Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad Company v. Buck. rule, that the efficient and predominating cause, in producing a given event or effect, though there may be subordinate and dependent causes in operation, must be looked to in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties concerned." At another place in the same opinion it is said: "To entitle such party to exemption, he must show not only that the same loss might have happened, but that it must have happened if the act complained of had not been done. Davis v. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716." In a recent work it is said: "Any wrongful act which exposes one to injury from rain, heat, frost, fire, water, disease, the instinctive or known vicious disposition or habits of animals, or any other natural cause, under circumstances which rendered it probable that such an injury will occur, is a primary, efficient and proximate cause, if the injury ensue. Many such cases have been referred to in the preceding pages." 1 Sutherland Dam. 62. In Byrne v. Wilson, 15 Irish C. L. 332, a stage-coach in which the plaintiff's intestate was a passenger was thrown into a canal by the negligence of the driver, and the lock-keeper turned on the water, thereby causing the death, by drowning, of the passenger, and it was held that the proprietor of the coach was liable under Lord Campbell's Act, the court saying: "The precipitation of the omnibus into the lock was certainly one cause, and (as it may be said) the primary cause of her death, inasmuch as she would not have been drowned but for such precipitation. It is true that the subsequent letting of the water into the lock was the other and more proximate cause of her death, and that she would not have lost her life but for such subsequent act, which was not the necessary consequence of the previous precipitation, by the negligence of defendant's servants. But in my opinion defendant is not relieved from liability for his primary neglect, by showing that but for such subsequent act the death would not have ensued." The chief justice, in his opinion, said: "The law is clear that every party is liable, not only for the immediate consequences of his negligence, but also for the resulting consequences of his acts, whether those acts are acts of violence or of negligence in breach of a duty which imposed the necessity of care and caution upon him." Proceeding upon the general rule we have stated, the court, in Eaton v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 11 Allen, 500, said: "And it is no answer to an action by a passenger against a carrier, that the negligence or trespass of a third party contributed to the injury." A Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad Company v. Buck. like ruling was made in Spooner v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 54 N. Y. 230. The case of Hatchell v. Kimbrough, 4 Jones L. 163, supplies an instructive illustration of the rule. There a roof was removed from a house, and the eye of the plaintiff was lost in consequence of the exposure resulting, and the defendant was held liable. The general rule is recognized and enforced by our own cases. Billman v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 76 Ind. 166; s. c., 40 Am. Rep. 230; City of Crawfordsville v. Smith, 79 Ind. 308; s. c., 41 Am. Rep. 612; Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426; s. c., 42 Am. Rep. 508; Dunlap v. Wagner, 85 Ind. 529; s. c., 44 Am. Rep. 42; Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Krinning, 87 Ind. 351. We turn now to the cases cited by the appellee. We have already shown by the quotation made from the able opinion in Brown v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., supra, that the case of Pullman, etc., v. Barker, 4 Col. 344; s. c., 34 Am. Rep. 89, is not sustained by authority, and we now add that it cannot be supported on principle. The cases of Krach v. Heilman, 53 Ind. 517, and Collier v. Early, 54 id. 559, were shown in Dunlap v. Wagner, 85 id. 529, to be in conflict with the cases of Schlosser v. State, 55 id. 82; Fountain v. Draper, 49 id. 441; Barnaby v. Wood, 50 id. 405, and English v. Beard, 51 id. 489, and to be condemned by other courts as well as by text-writers. It remains to add that the cases of Ryan v. New York, etc., R. Co., 35 N. Y. 210, and Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Penn. St. 86; s. c., 10 Am. Rep. 664, on which the cases of Krach v. Heilman, supra, and Collier v. Early, supra, are mainly founded, are in direct conflict with the decision in Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Krinning, 87 Ind. 351. Not only is this true, but it is also true, as shown by Judge Cooley, that the cases of Ryan v. New York, etc., R. Co., supra, and Fairbanks v. Kerr, supra, are everywhere repudiated. Cooley Torts, 76 n. The courts of New York have not followed Ryan v. New York, etc., R. Co., supra, as very clearly appears from the decisions in Webb v. Rome, etc., R. Co., 49 N. Y. 420; s. c., 10 Am. Rep. 389; Pollett v. Long, 56 N. Y. 200; Wasmer v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 80 id. 212; s. c., 36 Am. Rep. 608. We need not stop to inquire whether the case of Scheffer v. Railroad, 105 U. S. 249, is sustained by authority or not, for it is readily discriminated from the present case; there the court held that the representatives of one who became insane from an injury received in a collision, and Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad Company v. Buck. eight months afterward took his own life, could not recover. The court said: "The proximate cause of the death of Scheffer was his own act of self destruction. The argument is not sound which seeks to trace this immediate cause of the death through the previous stages of mental aberration, physical suffering, and eight months' disease and medical treatment to the original accident on the railroad." There is a plain difference between the case cited and the one at bar. In the former the immediate cause of death was an independent agency, and between the original injury and the death many other causes had intervened and a long time had elapsed; while in this case the death occurred soon after the injury, and the effects of the injury were unbroken and continuous from the time it was received until death ensued. In the case cited the violent act of the man himself produced the death; while in the one in hand a disease superinduced by the injury caused the death, and there was no break in the line of causation. A carrier of passengers is held to the exercise of a very high degree of care, and for a failure to use this care is responsible to a passenger who suffers an injury in a case where no fault of his contributes. It was said by this court in Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Hendricks, 26 Ind. 228, in speaking of the duties of railroad companies: "But they are required to exercise the highest degree of care to secure the safety of passengers, and are responsible for the slightest neglect, if an injury is caused thereby." There are many cases in our own reports to the same effect. Gillenwater v. Madison, etc., R. Co., 5 Ind. 339; Thayer v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 22 id. 26; Sherlock v. Alling, 44 id. 184; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kelly, supra. The rule is stated in stronger terms by the courts elsewhere as well as by the text-writers. Hutch. Carr., §§ 500, 501, n; Thomp. Carr. 200, 204, It is the duty of railroad carriers of passengers to stop at the regular stations and at safe places for alighting. Thompson says: "It is the duty of the servants of the railway company to run their trains so that a passenger shall have a reasonably safe and convenient place for alighting." Thomp. Carr. 228. This is substantially declared in Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Parmalee, 51 Ind. 42. In Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466; s. c., 7 Am. Rep. 699, the court said in a case very like the present: Stopping the train at an unusual place, rendered the company presumptively in the wrong to that extent, and the onus of explain 66 Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad Company v. Buck. ing this neglect was thrown upon the defendants." Shearm. & Redf. Neg., §§ 12, 280; Curtiss v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 29 Barb. 282; Angell Carr., § 569; 2 Redf. Railroads, § 176. It is said by Hutchinson: The passenger is entitled not only to be properly carried, but he must be carried to the end of the journey for which he has contracted to be carried, and must be put down at the usual place of stopping." Hutch. Carr., § 612. In Praeger v. Bristol, etc., Ry. Co., 24 L. T. (N. S.): 105, the train ran by the platform and the passenger was injured in leaving the car. The carrier insisted that there was no evidence of negligence, but COCKBURN, C. J., said: "The question is whether there was a want of reasonable care on the part of the company, and I think there was not only evidence but abundant evidence of this." The case of Cockle v. South Eastern Ry. Co., 27 L. T. (N. S.) 320, is very similar to the one just cited, and a like ruling was made. In the case last named it was said: "But it appears to us that the bringing up of a train to a final standstill, for the purpose of the passengers alighting, amounts to an invitation to alight, at all events, after such a time has elapsed that the passenger may reasonably infer that it is intended he should get out if he proposes to alight at the particular station." It is held in the case cited, and in many others, that where the stop is made at a dangerous place near the usual station, and about the usual time for stopping, the carrier should warn the passengers not to leave the train, or should apprise them of the dangerous place. McLean v. Burbank, 11 Minn. 277, vide opinion, p. 288; Manry v. Talmadge, 2 McLean 157, Laing v. Colder, 8 Penn. St. 479; Stakes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 192; Montgomery, etc., R. Co. v. Boring, 51 Ga. 583. The case of Pennsylvania R. Co. v, White, 88 Penn. St. 327, is very like the present, and the plaintiff was held entitled to recover. The court said: "It is the duty of the company to provide for the safe receiving and discharging of passengers. It is bound to exercise the strictest vigilance not only in carrying them to their destination, but also in setting them down safely, if human care and foresight can do so. Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Penn. St. 147." Applying the law as declared by the authorities cited, and many more might be added, it is clear that there was a breach of duty in running by the station and stopping at a dangerous place. A rule adopted by this court and sanctioned by many authoritiesof the highest character here requires attention. That rule is thus VOL. XLIX-23 Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad Company v. Buck. stated by Judge Redfield: "The fact that injury was suffered by any one while upon the company's trains as a passenger, is regarded as prima facie evidence of their liability." Redf. Carr., § 341. Professor Greenleaf's statement of the rule is substantially the same. 2 Greenl. Ev., § 227. Judge Cooley gives the question careful consideration, and makes a like statement of the rule. Cooley Torts, 660, 663. one. In the early English case of Christie v. Griggs, 2 Campb. 79, it was said: "The plaintiff had made a prima facie case by proving his going on the coach, the accident, and the damage he has suffered." This rule has long been recognized by our cases as the correct In speaking of the effect of evidence of the fact that an injury was received by the passenger, it was said, in Jeffersonville, etc., R. R. v. Hendricks, supra: "Ordinarily such fact should be regarded at least as prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the company," and this statement of the rule is adopted in the subsequent cases of Sherlock v. Alling, supra; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, 74 Ind. 462; Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Newell, 75 id. 542; Memphis, etc., Co. v. McCool, 83 id. 392; s. c., 43 Am. Rep. 71. In the case last named many authorities are cited, to which may be added Railroad Co. v. Walrath, 38 Ohio St. 461; s. c., 43 Am. Rep. 433; Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 94 Penn. St. 351; s. c., 39 Am. Rep. 787; Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291; Roberts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Pillow, 76 Penn. St. 510; s. c., 18 Am. Rep. 424. The rule is a general one, and is stated in general terms, and it is not to be understood that it goes on to the extent of supporting a claim to a recovery where the evidence shows there was no negligence on the part of the carrier, or rebuts the presumption of negligence. It must therefore be true in most instances that the negligence or freedom from negligence will appear from the evidence, because in proving the occurrence from which the injury resulted, the nature and cause of the accident will necessarily appear. Of course, if the evidence rebuts the presumption of negligence, there cannot be said to be a prima facie case, although there may be an accident and an injury. In some of the cases the view is taken that if a thing occurs which ought not to have occurred, had the requisite degree of care been exercised, then the carrier must show that such care was exercised. In one case it was said: "But where the thing is shown to be under |