vested in such a sense as to come within the rule that forbids the interference of the legislature.1 According to Mr. Justice Cooley, the rule applicable to cases of this description is substantially the following: "If the thing wanting, or which failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect in the proceedings, is something the necessity for which the legislature might have dispensed with by prior statute, then it is not beyond the power of the legislature to dispense with it by subsequent statute. And if the irregularity consists in doing some act, or in the mode or manner of doing some act which the legislature might have made immaterial by prior law, it is equally competent to make the same immaterial by a subsequent law." Quoting this language and applying this principle, it is held by the Supreme Court of Alabama, that it is competent for the legislature, by a curative act, to render valid the organization of a corporation, which might otherwise have been invalid by reason of the non-performance of something which the law required to be done as a condition precedent to the corporate existence.3 In other words, where the State prescribes certain conditions as essential to the organization of a corporation, it is competent for the State to waive or dispense with such conditions; and the State waives such conditions by enacting a subsequent statute declaring the existence of the association as a corporate body, and approving or ratifying its organization and amending its charter. So, in New York the conclusion has been reached that, notwithstanding a constitutional prohibition against the passage of special charters creating banking corporations, it is competent for the legislature, by a special curative act, to give validity to the corporate organization of a banking company, Syracuse City Bank v. Davis, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 188, 192. See on this subject Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 258; Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 325; Hepburn v. Curtis, 7 Watts (Pa.), 300; Johnson v. Wells County Comm'rs, 107 Ind. 15; Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 579. But it is not within the power of the legislature to pass an act obliging the courts to construe and apply a previous law, in reference to past transactions, according to the legislative judgment; the power of interpreting and applying the laws lies wholly with the courts. Lincoln Building Assoc. v. Graham, 7 Neb. 173. 2 Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed.), p. 458. 3 Central Ag. &c. Asso. v. Alabama &c. Co., 70 Ala. 120; s. c. 9 Am. Corp. Cas. 8. 4 Ibid. which had been informally organized by reason of the insufficiency of its certificate of incorporation, and the acknowledgment and recording thereof.1 The test by which to determine the validity of an act curing the defective organization of a corporation, is to consider whether the legislature had the power to create the corporation in the first instance; since it will not be denied that it has the same power to cure defects in the organization of an informally and irregularly organized corporation, as it has to bring into existence a new one." Numerous instances are found where the courts have sustained statutes curing irregularities in the votes or other acts of municipal corporations, or the like, where a statutory power has failed of due and regular execution, through the carelessness of officers or other causes.3 1 Syracuse City Bank v. Davis, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 188. See also People v. Plank Road Co., 86 N. Y. 1. 2 Mitchell v. Deeds, 49 Ill. 416, 419. 3 Menges v. Wertman, 1 Pa. St. 218; Yost's Report, 17 Pa. St. 524; Bennett v. Fisher, 26 Ia. 497; Allen v. Archer, 49 Me. 346; Com. v. Marshall, 69 Pa. St. 328; State v. Union, 33 N. J. L. 350; State v. Guttenberg, 38 N. J. L. 419; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Elizabeth, 42 N. J. L. 235; Rogers v. Stephens, 86 N. Y. 623; Unity v. Burrage, 103 U. S. 447; Spaulding v. Nourse, 143 Mass. 490; Tifft v. Buffalo, 82 N. Y. 204; Citizens' Water Co. v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 55 Conn. 1; Bridgeport v. Railroad Co., 15 Conn. 475; Truchelut v. City Council, 1 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 227; Frederick v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 561; Atchison v. Butcher, 3 Kan. 104; Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. (U. S.) 287, 295; McMillen v. Boyles, 6 Iowa, 304; Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687 (ratification by Congress of assessments against property); Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 579; San Francisco v. Certain Real Estate, 42 Cal. 513; Emporia v. Norton, 13 Kan. 569 (curing defects in proceedings to collect taxes); Mason v. Spencer, 35 Kan. 512 (curing defect in mode of levying sewer tax); Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 356, 364; Bolles v. Brimfield, 120 U. S. 759; Williams v. Supervisors, 122 U. S. 154 (tax assessments); Otoe County v. Baldwin, 111 U. S. 1; Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, 121 U. S. 172; State v. Newark, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 185; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644; Grenada County v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261 (distinguishing Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120); St. Joseph Townp. v. Rogers, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 644; U. S. Mortgage Co. v. Gross, 93 Ill. 483, 494. Compare Danielly v. Cabanness, 52 Ga. 211; Pompton v. Cooper Union, 101 U. S. 196; Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 Ill. 405; Jasper County v. Ballou, 103 U. S. 745; Copes v. Charleston, 10 Rich. L. (S. C.) 491; People v. Mitchell, 35 N. Y. 551; Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 327; Bass v. Columbus, 30 Ga. 845; Campbell v. Kenosha, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 194; Stines v. Franklin County, 48 Mo. 167; Knapp v. Grant, 27 Wis. 147; Duanesburgh v. Jenkins, 57 N. Y. 177 (reversing s. c. 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 294, and distinguishing People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128); Kimball v. Rosendale, 42 Wis. 407; s. c. 24 Am. Rep. 421; Ritchie v. Franklin County, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 67; Bradley v. Franklin But, keeping in mind the principle that the legislature can only validate where it could authorize, it follows that the legislature loses its power to validate, after the establishment of a constitutional ordinance prohibiting it from authorizing. Instances of curative acts in respect of municipal corporations which have been held void are, acts ratifying void assessments for local improvements; 2 acts validating a tax upon property not within the corporate limits when levied. Instances of curative acts which have been held valid are, acts ratifying an ultra vires contract for street improvements, and validat County, 65 Mo. 638; Lewis v. Shreveport, 3 Woods (U. S.), 205; Thompson v. Perrine, 103 U. S. 806; 8. c. 106 U. S. 589; Dows v. Elmwood, 34 Fed. Rep. 114; Gardner v. Haney, 86 Ind. 17. As already seen (ante, §§ 549-551) this power is now withdrawn by many of the State constitutions. See Marshall v. Silliman, 61 Ill. 218, a case which arose under the present constitution of Illinois. 1 Sikes v. Columbus, 55 Miss. 115; Grenada County v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261; Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120; Cairo &c. R. Co. v. Sparta, 77 Ill. 505; Kettle v. Fremont, 1 Neb. 329; Re Sackett &c. Streets, 74 N. Y. 95; Jacksonville v. Bassnett, 20 Fla. 525 (legalizing assessment of tax). So, the legislature may ratify the title to an office, after which it cannot be questioned in a proceeding by quo warranto. People v. Flanagan, 66 N. Y. 237. In Marshall v. Silliman, 61 Ill. 218, and Wilie v. Silliman, 62 Ill. 170, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that, under pretense of ratification, a municipal corporation could not be coerced by the legislature into the contracting of an indebtedness. In Elmwood Township v. Marcy, 92 U. S. 289, the Supreme Court of the United States, three judges dissenting, followed this decision. "Subsequent legislative sanction within constitu tional limits is equivalent to original authority." Dill. Mun. Corp. (4th ed.), § 544. The learned author cites to this truism, Wilson v. Hardesty, 1 Md. Ch. 66; Jasper County v. Ballou, 103 U. S. 745; Shaw v. Norfolk R. Co., 5 Gray (Mass.), 180; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 380; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 627; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. (U. S.) 88; Charles River Bridge V. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420; Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 119; Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 268; Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 Ill. 405. That a doubtful, obscure or covert validation will not be upheld, see Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120. 2 Baltimore v. Horn, 26 Md. 194. Comp. Lennon v. New York, 55 N. Y. 361; Baltimore v. Porter, 18 Md. 284 (where the attempt was made to ratify by ordinance a void assessment). In People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15; s. c. 21 Am. Rep. 676, and in Schumacher v. Tobeman, 56 Cal. 508, it was held that the legislature could not legalize a void assessment, nor by direct act make an assessment within an incorporated city. 3 Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Maquillon, 12 Kan. 301. 4 Brown v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 239. See also Duanesburg v. Jenkins, 57 N. Y. 177; O'Hara v. State, 112 N. Y. 146. ing municipal subscriptions to the stock of a private corporation.1 § 591. What is a "Local Law" within the Meaning of such a Prohibition. In the constitutions of some of the States, as already seen, the prohibition is in form against the passage of local or special laws relating to many subjects, among them to the subject of corporations. In the constitution of Georgia, the prohibition is against the passage of local acts where there is a general law embracing the same subject-matter. A local act, therefore, concerning elections, etc., in a particular county, to determine whether municipal bonds should be issued was void, there being a general statute in force on the same subject. In New York, the prohibition is against the passage of private or local bills, granting to corporations the right to lay down railway tracks, or granting to them any exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever, - an application of which has already been considered. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has pointed out that acts may be general acts within the meaning of the provision of the constitution of that State that "no general law shall be in force until published," and special or local acts within the - 1 Bridgeport v. Railroad Co., 15 Conn. 475; Winn v. Macon, 21 Ga. 275; Municipality v. Theater Co., 2 Robb. (La.) 209. Proceeding on these or similar grounds, the courts have upheld special statutes curing marriages defectively celebrated: Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 221; s. c. 10 Am. Dec. 121; State v. Adams, 65 N. C. 537 (validating slave marriages); Andrews v. Page, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 653 (legitimating children). Compare White v. White, 105 Mass. 325. Judicial sales defectively made: Beach v. Walker, 6 Conn. 190, 197. See Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 459, and cases cited in note 2; judgments defectively entered: Underwood v. Lilly, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 101; certificates of acknowledgment of deeds by married women defectively drawn: Tate v. Stooltzfoos, 16 Serg. & R. 35; Chestnut v. Shane, 16 Oh. 599 (overruling Connell v. Connell, 6 Oh. 358; Good 3 Dougherty County v. Boyt, 71 Ga. 484. 4 Ante, § 585; Astor v. New York &c. R. Co., 113 N. Y. 93; 20 Northeast. Rep. 594. 3 meaning of a constitutional inhibition against the passage of local laws containing more than one subject and that not expressed in the title. It has been held in that State that "an act to legalize and authorize the assessment of street improvements and assessments," which in its body related solely to certain street assessments in the city of Janesville, and undertook to legalize the same, was a general law within the provision above quoted relating to the publication of laws, so that it would not take effect until published, but was at the same time a local law within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition concerning the titles of statutes, and was therefore void because the subject of it was not expressed in its title.2 The court held that "the subject of a local act cannot be expressed in the title without reference to the place over which it is to operate being made known therein." On the same lines of reasoning, the same court has held that " an act to incorporate the Yellow River Improvement Company," which, besides creating the corporation with ordinary corporate powers, authorized it to improve the Yellow River within two specified counties, for the purpose of facilitating the running of logs, etc., and, after expending a certain sum of money for that purpose, to collect tolls on logs, etc., floated down the river, was a local act within the meaning of the constitutional provision touching the entitling of laws; but whether it was a special or private law the court did not determine. To this principle the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have annexed the following qualification: "Whenever the provisions of an act are compulsorily binding upon every city of the particular classification, the legislation is general and constitutional. Whenever the provisions are binding at the option of the local authorities, the legislation is special, local and unconstitutional." 995 § 592. Statute is General when Uniform in its Operation upon All the Members of a Particular Class. Statutes which 1 See Yellow River Improvement Co. v. Arnold, 46 Wis. 214, 222; Durkee v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 697; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400; Phillips v. Albany, 28 Wis. 340; Lawson v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 30 Wis. 597. 2 Durkee v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 697. 8 Ibid. Yellow River Improvement Co. v. Arnold, 46 Wis. 214. 5 Reading v. Savage, 120 Pa. St. 198; opinion by Ermentrout, J. |