In re Application of Killian for Retail Liquor License. Liquor License-Necessity--Choice Between Two Applicants. Where there are two applicants for retail liquor licenses in the immediate vicinity of each other, and the evidence shows no necessity for more than one, the court will grant the application of the one having the larger premises. In re Petition for Re-Hearing. Allegheny County. Ralph C. Davis, for applicant. No., 428 March Sessions, 1916. Q. S. PER CURIAM, May 15, 1916.-The records show that Frank Killian is the owner of two lots, together fronting 38.77 feet on Homewood Avenue, Thirteenth Ward, Pittsburgh. The larger of said lots has a frontage of 26.77 feet, and the smaller a frontage of 12 feet, said last mentioned lot being at the corner of Homewood Avenue and Formosa Alley. The first mentioned lot was purchased in 1905 and the second in 1906. The buildings are numbered 612 and 614, respectively, the latter being the corner premises. It also appears that No. 612 has been a licensed house for the past 11 years. It is manifest that there is, at this time, no necessity for two licensed houses at this point, whatever may have been the real or supposed necessity for both when a license was granted to the present applicant. Being of opinion that the tenant of the larger premises, for which a license has been granted for eleven successive years, should have the preference, the license tor the premises No. 614 was refused. The petition for re-hearing is refused. License In re Application for Wholesale License by O'Leary. -Wholesale Liquor Dealer-Deliveries in Another County-Remon strance. A wholesale liquor dealer has a right to deliver by his wagon packages of liquor to persons in another county, where the packages had been ordered and paid for at the licensed premises, and the making of such sales is no valid ground for a remonstrance. Remonstrance. No. 287 March Sessions, 1916. Q. S. Allegheny County. Charles A. Fagan, for applicant. Ralph J. Brown, for remonstrants. BROWN, J., April 11, 1916. At the hearing of Gerald A. O'Leary's application for a renewal license to sell liquor at wholesale, the sole remonstrance pressed against his right to the license was, that from his licensed premises, in Allegheny County, he had shipped and delivered by his wagon packages of liquor to persons in Washington County. The packages had been ordered and paid for at his licensed premises, and set apart and thereafter delivered by him to the purchasers. The right of a licensed vendor, under these circumstances, to ship and deliver by a common carrier or by his own wagon is well settled. Com. vs. Hess, 148 Pa., 98; Com. vs. Guinzburg, 46 Sup., at p. 493. In re Application of Karolcik for Retail Liquor License. Liquor License-Petition for Re-Hearing After Refusal-Necessity. A petition for a re-hearing will be refused where it appears from the location and character of applicant's building, and the number of licensed houses in the vicinity, that the application for a retail license was properly refused at the first hearing. In re Petition for Re-Hearing. No. 1152 March Sessions, 1916. Q. S. Allegheny County. Harry Weisberger, for applicant. PER CURIAM, May 15, 1916.-This application was refused, and the applicant has filed his petition praying that a re-hearing be allowed. Having given due consideration to the petition, the location and character of the building, and the number of licensed houses in that section of the Borough of Homestead, we are persuaded that the license was properly refused. The petition for re-hearing is dismissed. In re Application of Grogan for Retail Liquor License. Liquor License- -Retail Applicant Engaged to be Married to Applicant for Wholesale License-Rehearing Refused. Where a renewal of a retail liquor license is refused and the applicant petitioned for a rehearing, the fact developed that the petitioner was engaged to a wholesale liquor applicant, whose license had been granted, and that they were to be married within two months. It is fair to assume that petitioner will, when married, reside with her husband and devote her time to the discharge of her household duties and rehearing refused. In re Petition for Re-Hearing. Allegheny County. A. L. Pearson, for applicant. No. 38 March Sessions, 1916. Q. S. PER CURIAM, May 15, 1916.-Petitioner's application for retail license having been refused, she now prays that a rehearing be granted. An inspection of the record shows two licensed houses on Bates Street, within short distances of the location of petitioner's premises. License might have been refused on the sole ground that no necessity for same exists. But petitioner in her petition for rehearing calls attention to a fact which she thinks may have controlled the Judges. She avers that she "is led to believe that said refusal was due to an impression the Court had received that she was married to one Charles Downey, the holder of a wholesale license in the Second Ward of the above mentioned City of Pittsburgh." She also states that she is not married. During the hearing on the application of said Charles Downey for a wholesale license-which has been granted-he stated that he was unmarried but was engaged to Mrs. Grogan, and that the marriage would take place in June. It is fair to assume that petitioner will, when married, reside with her husband and devote her time to the discharge of her household duties. In the light of the above mentioned undisputed facts the license was refused. The facts set forth in the petition do not justify the granting of a rehearing and it is therefore refused. Pleading and Practice tice Act of May 14, Delaney vs. City of Chester. -Statement of Claim--Motion to Strike Off-Prac1915, P. L. 483. Under the Practice Act of 1915, plaintiff's statement of claim should state facts only, and, if it contains inferences and conclusions, a motion to strike off will be sustained. The Act is intended to simplify pleadings, and is to be followed whether or not the suit was started prior to January 1, 1916. Motion to Strike Off Statement of Claim. No. 109 June Term, 1914. C. P. Delaware County. A. A. Cochran, City Solicitor, for defendant. BROOMALL, J., April 20, 1916.—The above action was commenced on June 20, 1914. On February 9, 1916, the plaintiff filed her statement of claim. The Fractice Act of May 14, 1915, P. L. 483, requires that after January 1, 1916, procedure shall be as therein set forth. This applies to procedure after January 1, 1916, and does not relate merely to actions brought after that date. The statement of claim does not conform to the requirements of the Practice Act. The defendant has moved to strike this statement from the record. This motion will have to be allowed with leave to the plaintiff to file a new statement. The Practice Act is intended to simplify pleadings and expedite proceedings, and the Act must be construed with a view of effecting these results. For instance, instead of incorporating in a statement of claim inferences and conclusions, the statement of claim in this case should be as follows: 1. The City of Chester is a municipal corporation, being a city of the third class. 2. Seventh Street, running eastwardly from Welsh Street, was a public street of said city on February 26, 1914. 3. On February 26, 1914, there was a paved sidewalk on the south side of Seventh Street running eastwardly from Welsh Street. 4. On February 22, 1914, snow existed on said sidewalk. 5. This snow became hardened and remained until February 27, 1914. 6. On February 26, 1914, at about 11 o'clock A. M., the said plaintiff was walking on said sidewalk and fell. 7. At the time of the said fall, the plaintiff became injured by a cut on her head, injury to both arms, and internal injuries accompanied with pain and suffering. 8. The said injuries have continued until the present time. 9. The plaintiff has expended money for medicines and medical attend ance in connection with said injuries. W. S. SYKES, JAMES L. RANKIN, Attorneys for Plaintiff. Delaware County, ss: Delaney vs. City of Chester. Elizabeth Delaney, the plaintiff above named, being duly affirmed, according to law, says that the allegations in the foregoing statement are true. You are required to file an affidavit of defense to this statement of claim within 15 days from the service thereof. W. S. SYKES, 24 East Fourth Street, Chester, Pa. JAMES L. RANKIN, We, therefore, make the following order: Law Building, Chester, Pa. Upon motion of defendant, the plaintiff's statement of claim in the above case is stricken off, with leave to the plaintiff to file a new statement of claim in accordance with the Practice Act of 1915. South Side Trust Company et al. vs. Means et al. Scire Facias sur Mortgage-Terre Tenant-Title Acquired on Prior Judgment -Evidence. It is competent, in a case on a scire facias sur mortgage, for the terre tenant to offer in evidence the record of the judgment, execution and sale by the sheriff of the property mortgaged for the purpose of showing that the lien of the judgment through which he claimed title was prior to the lien of a certain part of the mortgage upon which the scire facias was issued. Scire Facias Sur Mortgage. No. 1727 January Term, 1913. C. P. Allegheny County. John M. Morrison, for plaintiff. John S. Wendt, for defendant. EVANS, J., January 18, 1916.-At the trial of this case on a scire facias sur mortgage the terre tenant offered in evidence the record of the judgment, execution and sale by the sheriff of the property mortgaged for the purpose of showing that the lien of the judgment through which he claimed title was prior to the lien of a certain part of the mortgage upon which the scire facias was issued. The objection on the part of the plaintiffs to this offer was sustained, and in sustaining that objection I think I was in error. This case appears to me to be ruled by the case of Hays vs. Anderson, 248 Pa., 1. New trial is granted. In re Workmen's Compensation Insurance. Insurance- -Workmen's Compensation Act-State Commissioner—Approval of Policy by. Under the Act of June 2, 1915, the Commissioner of Insurance has full supervisory control over insurance policies under the Workmen's Compensation Act. He cannot prescribe the form of the policy as to its mere phraseology, but he can require one that conforms in substance to the express requirements of the Act, and interdict one whose terms are in palpable violation of its inhibitions. O'Neil vs. Insurance Company, 166 Pa., 72, distinguished. The Commissioner cannot require that some general system of merit rating, adopted by him, shall be applied to all risks within the classification to which it may be applicable, and refuse to permit the writing of such risks at a flat rate without merit rating, but the schedule and basis rate are expressly subject to his approval, and cannot be lawfully applied until so approved. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Hon. Charles Johnson, Harrisburg, Pa. February 23, 1916. · Sir: Commissioner of Insurance, Harrisburg, Pa. There was duly received your communication of recent date requesting an opinion upon the following questions: "1st. As to whether the Insurance Commissioner has the authority, under Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 769, to approve or disapprove policies of insurance against liability under Article III of said Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, particularly with respect to the following: (a) As to whether the policy is drawn to comply with the requirements of Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the said Act? (b) As to the limitation of the coverage or insurance to insurance only against liability for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, in other words, to disapprove any policy form which purports to give for the premium approved by the Commissioner under Section 4 of said Act 341, as adequate for the benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act, insurance against liability other than liability for compensation, and to require a policy form which does limit the liability to the benefits required to be paid under the said Act? 2nd. As to whether the Insurance Commissioner has the power under the said Act to disapprove of any system of schedule or merit rating, under which an insurance company will inspect and rate its own risks, without any regulations whatever, or may the Insurance Commissioner require that schedule rating shall be applied only after an impartial inspection and rating of risks has been made. 3rd. Should the Insurance Commissioner approve of a general system of schedule or merit rating, may he require that the system approved shall be applied to all risks within the classifications to which the same is applicable and refuse to permit the writing of such risks at a flat rate without any schedule or merit rating?" Taking up these questions in the order in which they are above stated, I respectfully advise you as follows: 1st. (a) Section 1 of the Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 769, specified certain covenants that every policy of insurance against liability arising under Article III of the Workmen's Compensation Act shall contain, and the construction to be placed thereon, and the effect thereof. Section 3 of said Act No. 341 further forbids that any such policy shall contain certain limitations against the liability of the insurer and the effect upon the policy |