The power thus delegated to the board of fitting the details of regulation to the particular circumstances of each case is of the same character as that long exercised by the fish and game commissioners and their predecessors, the board of inland fisheries, in prescribing the details of the construction of the fishways to be constructed in dams where by law fishways have to be maintained. See St. 1866, pp. 231, 232, c. 238, §§ 2, 6; St. 1867, p. 741, c. 344; Pub. St. 1882, c. 91, § 4. See, also, 3 Province Laws, 1745-46 (State Ed.) c. 20, p. 267. These acts provide that the board, after examination of dams upon rivers where the law requires fishways, is to determine whether the fishways in existence are sufficient, and to prescribe by an order in writing what changes or repairs, if any, shall be made, and at what times the fishways are to be kept open, and to give notice thereof to the owners of such dams. The action of the fish commissioners under these acts is unquestionably legislative in character, and we cannot doubt that their action under them, exercised and acquiesced in by the public for this length of time, is valid. The result is that in our opinion the action of the board in the case at bar was the working out of details under a legislative act. The board is no more required to act on sworn evidence than is the Legislature itself, and no more than in case of the Legislature itself is it bound to act only after a hearing, or to give a hearing to the plaintiff when he asks for one; and its action is final, as is the action of the Legislature in enacting a statute, and, being legislative, it is plain that the questions of fact passed upon by the Legislature in adopting the provisions enacted by them cannot be tried over by the court. This court has been recently asked to try over the expediency of compulsory vaccination in an action under a statute requiring it. Com. v. Jacobson, 183 Mass. 242, 66 N. E. 719, 67 L. R. A. 935. On its declining to do so an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, and its refusal to do so was held to be correct. Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643. See particularly page 30 of 197 U. S., page 363 of 25 Sup. Ct. (49 L. Ed. 643). See, also, Devens, J., in Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co., 144 Mass. 531, 11 N. E. 929, 59 Am. Rep. 113. The practical result is that the defendants are forbidden to conduct their sawmill as they had conducted it for 30 years by a board who have not heard evidence and have refused the defendants a hearing, that the action of the board is final, and that no compensation is due to them. This result may seem strange. But it is no less strange than the practical results in cases which are decided law. Take the case before the court in Nelson v. State Board of Health, 186 Mass. 330, 71 N. E. 693, namely, a farm on the banks of a pond used as the water supply of a town. The state board of health can pass a general regulation under section 113, c. 75, Rev. Laws, forbidding privies within a specified distance from its shore; and, if the defendant had a privy there for 30 years, his right to maintain it would cease, al though the order was made without hearing; and the action of the board is final. On the other hand, if the board had proceeded, under section 118, to investigate this particular privy, the defendant would have been entitled to a hearing, and, on appeal, to a jury, as provided by section 119. Again, take, for example, the regulation of a local board of health in question in Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co., 144 Mass. 523, 11 N. E. 929, 59 Am. Rep. 113, requiring all rags arriving at the port of Boston from any foreign port to be disinfected at the expense of the owner before being discharged. The power of the local board of health to declare these rags a nuisance per se, so as to impose upon the owner without trial the expense of disinfecting them, was established by this court in that case. Had the local board undertaken to investigate the particular rags in question in Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co., under their jurisdiction to inquire into sources of filth, and they had been authorized under that act to abate the nuisance if they found the rags to be a nuisance, by ordering them to be disinfected at the expense of the defendant, they would have had to give the defendant a hearing on notice, and from their decision the defendant would have had a right to a trial by jury. That is what was decided in Salem v. Eastern Railroad, 98 Mass. 431, 96 Am. Dec. 650. That is to say, on the one hand, where the law is general and the question is whether under it the defendants are committing a nuisance, the facts are determined by judicial action; on the other hand, the determination of the same facts is legislative in case the Legislature decides to make the thing a nuisance per se. where it is legislative it is final, and no hearing is necessary; and where, as is the case here, it is made in the exercise of the police power, no compensation is due. The delegation of such legislative powers to a board is going a great way. But the remedy is by application to the Legislature, if a remedy should be given. In our opinion it is within its constitutional power, and the court can give no remedy. For similar cases, where the use which can be made of property has been left to the final determination of boards, see Newton v. Joyce, 166 Mass. 83, 41 N. E. 116, 55 Am. St. Rep. 385; Com. v. Roberts, 155 Mass. 281, 29 N. E. 522, 16 L. R. A. 400. See, also, in this connection, In re Wares, Petitioners, 161 Mass. 70, 36 N. E. 586. The difference between the majority and the minority of the court in Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100, 10 L. R. A. 116, 23 Am. St. Rep. 850, was on the construction of the act there in question. Exceptions overruled.32 32 "It is urged that there was denial of due process of law in failing to accord plaintiff in error a hearing before the board of tea inspectors and the Secretary of the Treasury in establishing the standard in question, and before the General Appraisers upon the re-examination of the tea. Waiving the point that the plaintiff in error does not appear to have asked for a hear SECTION 21.-IN REVOKING LICENSES COMMONWEALTH v. KINSLEY. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1882. 133 Mass. 578.) FIELD, J. The defendant was complained of for unlawfully keeping, in a building occupied by him in Millbury, a table for the purpose of playing at pool for hire, gain and reward, without authority or license therefor. By Gen. St. c. 88, §§ 69-72, as amended by St. 1880, c. 94, the selectmen in towns are authorized to grant licenses for such a table, but "such license may be revoked at the pleasure of the authority granting it"; and all persons are prohibited, under a penalty, from keeping such a table without a license. A license had been duly granted to the defendant, and it had been revoked by the selectmen without giving him notice of their intention to revoke it; but they had given the town clerk a certificate of the vote revoking the license, and he had informed the defendant of its contents, and thereafterwards the defendant "allowed a pool table to be used for hire upon his premises." The defendant contends that this revocation was inoperative, because it was made without giving him an opportunity to be heard, and that, if the statutes purport to authorize a revocation without notice, they are in this respect unconstitutional and void. The keeping of a pool table for hire is one of many things affecting the public morals, which the Legislature can either absolutely prohibit or can regulate, and one common form of regulation is by requiring a license. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license was that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity or privilege within the meaning of these words in Declaration of Rights, art. 12. Commonwealth v. Blackington, 24 Pick. 352; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597; Commonwealth v. Colton, 8 Gray, 488; Commonwealth v. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70; Commonwealth v. Adams, 109 Mass. 344; Commonwealth v. Fredericks, 119 Mass. 199. ing, and assuming that the statute did not confer such a right, we are of opinion that the statute was not objectionable for that reason. The provisions in respect to the fixing of standards and the examination of samples by government experts was for the purpose of determining whether the conditions existed which conferred the right to import, and they therefore in no just sense concerned a taking of property. This latter question was intended by Congress to be finally settled, not by a judicial proceeding, but by the ac tion of the agents of the government, upon whom power on the subject was conferred." Buttfield v. Strauaban, 192 U. S. 470, 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 355 (48 L. Ed. 525) (1904). It is immaterial in what manner the defendant obtained knowledge that his license had been revoked. Without considering whether the defendant would be liable to the forfeiture imposed by Gen. St. c. 88, § 70, if he had not had either notice or knowledge that his license had. been revoked, after such knowledge he would clearly be liable. 1876, c. 147,3 has no application to this case. Exceptions overruled. MARTIN v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1888. 23 Neb. 371, 36 N. W. 554.) Error to district court, Lancaster county. George Martin was indicted for selling liquors without a license. Case tried upon a stipulation of facts. Judgment for the State, and defendant brings error. REESE, C. J. Plaintiff in error was convicted of the crime of selling intoxicating liquors in violation of law, not having a license therefor. * It appears by the record that a license was issued to plaintiff in error on the 13th day of April, 1887, by which he was permitted to sell intoxicating liquors until the second Tuesday in April, 1888, but that on the 22d day of June, 1887, he was convicted of selling liquor on Sunday, the 12th day of the same month. This conviction was had in the police court, and on the 27th day of June the police judge certified the conviction to the city council. At a subsequent meeting of the council, we presume, although the date is not given, the resolution revoking the license was adopted without any notice having been given to plaintiff in error of the contemplated action of the council. The section of the statute under which this action was had is section 92 of the law governing cities of the first class (Comp. St. 1887, c. 13a), which is as follows: "Sec. 92. The mayor and council may, by ordinance, license, restrain, regulate, or prohibit the selling or giving away of malt, spirituous, or vinous, mixed or fermented, intoxicating liquors, the license. not to extend beyond the municipal year for which it shall be granted, and to determine the amount to be paid for such license not less than the minimum sum required by any general law upon the subject; * provided, that any permits issued to a druggist may be revoked by the council at pleasure; and further, that any license issued 33 This statute provides that licenses granted to keepers of billiard saloons under Gen. St. c. 88, shall be signed by the clerk of the city or town in which they are granted, shall be recorded by him, and shall continue in force until the 1st day of May next ensuing, unless sooner revoked, and that, when revoked, the clerk of the city or town shall give written notice of such revocation to the holder of the license. Accord: Child v. Bemus, 17 R. I. 230, 21 Atl. 539, 12 L. R. A. 57 (1891). FR.ADM.LAW.-11 by the mayor and council for any purpose mentioned in this section shall be revoked by the mayor and council upon the conviction of the licensee of any violation of any law, ordinance, or regulation pertaining to the sale of such liquors, and proceedings of appeal or error taken to review such judgment or conviction shall in no wise affect the revocation of such license, or the effect of such conviction, until such appellate or error proceedings be finally determined, and such conviction be finally annulled, revoked, or reversed." It is made the duty of the mayor and council to revoke the license "upon conviction of the licensee of any violation of any law, ordinance, or regulation pertaining to the sale of" liquors. The language of the statute is imperative. Any license "shall be revoked" upon such conviction. But it is contended that before the mayor and council can legally revoke the license, notice must be given to the licensee in order that he may show cause, if any exists, why the license should not be revoked. In support of this contention it is insisted that the license is a franchise, or public right, vested in the individual, and for which he has paid a consideration, and therefore it has all the necessary elements of property under the provision of the Constitution that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." There is no vested right in a license to sell intoxicating liquors, which the state may not take away at pleasure. Pleuler v. State, 11 Neb. 547, 10 N. W. 481. Such licenses are not contracts between the state or municipality issuing them and the licensee, but are mere temporary permits to do what otherwise would be unlawful. Barrie v. Schultz, 34 N. Y. 657. They are subject to the direction of the government, which may revoke them as it deems fit, and may be abrogated by the adoption of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquors. Columbus City v. Cutcomp, 61 Iowa, 672, 17 N. W. 47. The law of 1881, commonly known as the "Slocumb Law," absolutely prohibits the entire traffic in intoxicating liquors "by the most expressive language," giving only an exception where the license or permit is issued. Pleuler v. State, 11 Neb. 547, 10 N. W. 481. We therefore conclude that there is no such vested right or essential element of property in a license as to bring it within the provision of the Constitution above quoted. But this does not entirely dispose of the question here presented; for, if notice to the licensee was necessary to give the municipal authorities jurisdiction, the acts of the council might still be void for want of authority or power to act. A number of cases are cited by plaintiff in error, holding that notice in the particular cases then under consideration was necessary. These cases are: Plummer v. Com., 1 Bush (Ky.) 26; State ex rel. Heise v. Town Council, 6 Rich. Law (S. C.) 404; Com. v. Moylan, 119 Mass. 109; and Gaertner v. City of Fond du Lac, 34 Wis. 504. In Plummer v. Com. one Shepherd was licensed by the county court to keep a tavern. Before the expiration of the license, the county |