphantly vindicated by the circumstance that the distinguished gentlemen who have opposed it have been unable, even upon challenge, to point to the mischief which this new provision is to remedy. Where is the judge who has rewarded political friends, and oppressed political opponents? Where is the judge who has allowed a suitor's party predilections to obtain him an advantage in the temple of justice? Where is the judge who has swerved under public clamor to gain the prize of popular admiration? Where is the judge who has consorted in pot-houses with party tricksters, and trailed his ermine in partisan mire, to secure a renomination for his judicial office? These are the calamities which the gentlemen have deplored. Where do they exist? Where is the testimony that these depravities do and will attend an elective judiciary? Let the man stand forth who impeaches, aye, suspects the integrity and impartiality of our judges. Mr. Chairman, who demands this alteration? Who head this revolution? Those whose servants we are, and whose delegated powers we are exercising? No! The gentlemen press this amendment in the interests of the people, to preserve their liberties and to protect their property against unjust judges. Have the people expressed any sense of insecurity? Has an alarm been sounded? Was this alteration of the fundamental law contemplated when this Convention was authorized? Point me to the one line or the one word of evidence. And I would remind gentlemen that it would be well to consider the temper and wishes of the people. We are here to propose amendments to the of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, PEOPLE'S Constitution. "We, the people ordain and establish this Constitution for its government," are the words of the pretenacious of this elective principle, and amble. Mr. Chairman, the people are will not surrender it except for subsisting momentous reasons. I was struck with the subtle argument of the gentleman from Dauphin, that the judiciary were not representative officers, and were not, therefore, upon any correct governmental theory, to be elected by the people; that the Governor and legislators were the representatives of party, and would, with reason and propriety, administer their offices as their party might dictate. But the gentleman did not sufficiently refine his doctrines. To no purpose has he read from Aristotle to Stuart gument would apply with equal force to Mill. I would suggest to him that his aran appointive Executive and Legislature, for the functions of those departments are as distinctly defined as are those of the judiciary and should be as conscientiously and equitably exercised. That gentleman fails in his conception of public morality who believes that a solemn oath to "support the Constitution of this Commonwealth and to perform the duties of an office with fidelity," will permit party interests to over-ride a-faithful performance of official duties. That is the oath of office of the Executive, that the oath of office of the judge. The gentleman from Dauphin would repel the insinuation that the oath he took, as a member of this Convention, could be reconciled in his conscience with an unfaithful performance of his duties, even though grave party considerations demanded recreancy to his sworn trust. I have been thus elaborate on this point to demonstrate that there can be no fair deduction in favor of an appointive judiciary and against an appointive Executive, drawn either from the duties of each officer or the manner in which those duties should be performed. And the sentiment which would make an Executive the Executive of a party, and not the sworn officer of the Constitution, would unfit him for the selection of judges. The people will make no concession to such a notion as that. I fear, however, Mr. Chairman, that public judgment has been affected, and that false teachers have taught too generally that the Chief Executive of a great Commonwealth should respond to the party lash. But for that reason I shall oppose vesting in that officer the appointment of the members of a co-ordinate branch of government. The time will come when pledges of judicial appointments will help to secure gubernatorial nominations. The judgeship will become part of the Executive patronage, and we will witness, in the judicial department of our government, what we see in other high places-men filling exalted governmental stations who would not dare submit their title to office to a popular vote, men whom the people would consign to the lowest depths of political oblivion. I do not fear so greatly the pressure upon an Executive succeeding his election, but I do most seriously apprehend the bargains and pledges and promises to secure a nomination and election. We have been referred to the judicial system of the United States for the vindication of the doctrine of appointment. advisedly, for unbroken practice had sanctified this custom into a right-of pleading over, and was not this to benefit his party? Has the Convention heard of United States Judge Sherman, who would have been impeached and removed from office but for the party standing of a relative? And is there not an United States Judge Darell who, to aid his party, usurped functions that no man claims he possessed, almost precipitating civil convulsions? Are there not United States judges whose derelictions were so great that even now they are under impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors in their offices? And all this under a system of appointment for life. Mr. Chairman, the people have always felt their responsibility in the selection of judges, and have, with rare exceptions, discriminated in the selection of these officers. The instances are few in which they refused to re-elect a judge who gave a good account of his stewardship. No political party would dare present a notoriously incompetent candidate. The people have demanded and will demand the nomination of men of unspotted private and professional reputation. The people are well advised of the value of an upright judiciary, and they will see that our judges are kept out of the slums of partisan trickery. And I assert that a judge has a greater probability of being re-elected in a community in which he has ably and impartially administered his office than he has of being re-appointed by an Executive who has party favorites to reward, and combinations to make to secure higher political honors. I desire now, Mr. Chairman, to say a few words in reply to an unmanly assault made yesterday upon an eminent and respected judge of this city, a gentleman to whose vote I am, in part, indebted for my seat in this Convention. Mr. TEMPLE. I desire to ask the gentleman from Philadelphia a question. The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman on the floor allow himself to be interrogated? Mr. WORRELL. I will not, sir. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Philadelphia will proceed. Mr. WORRELL. Do not gentlemen know that the number of the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States has been decreased and then increased to serve party ends? Was not the whole system of the United States circuit courts reconstructed for party purposes? Has not an United States judge brazenly asserted that, by packing the jury, he could secure the conviction of a defendant in his court? Did not an R. Ludlow. United States judge in New York, after over-ruling a demurrer filed merely to raise a constitutional question, refuse an humble defendant the right-I say right 2.-Vol JV. I refer to Hon. James Mr. TEMPLE. I will ask the gentle man The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Philadelphia (Mr. Temple) will take hi |