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In the fall session of 1792, the act of June was amended. In the mean time, the justices of the peace had been appointed; and more than a majority of the members of the legislature, were in the commission: the constitution, to the contrary, notwithstanding. In the amendatory act, the quarter session justices, being those first named in the commission, were excused from the general drudging duties of a common justice of the peace. The appeal from a single justice, at first to be taken to a quarter session court, was henceforth to be taken to the county court, on half the amount, previously specified, over which they had jurisdiction: on less than twenty-five shillings, no appeal was allowed. Quarter session courts, to try slaves; any justice, to apprehend persons on a criminal charge. The power, to punish contempts, given to county courts, and to individual justices, in the same unlimited terms in which it had been given to the courts of quarter sessions. And thus were cherished "liberty, and equality,”—ever in the mouths of demagogues.

In the year 1793, an act of five pages,-the last for that purpose, but two, under the first constitution,--was passed, to amend the preceding. Appeals from a single justice, were regulated. The county courts, in addition to their former jurisdiction, were to take cognizance of all cases of bastardy— they were authorized to call on the sheriff for settlement, and appoint two of their own body to adjust the account; and if he was found in arrear to the county, judgment might be entered against him, on the report of these commissioners. The justices appointed to settle the account, to receive four shillings per day; to be paid by the county. The court could appoint an attorney at law, as counsel, and levy money on the county, to pay, what they might choose to allow, him.

When a quarter session justice, should be interested in any case in his own court, any other justice of the peace, (regarding seniority) if to be had, might be called into the seat, thus vacated for the time, by the interest, of the regular judge.

Any quarter sessions court clerk, might send a subpœna in chancery to any county, on demand, without assigning cause.

The court, to try presentments by the grand jury, in a summary way, without the intervention of a petit jury, or one of twelve men; and award judgment, and execution; be the sum what it might.

Nonresidents required to give bond for costs, before they could sue in quarter sessions court-residents were not. It occurs here, to introduce, the 2d section of the 4th article of the constitution of the United States-"The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges, and immunities of citizens in the several states." It seems pertinent, now to ask, if it is either a privilege, or an immunity, to sue for wrongs done, or rights withheld, without giving bond, and security? If it is--any citizen of the United States, although a nonresident, is entitled to it in effect; wherever it will apply. But if to sue, without giving bond and security, is no privilege or immunity, what is it? A natural, and indefeisible right-or a civil privilege, it must be. It seems to be a civil right in a citizen to sue--clearly deducible from the 13th section of the 12th article of the constitution, as follows, viz:

"That all courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by the due course of law; and right, and justice administered, without sale, denial, or delay." But is not a plain matter of constitutional right, a privilege? And if not, has the constitution of the United States, omitted to secure a community of rights, and secured only a community of privileges? And what are those privileges, if to sue without giving bond and security for costs, be not one of them?

Doubtless, the intent of the constitution was to place any citizen of the United States going from his own, into any other state, upon an equal footing, as to rights, privileges, and immunities, with the citizens of that state, while he was among them. Whatever right, &c. the citizens held, or could exercise, the same could their visiter, hold and exercise on the like terms. If resident citizens were required to give bond, so might nonresidents. It did not mean, that the nonresident, or itinerant of one state could acquire rights, or privileges, in his resident

state, or elsewhere, and assert them in a state of which he was a nonresident. No, the great object was, to fraternise, and harmonize, the citizens of the several states, who are citizens of the United States-that is done by conceding on the part of each state, as the occasion occurs, a free communion of state rights, without condition or restraint, to such citizens of the United States, no matter from what other state they are, as may want, or are in a situation, to receive the concession. "Such as I have, I give unto thee"-fills every demand of hospitality--satisfies every expectation of friendship, and harmonizes every feeling of right, and justice.

On the other hand, if a citizen, having rights in his own state, not common to other states, nor permitted by their laws, such extra rights cannot be claimed, or exercised, within such states, by any citizen. For if they could, it would overturn all state legislation, and give to the laws of other states, at the will of a nonresident citizen of the United States, an ex-territo rial effect. It would be subjecting one state to the legislative action of another. It would permit a citizen of a state holding slaves, for example, to introduce them into a state where they were prohibited. In fine, it would produce heats, strifes, and even bloodshed--to the utter subversion of all peace and harmony. Therefore the constitution does not mean, that one state, is to be controlled by another; and still less, if possible, by the citizens individually, who may reside in one, and visit another-but it intended, that each state should within its territories, extend the same rights, privileges, and immunities, to other citizens of the United States, when within its limits, as were possessed, or enjoyed by its own citizens. The right to sue without giving bond for costs, would be one of those privileges, where it was enjoyed by resident citizens of the

state.

Another act of two pages, passed at the session of 1795, to amend this court law. The principal object of which seems to have been to give to the quarter sessions court, concurrent jurisdiction, with the district courts, which had been established, by a previous act of the same session, in all civil cases.

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The governor was authorized, to fill vacancies in the courts of quarter sessions, upon his own appointment, whether he selected a justice of the peace, or not.

The district court law, passed at this session, is now to be taken up, as a part of the judiciary system of Kentucky.

This act, reciting that the constitution of the court of appeals was equal to a denial of justice, and the expenses burthensome to suiters took from it the original jurisdiction with which it had been invested.

The state, was then divided into six districts-and Bardstown, Frankfort, Washington, Paris, Lexington, and Danville, fixed on as places at which the courts of their several districts were to be holden twice in each year. Six judges, were to be appointed; who were to agree among themselves, to hold the courts in pairs, during terms of fifteen days, if necessary. They were severally to take an oath--each court to appoint its own clerk--to be attended by the sheriff, of the county, where they sat-and might punish contempts.

District courts, were to have jurisdiction over all persons, causes, matters, and things, at common law, or in chancery, arising within their districts; except actions of assault and battery, actions for slander, and actions of less value than fifty pounds: unless in the latter case, they were against justices of the peace.

Among many details for carrying this jurisdiction into effect, occupying twenty odd pages, it is worthy of notice, that rules were to be held in the clerk's office monthly, on a day fixed; at which the parties were to enter their allegations, pleadings, and notices; and take their judgments by default, subject to exceptions, and the ultimate judgment of the court: a mode of procedure apparently attended with great convenience, calculated to facilitate preparation, and promote despatch. But even these withstood not the tooth of time: they were afterwards abolished.

Proceedings, in chancery, allowed, and regulated, against absent defendants, having effects in the hands of residents; with permission to such defendants within seven years after decree against them, to enter an appearance, and contest the right of the complainant.

The district courts, superseded, the court of oyer and terminer; and were to exercise criminal jurisdiction in a similar manner. Prosecutors for the commonwealth were to be appointed by the courts, to officiate where the attorney general, could not attend; and to be paid out of the public treasury, as much as the court would certify, cach, deserved, for his services.

Deeds, and other writings, might be acknowledged, before the clerk of a district court, and recorded, in the manner prescribed to the clerk of the court of appeals-provided, that where the deed was for land, the whole of it must lie in the district.

The judges, of these courts, were allowed one hundred and fifty pounds each, to be paid as the salaries of the judges of the court of appeals were, annually.

The counties, where the court sat, except Franklin, were to furnish court houses and jails-prison bounds, might be prescribed by the court.

Appeals and writs of error, lay from judgments, and decrees of these courts, as from those of the quarter session courts. And all necessary details, are supposed to have been provided for carrying all the powers of the court into full effect.

At the same session, the act establishing district courts, was amended; and all the criminal jurisdiction, concentrated in the court, to be holden at Frankfort.

An act of this session, affecting the public administration of justice, will for that reason, be recognised here, and an outline presented; although an anomaly in jurisprudence. It is, "An act concerning arbitrations." The preamble suggesting great inconvenience to the citizens, by reason that suiters, are burthened with enormous expenses, and the protraction of the final determination of their suits, which operate almost a denial of justice; for remedy whereof, it is enacted: "That parties having controversies, may prepare a statement of their case, and have it entered in any court of record, with the names of the arbitrators." And hence the parties have, respectively, a

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