1776. Gen. Sullivan was too inattentive and confident. Though in the midst of royalifts, he suffered them to go backward and forward juft as they pleafed. One of the American chaplains fearing that the British would make a circuitous march and take to the Jamaica road, asked him whether he had guarded that pass fufficiently, and received for anfwer, "Yes; fo that an angel cannot force it."

Aug.

29.

It may be thought by many, that if gen. Howe, inftead of commencing his operations on Long Island, had run up the North River, and landed above New York, he would either have compelled gen. Washington to a fudden evacuation of the city, with the lofs of nearly all the ftores of the army; or to have fought though very unequal in numbers and troops; or to have furrendered for want of provifions. That fuch a movement might have been made, wind and tide favoring, without any particular danger of a failure, had been established by the fafe paffage of the Phoenix and Rofe up and down the river.

The victorious army encamped in the front of the American works in the evening; and on the 28th at night broke ground in form about 4 or 500 yards diftant from a redoubt which covered the left of the Americans. The fame day gen. Mifflin croffed over from New York with 1000 men; at night he made an offer to gen. Washington of going the rounds, which was accepted. He obferved the approaches of the enemy, and the forwardnefs of their batteries; and was convinced that no time was to be loft. The next morning he converfed with the general upon the fubject, and faid, "You must either fight, or retreat immediately.

What is your

ftrength?" The general anfwered, "nine thoufand." 1776. The other replied, "It is not fufficient, we must therefore retreat." They were both agreed as to the calling of a council of war; and gen. Mifflin was to propose a retreat. But as he was to make that propofal, left his own character should fuffer, he ftipulated, that if a retreat should be agreed upon, he would command the rear; and if an action the van. When the council was held, these reasons among others were mentioned for removing the army to New York, viz.-" The heavy rains which have fallen two days and nights, with but little intermiffion, have injured the arms, and spoilt a great part of the ammunition; and the foldiers, being without cover and obliged to lie in their lines, are worn out."-"From the time the enemy moved from Flatbufh, feveral large fhips have attempted to get up, as supposed, into the East River, to cut off our communication, by which the whole army would be deftroyed, but the wind being north-eaft, they have not been able to effect it."-"The troops are become difpirited, by their inceffant duty and watching.". It was unanimously agreed to quit. Col. Glover, who belonged to Marblehead, was called upon with the whole of his regiment fit for duty, to take the command of the veffels and flat-bottomed boats. Most of the men were formerly employed in the fishery, and fo peculiarly well qualified for the fervice. The colonel went over himself from New York to give directions; and about seven o'clock at night, officers and men went to work with a spirit and refolution peculiar to that corps. The embarkation of the troops was committed to gen. M'Dougall. He was upon the spot at Brooklyne ferry, at eight o'clock,

1776. the hour fixed for the commencement of this impor tant movement. To his great mortification he found the militia had not yet embarked. The getting them over protracted the time till between ten and eleven o'clock. Mean while, about nine, the tide of ebb made and the wind blew ftrong at north-east, which adding to the rapidity of the tide, rendered it impoffible to effect the retreat, in the courfe of the night, with only that number of row boats which they could command; and the state of the wind and tide put it out of the power of col. Glover's men to make any use of the fail boats, Gen. M'Dougall fent col. Grayfon, one of the commander in chief's aids, to report to his excellency their embarraffed fituation; and gave it as his opinion, that the retreat was impracticable that night. The colonel returned foon after, not being able to find the commander in chief, on which the general went on with the embarkation under all these difcouragements. But about eleven the wind died away, and foon after fprung up at fouth-weft, and blew fresh, which rendered the fail boats of use, and at the fame time made the paffage from the inland to the city, direct, eafy and expeditious. Providence further interpofed in favor of the retreating army, Aug. 30. by fending a thick fog about two o'clock in the morning, which hung over Long Island, while on New York fide it was clear. During the embarkation, col. Scammell was fent to gen. Mifflin with orders for a particular regiment to march down to the ferry; the colonel miftook the orders, and instead of a regiment understood the whole covering party, and delivered them accordingly. On that gen. Mifflin quitted the lines, and came down to the place of embarkation, to the great

aftonishment of gen. Washington, who with furprise in- 1776, quired into the reason of fuch conduct. The mistake being cleared up, gen. Mifflin returned to the lines, after they had been abandoned about three quarters of an hour, without its being difcovered by the enemy, because of the fog. The fog and wind continued to favor the retreat, till the whole army, 9000 in number, with all the field artillery, fuch heavy ordnance as was of most value, ammunition, provifion, cattle, horfes, carts, &c. were fafe over. The water was fo remarkably fmooth as to admit of the row boats being loaded within a few inches of the gunnel. Gen. Washington, though often entreated, would not leave the island, till Mifflin with his covering party left the lines, at about fix o'clock. The enemy were fo nigh, that they were heard at work with their pickaxes and fhovels. In about half an hour after the lines were finally abandoned, the fog cleared off, and the British were seen taking poffeffion of the American works. Four boats were on the river, three half way over, full of troops; the fourth, within reach of the enemy's fire upon the fhore, was compelled to return; fhe had only three men in her, who tarried behind to plunder, The river is a mile or more across; and yet the retreat was effected in lefs than thirteen hours, a great part of which time it rained hard.

Had it not been for the providential shifting of the wind, not more than half the army could poffibly have croffed, and the remainder, with a number of general officers, and all the heavy ordnance at least, must inevitably have fallen into the enemy's hand. Had it not been also for that heavenly meffenger, the fog, to cover the first desertion of the lines, and the feveral proceed

1776. ings of the Americans after day-break, they must have

Sept.

2.

fuftained confiderable loffes. The fog refembled a thick fmall mist, so that you could fee but a little way before you. It was very unusual alfo to have a fog at that time of the year. My informer, a citizen of New York, could not recollect his having known any at that season, within the space of twenty or thirty years.

Governor's Inland, on which were two regiments, was evacuated likewife with the lofs only of one man's arm, by a cannon fhot from the fhips. The Americans finished the removal of their military ftores from thence, and took every thing off but a few pieces of cannon, notwithstanding the fhips of war lay within a quarter of a mile of fome part of it *.

Since the affair of Long Island, endeavours have been used to keep up the spirits of the people, by puffing accounts of the extraordinary bravery of their troops, and the deftruction they made of the enemy. But that matters are not very promifing appears from a letter of gen. Mercer, who commands the flying camp, dated September the 4th, wherein he writes, "Gen. Washington has not fo far as I have feen 5000 men to be depended on for the service of a campaign, and I have not 1000. Both our armies are composed of raw militia, perpetually fluctuating between the camp and their farms, poorly armed, and still worse disciplined. These are not a match for, were their numbers equal to, veteran troops, well fitted and urged on by able officers. Numbers and difcipline must prevail at last. Giving foldiers, or

* The particulars of the retreat are taken from Dr. Rodgers's thankfgiving fermon; from col. Glover's letters; and from the information of perfons who were prefent.