The assessor is the officer who has been provided by the Legislature for fixing the valuation of property for the purpose of taxation. No appeal to any court is provided from the assessor's judgment in fixing the value of property for taxation,22 nor has any express authority been conferred upon a court to revise such valuation, or to correct an assessment, or order a new one, or to make a rebate of any tax. And we are of opinion that the power does not belong to any court to revise the assessment made by an assessor, and change or set aside any valuation of property made by him, where his judgment has been honestly exercised, and upon a right basis. To do so would seem to be to arrogate the power of ascertaining the value of property for taxation, which ascertainment of value, the Constitution declares, shall be by some person or persons designated by the General Assembly, and not otherwise. The Legislature has provided a special board for the review of assessments in the matter of valuation, as follows: The assessor, town clerk and supervisor shall attend at the time and place specified in the notice (before directed to be given), and on the application of any person conceiving himself aggrieved they shall review the assessment; and when the person so objecting thereto shall make an affidavit that the value of his personal estate does not exceed a certain sum specified in such affidavit, the assessor shall reduce the assessment to the sum specified in such affidavit; and if he, or any other one, objects to the valuation put upon any of their real estate, the board shall hear the objections, and may reduce the same if a majority of the board think it advisable, and in such case the assessor shall correct his list. Laws 1861, p. 242. This was the law in force at the time this assessment was made, and the appellant should have applied to that board for the correction of any overvaluation of his property. An omission to assess some other persons liable to taxation, or to assess a portion of the taxable property of others, would be an objection of a like character with the one here made, as the effect would be the same, though it might be less in degree, as that of an overvaluation, to wit, to cause the complaining taxpayer to bear an undue proportion of the burthen of taxation. Yet it has been held that such an omission would not affect the validity of a tax. Merritt et al. v. Farris et al., 22 Ill. 303; Dunham et al. v. City of Chicago, 55 Ill. 357. In the case of Albany & West Stockbridge R. Co. v. Town of Canaan, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 244, it was held that the action of assessors, so long as they confine themselves within the statute rule, 22 See, as to earlier law, Bureau County v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 44 Ill. 229 (1867). is conclusive, however grossly they may err in estimating the amount, and that the tax based upon the assessment is like a judicial sentence, and can be assailed only for fraud or want of jurisdiction. So it was held, in Weaver v. Devendorff, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 117, that in fixing the value of taxable property by an assessor, the power exercised is, in its nature, purely judicial. In City of Chicago v. Burtice et al., 24 Ill. 489, it was said that the court would inquire whether the commissioners for assessment fraudulently valued the property above its true value, but that if they honestly estimated property too high or too low, the court would not disturb the assessment; and see, to the like effect, Elliott v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. 293, and Jenks et al. v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. 296. The case of Creote et al. v. City of Chicago, 56 Ill. 423, which is relied on by appellant's counsel, we do not regard as materially variant from the view here expressed. It was only held there that the defense of fraud in the making of the assessment might be made, as also that the assessment was made on a wrong basis, in violation of the statute and the Constitution. In the present case there was no suggestion of fraud, or that the assessment was made on a wrong basis. The defense against the entry of judgment, as offered, we must regard as simply one of an excess of valuation, made in the honest exercise of the judgment of the assessor, and we are of opinion it was rightly excluded by the court. The judgment is affirmed. 23 Accord: New Orleans v. Railroad Co., 37 La. Ann. 45 (1885); Rockland v. Rockland Water Co., 82 Me. 188, 19 Atl. 163 (1889); State v. Sadler, 21 Nev. 13, 23 Pac. 799 (1890); Stanley v. Supervisors of Albany, 121 U. S. 535, 7 Sup. Ct. 1234, 30 L. Ed. 1000 (1887); Shumway v. Baker Co., 3 Or. 246 (1870). City of Chicago v. Burtice, 24 Ill. 489, 492 (1860): "It is nothing less than a legal fraud if the commissioners fix a valuation upon property above its real value, for the purpose of evading the provisions of the law, which forbids them to assess property more than three per cent. in any one year. It is true that the court ought not willingly to ascribe to the commissioners such motives; but when an outrageous valuation is shown, where, without it, the amount desired could not be assessed within the three per cent., it would seem to leave the court at liberty to draw no other conclusion. We hold, without hesitation, that this is a proper subject of inquiry, and, when established, constitutes a good defense. As no mathematical rule can be applied to determine, with certainty, the value of real estate, and especially unimproved city property, it must be expected that the judgments of men will differ, and, if commissioners honestly estimate property too high or too low, the court will not disturb it; but when an assessment is made so wide of the true value, as established by witnesses, as to raise the presumption that it was overestimated from design, and especially when the court can see the motives prompting to such design, it will not and ought not to hesitate so to find. The court did not err in admitting proof of the value of the property." See, also. Burton Stock Car Co. v. Traeger, 187 Ill. 9, 58 N. E. 418 (1900); State Board of Equalization v. People, 191 Ill. 528, 61 N. E. 339, 58 L. R. A. 513 (1901), valuation too low. HILTON v. MERRITT. (Supreme Court of United States, 1884. 110 U. S. 97, 3 Sup. Ct. 548, 28 L. Ed. 83.) WOODS, J.24 * The question presented by the exception of plaintiffs is whether the valuation of merchandise made by the customs officers under the statutes of the United States for the purpose of levying duties thereon is, in the absence of fraud on the part of the officers, conclusive on the importer, or is such valuation reviewable in an action at law brought by the importer to recover back duties paid under protest? * * * The provisions of the statute law show with what care Congress has provided for the fair appraisal of imported merchandise subject to duty, and they show also the intention of Congress to make the appraisal final and conclusive. When the value of the merchandise is ascertained by the officers appointed by law, and the statutory provisions for appeal have been exhausted, the statute declares that the "appraisement thus determined shall be final and deemed to be the true value, and the duties shall be levied thereon accordingly." This language would seem to leave no room for doubt or construction. The contention of the appellants is that after the appraisal of merchandise has been made by the assistant appraiser, and has been. reviewed by the general appraiser, and a protest has been entered against his action by the importer, and the collector has appointed a special tribunal, consisting of a general and merchant appraiser, to fix the value, and they have reported each a different valuation to the collector, who has decided between them and fixed the valuation upon which the duties were to be laid, that in every such case the importer is entitled to contest still further the appraisement and have it reviewed by a jury in an action at law to recover back the duties paid. After Congress has declared that the appraisement of the customs officers should be final for the purpose of levying duties, the right of the importer to take the verdict of a jury upon the correctness of the appraisement should be declared in clear and explicit terms. So far from this being the case, we do not find that Congress has given the right at all. If, in every suit brought to recover duties paid under protest, the jury were allowed to review the appraisement made by the customs officers, the result would be great uncertainty and inequality in the collection of duties on imports. It is quite possible that no two juries would agree upon the value of different invoices of the same goods. The legislation of Congress, to which we have referred, was designed, as it appears to us, to exclude any such method of ascertaining the dutiable value of goods. 24 Only a portion of the opinion of Woods, J., is printed. This court, in referring to the general policy of the laws for the collection of duties, said in Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 263, 14 L. Ed. 931: "The interposition of the courts in the appraisement of importations would involve the collection of the revenue in inextricable confusion." And, referring to section 3 of the act of March 3, 1851, which is reproduced in section 2930, Revised Statutes, this court declared, in Belcher v. Linn, 24 How. 508, 16 L. Ed. 754, that, in the absence of fraud, the decision of the customs officers "is final and conclusive, and their appraisement, in contemplation of law, becomes, for the purpose of calculating and assessing the duties due to the United States, the true dutiable value of the importation." To the same effect, see Tappan v. United States, 2 Mason, 393, Fed. Cas. No. 13,749, and Bailey v. Goodrich, 2 Cliff. 597, Fed. Cas. No. 735. The appellants contend, however, that the right to review the appraisement of the customs officers by a jury trial is given to the importer by sections 2931 and 3011 of the Revised Statutes. The first of these sections provides that on the entry of any merchandise the decision of the collector as to the rate and amount of duties shall be final and conclusive, unless the importer shall, within two days after the ascertainment and liquidation of the proper officers of the customs, give notice in writing to the collector on each entry, if dissatisfied with his decision, setting forth distinctly and specifically the ground of his objection thereto, and shall within thirty days. after such ascertainment and liquidation appeal therefrom to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the decision of the Secretary in such appeal shall be final and conclusive, and such merchandise shall be liable to duty accordingly, unless suit shall be brought within ninety days after such decision of the Secretary of the Treasury. Section 3011 provides that any person who shall have made payment under protest of any money as duties, when such amount of duties was not, or was not wholly, authorized by law, may maintain an action, which shall be triable by jury, to ascertain the validity of such demand and payment of duties, and to recover back any excess so paid; but no recovery shall be allowed in such action unless a protest and appeal shall have been taken as prescribed in section 2931. The argument is that by these sections the appraisement which had been declared final by section 2930 is opened for review by a jury trial. Such is not, in our opinion, a fair construction of this legislation. Considering the acts of Congress as establishing a system, and giving force to all the sections, its plain and obvious meaning is that the appraisement of the customs officers shall be final, but all other questions relating to the rate and amount of duties may, after the importer has taken the prescribed steps, be reviewed in an action at law to recover duties unlawfully exacted. The rate and amount of duties depend on the classification of the imported. merchandise; that is to say, on what schedule it belongs to. Ques tions frequently arise whether an enumerated article belongs to one section or another, and section 2499 of the Revised Statutes provides that there shall be levied on every nonenumerated article which bears a similitude either in material, quality, texture, or the use to which it may be applied to any enumerated article chargeable with duty, the same rate of duty which is levied and charged on the enumerated. article which it most resembles in any of the particulars before mentioned. In determining the rate and amount of duties, the value of the merchandise is one factor; the question what schedule it properly falls under is another. Congress has said that the valuation of the customs officers shall be final, but there is still a field left for the operation of the sections on which the plaintiffs in error rely. Questions relating to the classification of imports, and consequently to the rate and amount of duty, are open to review in an action at law. This construction gives effect to both provisions of the law. If we yield to the contention and construction of plaintiffs in error, we must strike from the statute the clause which renders the valuation of dutiable merchandise final. We are of opinion, therefore, that the valuation made by the customs officers was not open to question in an action at law as long as the officers acted without fraud and within the power conferred on them by the statute. The evidence offered by the plaintiffs, and ruled out by the court, tended only to show carelessness or irregularity in the discharge of their duties by the customs officers, but not that they were assuming powers not conferred by the statute, and the questions which the plaintiffs proposed to submit to the jury were, in the view we take of the statute, immaterial and irrelevant. * * STANLEY v. ALBANY COUNTY SUP'RS. (Supreme Court of United States, 1887. 121 U. S. 535, 7 Sup. Ct. 1234, 30 L. Ed. 1000.) * FIELD, J.25 ** In nearly all the states, probably in all of of them, provision is made by law for the correction of errors and irregularities of assessors in the assessment of property for the purposes of taxation. This is generally through boards of revision or equalization, as they often are termed, with sometimes a right of appeal from their decision to the courts of law. They are established to carry into effect the general rule of equality and uniformity of taxation required by constitutional or statutory provisions. Absolute equality and uniformity are seldom, if ever, attainable. The diversity of human judgments, and the uncertainty attending all human evidence, preclude the possibility of this attainment. Intelligent men 25 Only a portion of the opinion of Field, J., is printed. |