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23d of April, in a manifesto. On the 29th of December, 1845, the United States ratified the resolution annexing Texas. And on the 1st of January, 1846, Mr. Slidell renewed his application to be received as minister. The Mexican government replied, that “it was resolved to maintain the most just of causes at all hazards, and not to suffer the nation to be despoiled of its territory.” And thus, amidst threats and preparations for war, Mr. Slidell's mission was ended. On the 11th of March, after every effort to preserve peace had proved abortive, Gen. Taylor broke up at Corpus Christi ; and on the 19th encountered a Mexican force on Texian soil, at Arroys Colorado. On the 22d he reached Point Isabel; on the 28th he arrived on the Rio Grande, opposite Metamoras. On the 11th of April, Ampudia arrived and took command of the Mexicans. On the 25th of April Arista arrived, and the Mexican army crossed the Rio Grande, in two days after the declaration of war by Parades, at Mexico.
From what has since been developed of the temper of the Mexican government and people, no reasonable doubt can be entertained, but that the threats of war made by Gen. Almonte, in his protest of 1843, against annexation, were the unalterable determination of the Mexican government, and in pursuance of the general policy herein indicated. The conspiracy to overthrow the government of Herrera, on the ground that he was favorable to peace, was in operation before Gen. Taylor left New-Orleans; and long before he broke up from Corpus Christi, Mexican columns were marching to attack Texas, without reference to any boundary. The distinction between the Neuces and the Rio Grande was an after thought of party faction in the United States. The United States senate, by a vote of 40 to 2, and the house, 173 to 14, recognised the war as the act of Mexico, although the federal press and speakers have not ceased to declare, that the war was the act of the United States executive. This treasonable slang is gladly transferred into the columns of the European press, and affords the London Times a choice morsel wherewith to feed its malice against the Union, That print remarks, Sept. 30:
“In the present state of public opinion in the world, we should have thought it extraordinary if the most absolute of European sovereigns had dared to embark in such a war; but that a man, temporarily of with a limited power like that of the President of the United States, should, by his own will and pleasure, have plunged his country into such a series of embarrassinents, is, without exceptiou, the most extraordinary eyent which has ever occurred in the history of any modern republic. The sequel will show whether the mere prestige of military achievements is sufficient to overthrow all the principles on which the constitution of the United States is professed to be founded ; and even in this affair of the armistice and the alleged negotiation for peace, we shall be curious to learn how far General Scott's conduct will be approved and supported by his government, which no doubt anticipated a more brilliant ... from the march to Mexico.'
It has always been the case, that the petty malignity of the London press in relation to American affairs has been disappointed as soon as uttered; and in the present case, the magnanimity, which is incomprehensible to a British mind, of p using in the moment of triumph, arresting the uplifted hand about to deal the finishing blow, and yet again tendering mercy, it construes into weakness. Fortunately for the honor of American arms, Mexican obstinacy was true to itself, and the “most brilliant results” crowned the campaign. Most assuredly the people of the whole Union, like those of Pennsylvania, will rebuke, in thunder tones, those miserable and selfish partisans, who contend that the defence of the nation against an organized and deliberate attack of years' preparation, is “a scheme of conquest.”
The policy of the Mexicans in adopting war as the future state of relations between the two nations was, under the circumstances, sound, on the supposition that the military strength of the Union was no greater than its reputation among the nations of Europe; and that the Mexicans were capable of defence. Events have, however, proved the utter fallaciousness of both these views. Two most astonishing campaigns, in which, whatever might have been the disproportion in numbers between the volunteers, or the militia of the United States, and the troops of Mexico, veterans of twentyfive years standing, not a repulse has been sustained, have placed the Union foremost among military nations. The world has witnessed the unusual spectacle of the march of 10,000 volunteers, 300 miles, through an enemy's country, capturing Puebla, with its 50,000 inhabitants, leaving in it a garrison, and advancing upon a capital of 200,000 souls, defended by 22,000 men, well supplied with guns, and posted in works of apparently impregnable strength, defeating them in four engagements, driving them out and occupying the city, with the loss altogether of 3,000 men | Such energy and indomitable resolution have destroyed the illusions of the Mexicans, and silenced forever the sneers of European writers and diplomatists, while their fears have been awakened. The “model Republic” has been discovered to possess in the greatest degree that of which it was supposed most destitute, military resources and efficiency. Our institutions have been found perfect in their kind for promoting national warfare in time of peace; and are now proved equal to any emergency in time of war. A nation of eight millions of people, accustomed to war, have been conquered in two campaigns. War and conquest are, however, incompatible with the genius of our institutions, which are based essentially upon the will of the people. Hence, coercion is inapplicable to any portion of the people existing beneath our laws. The annexation of Texas was in conformity to the almost unanimously-declared wishes of her people, and in accordance with the will of the people of the United States, as expressed at the general election of 1844. Mexico sought to coerce the people of Texas into submission to an odious dictatorship, as a “pretext” for the war which was thought necessary to protect her remaining territory from the peaceful advance of American settlers. She has played her game, and lost. No part of the Mexican people can, therefore, be compelled to come into the Union, nor would their presence be at all desirable. That which is desirable, however, is that they should keep the peace, and pay to the last cent all the expenses and damages that they have occasioned by their erroneous policy and obstinacy. No country on the face of the earth enjoys so many natural advantages as Mexico. Her mineral resources beyond doubt exceed those of any other nation, and are capable of being developed to any extent. Her soil is most fertile, and the climate presents every variety of temperature. To bring these into requisition for the service of the world, all that is required is a firm and liberal government; one that shall not meddle with individual enterprise, and shall have sufficient stability to ensure justice and protection to property. Such a government as we have intimated may doubtless be composed of such men as Almonte and Herrera, supported by a column of United States troops, the chief of which should have sole charge of military affairs—attack and crush every Mexican force, and suppress, with the utmost promptitude and severity, every insurrectionary movement or organized hostility. By these means ten years would not elapse before the commercial principle would have so developed itself, as to afford the civil government of Mexico sufficient strength to maintain itself against the rise of any new military interest. A strong infusion of the American race would impart energy and industry gradually to the indolent Mexicans, and give them such a consistency as a people, as would enable them to hold and occupy their territories in perfect independence. If, in aster years, they should then as a whole people desire union with the Northern States, it would become a matter of discussion. The difficulties of Mexico have grown out of the fact that they possess vast natural wealth, which they do not appreciate nor exert themselves to develope. It is not in the nature of things that a race of enterprisiug adventurers should permit rich mines and valuable lands to remain unoccupied, merely because they are within the limits of a government whose people are too imbecile to turn them to advantage. Had Mexico been settled by a vigorous race of Europeans, that would have turned its advantages to account, developed its wealth, increased its commerce and multiplied its settlements, she would not now be in danger of losing her lands by emigration from the North, but her people would rather have pressed into the Red river, and, perhaps, Mississippi valley, and striven with Americans for the possession of the fertile bottoms. Why does not the Anglo-Saxon race in Canada press upon our frontier, and settle western strips to annex to the colonies 7 Is it not because the superior vigor of the American race defies their competition ? In 1803, according to Humboldt, the population of Mexico was 6,500,000, or 1,200,000 more than that of the United States, according to the census. The latter is now 20,000,000, and the former 8,000,000. Had the Mexicans in any degree possessed the industrial activity of the Americans, the nation would have been in no danger of losing her territory. Not only, however, have her people been incapable of enterprize, but her insane government has by every means obstructed the progress of trade. The flourishing commerce which existed in former years, and which enabled the merchants of Vera Cruz to construct the splendid road to the city of Mexico, perished under the misnamed independence of the country, and the last vestige perished when the suicidal government of 1827 banished the foreign merchants. It is the mission of the United States to restore the march of commerce and trade in Mexico, and to do so by an armed force to support a just government. When Great Britain under similar circumstances has invaded an Indian nation adjoining her territory, annexation has been the invariable result. Hers is, however, a treacherous and blood-thirsty government, and by no means to be imitated by republican North America. Nevertheless, Mexico should be made to pay at least all the pecuniary expense to which she has subjected us. The precious lives she has sacrificed cannot be restored; nor can the dangers which must assail our institutions growing out of the circumstance, be avoided. All that she can repair she should be compelled to make good; and this can be done in the shape of full payment in money for past debts, and an annual payment over the expense of the occupying force sufficient to pay the interest in full, and to form a sinking fund for the ultimate discharge of the debt created by the war, and this, in addition to the territory acquired. As a Mexican government under such circumstances would have no military of its own to pay, as none should be suffered to exist, the burden would not be heavy upon her. Even this mode of settling the difficulty would be accompanied by great disadvantage to the United States, inasmuch as it would involve the continuance of a large standing army, and greatly extend the patronage of the federal executive, while it would foster that military spirit which has already been developed to so great an extent; but it apparently presents evils of a less magnitude than any other mode of arriving at a settlement. To withdraw troops to a line of defence, would be first to surrender the military reputation which has been so dearly bought, and which, in view of our relations with Europe, is invaluable, and still to require an immense standing army, fraught with all the evils which such an institution engenders; to surrender all the advantages which commercial intercourse with Mexico would confer on both nations and on the world; to leave our commerce in all parts of the world permanently exposed to Mexican privateers; and to impose a heavy and useless expense on the people of the United States—an expense of not less than $20,000,000 per annum, or equal to the whole ordinary expenditure of the government—in addition to past expense, and all that Mexico owes us under treaty. Without the force, the frontier would be continually exposed to inroads. Such a scheme is practicable on the ground that Mexico would forever remain inert—abandon the project of reconquering Texas, which has been the instrument of revolution for ten years—and tacitly preserve the peace which she refuses to acknowledge. To subjugate with the view to annexation, is the greatest of evils: because it is impossible to confer equal rights on eight millions of vanquished people; and what could be done with such a race subject to the federal government Unless those people held the same relation to the government as do all the existing states, the nature of the federal government would be changed, and in their form assume a monarchical character. Under such circumstances, what sovereign of Europe could sway a power equal to that of an American executive ruling Mexico with the support of a United States army An army trained in such a war would throw to the surface vigorous and dangerous military chiefs, under whom the consolidation of military strength, based upon the monarchical character which the government in Mexico must assume, would be fatal to our institutions. The military vigor exerted for the subjugation of Mexico, would, engrafted upon the form of government there, be easily turned against the iustitutions which sent it forth. The back-ground of such a picture is too fearful to contemplate. An army of occupation auxiliary to a purely Mexican government, would present less of danger, because the federal executive could not get that hold of the Mexican people which an incorporation of the governments would effect. The soldiers succeeding each other for short terms would most of them, as they were discharged, remain in the country, and, gradually infusing vigor into the race, regenerate the whole nation. They would lay the foundation for that law-abiding population, on the growth of which the Mexican government would rely for its support when the United States army should be withdrawn. This mode of proceeding would involve no retrograde movement of our arms, which would promptly be construed, whatever might be its real motive, by all our European friends into weakness and inability to maintain a war, and color with a shade of truth those malignant predictions in which public men and writers, especially in England, have delighted to indulge in relation to this country. The great problem is to inoculate Mexico with the commercial spirit, without awaking, to too great an extent, the military spirit of the Union. Most assuredly this proneness to martial enterprize has been powerfully stirred among us during the past eighteen months. The temper of the nation is now such, that were the northeastern boundary question still under discussion, the government would not feel safe in making large concessions for the sake of settlement. To allay this feeling, and yet find means to make Mexico pay in full the damage she has done, and promote her own interests by adopting a free-trade policy, are the objects most desired.