BAIL IN ERROR-Continued. execution and proceeding as if it had not been given, constitutes a good defence to an action upon it. Ib.

An action of debt upon the bond of bail in error should be brought in the Court where the original judgment was obtained. (C. P.) Lukens v. Bryson, 540.

Approval of bail in error, when vacated. See ERRORS AND APPEALS. Kaufman v. Hirsch, 347.

BAILMENT. In general terms, a bailment is the delivery of goods, or any other species of personal estate for use, keeping, or on some other trust, where the general property does not pass. Krause v. Commonwealth, 61.

A delivery of chattels upon a sale made on condition that the title shall pass on the payment of the purchase-money at a future day, does not constitute a bailment, but vests in the transferree a conditional title. lb.

Difference of rights of innocent purchasers and creditors towards chattels held under bailment and under conditional sale, explained. Ib.

Liability of bank for loss of securities left with it for safe keeping as a bailee without hire. See BANKS AND BANKING. Comp v. Carlisle Deposit Bank, 453. See COMMON CARRIERS.

BANKRUPTCY. Where one who conveys lands for the purpose of defrauding creditors, is subsequently adjudicated a bankrupt, the assignee in bankrupt alone can institute proceedings to set aside the fraudulent conveyance, and if he neglects to institute such proceedings for two years after his appointment, the title of the grantee becomes indefeasible. Creditors of the bankrupt, whose debts were contracted after the bankruptcy, have no standing to attack the conveyance. (0. C.) Connell's Estate, 406.

BANKS AND BANKING. A bank having opened a deposit account with a customer in the usual manner, cannot, in the absence of any claim by a third | party, refuse to pay over on demand the balance standing to the credit of the account, on the ground that the moneys deposited were not the property of the depositor, but belonged to a third party, against whom the bank claimed a right of lien or set-off for an indebtedness due by the latter to the bank. First Nat. Bank of Lock Haven v. Mason, 265.

When a bank has extended its credit to a depositor by discounting his note, but learns of his insolvency before payment, or notice of any checks drawn upon the fund, the bank may withdraw the credit upon tendering the depositor the consideration, i. e., the notes and the amount of the discount. Dougherty v. Central National Bank, 1.

In case of the insolvency of the borrower before actual payment of the money by the lender, an equitable right analogous to the doctrine of stoppage in transitu may be exercised by the lender. Ib.

Where a bank depositor dies insolvent, the bank cannot set off against the amount standing to the credit of decedent, a note of the decedent discounted by the bank in his lifetime. (C. P.) Shoemaker v. Bank, 420.

A bank is responsible for the safe-keeping of the money of a depositor, and it cannot set up the fraud of its own officers as an answer to demand for repayment. Steckel v. First Nat. Bank of Allentown, 17.

The cashier is the executive officer of a bank, and authorized by the nature of his office to receive money on deposit; after receiving it no trick or fraud on his part, by means of which the money passes to a firm in which the bank officers are largely interested, can relieve the bank from its liability. Ziegler v. Bank, 19.

BANKS AND BANKING—Continued.

In an action by a bank upon a promissory note, evidence is admissible that the note was procured from the defendant by fraud on the part of the bank officers under the following circumstances: that the defendant went to the bank to receive payment of a certificate of deposit; that when the money was paid, he signed a paper represented by the bank officer to be a a receipt for the money, but which afterwards turned out to be the note upon which suit was brought. Resh v. Bank, 21.

What a sufficient ratification of unauthorized acts of a bank president. Winton v. Little, 37. Where bonds are left at a bank for safe-keeping without hire, the depositor taking a receipt stipulating that the deposit was made at his risk, the bank is not liable for their loss by the dishonesty of the cashier, even though it appear that the bank was in the habit of detaching the interest coupons, forwarding them for collection to corresponding banks, and by so doing obtaining a temporary credit at such banks, upon which interest was allowed. Comp v. Carlisle Bank, 453.

Evidence of loose declarations made by the cashier at the time of giving the receipt as to the safety of the bonds is not admissible to vary the effect of the written receipt. Ib.

National Banks. Real estate security may be taken by a national bank for present or future advances. Winton v. Little, 37.

Usurious interest actually received by a national bank in the renewals of a series of notes cannot be set off in a suit brought by the bank on the last renewal note in the series. The forfeiture of the interest only occurs where illegal interest has been stipulated for but not paid. National Bank of Fayette v. Dushane, 472.

The only remedy of the defendant is by an action of debt against the bank under the National Bank Act to recover the penalty therein prescribed. Ib.

Where the pledgee of stock has the shares transferred into his name upon the books of the company he is liable for all assessments made upon stockholders in the event of the bank becoming insolvent. But where the stock is put into the name of a third person to hold for benefit of the pledgor and pledgee, this liability does not attach. (U. S. C. C.) Anderson v. Philadelphia Warehousing Co., 262.

Where the stock is transferred into the name of the president of a corporation pledgee, the question should be submitted to the jury, whether such corporation consented to become shareholders, and whether the transfer to their president was with the understanding that it should be a transfer to them, or was subsequently recognized by them as such transfer. Ib.

Taxation of Banks. See TAXES AND TAXATION. Lackawanna v. First Nat. Bank of Scranton, 549. Truby's Appeal, 550.

BENEFICIAL SOCIETIES. A member of an unincorporated beneficial society cannot maintain an action for benefits against the officers of such society. The effect of the Act of April 28, 1876, is simply to exonerate the members from individual liability, and to confine the execution to association property. An action at law is still maintainable against the members as copartners with a liability thus limited. (C. P.) Kurz v. Eggert, 126.

See STOCK EXCHANGE.

BILLS AND NOTES. Parol evidence is admissible to show that the maker of a promissory note was induced to sign it under a belief caused by the representations of the payee, that the note was a re ceipt for money paid. Resh v. Bank, 2i.

BILLS AND NOTES-Continued.

The moral obligation of a married woman to repay money borrowed by her, is a sufficient consideration for a note given by a third person to secure such indebtedness. Leonard v. Duffin, 155.

One who accepts a draft as treasurer is not liable personally, if the holder of the draft knew that the intention of the parties was that the defendant was not personally to be liable. (C. P.) German v. Moodie, 221.

In a suit against the indorser of a promissory note, in order to prevent judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence, it is enough for the affidavit to show that the defendant's indorsement was obtained by misrepresentation, and that the note was negotiated in fraud of his rights. Smith v. Popular Building Association, 168.

Judgment for want of an affidavit of defence will not be entered against one who signs upon the face of a note below the maker adding to his name the word "indorser." (C. P.) Schwenk v. Yost, 16.

The payees of a check are not purchasers for value of negotiable paper so as to prevent the bank upon which the check is drawn from exercising a quasi right of stoppage in transitu upon the proceeds of a note of the drawer of the check constituting the only money in bank to his credit. Dougherty v. Central National Bank, 1.

What not sufficient averment of New York usury law in an affidavit of defence to a suit upon a promissory note made in New York. See AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENCE LAW. Boughton v. Bank, 519.

Usurious interest received by national banks upon a series of renewal notes, effect of. See BANKS AND BANKING. Bank r. Dushane, 472.

BILL OF PARTICULARS, when demandable in criminal case. See CRIMES. Williams v. Commonwealth, 113.

See PRACTICE.

BILL OF REVIEW. See ORPHANS' COURT. BILLIARD TABLES, tax on.

(C. P.) Albrecht v. Lane, 377.

See TAXES.

BUILDING ASSOCIATION-Continued. 1859, must comply in all their operations with the provisions of that Act; they are required to loan moneys lawfully in the treasury to the highest bidder, in open competition, at a stated monthly meeting; they are not permitted to borrow money from banks or others for the purpose of loaning it to members at interest in excess of six per cent., nor can they fix a minimum rate of premium below which they will not receive bids. Stiles's Appeal, 83.

But a borrowing stockholder cannot complain of the action of the association in this respect unless he is injured by it, hence, if no bid was refused the borrower because it was below the minimum rate, but the loan was awarded to him upon a bid made by himself alone, or in consequence of competition with other bidders, at a premium above the minimum, he was not injured by the fact that an illegal rule had been established, and he is liable for the premium so bid. (C. P.) Orangeville Savings Fund v. Young, 251.

What not a sufficient averment of set-off in an action upon a building association order. (C. P.) Devenney v. Building Association, 127.

Payments on stock assigned as collateral security for a building association mortgage are not ipso facto payments on the mortgage. Economy Building Association v. Hungerbuehler, 218.

When such payments have been credited to the general account of the mortgagor, the testimony of the officers of the association that they considered the payments as upon account of the mortgage, is not admissible to prove that fact. Ib.

When a married woman having given a mortgage to a building association does not set up her coverture as a defence to the premiums contracted for, her next of kin after her death will not be permitted to do so. (C. P.) Building Association v. Roan, 15.

Separate suits in the name of the Commonwealth may be maintained against the principal and each of the sureties upon the official bond of a prothonotary. The Act of June 14, 1836, only prohibits the bringing of separate suits by different plaintiffs upon the same bond. Clement v. Commonwealth, 131.

Where a suit upon an official bond has been brought in the name of the equitable plaintiff, the name of the Commonwealth as legal plaintiff may be brought in by amendment, even though at the time of the amendment, the original cause of action would have been barred by the statute. Ib.

A corporation which issues a coupon bond is in the position of a maker of a promissory note, not of the drawer of a check or bill of exchange. There is no obligation upon the holder to demand payment within a reasonable time. Williamsport Gas Co. v. Pinkerton, 97.

Whether municipal bonds issued without the filing of the statement required by the Act of April 20, 1874, § 2, are illegal, not decided. Matthews v. Scranton, 507.

BROKER. See STOCK EXCHANGE.

BUILDING ASSOCIATION. Building associations chartered under the general Act of April 15,

Powell v. Abbott, 231.

CATCHING BARGAIN. See FRAUD. COLLATERAL SECURITIES. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

COMMISSIONS. See ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. AsSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. DECEDENTS' EsTATES.

COMMON CARRIER. Where a common carrier wrongfully refused to deliver goods to the assignee of a bill of lading, the measure of damages is the difference between the price at which such assignee sold them at the time when the goods ought to have been delivered, and the price realized at a sale after the delayed delivery. (Ü. S. C. C.) Schmidt v. The Pennsylvania, 351.

The duty of a carrier to its passengers is to use the greatest possible care, hence to enable a passenger to recover for injuries from a company, whose train came into collision with the car upon which he was travelling, it must appear that the carrier company did not fail in its duty to him. Phila. & Reading R. R. Co. v. Boyer, 497.

The driver of a horse car, whose tracks cross a steam road at grade, is bound to "stop, look, listen," and use whatever other precautions were reasonably in his power. His carelessness in this regard is not

COMMON CARRIER-Continued.
excused by the failure of the flagman of the steam road
to give proper notice of an approaching train. Ib.

An ordinance of the city of Philadelphia providing
that the conductors of all passenger railway cars shall
in passing a steam road at grade, cross the track in
advance of their car, does not apply to cars having no
conductor, and attended only by a driver. Ib.

A boy permitted by a conductor of a train to ride
upon the cars free of charge for the purpose of selling
newspapers is not a passenger, and if he is killed
while on the train, no action can be maintained against
the company for his death. He is simply a trespasser,
to whom the carrier owes no duty. Duff v. Allegheny
Valley R. R. Co., 504.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The constitu-
tionality of the Act of April 22, 1794, known as the
Sunday law, is now not open for argument. Seventh
Day Baptists are as much subject to its provisions as
other citizens. Waldo v. Commonwealth, 200.

The Act of June 11, 1879, relating to the examina-
tion of insolvent debtors is unconstitutional, because
upon its face it proposes to force a debtor to forego his
constitutional right under Art. I. § 9 of the Constitu-
tion, of not being compelled to give evidence which
might render him liable to a criminal prosecution.
Horstman v. Kaufman, 513.

Where the measure of duty on the part of a pas-
senger is ordinary and reasonable care, and the stand-
ard shifts with the circumstances of the case, the
question of contributory negligence is for the jury.
Ib.

of the alleged libel was not maliciously or negligently
made shall be established to the satisfaction of the
jury. Ex parte Steinman, 145.

The Acts of May 6, 1863, and April 10, 1872, pun-
ishing the sale of railroad tickets by unauthorized
persons are not unconstitutional, but are a proper ex-
ercise of the police power of the State. (Q. S.) Com-
monwealth v. Wilson, 291.

These Acts do not trench upon the power of Congress
to regulate inter-state commerce, nor do they impair
the obligation of any contract. Ib.

A statute will not be held unconstitutional if it ad-

Where injury to a passenger results from defective
track, cars, machinery, or motive power, there is a
presumption that the carrier has been negligent. But
no such presumption arises when the passenger is in-
jured by the act of a third person, over whom the car-
rier has no control. In such a case, in order to render
the carrier liable, his negligence must be affirmatively
proved. Federal Street P. R. W. Co. v. Gibson, 533.
Where a passenger on a ferry boat is thrown down,
and injured by the boat striking the wharf with vio-
lence, the company is liable, and in a case where the
lower end of a fibula was fractured, and an ankle-
joint sprained, $3200 was awarded by a referee as
reasonable damages. (C. P.) Monaghan v. Ferry Co.,
368. (Affirmed. See 10 W. N. C. 46.)

See NEGLIGENCE.

CONDITION. A condition in restraint of mar-
riage attached to a bequest in favor of a widow is in
terrorem and void; but the condition is validated by a
limitation over on event of remarriage, for such a
limitation shows that the condition was not intended
as a menace, but as the basis of a distinct gift. Bon-
bright's Appeal, 475.

Such a limitation over is none the less valid because
to one upon whom the law itself casts the property. Ib.
CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION. See COURTS.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. The laws of another
State, a member of the Union, must be proved as mat-
ters of fact. The Courts will not take judicial notice
of them. Boughton v. American Exchange Bank, 519.
CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Art. I. § 7,
Art. I. § 9,
Art. III. § 21,

Art. V. § 5,

147.

513.

339.

369, 529.

stitution. Hence the Act of June 11, 1879, authoriz-
ing the amendment of mechanics' claims is held not
to be retroactive. Fahnestock v. Wilson, 385.
An Act of Assembly requiring a county to pay the
personal debt of its ex-sheriff, contracted for the food
of jail prisoners, is void. Faas v. Warner, 412.

Assessments for the expenses of draining meadow
lands upon Greenwich Island cannot be enforced by
distress against the goods of a tenant of the land
against which the assessment is made, whose tenancy
began after the assessment was laid. (C. P.) Maynes
v. Rutherford, 221. Rutherford v. Maynes, 5€1.
A tax laid for a private purpose is unconstitutional.
Ib.

Since the adoption of the Constitution of 1874, an
action for consequential damages may be maintained
against a corporation for acts done in the exercise of
the right of eminent domain. Reading v. Althouse,

22.

Where a municipal corporation appropriates the
water of a stream for municipal purposes, it becomes
liable to all persons damaged by the diversion of the
stream. Ib.

Under Art. III. § 21, of the Constitution, which pro-
vides that in cases of death caused by negligence the
right of action shall survive, no right of action sur-
vives to the personal representatives of the deceased, but,
in the absence of new legislation, the right of action
is vested in the relatives who, by the Act of April 26,
1855, were entitled to sue. Books v. Danville, 339.

Quare, Whether the Act of April 4, 1868, limiting
the pecuniary liability of railroad companies for negli-
gently causing death can be taken advantage of by a
corporation which never formally accepted its provi-
sions. Phila. and Reading Railroad Co. v. Boyer, 497.
Quare, The effect of Art. III. § 21, of the Constitu
tion of 1874, upon the Act of April 4, 1868. Ib.

The second clause of Art. IX. § 8, of the Constitu-
tion prohibits the creation of a new municipal debt or
the increase of an existing debt of more than two per
cent. of the assessed property valuation unless author-
ized by a public vote. It does not prevent municipal

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued. officers from increasing existing or creating new indebtedness to an amount less than two per cent. without a public vote, provided the extreme limit of seven per cent. be not exceeded. Pike County v. Rowland, 241.

The Act of March 31, 1870, providing for the payment by banks of a tax of one per cent. upon their capital stock at par, and that upon such payment the other property of the bank should be exempt from taxation does not infringe upon the constitutional prohibition against exempting property from taxation. Lackawanna v. First Nat. Bank, 549.

The Act of June 7, 1879, reducing the tax upon national bank stock went into effect at once and applied to the tax of the current year. It does not violate the provision of Art. IX. § 1, of the Constitution that all taxes shall be uniform on the same class of subjects. Truby's Appeal, 550.

CONTRACT. An appointment as exclusive agent for the sale of a certain make of sewing machines within a prescribed territory is such a contract as a court of equity will restrain the breach of by an injunction. (C. P.) Ewing v. Willcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Co., 272.

The moral obligation of a married woman to repay money borrowed by her is a sufficient consideration for a note given by a third person to secure such indebtedness. Leonard v. Duffin, 155.'

An assignor for the benefit of creditors has sufficient interest in land assigned to support a guarantee given by him upon a sale of the land by his assignee that it contains a certain number of acres. Schriver v. Eckenrode, 161.

A note whose consideration is the stifling of a prosecution for forgery is void, and the entry of judgment thereon by virtue of a warrant of attorney does not make it an executed contract. Tebay & Bredin's Appeal, 151.

In such case public policy requires that the defendant be heard, and if the contract is void his relief is an incident. The principle depends on the public good, not on the merit of the defendant. But in a case of mere fraud between the parties, where the public is not interested, the law leaves the parties where they place themselves. Ib.

A promise in aid of a charity will not be sustained by the moral obligation alone, which underlies it. A legal consideration attaches only when work is begun or responsibility incurred upon the faith of the promise, or when it becomes the basis of similar engagements by others, and in either case it must be made to a party capable of enforcing it. (O. C.) Stokes's Estate, 439.

Quare, Whether a promise to pay money to a charity made within one calendar month of the death of the promisor is within the Act of April 26, 1855. Ib.

Where a contract between a mechanic and the owner of land for the erection of a house contained a covenant on the part of the mechanic that no mechanic's lien should be filed, and a covenant on the part of the owner that the building should be insured to a specified amount, these covenants are separate and independent and the breach of one does not justify a breach of the other. Long v. Caffrey, 25.

A severable contract may be severed for the purpose of enforcing rights as they accrue, but a party in default cannot insist on its being treated as severed to avoid a right to rescind for non-performance of any one portion. (U. S. C. C.)__Norrington v. Wright, 422.

Under a contract for 5000 tons of rails to be shipped in about equal quantities in February and four suc

CONTRACT-Continued.

ceeding months, the purchaser may rescind on failure to ship the stipulated quantity in February. Ib. Under what circumstances time is not of the essence of a contract to pay for and take away merchandise purchased, within thirty days of the signing of the contract. (C. P.) Kitchen v. Stokes, 48.

Where one becomes surety for a consignee and in the contract of suretyship it is provided that the consignments are not to exceed in amount the sum of $5000 at any one time, and it appeared that several consignments were made exceeding the stipulated amount, the surety is discharged from all liability by reason of the variance in the terms of the contract. Brez v. Warner, 45.

A contract to pay a certain sum out of his income to the maintenance of a school, contingent upon the convenience of the promisor, of which he is to be the judge, is not binding upon his executors. (O. C.) Wood's Estate, 170. Appeal of Trustees of University, 520.

What sufficient evidence of performance of contract. (U. S. C. C.) Reading v. Texas & Pacific R. R. Co., 175.

Where one whose name is forged to a promissory note, after knowledge of the forgery ratifies the instrument by payments on account, he is estopped from denying the validity of the note. (C. P.) Brooke v. Harman, 462.

CONVERSION, equitable, what words in will work an equitable conversion. See WILL. Jones v. Caldwell, 459.

CORPORATION. A charter will not be granted to'an institute for instruction in electricity as a curative agency with power to confer degrees, where the provisions of the charter as a prerequisite to the obtaining of a degree require in the applicant only a knowledge of electricity, galvanism, and magnetism. P.) In re Electropathic Institute, 31.

(C.

By the Act of March 24, 1877, the standard qualifications for a practitioner of medicine are a good moral character, a thorough elementary education, a comprehensive knowledge of human anatomy, human physiology, pathology, chemistry, materia medica, obstetrics, and practice of medicine and surgery, and public hygiene. Ib.

A by-law must be neither inconsistent with nor repugnant to the charter of a corporation, nor can new and additional tests or qualifications be imposed by a by-law upon voters. (C. P.) Raynor v. Beatty, 201.

The Court of Common Pleas in equity has jurisdiction to supervise and control a corporate election, and in the exercise of this jurisdiction upon a bill filed anterior to an election at which it is alleged that difficulties may arise, it will direct the judges of election to return to the Court the votes cast together with the list of challenged votes which were received or ruled out. Ib.

In order to validate corporate action at a special meeting it is necessary that notice either actual or constructive be given to every corporator who is entitled to participate in such meeting. Pike County v. Rowland, 241.

Constructive notice may be given in any manner provided either in the charter or by-laws, but in the absence of such special provision, personal notice is requisite. Ib.

In the absence of due warning, any attempted corporate action at a special meeting is void. Ib.

The powers of a corporation are such as are conferred by their charters, whether express or fairly implied;

CORPORATION-Continued.
hence, in the absence of charter authority, a lease or
contract by a railroad company to transfer all its roll-
ing stock, etc., with all its rights and duties, is ultra
vires and void. (U. S. S. C.) Thomas v. West Jersey
R. R. Co., 65.

A mere recognition by the Legislature that such a
lease has been made is not sufficient to operate as a
legislative ratification of the same, nor can its inva-
lidity be cured by the subsequent approval of the
stockholders. Ib.

Any contract by which a corporation owing duties to
the public disables itself from performing those duties
without the consent of the State is void. Ib.

There are certain cases where good faith requires
that the executed contracts of a corporation, though
originally ultra vires, should be permitted to stand,
but this principle does not prevent a Court from re-
fusing to enforce such portions of an ultra vires contract
as remain unexecuted. Ib.

The directors of a mutual insurance company have
power to cancel a policy of insurance at the request
of the insured upon payment of all assessments then
made, and their action, if done in good faith, cannot
be set aside by a receiver of the company subsequently
appointed. Acker v. Hite, 99.

Public policy forbids that a bank should set up the
fraud of its own officers as a defence to the repayment
of money due depositors. Steckel v. Bank, 17.

The Legislature has the right to prescribe the con-
ditions under which foreign corporations may do busi-
ness in this State, and a corporation failing to comply
with the requirements of the statute cannot maintain
an action upon any contract in the Courts of this
State. Travellers' Insurance Co. v. Heath, 516.

One who has dealt with a corporation as such will
not be permitted to deny his liability on a contract by
alleging that the corporation has no legal existence,
and, therefore, no right to sue. Spahr v. Farmers'
Bank, 433.

The mere fact that a corporation has adopted an ille-
gal by-law does not absolve its debtors from compliance
with their contracts unaffected by the objectionable
by-law. (C. P.) Building Association v. Young, 251.
Where the charter of a cemetery company provides
that its property shall be exempt from taxation except
for State purposes, the land of the company is not
liable for assessments for municipal improvements.
Olive Cemetery Co. v. Philadelphia, 85.

The Act of April 24, 1874, relating to the taxation
of coal mining companies applies to corporations
authorized to hold and lease coal lands to be worked
by others, although the corporation itself is expressly
prohibited by its charter from mining. Big Black
Creek Improvement Co. v. Commonwealth, 74.

For the purpose of assessing the stock of a corpora-
tion for taxation, under the Act of June 7, 1879, the
actual cash value of the stock is to be ascertained by
the prices at which it sold between the first and fif-
teenth days of November, and not by the average sales
during the year ending on the first Monday of Novem-
ber. Penna. R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 179.

CORPORATION-Continued.

Where the certificate of stock is lost, in such case,
no indemnity need be offered by the stockholder. Ib.
See BANKS AND BANKING. INSURANCE. RAILROAD
COMPANIES.

COSTS. Upon the discontinuance of an attach-
ment execution, the garnishee is entitled to all his
costs, including a $3.00 attorney fee. (C. P.) Grif-
fiths v. Stadtmuller, 348.

In an action by the sheriff to recover costs, interest
is not payable on the amount of his bill. Galbraith
v. Walker, 474.

Where a defendant endeavors to set off the amount
of his costs against the amount recovered by the plain-
tiff after a trial upon an appeal from a justice of the
peace, upon the ground that before appeal the de-
fendant tendered the amount recovered, it is necessary
that the fact of such tender should appear upon the
record. Driesbach v. Morris, 57.

Security for costs. Where a party to proceed-
ings in the Orphans' Court desires to compel a non-
resident party to enter security for costs, the proper
practice is to apply for an order by petition. Until
such an order is made, there is no stay of proceedings.
(0. C.) King's Estate, 207.

COUNTY. An Act of Assembly requiring a county
to pay the personal debt of its ex-sheriff, contracted
for bread for jail prisoners, is void. Faas v. Warner,
412.

A board of county commissioners cannot perform any
valid act at a special meeting, unless each member of
the board has had personal notice of the time and
place of such meeting. Pike County v. Rowland, 241.

Interpretation of Art. IX. § 8 of the Constitution,
relating to the increase of county and municipal in-
debtedness. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Pike County
v. Rowland, 241.

Principles governing the settlement of the accounts
of the treasurer of Allegheny County in reference to
the collection of tavern licenses. Kilgore v. Common-
wealth, 184.

Art. V. § 5 of the Constitution secures to every
county of over 40,000 inhabitants (1) The right to be
a separate judicial district; (2) The right to have a
resident Law Judge; and (3) The right not to have
Associate Judges. Commonwealth v. Dumbauld, 369,
417, 529.

This right not to have Associate Judges cannot be
taken away from such a county by a legislative enact-
ment attaching a contiguous county of less than
40,000 inhabitants. Ib.

A county so attached to a separate judicial district
does not become a part of such district by virtue of
such attachment. It has the right to have Associate
Judges resident in the county, and to have the Presi
dent Judge of the county to which it is attached pre-
side in its courts. Ib.

Whether the inhabitants of a county so attached are
entitled to vote at the election of the President Judge
who is to preside in its Courts, not decided. Ib.

COURTS. It is within the general powers of the
Courts of Common Pleas to make rules regulating
their practice, which are not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the State. Lehman r.
Howley, 386.