unmarried, stands in the father's place, after his death, as to the consent required to the child's marriage during minority. She cannot, however, appoint a guardian by will, as she is not mentioned in the statute of Charles the second, by virtue of which alone the father enjoys that privilege (e).

3. [The duties of children to their parents, arise also from a principle of natural justice and retribution. For to those who gave us existence, we naturally owe subjection and obedience during our minority, and honour and reverence ever after: they who protected the weakness of our infancy, are entitled to our protection in the infirmity of their own age; they, who by sustenance and education have enabled their offspring to prosper, ought in return to be supported by that offspring, in case they themselves stand in need of assistance. Upon this principle proceed all those duties of children to their parents, which are enjoined by positive laws. In this country, the law has not deemed it necessary to make much provision on the subject of the filial obligations. But it is held that a child is justified in defending the person and maintaining the cause or suit of a parent, just as a parent is justified in performing the same duties for a child (f).] And by the statutes relating to the poor, the children of any old, blind, lame, impotent, or other poor person not able to work, shall, if of sufficient ability, at their own charges relieve and maintain him or her, in the manner and according to the rate which the justices of the peace at their quarter sessions shall direct (g).

III. We are next to consider the case of illegitimate. children or bastards. The duty of parents to their bastard children is, by our law, principally that of maintenance. [For, though bastards are not looked upon as children for

(e) Vaughan, 180; Ex parte Edwards, 3 Atk. 519. The courts, however, will regard her wishes on this head with great attention, where no guardian has been se

lected by the father. See In re Kaye, Law Rep., 1 Ch. App. 387.

(f) 1 Bl. Com. 454.

(g) Vide post, bk. Iv. pt. ш. ch. II.

[any civil purposes, yet the ties of nature are not so easily dissolved; and the support of the offspring by the parent is, for reasons already noticed, a matter of natural obligation. The civil law, therefore, when it denied maintenance to bastards begotten under certain atrocious circumstances, was neither consonant to nature nor reason; however profligate and wicked the parents might justly be esteemed (h).]

The method in which the English law provides maintenance for an illegitmate child, during its infancy, is as follows. The mother is entitled to its custody (as it would seem) in preference to the putative father (i); and is bound to maintain it until the child attains the age of sixteen, or gains a settlement in its own right, or (being a female) becomes married (k), and in the event of the mother's marriage, the same liability attaches to her husband (1). And if the mother be of sufficient ability to maintain her bastard, while so dependent, and neglects that duty, so that it becomes chargeable to a parish, she is made liable, by 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 6, to be punished as a vagrant. But if, on the other hand, the mother be not of sufficient ability, the law affords her the means of relieving herself from her liability as its mother, and of compelling the putative father to supply a fund for its maintenance (m). For by 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, as amended by the

(h) See Nov. 89, c. 15.

(i) See R. v. Hopkins, 7 East, 579; Ex parte Anne Knee, 1 Bos. & P. (N. S.) 148; In re Hakewill, 12 C. B. 231.

(k) 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, ss. 57, 71; Laing v. Spicer, 1 Tyr. & Gran. 358; R. v. Wendron, 7 Ad. & Ell. 819.

(1) 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, ss. 57, 78. But it does not attach to the administrator of her estate after death. (Ruttinger v. Temple, 4 B. & Smith, 491.)

(m) The following are among the more recent cases on the subject of

affiliation and maintenance in bastardy:-Queen v. Shipperbottom, 10 Q. B. 514; Queen v. Whittles, 13 Q. B. 248; Queen v. Justices of Leicestershire, 15 Q. B. 88; Kendall v. Wilkinson, 4 Ell. & Bl. 680; Potts v. Cumbridge, 8 Ell. & Bl. 847; Hodges, app. v. Bennett, resp., 5 H. & M. 625; The Queen v. Pickford, 1 B. & Smith, 77; Follit v. Koetzow, 2 Ell. & Ell. 730; The Queen v. Gaunt, Law Rep., 2 Q. B. 466; Marshall, app. v. Murgatroyd, resp., ib. 6 Q. B. 31; The Queen v. Glynne and others, ib. 7 Q. B. 16.

Bastardy Laws Amendment Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 65), and the Bastardy Laws Amendment Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 9), a single woman may either before the birth of her bastard child, or at any time within twelve months afterwards, make application to a justice of the peace, charging a person by name as the father of such child; and where the alleged father has within twelve months next after its birth paid money for the maintenance of the child, such application may be made at any subsequent period whatever without limitation in regard to time (»). Upon such application, the justice issues his summons to the party charged to appear at a petty sessions, whereat the evidence on both sides is heard (o). And if the evidence of the mother as to the paternity of the child be corroborated in some material particular by other testimony to the satisfaction of the justices, the man charged may be adjudged to be the "putative father" of the child in question (p); and the justices may (if they see fit under the circumstances) make an order on him for the payment to the mother-or to some other person to be appointed for the custody of the child in the case of her death, insanity, or imprisonment-of a weekly sum of money for its maintenance and education; and such order shall be in force until the child shall die or shall attain the age of thirteen, or (if the justices shall so direct) shall attain the age of sixteen (9). The party charged, however, is entitled to appeal from this order to the quarter sessions, upon entering into his recognizance to try the appeal and pay

(n) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65, s. 3. If the alleged father can be shown to have ceased to reside in England within the twelve months following the birth, then the application may be made at any time within the twelvemonth next after his return to England. (Ib.) Where the child has become chargeable, the guardians may make the applica

tion instead of the mother. (Sect. 8.)

(0) In cases arising within the metropolitan police district, a single magistrate may act. (8 & 9 Vict. c. 10, s. 9.)

(p) See The Queen v. Damerell, Law Rep., 3 Q. B. 50; Cole v Manning, ib. 2 Q. B. D. 611. (a) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65, s. 5.

such costs as shall be adjudged thereon; and on the hearing of such appeal, the case is to be tried de novo, in the manner already stated in regard to the proceedings before the justices in petty sessions (r).

Though maintenance is thus provided for bastards, either from their mother or their father, during the period of childhood, they labour, on the other hand, under several incapacities and disadvantages; all of which are founded on the general doctrine, that a bastard is, for legal purposes, filius nullius, or, as it is sometimes expressed, filius populi (s). Hence he is not entitled by law either to the name of his mother or to that of his reputed father (t); nor can he take property by the mere description of child. of his putative parent, until he has in some way acquired the reputation of standing in that relation to him (u). So, with respect to the acquisition of property jure sanguinis, he is in a different position from others-for he can neither himself be heir to any one, nor have any heir except one who is the issue of his own body-because being nullius filius, he has no ancestor from whom inheritable blood can be derived, and no collateral relations. If therefore he purchase land, though he may take in fee, so far as the power of disposing of the same to others is concerned, it is not, while it remains in his own seisin (scil. is held by his own title), a fee in the sense of being descendible to heirs generally, but its descent is confined to the heirs of his own body (x). And if he die seised of such estate without having devised it, and without lawful issue, it will escheat

(r) Sect. 9.

(8) Fortesc. de Leg. c. 4.

(t) Co. Litt. 3 b; Wilkinson v. Adam, 1 Ves. & B. 452.

(u) It may be worth while here incidentally to remark that reputation appears to be the true title to surnames, even for those who are legitimate. Hence a man may acquire a fresh surname in a variety of ways, as, for example, by ob

taining the licence of the crown for that purpose, or even by advertisement in the public papers and habitual use. (See Doe dem. Luscomb v. Yates, 5 Barn. & Ald. 544); Re Gimlet, 11 W. R. 210; also Falconer's "Surnames," 1862, and Supplement, 1863.

(x) Ld. Raym. 1152; 1 Prest. Est. 468.

to the crown, or other lord of the fee (y). And upon the same principle, he cannot claim any share of personal estate as next of kin to a party dying intestate; and if he himself die intestate, and without wife or lawful issue, the crown is entitled to the beneficial administration of the personal estate. Yet the royal claim to the real or personal estate of a bastard under such circumstances, is not strictly enforced; and upon a proper petition, the crown's right will in general be transferred to the nearest member of his reputed family (2). There are some other points also, as to which a bastard is peculiarly circumstanced. Thus he does not follow (as legitimate children do) his father's place of parochial settlement under the laws relating to the poor, but his primary settlement (i. e. if born antecedently to 14th August, 1834,) is in the parish where he was born (a); and if born after that date,-that is to say, after the passing of the Poor Law Amendment Act, 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76, -then he has and follows the settlement of his mother till he attains the age of sixteen, or shall acquire a settlement for himself (6). Again, to authorize his marriage under twenty-one, the consent of his father or mother is not required, and is of no avail (c): but a licence to marry may be granted to him, upon oath made that there is no person authorized to give consent (d). And to this we may add, that though in general a father may by deed or will appoint a guardian for his infant child, in the event of his decease, he has no such privilege if the child be illegitimate (e). On the other hand, the laws relative to incest, and to marriages within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity, apply to a bastard with equal force as to those who are born in wedlock, the principle

(y) Vide sup. vol. 1. p. 441. (2) Megit v. Johnson, Doug. 542; Toller, Ex. 107. See 59 Geo. 3, c. 94, enlarging the powers of the crown to abandon its rights in the case of escheated estates.

(a) Hard's case, Salk. 427.

(b) 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 71; and see 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, s. 35. (c) Priestley v. Hughes,

East, 1.

11

(d) See 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, s. 14; 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 85, s. 12.

(e) Vide post, p. 313.