Bloom v. Franklin Life Insurance Company. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 550; s. c., 21 Am. Rep. 541, & rule was declared which it seems difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with that laid down in Cluff v. Mutual, etc., Co., supra, for it was held in the later case that where an assured submits to a surgical operation for the purpose of producing abortion, there can be no recovery upon the policy. It is true that the opinion puts the decision upon the ground of public policy, but when the real reason for the decision is reached, it will be found that it rests upon the ground that the act was in violation of the rights of the insurance company, for an act against public policy cannot relieve the company unless it is one increasing the risk. If a man should violate public policy by entering into an illegal conspiracy to prevent competition at a public sale, and this should lead to his death, we suppose no one would claim that because his act was against public policy the insurance contract was avoided. Again, if an assured should enter into a conspiracy to corruptly control the acts of a government official, or should enter into a marriage brokerage contract, and these acts should lead to his death, it would be clear that the policy of insurance would not be rendered void. In our opinion the law is this: A known violation of a positive law, whether the law is a civil or a criminal one, avoids the policy if the natural and reasonable consequences of the violation are to increase the risk; a violation of law, whether the law is a civil or a criminal one, does not avoid the policy if the natural and reasonable consequence of the act does not increase the risk. Whether the violation of law was the proximate cause of death, and whether it was an act increasing the risk, must in general be determined from the facts of the particular case. There must in all cases, whether the law violated be a criminal or a civil one, be some causative connection between the act which constituted the violation of law, and the death of the assured. A man engaged in uttering counterfeit money might meet his death while so engaged, and yet there might be circumstances which would destroy the causal connection between the death and the violation of law, and in such a case it is clear that a company would not be relieved from liability. On the other hand, an assured might bring on his death while engaged in the violation of a civil law, as for instance, in the case of an attempt to force an entrance into a man's house for the purpose of arresting him on civil process. Another illustration may be found in the case of a Bloom v. Franklin Life Insurance Company. railway engineer who in violation of law neglects to sound signals and brings on a collision in which he perishes, and a hundred examples are supplied in cases of collisions at sea or on navigable streams, brought about by a violation of maritime laws. It would not be difficult to multiply examples proving that the rule must be that the known violation of a positive law relieves the company where the act constituting the violation is the proximate cause of death, whether the positive law violated be a civil or a criminal one. The act of the assured in this case was the proximate cause of his death within the meaning of the law. A man who makes a violent assault upon a woman puts his own person in danger, for a father, a husband, or a child may interfere to protect the assailed woman, and may overcome the assailant by force. Strangers not only may interfere to protect the person violently assaulted, but are in strict law under a duty to interfere. The natural result of such an illegal act as that of the assured therefore was to bring his person into danger, and as death resulted his own act was the proximate cause. It may well be doubted whether an assured who violently assaults another does not cause a forfeiture, even though the rescuer uses excessive force; but that point we need not decide, for the interference in this instance was a lawful one. While the unlawful act of the assured must tend in the natural line of causation to his death, in order to work a forfeiture, it is not necessary that the act should be the direct cause, nor that the precise consequences which actually followed could have been foreseen. It is enongh if the act is unlawful in itself, and the consequences flowing from it are such as might have been reasonably expected to happen, for in such a case the ultimate result is traced back to the original proximate cause. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Eaton, 94 id. 474; Dunlap v. Wagner, 85 id. 529; s. c., 44 Am. Rep. 42; Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426; s. c., 42 Am. Rep. 508; Billman v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 76 Ind. 166; s. c., 40 Am. Rep. 230. In the case of Cluff V. Mutual, etc., Co., supra, the decision was that where the assured made an assault upon another, and the person assaulted killed him, the policy was forfeited. The same general doctrine was maintained in Bradley v. Mutual, etc., Ins. Co., supra, but it was held that where there was any conflict of evidence, the question of whether the death was the natural result of the wrongful act must Bloom v. Franklin Life Insurance Company. be left to the jury. In the case of Insurance Co. v. Seaver, 19 Wall. 531, the assured was driving in a race, a collision took place, he leaped from his sulky and was killed, and the court held that death was proximately caused by the unlawful act of racing. The subject received consideration in Miller v. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., 34 Iowa, 222, where the assured, while suffering from a fit of delirium tremens, escaped from his keepers, ran out into the street in very inclement weather, and by the exposure brought on another form of disease which was the immediate cause of death. The court held that the proximate cause of death was the excessive use of intoxicating liquor. But there is really no reason for endeavoring to find insurance cases, for the fundamental principle must be the same whether the contract is one of insurance or an ordinary commercial agreement. The fundamental principle is as old as the "Squib case" on the civil side of the common law, and on the criminal side as old at least as the time of Sir Matthew Hale. 1 Hale P. C. 428; 1 Hawk. P. C. 93; Kelley v. State, 53 Ind. 311; Harvey v. State, 40 id. 516; Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Buck, 96 id. 346, 350. Courts cannot be ignorant of the nature of men, and must attribute to them the ordinary passions and weaknesses inherent in human nature. It has been expressly adjudged that courts may presume that domestic animals will act in conformity to their usual propensities and habits, and surely there is stronger reason for extending this principle to beings of intelligence, reason and affections. Whart. Neg., §§ 100, 107; Billman v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., supra. It has indeed been laid down by respectable authority that notice will be taken of the habits of men acting in masses, and if this be true, it must also be true that notice will be taken of what an ordinary man would likely do under a known state of affairs. Whart. Neg., § 108. Whart. Neg., § 108. These considerations lead to the conclusion that a man who beats and maltreats another's wife may reasonably expect the husband to defend her without being careful to select the means of defense or to nicely weigh the degree of force. To expect a husband to act coolly and with careful circumspection in such a case is to expect an unreasonable thing. The probability is that the husband will in such a case use force, and this makes it probable that the one who assaults the wife will encounter force at the hands of the husband, and what is probable is, in legal contemplation, to be expected. Billman v. Bloom v. Franklin Life Insurance Company Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., supra, and authorities cited. If therefore an assured does assault another's wife, he does an unlawful thing which he must expect will bring upon him violence from the husband, and if this force leads to death, then the proximate cause of death is the unlawful act which provoked the use of violence. The violation must be a known one, and we are inclined to think that the law violated must be a known one, that is, must be one of which the violator has, or should have, actual knowledge. But there are many things of which no man can be ignorant, and among the things of which no one can be ignorant is, that it is against the law to commit murder, to steal, or to violently beat another. We cannot doubt that the beating of Mrs. Bloom was an act known by the assured to be a violation of law. The fact that the assured was intoxicated when he committed the assault and battery upon his brother's wife does not change the law. Drunkenness is no excuse for crime. Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550, and authorities cited. A man who voluntarily makes himself drunk is in a measure responsible for his own irresponsibility. But waiving this consideration, the degree of intoxication does not appear to have affected the mental capacity of the assured, and the presumption here is, as in all cases, that the mental condition was a normal one. There is no force in the proposition that the assured did not lose his life in a known violation of law, but in consequence of the violation. The cause of the cause is in law sufficient, and the cause of the cause of death was the blow given while the assured was in the act of violating the law, and it is not material whether death did or did not immediately ensue. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Buck, supra. What we have said disposes of all the questions in the case, and it is not necessary to examine the special finding. Judgment affirmed. Hibbits v. Jack. HIBBITS V. JACK. (97 Ind. 570.) Will-restraint of marriage. A devise to the testator's wife "so long as she shall remain my widow” is not in restraint of marriage.* A CTION to quiet title. The opinion states the facts. The defendant had judgment below. J. S. Buckles and J. W. Ryan, for appellant. O. T. Boaz, W. W. Herod and F. Winter, for appellees. NIBLACK, J. In his life-time and at the time of his death, as hereinafter stated, John Jack was, in addition to a considerable amount of other property both real and personal, the owner of one undivided third part of a tract of land in Delaware county, estimated to contain sixty-five acres, upon which a flouring mill and its appurtenances were situate. On the 27th day of September, 1859, the said Jack executed and published his last will and testament, which contained, amongst others, the following provision: "I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my beloved wife, so long as she shall remain my widow, all of my goods, chattels, rights, credits, moneys and effects, of every kind and character whatever, and all of my right, claim and interest of, in and to any and all real estate, wherever situated, of which I am or may be at any time seised or possessed, which may remain after payment of all my just debts." Early in the month of October then next ensuing Jack died, leaving his will so executed and published in full force, and Susan Jack, as his widow, and Emily E. Jack, since intermarried with Edward H. Valentine, Martha M. Jack, since intermarried with William L. Little, Parmelia R. Gilbert, Mary E. Wood and Florence T. Jack, since intermarried with James E. Howe, as his only children surviving him. * See Crawford v. Thompson (91 Ind. 266), 46 Am. Rep. 598; Bostick v. Blades (59 Md. 231), 43 Am. Rep. 548; Stillwell v. Knapper (69 Ind. 558), 35 Am. Rep. 240. |