City of Valparaiso v Gardner. current expenses where there were no funds in the treasury and the existing indebtedness exceeded two per centum of the value of the taxable property of the municipality. There the question was not whether the claim which the municipal officers were about to pay in bonds was or was not a debt within the meaning of the Constitution; while here that is the question, so that we come to the decision of this case unfettered by any former adjudication of this court. The question is a grave one, and not entirely without difficulty. If we hold that the contract to pay an annual water rent of $6,000 during a period of twenty years creates a debt for the aggregate sum of $120,000, and is a debt within the prohibition embodied in the Constitution, we should lay down a principle that would, in a great majority of instances, put an end to municipal government. If it be true that an agreement to pay a given sum each year for a long period of years constitutes a debt for the aggregate sum resulting from adding together all the yearly installments, then it is extremely doubtful whether there is a city in the State that has authority to repair a street, dig a cistern or build a sidewalk, for nearly every city has contracts for gas and water supplies running for a long series of years, in which the aggregate amount of annual rents would of themselves equal, if not exceed, the limit of two per centum on the value of taxable property. We know, as matter of general knowledge, that water works and gas works require the outlay of enormous sums of money, and that such enterprises are not undertaken under contracts running for short periods of time. If the aggregate sum of all the yearly rents is to be taken as a debt within the meaning of the Constitution, then many cities will be left without the means of procuring things so essential to public welfare and safety. We are not to presume, unless coerced by the rigor of the words used, that the framers of the amendment, or the electors who voted for it, intended to destroy the corporate existence of our municipalities or to leave them without water or light. Nor are we to presume that the electors were ignorant of the existence, condition and necessities of our great towns and cities. On the contrary, we are to presume that these things were known to the electors, and that they intended to foster the best interests of these instrumentalities of local government. An error frequently finds its way into trains of reasoning from the assumption, often made, that the officers are the corporation. This assumption is radically City of Valparaiso v. Gardner. erroneous, for it is the inhabitants, and not the officers, who constitute the public corporations of the land. Grant Corp. 357; Lowber v. Mayor, etc., 5 Abb. Pr. 325; Clarke v. City of Rochester, 24 Barb. 446. To deny the right to procure water and light is to deny it to the inhabitants of the towns and cities, and these form no inconsiderable part of the population of the State. We cannot therefore by mere intendment declare that the electors of the State meant to lay down a rule that should practically take from the inhabitants of our cities the power to supply themselves with water or light. To reach the conclusion that they meant to do this, we must find clear warrant in the language of the constitutional provision itself. We agree that if it be found that the language used is clear and explicit, we must give it effect, no matter how disastrous the consequences may be. While it is our duty to yield to the words of the Constitution, still in determining what meaning they were intended to have, it is proper to consider the circumstances under which the provision was adopted and the object it was intended to accomplish. Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 78, 79. In view of the warring among the adjudged cases it is not easy to affirm that the word "debt" has a firmly settled meaning. In one case it was said, "But the compensation to this contractor was not a debt within the sense of this provision, until the service was performed and the contractor was entitled to be paid. It was, no doubt, an obligation, in some sense, from the time the contract was entered into, but it was not a debt in the popular sense" of the term. Weston v. City of Syracuse, 17 N. Y. 110. A similar definition is annexed to the word in the opinion of the court, written by the eminent jurist, Judge DENIO, in Garrison v. Howe, 17 N. Y. 458. It was said in Wentworth v. Whittemore, 1 Mass. 471, "but whenever it is uncertain whether any thing will ever be demandable by virtue of the contract it cannot be called a debt." By the Supreme Court of California it was said: "A sum payable upon a contingency however is not a debt, or does not become a debt until the contingency has happened." People v. Arguello, 37 Cal. 524. In Sackett v. City of New Albany, supra, this language was used: By indebtedness,' in this connection, we mean an agreement of some kind by the city to pay money where no suitable provision has been made for the prompt discharge of the obligation imposed by the agreement." Conceding that there are cases giving 66 City of Valparaiso v. Gardner. the word "debt" a somewhat different meaning from that affixed to it by these authorities, still they are sufficient to prove, at least. that the word cannot be said to have a firmly settled meaning. It is not necessary for us to decide that the meaning given the word in the cases cited is that which the word invariably possesses, for it is sufficient for our purpose to assume that its meaning is not so fixed and definite as to forbid construction. The word used in the construction is "indebted," but without ascertaining what the word "debt " means we cannot affix a meaning to that word, for its popular meaning is "placed in debt," or as Worcester puts it, "being in debt." It is obvious that a corporation owing no debt cannot be indebted. Our leading purpose is therefore to ascertain what meaning the authors of the Constitution intended the word "indebted" to have, and we address ourselves to its accomplishment. It is clear that if the city should fail to perform its contract, the recovery would be for damages for a breach of contract, and not the contract rate of compensation, and therefore it cannot be true that the whole of the compensation is certainly demandable by the corporation with which it contracts. It may be that but a small part of even one year's compensation can be recovered. On the other hand, the failure of the water company to perform may put an end to the contract, and that would, of course, terminate all liability of the muncipal corporation. There could be no action maintained against the city for the recovery of compensation under the contract without evidence that the water had been furnished, and this proves that there is no indebtedness until the water has been supplied in accordance with the terms of the contract. The effect of the proposed contract is that the city shall be liable for water as it is furnished and not before. It is not until after the water has been furnished that there can be justly said to be a debt, for while there might be a liability for damages, in case of a breach on the part of the city, there is certainly none under the contract until the city has received that for which it contracted. If it can pay this indebtedness when it comes into existence, without exceeding the constitutional limitation, then there is no violation of the letter, and surely none of the spirit of the Constitution. We are careful to say when the debt comes into existence, and not to say when it becomes due, for between these things there is an essential difference. The object to be accomplished by the City of Valparaiso v. Gardner. amendment, the condition and necessities of our municipalities, as known to the authors of the amendment, and the just force of the language employed, authorize us to conclude that the inhibition of the Constitution does not apply to contracts for water to be paid for as the water is furnished, provided it is shown that the contract price can be paid from the current revenues as the water is furnished, and without increasing the corporate indebtedness beyond the constitutional limit. The adjudged cases sustain our conclusion. The cases upon which our case of Sackett v. City of New Albany, supra, is based, were decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and having once accepted the decisions of that court as authoritative, it is both consistent and logical to follow them so far as we can without yielding our own deliberate convictions. Happily however the decision of that court declares the rule to be that which we have here endeavored to prove the correct one. The case to which we refer is that of East St. Louis v. Eust St. Louis, etc., Co., 98 Ill. 415, where the subject was much discussed; three of the members of the court wrote opinions, but there was no dissenting vote. In delivering the opinion of the court, SHELDON, J., set forth the provision of the Illinois Constitution and stated the argument of counsel to be that a contract similar to the one here under discussion violated the Constitution, and said: We do not assent to the correctness of this view. The contract was for the furnishing of an article for nightly consumption by the city during a period of thirty years, fixing the price at which the article should be furnished. There was no indebtedness in advance as any thing being furnished, but indebtedness arose if gas should have been furnished along from night to night during the period of thirty years. The contract provides for the payment, monthly, at the end of each month, the amount that became due for the month then ended. When the company has furnished the gas for a certain month, then there is a liability—an indebtedness arises. and not before, as we conceive. Hence the amounts that might become due and payable under the contract in future years did not constitute a debt against the city at the time of the entering into the contract, within the meaning of the Constitution." The decision in Prince v. City of Quincy, 105 Ill. 138; s. c., 44 Am. Rep. 785, does not overrule the case we have cited, but decides a different point from the one discussed in the extract quoted by us. The point really decided in City of Valparaiso v. Gardner. Prince v. City of Quincy, supra, is stated with admirable precision and clearness in the head-note prepared by the editor of the American Reports. The learned editor's statement is this: "Where the Constitution forbids any municipal corporation to become indebted beyond a certain amount in any manner or for any purpose,' that amount may not be exceeded even for necessary current expenses." The clause in our Constitution is, in legal effect and almost in words, the same as that of Iowa, and it is evident that it was taken from the Constitution of that State. It was said in the argument in Prince v. City of Quincy, 105 Ill. 215, that the clause in the Illinois Constitution was taken from that of Iowa, and if this be true, then the Illinois courts should have looked to the construction given by the courts of Iowa, for it is a familiar rule that where a clause is taken from the Constitution or statute of another State, it will be deemed to have the meaning given it by the courts of that State. Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. 327, is authority upon this point, although it has long since ceased to be authority upon some of the points decided; and the cases of Fall v. Hazelrigg, 45 Ind. 576; s. c., 15 Am. Rep. 278, and Clark v. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co., 44 Ind. 248, are in harmony with that decision upon the point to which we have cited it. Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 64. Turning to the decisions of the Iowa courts we find abundant support. In Dively v. City of Cedar Falls, 27 Iowa, 227, it was held that an obligation arising under a contract to pay for work when it was performed does not constitute an indebtedness within the meaning of the Constitution, and this decision has the approval of Judge Dillon. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. (3d ed.), § 135. The question was very fully discussed in Grant v. City of Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396, where it was held that a contract entered into by the city for the supply of water for a term of years, at an annual rental, is one relating to the ordinary expenses of the city and that the annual rental is not an indebtedness within the meaning of the Constitution. One of the illustrations used in the course of the opinion is so apt that we quote it: "Suppose a man having a family to support is without other means to do it, except his salary, which is adequate for that purpose. He is compelled to rent a house to live in, and by a contract for a term of years he can reduce its cost, and he therefore makes a lease for ten years at $300 per year, or $3,000 for the term, the rent being |