Corporations In re Polish Falcon Society Charter. Charter Application Purpose "Sick Benefits." -"Social Enjoyments" and A charter will be refused where the petition for incorporation specifies that it is for a club for "social enjoyments" while the testimony shows that the organization with which the proposed club is to be affiliated pays "sick benefits" from the treasury and in case of deficiency, the members will be liable for an assessment, as a charter will not be granted for more than one purpose. Commissioner's Recommendations. No. 434 July Term, 1916 Docket "B." C. P. Allegheny County. Elias Sunstein, for petitioners. CARPENTER, J., September 30, 1916.-The Commissioner recommends that the proposed charter be approved. I cannot concur in this recommendation. The petition sets forth that "The purpose for which the corporation is formed is the maintenance of a club for social enjoyments." The testimony shows that the organization pays "sick benefits" and "death benefits" from the dues in the treasury, and if there is not a sufficient sum on hand for that purpose an assessment is levied upon the members. This brings the proposed corporation within the provisions of sub-division JX of the Act of 1897, P. L. 283. Petitioners offered in evidence a copy of the constitution and laws (English translation) of the Polish National Alliance, on file in this Court at No. 2142 April Term, 1914, to which the by-laws of all subordinate bodies are subject. An inspection of the constitution and laws to which reference is made discloses that one of the purposes of the association differing from those mentioned above, is "To rekindle, uplift and uphold the national spirit; raise the standard of morality; to spread knowledge; to encourage the Polish youth to faithful service to their mother country and the use of the Polish language, at all times and places, among themselves." It further appears that the objects specified are to be accomplished by, inter alia, "instructions in the art of fencing, cycling, swimming, skating, shooting," etc.; "by affiliating with the Polish Falcon Alliance and arranging and celebrating national anniversaries and participating in all Polish manifestations." The officers are required to take the following obligation: "I......... declare upon my assuming the office of.................... word of honor, in presence of all associated brother Falcons, and our oppressed mother country, Poland, to perform such offices for her sake and for the benefit of the Aerie and the whole Alliance, always in unity, according to the will and decisions of the majority and the by-laws." It has been held repeatedly that the law does not permit incorporation for two or more purposes. See Application of East Liberty Lodge No. 58, Loyal Order of Moose, etc., 60 P. L. J., 258; and Cassoli Mutual Relief Society of Philadelphia, 19 Dist. R., 543, and case there cited. I cannot approve a proposed charter under which, as the testimony plainly indicates, it is the intention to conduct a beneficial association, while the purpose as stated is "social enjoyments." The evidence, oral and written, lays emphasis on other aims and purposes of the organization which are not essential to and do not come within any fair interpretation of the term, "social enjoyments." The application is refused. Real Estate Shoub et ux. vs. Dunbar. Highways-Viewers Liens and Encumbrances. -Acts of The streets and lanes of the Reserve Tract owned by the Commonwealth were made public highways pursuant to the provisions of the Act of September 11, 1787, declaring them to be "common highways forever," thus vesting contractual rights in the lot owner which entitled him to compensation in case of the vacation of any of these streets and lanes. The Act of March 21, 1905, P. L. 46, recognized these rights in case any of the streets and lanes remained unopened for a continuous period of 30 years; and in order to convey a good and marketable title to any of the land affected, the provisions of this Act as to appointment of viewers, etc., must be complied with in order to convey the property free of liens and encumbrances. Case Stated. No. 1018 October Term, 1916. Docket "B." C. P. Allegheny County. Charles W. Dahlinger for plaintiffs, Lawrence W. Bigham, for defendant. BROWN, J., September 12, 1916.-The streets and lanes of the Reserve Tract owned by the Commonwealth were made public highways pursuant to the provisions of the Act of the General Assembly of September 11, 1787— the Act declaring them to be "common highways forever." And the Commonwealth's sale and conveyance of lots passed to its vendees, successors, heirs and assigns, rights in the "common highways" that could not be divested and taken away except upon making just compensation The fact that a lane, or a portion, has never been opened does not change the contractual vested right of an owner to just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner provided by law. This measure (a) of right in the lot owners, and (b) of compensation to them-arising from vacation of lanes laid out by it-is recognized by the Commonwealth in the passage by the General Assembly of: AN ACT Authorizing the municipalities of the Commonwealth to vacate, in whole or in part, all streets, lanes and alleys within their corporate limits, laid out by this Commonwealth, whenever the same, or the portion to be vacated, shall have remained unopened for a continuous period of thirty years next preceding such vacation. Section 1. Be it enacted, etc., That the municipalities of the Commonwealth shall have the power and authority to vacate, in whole or in part, all streets, lanes and alleys within their corporate limits, laid out by this Commonwealth, whenever the same, or the portion to be vacated, shall have remained unopened for a continuous period of thirty years next preceding such vacation. Section 2. In exercising the power aforesaid, all proceedings for the ascertaining of damages, and the assessment of benefits incident thereto, shall be as now provided for by law in reference to payment of costs, damages and expenses of public improvements within municipal corporations. Section 3. All Acts or parts of Acts in conflict with the foregoing be and the same are hereby repealed. Approved-the 21st day of March, A. D. 1905. SAML. W. PENNYPACKER. Upon the authority in said Act of March 21, 1905, P. L. 46, Councils of the City of Pittsburgh passed an ordinance, approved June 16, 1916, vacating Federal Lane from McKee Place to the Reserve Line the vacation including that portion of the lane crossing plaintiffs' lot. The damages and benefits arising from this vacation have not been ascertained-nor any proceeding to that end instituted-as required by the Shoub et ux. vs. Dunbar. second section of said Act of March 21, 1905. And until such proceedings are brought and conducted to final judgment-so that all lot owners affected by the vacation may have their day in Court and be bound by such judgment-it cannot be said that plaintiffs' can convey a good and marketable title in fee simple free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. Defendant is entitled to judgment on the case stated. ORDER. And now, September 12, 1916, in accordance with the foregoing opinion judgment on the case stated is entered in favor of defendant. Commonwealth vs. Garovitz. Court of Quarter Sessions-Certiorari-Authority. The Courts of Quarter Sessions have no authority to issue writs of certiorari. Certiorari. No. 2 June Sessions, 1914. C. P. Fayette County. S. R. Goldsmith, for defendant. VAN SWEARINGEN, P. J., June 20, 1916.-The question for decision in this case is whether or not a writ of certiorari to a justice of the peace may issue from the Court of Quarter Sessions. The defendant was tried before a justice of the peace on a charge of disorderly conduct. He was found not guilty of the offense, but the justice imposed the costs on him, which he paid under protest in order to escape being sent to jail. Alleging that the proceeding before the justice was illegal and without authority of law, the defendant's counsel caused a writ of certiorari to be issued from the Court of Quarter Sessions, and the record of the justice is before us for review. We are of opinion that the Court of Quarter Sessions was without authority to issue the writ, and that the certiorari should be quashed. By sections 11 and 13 of the Act of May 22, 1722, 1 Sm. L., 131, the judges of the Supreme Court were authorized to issue writs of certiorari to, and review the proceedings had before, the justices of the peace of the different counties. The Constitutions of 1790 and 1838 gave to the judges of the Courts of Common Pleas like powers possessed by the judges of the Supreme Court to issue writs of certiorari to justices of the peace. The 10th section of the 5th article of the Constitution of 1874 provides: "The judges of the Courts of Common Pleas, within their respective counties, shall have power to issue writs of certiorari to justices of the peace and other inferior courts not of record, and to cause their proceedings to be brought before them, and right and justice to be done." Nowhere do we find any authority given to the Courts of Quarter Sessions to issue writs of certiorari. No constitutional provision. Act of Assembly, or decision of any court, supporting such authority, has been cited by counsel. On the contrary it has been expressly held that the provision of the Constitution of 1874, above quoted, is the only authority existing in Pennsylvania for the issuing of writs of certiorari to inferior courts, excepting that possessed by the Supreme Court, and that the Courts of Quarter Sessions do not have authority to issue such writs. Evans vs. Commonwealth, 5 Pa. C. C., 362. And now, June 20, 1916, for the reasons stated in the opinion herewith filed, the writ of certiorari is quashed. Fording vs. Schreiber et al. Equity Account--Relation of Debtor and Creditor. A bill for an accounting will be dismissed where it appears that the relation between the plaintiff and defendant was simply that of debtor and creditor, as no duty to account is imposed where plaintiff has no interests either as a partner or owner. In Equity. No. 597 July Term, 1915. C. P. Allegheny County. Harry A. Estep, for plaintiff. Hugh M. Stilley and A. C. Stein, for defendants. REID, J., January 28, 1916.-Some years before the events stated in the bill, S. Schreiber, one of the defendants, had been the proprietor of a restaurant in Third Avenue, Pittsburgh, and, having failed in that undertaking, was indebted as a result. He afterwards leased from E. J. House the premises described in the bill and established there a dairy lunch restaurant. By this means he and his wife were known to the landlord. He relinquished the business there to O. C. Herrick, who became House's tenant of the same premises by lease dated April 1, 1910, to run for the term ending March 31, 1912. This lease was afterwards renewed for one year from April 1, 1912. On June 10, 1912, Herrick with the consent of the landlord assigned the unexpired term to E. C. Burkhart, and also sold and transferred to Burkhart the restaurant fixtures, etc., then upon the premises, 407 Water Street, Pittsburgh. Upon Burkhart's thus acquiring title S. Schreiber (according to his testimony) agreed with him to purchase the restaurant, fixtures, term, etc., for $1,900. Not having the full amount of the purchase price, and knowing Dr. F. H. Kuhns, he arranged with the latter to lend him $950 to make up the amount required, without security or under other arrangements than his (Schreiber's) parol agreement to repay the loan without interest when he should be able to do so. Dr. F. H. Kuhns and his assignee, the complainant, maintain that Kuhns alone became the owner of the lease, did not lend the money to Schreiber, and that the latter and his wife were merely employes, first, of Kuhns, and afterwards of complainant, having no interest in either the lease or the business. On June 17, 1912, Burkhart with the assent of the landlord assigned the unexpired portion of the term to Kuhns and at the same time executed and delivered a bill of sale to him for the consideration of $1,900.00, conveying the leasehold and all the personal property in and about the restaurant. Kuhns did not personally go into possession of the restaurant, but S. Schreiber and his wife took possession and control, and managed and conducted it from that time to the present, so far as appearances went, as owners. This was the situation when on March 28, 1913, Kuhns by a bill of sale for the consideration of $3,000 transferred to complainant the leasehold for the premises and all the personal property in and about the restaurant. When the lease ending April 1, 1913, was renewed, House, the landlord, had it made in the names of Kuhns, S. Schreiber and Elizabeth Schreiber as lessees, and when renewed for 1914 he made the Schreibers h's tenants, not including the name of complainant, who in the meantime had obtained the bill of sale referred to. The complainant did not go into actual possession of the premises any more than did his predecessor Kuhns. He found the Schreibers in possession, and they remained, he avers, by an arrangement with him to man Fording vs. Schreiber et al. age the restaurant for him for a weekly salary to each of $12.50. This, hc avers, was also the arrangement under which they held possession as representatives of Dr. Kuhns. The Schreibers absolutely deny such arrangement. They maintain that S. Schreiber was and is the sole owner of the lease and restaurant, the transfer of the lease and the bill of sale to Kuhns having been arranged as a mere matter of convenience and precaution, as Schreiber's then existing indebtedness would prevent his taking title in his own name. Schreiber admits that he owes to complainant as assignee of the rights of Dr. Kuhns the sum of $800, having repaid $150 of the loan to Fording. This amount the latter claims was a payment to him as an owner out of the profits of the business. April 27, 1915, complainant filed this bill to require S. Schreiber and Elizabeth Schreiber, and E. J. House, landlord, (1) to assign him the existing lease for the restaurant premises; (2) to require the Schreibers to deliver to him all assets, goods, merchandise, fixtures and book accounts pertaining to their said restaurant business; and (3) to state an account of all income and profits from said restaurant, and of all stock on hand. FINDINGS OF FACT. First. S. Schreiber and Elizabeth Schreiber, his wife, were tenants of the premises at No. 407 Water Street, Pittsburgh, Pa., their landlord being E. J. House, now a co-defendant in this bill, and they established there the Dairy Lunch Restaurant, which they afterwards sold to O. C. Herrick. As a result of this tenancy, the Schreibers were known to House, the landlord, before Dr. Kuhns took an assignment from Burkhart. Second. The said Schreibers have been conducting said restaurant in the House building for almost four years; the lease from April 1, 1913, being in the name of F. H. Kuhns, S. Schreiber and Elizabeth Schreiber, and since April 1, 1914, in the names of S. Schreiber and Elizabeth Schreiber alone. Third. That the said Schreibers were not guilty of an act of fraud in procuring the said lease to be made out in their names. Fourth. That the landlord, E. J. House, did refuse to make a lease for the premises in controversy to the complainant or to recognize him in the transaction. Fifth. That on or about March 28, 1913, the complainant did acquire by purchase from F. H. Kuhns all the right, title, interest and claim of said Kuhns in and to the leasehold and fixtures of the Royal Blue Dairy Lunch, No. 407 Water Street, Pittsburgh. Sixth. That said F. H. Kuhns was not on said date, and never had been the true owner of said leasehold, fixtures, etc., but the same had been bought and held by said Kuhns for the defendant S. Schreiber. Seventh. That said Kuhns advanced the sum of $950.00 to said Schreiber as a loan, making the check therefor to Burkhart, the person from whom the lease, fixtures, etc., were purchased for the sum of $1,900.00-the said Schreiber himself furnishing $950.00 of the purchase price required. Eighth. That the arrangement between said Schreiber and Kuhns was that Schreiber should repay said loan without interest when he should become able to do so. And there was no arrangement or agreement by which said Kuhns became the owner in fact of said lease and restaurant or by which said Schreiber and his wife went into the possession of said demised premises and of the fixtures, equipment, etc., of said restaurant as the agents and employes of said Kuhns at the rate of $12.50 per week in wages to be paid to each-nor under any other similar arrangement. Ninth. When said Schreibers entered into possession of said premises |