would operate to grant to the corporation powers, by a special act, for other than municipal purposes.1

ARTICLE III. RESTRAINTS AS TO THE TITLES OF LAWS.

§ 607. Constitutional Restraints as to the Titles of Statutes. - The constitutions of most of the States contain provisions

2

like the following, which is found in the constitution of Missouri: "No bill . shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." 1 Others contain a similar provision restricted to private or local bills, like the following, which is found in the constitution of New York: "No private or local bill which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." It is perceived that these provisions require two things, each relating to a different part of the bill: 1. It must be single in respect of its subject-matter. 2. That single subject-matter must be expressed in its title. If, therefore, the statute embraces more than one subject it is void, whether or not the subject is expressed in its title. On the other hand, although a statute may embrace but one subject, it is still void if that subject be not expressed in its title.

§ 608. Such Provisions Mandatory. Such constitutional provisions are mandatory, and not merely directory to the legislature; the courts, and not the legislature, are the final judges of whether they have been complied with; and if a statute is passed in violation of such a provision, the courts will set it aside. in whole or in part, according to its nature. The legislature cannot evade a constitutional provision that no private or local law shall be passed embracing more than one subject, and that expressed in its title, — by declaring that such an act is a public law.5

§ 609. Judicial Expressions as to the Design of these Provisions. Although the design of such a constitutional provision may seem obvious, a clearer understanding of the subject may perhaps be had if the discussion is prefaced by some judicial statements of that design. The Court of Appeals of New York

1 Const. Mo. 1875, art. 4, § 28.
2 Const. N. Y., art. 3, § 16.
3 Post, §§ 625, 658.

Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 595; Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Tex. 184; People v. Fleming, 7 Col. 230. To this statement exceptions exist in California and Ohio,

where the provision is held to be merely directory to the legislature, which is tantamount to frittering it away entirely: Washington v. Page, 4 Cal. 388; Pierpont v. Crouch, 10 Cal. 315; Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 176. 5 Belleville &c. R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20.

have said that "the design of the constitutional provision was to prevent the uniting of various objects having no necessary or natural connection with each other, in one bill, for the purpose of combining various pecuniary interests in support of the whole, which could not be combined in favor of either by itself."1 Another purpose of the provision has been declared to be that neither the members of the legislature nor the public should be misled by the title, not that the latter should embody all the distinct provisions of the bill in detail."2 Again, it has been said: "The constitutional provision referred to has been deemed by statesmen and jurists, conditores legum, of so much importance that it is found in the fundamental laws of most of the States. Its purpose is to prevent fraud and deception by concealment, in the body of acts, of subjects not by their titles disclosed to the general public and to legislators, who may rely upon them for information as to pending legislation.3 Again, it has been said by the Supreme Court of Michigan: "There was no design by this clause to embarrass legislation, by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation, and thus multiplying their number; but the framers of the constitution meant to put an end to legislation of the vicious character referred to, which was little less than a fraud upon the public, and to require that in every case the proposed measure should stand upon its own merits, and that the legislature should be fairly satisfied of its design, when required to pass upon it." In like manner it has been said of the same constitutional provision by Beasley, C. J., that its purpose is plainly twofold: "First, to insure a separate consideration for every subject presented for legislative action; second, to insure a conspicuous declaration of such purpose. By the former of these requirements, every subject is made to stand on its own merits, unaffected by improper influences,' which might result from connecting it with other measures having no proper relation to it; and, by the latter, a

1 Conner v. The Mayor, 5 N. Y. 293.

2 Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 241, 253. See also People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 192; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116;

People v. Commissioners, 47 N. Y. 501.

3 Astor v. Arcade R. Co., 113 N. Y. 93, 109, per Earl, J.

People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, opinion by Cooley, J

notice is provided, so that the public, or such part of it as may be interested, may receive a reasonable intimation of the matters under legislative consideration." The Supreme Court of Alabama have also said: "It has been often said in this court, repeating the words of other courts, that this clause of the constitution is intended to accomplish but one purpose, the suppression of a practice which had been too prevalent, leading at times to unfortunate, if not corrupt legislation, by which several projects or subjects, having no proper relation to each other, were combined in one bill, and the supporters of each assisted in passing all into law; or, clauses were inserted, of which the title gave no intimation; and the prevention of the deception of the legislature, and the people, by concealing under alluring titles legislation which, if its real character had been disclosed, would have been condemned.” 2

§ 610. Construed Liberally in Support of Legislation: General Expressions of this Doctrine. The courts everywhere agree in taking the view that these constitutional restraints should not receive a rigid and exact application, but that they should be construed and applied liberally with the view of supporting, rather than of overturning, acts of the legislature.3 As this is a subject of great importance, especially in connection with the titles of statutes conferring or extending corporate powers, we shall take the liberty of quoting at considerable length expressions of judicial opinion confirming this view, and indicating the general lines of thought on which the courts proceed in applying such provisions. "It is settled by abundant authorities, resting on sound reason and principles, that the title of an act is not required to enumerate all the particulars, incidents and details by which its object is to be carried out. The constitution requires only that the title should announce its general object. The provisions in the body of the act, such as are ancillary to accomplish the purpose of the act and come within its purview, which are incidental or germane thereto, are considered as covered by the title, where its language is broad enough to include the same." 4 "This

1 Rader v. Union Township, 39 N. J. L. 509.

2 Montgomery &c. Assn. v. Robinson, 69 Ala. 413, 416, opinion by Brickell, C. J.

Harris v. Niagara County Super

visors, 33 Hun (N. Y.), 279; Blake v. People, 109 Ill. 504; Otoe County v. Baldwin, 111 U. S. 1.

4 Mississippi &c. R. Co. v. Wooten, 36 La. An. 441, opinion by Bermudez, C. J.

provision of the constitution must receive a fair and reasonable construction; one which will repress the evil designed to be guarded against, but which, at the same time, will not render it oppressive or impracticable."1 Such a constitutional provision has been said to have been adopted to prevent amendments to legislative enactments, by which distinct and unconnected matters might be introduced; hence it "should not be so construed as to restrict legislation to such an extent as to render different acts necessary, where the whole subject-matter is connected, and may be properly embraced in the same

act."

And the rule has been laid down" that none of the provisions of a statute should be regarded as unconstitutional, where they all relate, directly or indirectly, to the same subject, have a natural connection, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title." 2 Again, it has been said: "In the construction of this and similar constitutional provisions, prescribing rules of legislative procedure, the observance of which is essential to the validity of legislative enactments, the courts have kept steadily in view the purposes of their adoption, and have avoided a closeness of construction tending to embarrass legislation."3 The same court said in an earlier case: "The evil contemplated was not the generality and comprehensiveness of titles. Those faults do not tend to mislead or deceive. The particular subject selected by

the legislature, and put in the title, must embrace every part of the law. The question must always be, whether, taking from the title the subject, we can find anything in the bill which cannot be referred to that subject. If we do, the law embraces a subject not described in the title. But this conclusion should never be attained, except by argument, characterized by liberality of construction and freedom from all nice verbal criticism." 4 And the same court has added: "No statute having but one general object, reasonably and fairly indicated by its title, has been condemned because of the generality of the terms of the title. Whatever provisions that have, by fair intendment, a necessary or proper connection with the subject expressed in the title, may be introduced into the body of the enactment. When the generality of the title is not made a cover for legislation incongruous to, or diverse from, the subject expressed, the spirit and purpose of the constitution

1 Belleville &c. R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20, 29, opinion by Caton, J.

2 Phillips v. Covington &c. Co., 2 Metc. (Ky.) 219, 222; McReynolds v. Smallhouse, 8 Bush (Ky.), 447, 453. See also Louisville &c. Turnp. Co. v. Ballard, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 165.

3 Montgomery &c. Asso. v. Robinson, 69 Ala. 413, 416, opinion by Brickell, J.

4 Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 99, opinion by Walker, C. J.