formed, upon the subject, to do which he must duly, impartially, and effectually inquire, examine, deliberate, and decide." The principle recognized in both of the cases referred to is that, inasmuch as the object of evidence in such examinations is merely to inform the conscience and judgment of the officer, such evidence may be taken in any way that is reasonably sufficient for that purpose. The officer is not governed by the rules of litigious evidence, and his decisions are not to be deemed arbitrary merely because they are founded upon information which a court would hold not to be evidence at all. We not only adhere, then, to the opinion expressed in Manion's Case, 6 Mackey, 409, that the Commissioners have full discretion in the matter of retail liquor licenses, but we hold that they may conduct. their inquiries by what may be called executive methods. * LILLIENFELD v. COMMONWEALTH.` (Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1896. 92 Va. 818, 23 S. E. 882.) Appeal from corporation court of Charlottesville. Proceedings by the Commonwealth against T. J. Lillienfeld to revoke defendant's liquor license. From a judgment revoking the license, defendant appeals. Affirmed. * RIELY, J. * * The proceeding to revoke the license of the plaintiff in error to sell liquor was taken by the court of its own motion, under section 560 of the Code, which is as follows: "Upon the motion of the attorney for the commonwealth for the county or city, or of any other person, after ten days' notice to any person or firm licensed to sell liquors or any other thing, the granting of whose license was based upon the certificate of a court, the court which granted the certificate may revoke the license;" and the order of the court initiating the proceeding was in the following words: "It is ordered by the court that a notice be issued against F. J. Lillienfeld to show cause, if any he can, why the bar-room and retail-liquor license under which he is doing business should not be revoked for selling and causing to be sold to minors whisky, wine, and beer." Upon the hearing of the matter, Lillienfeld, by his counsel, moved the court to quash the notice upon the ground that it was not sufficiently specific, which motion the court overruled; and this constitutes the first assignment of error. The order of the court, which was duly served upon the defendant, set forth plainly the ground of the proceeding-the sale of liquor to minors. It apprised him of the charge against his conduct of the business under his license. The statute does not provide, in terms, 5 Compare Queen v. Licensing Justices, 14 Q. B. D. 584 (1885); Reg. v. Bartlett, 49 Justice of Peace, 772 (1885). Only a portion of the opinion by Riely, J., is printed. that the ground upon which the revocation of the license is or will be asked shall be set forth in the notice or otherwise. It is sufficient to state the charge or charges in general terms, if stated with sufficient certainty to enable the person or firm whose license it is sought to revoke to understand the ground upon which the revocation will be asked. This was done in this case. The proceeding is a summary one; and, as was said by Judge Lewis in Cherry v. Com., 78 Va. 375, 378, "it was manifestly not the intention of the Legislature to require in such proceedings the application of the strict and technical rules which apply to indictments and other forms of accusation in criminal prosecutions." There is no substantial difference between the notice given in this case and the notice given in the case of Cherry v. Com., supra, or in the case of Davis v. Com., 75 Va. 944, in both of which cases the notice was held to be sufficient. It is also alleged as error that the court admitted as evidence, over the objection of the defendant, 19 indictments which had been found against him by its grand jury for selling liquor to minors and were then pending in the court for trial; and also in receiving the testimony of Charles Wilkins that he had purchased intoxicating liquors of the defendant at his bar-room within the preceding 12 months, but prior to May 1, 1895, when his license took effect. In this there was no error. In a proceeding of this kind, the whole matter is heard and determined by the court, and it is not confined to the strict rules of evidence which obtain upon the trial of an issue before a jury, but the doors of evidence are and should be thrown open, that the court may be satisfied whether or not it has intrusted the sale of liquor to an unfit person, and the privilege of the license been abused or the law violated. The relevancy and materiality of the evidence, and the weight to be given to it, are matters for the consideration of the court, when it comes to determine the case. Even in certain criminal prosecutions involving the life or liberty of the accused, whenever the intent or guilty knowledge is a material ingredient in the issue of the case, evidence of other acts of the accused of a similar nature tending to establish such intent or knowledge is admissible as evidence, if not too far removed; and what are the limits as to the time and circumstances is for the court, in its discretion, to determine. Trogdon's Case, 31 Grat. 863. Upon a review of the whole evidence, as certified by the court, we are of opinion that the discretion of the court was properly exercised in revoking the license of the plaintiff in error. When the license was granted, he, along with the other applicants for liquor license, was notified and warned by the court that if he sold or allowed liquor to be unlawfully sold to minors his license would be revoked. The evidence discloses that liquor was sold in his bar-room, in a number of instances, and, if he did not himself sell it, he did not exercise due oversight and vigilance to see that it was not done by his bar tender. It further appears that, even after the large batch of indict ments for selling liquor to minors had been found against him, he still retained as his bar tender the man who is proved to have freely and without inquiry sold liquor to minors. The protection of minors against the terrible evils which ensue from contracting in early life the habit of indulgence in strong drink, and the happiness of parents, as well as the good of society in general, require that this dangerous traffic in ardent spirits should be carefully guarded, and not placed or suffered to remain in the hands of men who will disregard the law, or allow it to be disregarded by their employés, or knowingly retain in their service as bar tenders persons who violate the law. Upon a consideration of the whole case, the court is of opinion that the corporation court did not err in revoking the license of the plaintiff in error, and that its judgment should be affirmed." DODD et al. v. FRANCISCO et al. (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1902. 68 N. J. Law, 490, 53 Atl. 219.) On certiorari. DIXON, J. This certiorari brings before the court the proceedings of the state board of health respecting an application for permission to locate a cemetery in the town of Bloomfield, Essex county. The application was first presented on December 24, 1900, to the council of the town, and being approved by that body was then presented to the local board of health, which on March 5, 1901, refused to give its consent. Thereupon the applicants appealed to the state board of health, and on June 28, 1901, that board passed a resolution by which the action of the local authorities was reversed and the desired permission was granted. This resolution was set aside by this court at the term of February, 1902, because the parties interested had not been heard before the board itself; the only hearing given to them having been had before a committee of the board. Afterwards, on April 22, 1902, the counsel of the respective parties were notified that on May 8, 1902, at 2 o'clock p. m., in the state house, the state board of health would meet to consider the application, and at that time and place counsel representing the applicants and the opponents appeared and were fully heard by the board, as were also all individuals who desired to express their views. The result of the board's deliberation was another resolution, passed May 22, 1902, to the same effect as that of June 28, 1901, which resolution is now before us for review. 7 See, also, Traer v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 106 Iowa, 559, 76 N. W. 833 (1898). But see People ex rel. Silkens v. McGlyn, 62 Hun, 237, 16 N. Y. Supp. 736 (1891), no proof other than character and standing of complainants. The statute under which these proceedings were taken is the sixth section of a supplement to the cemetery act, approved March 25, 1885. Gen. St. p. 354. * * * The third, fifth and sixth reasons assigned for annulling the resolution present two questions-First, whether the board was bound to examine persons under oath touching the matters stated and controverted at the hearing before it; and, second, whether the board had a right to consider a report made to it by its committee while. the first appeal was pending. In the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Garretson in the case. above cited it is said: "The board of health was acting judicially upon the application before it, and all parties were entitled to be heard by the board in a legally organized meeting of the board." This expression is referred to by counsel for the prosecutors as indicating that it was the duty of the board to examine witnesses as to disputed questions of fact. But we do not so understand it. Its import is merely that the functions of the board were such as required the exercise of the judgment of the board itself, and hence that parties interested had a right to present and discuss before the board the matters on which its judgment should rest. Nor do we find either in the statute relating to cemeteries or in that establishing the state board of health (Gen. St. p. 1634), any indication that the board was to proceed as courts do in suits inter partes. There is nothing suggestive of a power to summon witnesses, to administer oaths or to compel the giving of evidence, either oral or written. Moreover, the matters to be considered by the board respecting the propriety of locating a new cemetery are of so general and public a nature that they can be decided more intelligently by observation and discussion than by testimony. In this respect the board resembles boards of assessment, whose proceedings involve the exercise of judicial functions (Peckham v. Newark, 43 N. J. Law, 576), but whose judgment is to be founded on facts obvious to their senses or ascertained by inquiry and examination, who, although not authorized. to call witnesses and examine them upon oath, should, as do surveyors and freeholders in road cases, visit the premises in controversy and avail themselves of every accessible means of information likely to aid them in reaching a proper determination. State v. Jersey City, 24 N. J. Law, 662, 665. We therefore conclude that the board was not bound to receive evidence under oath. What has been already said indicates also that in our judgment it was not erroneous for the board to consider the report of its former committee regarding the matter pending before the board. The report was a means of information accessible not only to those who were members of the board when the report was presented, but also to new members. As a part of the discussion proper in the deliberations of such bodies, the report was at least the statement of persons who had made special investigation and presumably formed impartial judgments on the matter under consideration. * Resolution granting the desired permission affirmed. SECTION 25.-IN CONNECTION WITH REVENUE TOMLINSON v. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION. (Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1889. 88 Tenn. 1, 12 S. W. 414, 6 L. R. * A. 207.) LURTON, J.* * The complaint made in the petition is that it [the board of equalization] refused to hear witnesses offered by complainant in support of his complaint as to an excessive assessment as to valuation. In this, did they "exceed their jurisdiction," or "act illegally"? To determine this, we must not only consider the language of the act defining their duties, but consider the general nature and scope of the powers conferred upon them. They are styled a "board of equalization." They are charged, primarily, with the duty of "examining" and "equalizing" assessments. This duty they are expected, most manifestly, to perform, not upon testimony, but upon a "comparing" the assessments in one district or neighborhood with another—one piece of property with the assessment upon another of equal value. Clearly, this is to be done upon their own knowledge of the comparative valuations, and the end to be reached is an equalization whereby discriminations in favor of one, or against another, are to be corrected. In addition to this, they are to correct mistakes made by the assessor, and eliminate from the list property exempt under the law from as sessment. Finally, they are empowered to hear and adjust complaints from any party feeling aggrieved on account of excessive taxation, where in their judgment justice demands it. How are they to "hear and adjust" such complaints? Petitioner's contention is that they must hear witnesses produced by him; that he has a right to examine such witnesses, and cross-examine such as are produced against him. In other words, that the act contemplates a regular trial, according to the ordinary course of law, and the decision according to the weight of the proof. We have seen that, with reference to the primary duty of the board-that of equalizing assessments-the act contemplates no 8 The rest of the opinion is omitted. See ante, p. 76. Only a portion of the opinion of Lurton, J., is printed. |