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In re Recorder's Bond.

-Recorder of Deeds-Bond and Recognizances of—Act of April 28, 1915, P. L. 198.

The Act of April 28, 1915, P. L. 198, does not change the bond and recognizance required of the Recorder of Deeds, except that the Recorder's bond and recognizance must be placed in the custody of the County Controller, who is required to issue his certificate to that effect on deposit of the bond. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

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In answer to your favor of the 16th inst. forwarding the letter of John A. Fairman, Recorder of Deeds of Allegheny County, in which you ask to be advised as to whether the bond which heretofore was required to be furnished by the Recorder of Deeds of that county in the sum of 600 pounds must also be furnished since the passage of the Act of April 28, 1915, P. L. 198, and you ask also to be advised what certificate must be filed in your office advising you of the filing of said bonds.

The Act of April 28, 1915, is entitled:

"An Act relating to the bonds to be given by the county officers, the amount and conditions thereof, the sureties for such bonds, the payment of the premiums therefor, and the recording and custody thereof, in counties having over eight hundred thousand and less than one million five hundred thousand inhabitants."

It includes Allegheny County. It provides that the Recorder of Deeds shall give a bond of $20,000. It sets out in terms the conditions of the bond and provides that:

"The custody of each of said bonds shall belong to the county controller of the proper county, except the bond of the county controller, the custody of which shall belong to the county commissioners of the proper county."

It contains a repealer of "all acts or parts of facts, general, special or local, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act."

By Section 7 of the Act of March 18, 1775, 1 Smith Law, 424, the Recorder of Deeds of the several counties of the province of Pennsylvania, were required to give bonds to the Governor of the province, which bonds were to be kept in the Secretary's office, and the condition thereof was contained in the Act.

By the Act of March 14, 1777, Section 3, 1 Smith's Laws, 443, the Recorder of Deeds of the several counties mentioned therein, of which the county of Westmoreland, then containing the territory now included in the County of Allegheny, was required to give a bond in the sum of 600 pounds to the Speaker of the House of Assembly, which was subsequently changed by the Act of 12 March, 1791, 3 Smith's Laws, 8, to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the custody of said bond was given to the Secretary of the Commonwealth.

These old Acts provided for the giving of bonds by the Recorder of Deeds, the conditions of the bond and the custody thereof. All of these matters are covered by the Act of April 28, 1915, the latter Act containing a repealer of all Acts or parts of Acts, "general, special or local, inconsistent with its provisions."

I am of opinion the old Acts above referred to are repealed, in so far as they refer to the bonds given by the Recorder of Deeds, in counties having over 800,000 and less than $1,500,000 inhabitants, and that the giving of

In re Recorder's Bond.

such bond, the amount and the custody thereof, is controlled by the Act of April 28, 1915.

However, the Act of April 28, 1915, P. L. 198, does not in any way refer to recognizances. The Act of April 15, 1834, P. L. 549, specifically provides a form of bond which must be given by the sheriffs and coroners of the various counties and the same Acts provides the form of recognizance which shall also be given by them. It has been held that the recognizances and the bond are distinct sureties, affording separate remedies. Morris Estate, 4 Pa., 162; Commonwealth vs. Lelar, 13 Pa., 22; Commonwealth vs. Montgomery, 13 Pa., 519.

I am, therefore, of opinion that the Act of April 28, 1915, does not repeal the Act of April 15, 1834, in so far as the latter Act requires the Sheriff and Cororner to give a recognizance, and that you should require the recognizance to be taken as heretofore.

Concerning the other inquiry as to what certificate is necessary in order to justify the Secretary of the Commonwealth in transmitting a commission to the Governor, I have to advise you that inasmuch as the bond of the Recorder of Deeds is now to be given into the custody of the county controller of the proper county, a certificate should be required of the county controller showing that a bond with a proper surety company authorized to do business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and approved by the Insurance Commissioner in the sum of $20,000 has been delivered into his custody. Upon the receipt of such certificate you will be justified in transmitting to the Governor the commission for his signature. Very truly yours,

WILLIAM M. HARGEST,

Deputy Attorney General.

Criminal Law- -Paroleof Inspectors.

In re Parole of Prisoner.

-Prisoner Wanted in Another State-Prison Board

It is a matter of discretion with the Board of Control of Prisons whether a prisoner may be released on parole only to be turned over to an officer from another state for trial on a charge of murder committed prior to his imprisonment, with the understanding that if he should be acquitted of the charge of murder he would "be returned."

Under the Act of May 10, 1909, Section 9, the whole matter is within the discretion of the Board of Inspectors and there is no precedent for paroling a prisoner into the custody of an officer from another state.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Harrisburg, Pa.

Mr. John M. Egan, Parole Officer,

Sir:

Western Penitentiary,

Pittsburgh, Pa.

December 22, 1915.

Your favor of recent date, addressed to the Attorney General, was duly received. You asked to be advised whether William Harris, a prisoner, sentenced on March 28, 1910, and whose minimum sentence expired March 28, 1913, may be paroled into the custody of a Maryland officer, or given conditional freedom and an opportunity to voluntarily go to Maryland for trial.

You state that there is a warrant, issued March 2, 1910, by the President Judge of Frederick County, Maryland, charging one William Johnson with murder and that it is alleged that Harris is the William Johnson

In re Parole of Prisoner.

named in the warrant, but that there is a doubt as to the identity of the prisoner and that he is willing to go into the State of Maryland for trial. You also state that the Board of Inspectors is anxious to ascertain whether whether it may grant Harris conditional freedom and give him an opportunity to go to Maryland to stand trial.

The Act of May 10, 1909, which was in force at the time Harris was sentenced, relating to the parole of convicts, provides in Section 9:

"If it shall appear to either of the said Boards of Inspectors, upon an application by a convict for release on parole, that there is a reasonable probability that such applicant will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, then said board shall recommend to the Governor that such convict be released on parole, subject to such rules and regulations for such convict as the said board may prescribe, until the expiration of the maximum limit of the sentence imposed on such convict."

The ninth section of the Act of June 19, 1911, contains the same provisions, so it is not necessary to decide which Act applies.

This provision of the law puts the whole matter in the discretion of the Board of Inspectors, and the Board may make such rules and regulations for this particular convict as it sees fit.

The fact that Harris is charged under the name of William Johnson with having committed murder in Maryland prior to his sentence to the Penitentiary, there being serious doubt, as appears from your letter, of his identity, will not prevent the Board of Inspectors from paroling him if, in their opinion, there is a reasonable probability that he will live and remain at liberty "without violating the law" subsequent to his parole.

There is perhaps no precedent for paroling a prisoner into the custody of an officer of another State for the purpose of being taken to such State for trial and to be returned in the event of his acquittal, but there is nothing in the law which prohibits such parole, and it is a comity which probable should exist. If the Board of Inspectors determined that Harris should be released on parole, then under its power to release him, "subject to such rules and regulations for such convict as the Board may prescribe," the Board may, in my opinion, parole him into the custody of a Maryland officer with the understanding that in the event of his acquittal on the charge of murder pending against him, he shall be subject generally to the rules governing prisoners on parole from the Western Penitentiary.

If, on the other hand, the Board of Inspectors feels that the circumstances warrant the recommending of Harris on parole, giving him permission to voluntarily go to Maryland for trial, it has authority to make such rule with respect to Harris. In the latter event, he would probably be regularly extradicted if he did not voluntarily go into the State of Maryland for trial.

In other words, having regard to the fact that there is a commitment issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in the State of Maryland lodged with the Western Penitentiary, and the comity which should exist between the States in relation thereto, the Board may either parole Harris and give him an opportunity to voluntarily go to Maryland for trial, or may parole him into the custody of a Maryland officer, as above indicated.

Very truly yours,

WM. M. HARGEST,

Deputy Attorney General.

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In re Making Up Lost Time.

Female Labor- -Accidents to Machinery

Act of July 25, 1913, Section 3.

Lost Time-Making Up of—

Under the provisions of the Third Section of the Act of July 25, 1913, P. L. 1024, where an establishment was necessarily shut down in consequence of the break down of an outside power plant, from which source such establishment obtained and upon which it was dependent for its power, the time lost by reason thereof can be lawfully made up by overtime by female employes therein.

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There has been referred to me your communication of November 19, 1915, to Attorney General Brown, relative to the subject of “over-time" on account of break down of machinery and requesting an opinion in said

matter.

The question submitted is "where a concern obtained electric power from an outside source and owing to a breakdown in the central power station their power was shut off for something like five hours, which time they desired to make up by working overtime;" whether overtime work by female employees to make up lost time in such case, is lawful under the Act of July 25, 1913, P. L. 1024.

The third section of said Act, after fixing the maximum number of hours of labor per day and per week, and days per week, permitted to any female employe in any establishment, and permitting certain overtime work in weeks in which a holiday occurs, further provided for overtime employment "to make up time lost in the same week in consequence of the alteration, repairs, or accidents to machinery or plant upon which she was employed and dependent for employment."

The purpose of this proviso was to relieve in a measure the employer and employe from the loss that otherwise would be sustained from a shutdown of a plant for alteration or repairs, or by reason of an accident to machinery or plant. It give, upon the terms and within the limits prescribed by the Act, an opportunity to make up time so lost by overtime work. It is manifestly in the interest of both parties, enabling the employer to regain in whole or in part some portion of the lost time of his operation and likewise affording to the employe the privilege of making up her lost hours of employment and wages therefore.

The Act strictly guards against the abuse of this provision by limiting such overtime to the week in which the shutdown occurred and the maximum hours of work permitted in such case.

The question here is whether the cause above stated as the occasion of the shut-down in the present case, comes within the meaning of "accidents to machinery or plant," as this clause is used in the Act. The shut-down of the plant in the case stated was due to lack of power, which came from an outside power station which had broken down. In effect, the power plant was a part of the plant in question and necessary to the latter's operation. While the accident primarily befell the former, its results extended to and affected the latter. When the power that drives machinery fails, the machine stops. There has befallen it the loss of the force that drives it. Power is as vital to a machine as any of its parts, and its interruption as

In re Making Up Lost Time.

effectual in stopping the machine as would be the breakdown of the machine itself. While the power in such a case as the present one originated outside the plant, yet the electrical energy which drove its machinery was that which came into the plant, thereby becoming a part thereof and upon which its machinery depended, to run. When an accident deprived it of this power, such accident reached the plant. To hold where a machine breaks down that it would be an accident for which the lost time thereby occasioned may be made up by overtime work, but that an accident which deprived the machine of the power upon which it was dependent to operate, is not such an accident as permits overtime work to make up the lost time ensuing in such case, would be to give the portion of the Act here under consideration an altogether unreasonable construction. There is no apparent purpose to be effectuated by such a narrow interpretation. Such a case as the present one is both within the reason and purpose of the said provision of the Act, and it is fair to presume that it was intended to apply in such a contingency.

I am therefore of the opinion that in the case mentioned, namely: Where an establishment was necessarily shut down in consequence of the breakdown of an outside power plant, from which source such establishment obtained and upon which it was dependent for its power, that the time lost in such establishment by reason thereof can be lawfully made up by overtime work by a female employe therein, in pursuance of and in accordance with the provisions of the third section of the said Act, which permits overtime work to make up lost time occasioned by "accidents to machinery or plant." Very truly yours,

EMERSON COLLINS,

Deputy Attorney General.

In re Insurance of City and State Employes.

Workmen's Compensation Act- -State Institutions——Employes in―Municipalities--Insurance-Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736.

Under the provisions of the Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, the appropriation of $15,000.00 by the state to the Workmen's Insurance Fund" to pay compensation for injuries to, or death of, employes of the Commonwealth is limited to employes proper on the payroll of the Commonwealth and its Departments, and does not include employes of governmental agencies of the state (such as State Hospitals for the Insane and similar institutions) which receive separate appropriations, and have the power of employment and discharge of subordinates. Under the Act they are bound to insure their own employes and to pay for the same from their ordinary receipts or out of the funds appropriated for their maintenance. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

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I have your favor of the 2nd inst. requesting an opinion as to whether "under the State Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, agencies of the State government which receive separate appropriations and have the power of employment and discharge of subordinates (such, for instance, as Boards or Commissions managing Hospitals for the Insane and similar institutions), are bound under the provisions of said act to insure their employes, or whether such employes are to be insured under said act as employes of the Commonwealth."

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