Hutchinson vs. Goshorn et al. applicants for original appointment, because it has no discretion under the statute as to the appointment of those persons who have been suggested by the ward executive committee for reappointment, and because insofar it has discretion as to the appointment of persons suggested for original appointment the Board had acted illegally and arbitrarily and contrary to the Act. It was further charged that the defendants had refused to make said appointments for the purpose of selecting unlawfully, illegally, etc., other persons as registrars. There was no evidence to sustain this charge. At the hearing it appeared that the above suggestions were not made by the ward executive committee; they were made by the complainant as chairman after consultation with the chairmen of the respective districts in the ward and by their authority. This appears to have been the custom that has prevailed throughout the City of Pittsburgh. The custom probably arose under the previous Act of 1906, which, however, has been changed by the Act of 1913. We have no disposition to dispose of the case upon this proposition, but we suggest that both the Board of Registration Commissioners and the ward committees note the provisions of this Act of 1913, which declares that the names shall be suggested to the Commissioners "by the ward executive committees" and that the petitions shall be signed "by the president and one secretary" of the ward executive committee. This language indicates that the chairman and the secretary are but the agents of the committee and that the suggestion ought to come from the committee itself. There is grave doubt whether the complainant is a party who has standing to invoke the powers of a Court of Equity in such a case as this. He is but the chairman of a ward executive committee and as such it is difficult to perceive what "property right" of his may be infringed by any act of the defendants relative to the matter in controversy. Ordinarily the powers of a Court of Equity can only be invoked where some right in property is imperiled. Bispham's Equity, page 642. Kearns vs. Howley, 188 Pa., 116. Another suggestion is that for the alleged wrongs there are adequate remedies at law, and consequently there is no jurisdiction in equity. It is true that for failure to perform a duty enjoined mandamus will generally lie. It is likewise true that the only way to try the title to an office is by proceedings in quo warranto. The argument is, that, if these appointments have not been made, the remedy is by mandamus to compel performance of the duty, providing such duty is enjoined by the statute; that in case the appointments have been made of other persons than the ones suggested by the ward committee the remedy is by writ of quo warranto. But however the above suggestions may be, we are of opinion that the complainant is not entitled to the relief he demands under the facts and circumstances disclosed. His proposition is that the ward executive committee constitutes the fountainhead of appointment of registrars, and that the Board of Commissioners must reappoint a candidate suggested by the ward committee, who had previously served in the capacity of registrar if he is not unfit; and that it cannot disregard the suggestions of a ward committee unless the applicant is unfit, in case of an original appointment. In other words, the proposition of the complainant is, when reduced to its last analysis, that the Board of Commissioners in the matter of appointing registrars has substantially no discretion as to qualification and fitness for the positions, but must follow the suggestions of the ward committee. This proposition was ably and earnestly urged by the learned counsel for Hutchinson vs. Goshorn et al. the complainant and they contend that such is the plain meaning of the 5th Section of the Act of 1913 above mentioned. It is not pretended that the duty of appointing registrars has been expressly committed to the ward committees. The contention is that this duty is inferable from the language of the statute. This requires an examination of said section. The first sentence of said section is as follows: "The Commissioners shall, no later than August fifteenth of each year, appoint four registrars for each election district, as herein provided." The language quoted is certainly not ambiguous. Plainly the duty of appointing these registrars is thereby vested in the Board of Commissioners. Had the Legislature intended that the sole duty of the Board of Commissioners was to register the will of the ward committees, why did it not say so? If the intention was to test the ward committees with the power of naming these registrars, it is difficult to understand why the Legislature did not impose that duty upon the ward committees directly, instead of in the manner indicated in the Act as claimed by the complainant. The fact that the duty is expressly committed to the Commissioners is pregnant in ascertaining the meaning of the statute. There is no provision in this long section which, in our judgment, sustains the contention of the complainant. On the other hand it is expressly provided that no appointment shall be made unless the candidate shall have personally appeared before the Commissioners and satisfied them of his qualifications. This shows that the Commissioners must supervise and must consider, in addition to petitions, the personality of the applicant. There is a further provision that, in case of a reappointment, this personal appearance of the candidate shall not be necessary. We cannot regard this as any more than a direction to the Commissioners as to how they shall exercise the discretion vested in them. If a man has once been found qualified, after personal examination, this provision merely dispenses with a vain proceeding. There is no command that a party who has once served must be again appointed if suggested by a ward committee. On the other hand, the express direction of the first sentence is that the Commissioners shall "appoint four registrars" each year. Besides the above there is a provision that if the persons nominated are not found properly qualified, the Board may decline to appoint them and then the ward committee shall suggest other names. Finally the appointment of any registrar must be approved by three Commissioners. This is in line with the 4th Section of the Act, which declares that the concurrence of three Commissioners shall be necessary to any affirmative action. In view of the foregoing we are driven to the conclusion that the contention of the complainant is not well founded. Our duty here is to construe the statute as it has been enacted by the Legislature. We are of opinion that to adopt the proposition of the complainant would be to strain the language of the statute improperly on our part. If the Legislature, in its wisdom, intended that the ward executive committees should exercise the discretion of appointing these registrars, it should have been stated in unmistakable language and should not have been left to mere construction or doubtful inference. It was not seriously contended by the complainant that the evidence established illegality or arbitrary conduct on the part of the Board of Commissioners, in case it were held that the discretion in the matter of appointing registrars was vested in the Board. Having determined that the plain meaning of the statute is that the discretion is vested in the Board, the charge of illegality and arbitrary conduct fails. Hutchinson vs. Goshorn et al. ORDER. And now, to wit, August 15th, 1916, after hearing, the preliminary injunction heretofore granted is now dissolved. In re Collateral Inheritance Appraisement. Appraisement- -Collateral Inheritance Tax-Attorney Fee-Act of May 6, 1887, P. L. 79. The 13th section of the Act of May 6, 1887, P. L. 79, prohibits an attorney appointed to make an appraisement of an estate for collateral inheritance tax purposes from accepting any fee or reward for performing any services for the administrator of the estate which such attorney is to appraise. This department is in receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, asking to be advised whether an attorney appointed to make an appraisement of an estate for the purpose of collecting the collateral inheritance tax is prohibited from performing any services for the administrator and receiving compensation therefor from said administrator, under the provisions of Section 13 of the Act of May 6, 1887 (P. L. 79), providing— "It shall be a misdemeanor in any appraiser, appointed by the register to make any appraisement in behalf of the Commonwealth, to take any fee or reward from any executor, or administrator, legatee, next of kin, or heir of any decedent; and for any such offense the register shall dismiss him from such service, and, upon conviction in the quarter sessions, he shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars, and imprisoned not exceeding one year, or both, or either, at the discretion of the court." The obvious intention of this section is to prevent a person from representing the Commonwealth in the appraisement of an estate for the collateral inheritance tax, and at the same time represent the parties interested in the estate on which the tax is to be imposed. You are accordingly advised that the above quoted section operates to prohibit an attorney appointed to make an appraisement of an estate for collateral inheritance tax purposes from accepting any fee or reward for performing any services for the administrator of the estate which such attorney is to appraise. Very truly yours, JOSEPH L. KUN, Deputy Attorney General. Forest Fire Warden In re Forest Fire Warden. -Appointment -Alien-Act of June 3, 1915, P. L. 797. The Act of June 3, 1915, P. L. 797, imposes no condition as to citizenship for appointment as a Local Forest Fire Warden, and there is nothing in the Act to prohibit the appointment of an alien to that position. This department is in receipt of your letter of the 21st ult., asking substantially whether a person, not a citizen of the United States or of Pennsylvania, may be appointed to the office of Local Forest Fire Warden, which office was created by the Act of June 3, 1915, P. L. 797. Citizenship, although often expressly required by statute or the constitution, is not, in the absence of such requirement, an absolute necessary qualification for office. 29 Cyc., 1377. No constitutional provision exists prohibiting the appointment of an alien to the office of local forest fire warden and the determination of the question, therefore, rests upon the construction of the Act of 1915. An examination of the statute discloses the fact, that it affirmatively legislates on the subject of the qualifications of such wardens, section 401 providing as follows: "Qualifications-a person appointed a local forest fire warden shall be chosen expressly by reason of his physical fitness, sobriety, honesty and ability to perform the duties herein required." It is to be noted that these qualifications are moral, mental and physical, and involve in no degree the necessity of citizenship. Expressio unius est exclusio alterious is a rule of construction which, as applied in this particular instance, means that the Legislature having enumerated the qualifications for the office, others are not necessarily to be added. I find no other provisions of this Act which would operate to make an exception to this rule, and you are, therefore, advised that you may, in your discretion, appoint a person not a citizen of the United States or of the State of Pennsylvania to the office of Local Forest Fire Warden. Very truly yours, JOSEPH L. KUN, Deputy Attorney General. Wills Life Estate Deniston et al. vs. Deniston et al. -Trust-Demurrer -Children. Testatrix bequeathed the income of certain property to her two daughters and one son under certain conditions, and then provided: "And in further trust at their decease to their right heirs in fee, provided, however, that either die without leaving issue surviving her, ther and from thenceforth my said son Henry to receive one-fourth of the net rents and the surviving sister, whether Ellen or Letitia, three-fourths, and upon the death of the said survivor and the said Henry, then in trust for their right heirs in fee; but in the event of both Ellen and Letitia leaving lawful issue surviving, Henry to have no interest beyond that of his natural life." One of the daughters died without leaving issue surviving and thereafter the surviving daughter and the son made partition of the land, the daughter acquiring the son's interest. This "surviving" daughter having died testate but without leaving issue surviving, two of the heirs at law of the original testatrix filed their bill for partition, to which the executors and trustees under the will of the daughter demurred, claiming that their testatrix owned the land in fee. Held: That under the terms of the will of the first testatrix, the demurrer must be overruled and the demurrants be required to file their answer. In the interpretation of a will it is doubtless true that in some instances the word "children" has been given the larger and more comprehensive meaning sometimes given the word "issue," but there is no fixed or arbitrary rule requiring that this be done in all cases. The dominant thought and purpose of the testator as discovered in the whole will must prevail. In Equity. Bill for Partition. No. 1928 January Term, 1915. Allegheny County. Joseph H. Bialas and Dalzell, Fisher & Hawkins, for plaintiffs. C. P. Ralph L. Smith, Scott & Purdy, R. T. M. McCready, McVicar, Hazlett & Gardner, Blair & Anderson, M. L. Thompson, S. R. McClure, Watson & Freeman and McCook & Jarrett, for defendants. CARPENTER, J., September 23, 1916.-Letitia Deniston died in the year 1866, testate. Her will, dated September 1862, was probated March 21, 1866, and recorded in the Register's Office of Allegheny County. Testatrix, at the time of her death, was seized in fee, inter alia, of an improved lot of ground (the lot involved in this proceeding) fronting on Wood Street in the City of Pittsburgh. This property is mentioned in the 3rd and 6th paragraphs of her will. In the 3rd paragraph, after devising a tract of land to her son Henry, she says: "I bequeath to him (Henry) during his lifetime one-seventh of the net rents, issues and profits of my house on the westerly side of Wood Street a short distance below Fifth Street in the City of Pittsburgh, the same now and for some time past occupied by Messrs. Reineman. The other six-sevenths of the net rents of said Wood Street property to be divided equally between my daughters Ellen and Letitia; provided, however, that should the net annual rents accruing from said premises amount to over seven hundred dollars, exclusive of taxes, repairs, etc., the said Henry then to receive one hundred dollars annually and the balance to be equally divided between Ellen and Letitia or their children. But in the event of either the said Ellen or Letitia dying without leaving issue surviving, in that event the survivor shall be entitled to three-fourths of said rents during life and Henry to one-fourth, and in this proportion the fee shall go to their children at their decease." The sixth paragraph refers to the same property and reads as follows: "To my executors hereinafter named and to the survivor of them and to the executors or administrators of such survivor I devise the aforesaid house and lot on Wood Street in the occupancy of Reineman, in trust, nevertheless, and upon the express conditions, to permit and allow my |