we shall not need to appeal any whither but to all the notices of virtue and vice which are in mankind. 18. Indeed, there are some sins of ignorance, that is, such which are subjected in the understanding, which are worse than some sins of malice, or such which are subjected wholly in the will and the faculties which obey it. Thus to be ignorant of the fundamental articles of faith, is a worse state of things than to have committed an act of gluttony, or to have entertained a wanton thought, or to have omitted divine service upon a festival. The Jews had an opinion that thoughts were free, and God did not require them of us with severity; but a thought against faith, that was highly criminal. "Cogitationem pravam Deus non habet vice facti, nisi concepta fuerit in Dei fidem atque religionem," said R. David Kimchi; meaning, that no sin was greater than heresy, or an error in faith.' But the reason of this is, not only because the effect of heresy is, like the plague, infectious and disseminative; but because by how much the articles of faith are more necessary to be believed, by so much is the ignorance of them more criminal, and more voluntary, and therefore less excusable. But even in matters of faith, where there is less of malice or wilful negligence ingredient into the ignorance of them, there the crime is less than any thing else, be the instance what it will. But this will be more explicit in the sequel. RULE VI. Ignorance does always excuse the Fact, or diminish the Malig nity of it, or change the Kind and Nature of the Sin. 1. IGNORANCE, according to its several capacities, and the several methods of art and ways of speaking, hath several divisions. But all are reducible to this in order to conscience. Ignorance is either voluntary or involuntary. It is vincible or invincible, that is, it can be helped or it cannot. It is the cause of the action, or it only goes along with it. And of these several ignorances there are many degrees, but no more kinds that are here fit to be considered. 2. The first sort of ignorance, which is involuntary, invincible, and antecedent, that is, is the cause of an action,so that the thing would not be done but by that ignorance,— does certainly make the action also itself involuntary, and consequently not criminal. In this sense is that of the lawd: "Errantis nulla voluntas, nullus consensus;" " They that know nothing of it, consent not."-This is meant of ignorance that is involuntary in all regards, that is, such as is neither chosen directly nor indirectly, but is involuntary both in the effect and in the cause. Thus what fools and madmen and infants do, is not at all imputed to them, because they have no understanding to discern good from evil; and therefore their appetite is not depraved or malicious, which part soever they take. Επεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ διαθέσεως ἡ ὕβεις συνίσταται, ακο λούθως λέγομεν τὸν μαινόμενον, καὶ τὸν νήπιον, εἰ καὶ ωθήσουσί τινα, ἢ διὰ λόγων ὑβείσουσι, μὴ κατέχεσθαι, διότι οὐ δοκοῦσι διάΘεσιν ἔχειν ὑβριζόντων μὴ αἰσθανόμενοι, saith the law, according to the interpretation of the Greeks: "Injury proceeds from the affection; and consequently we say, that a madman or an infant, if they strike or reproach any one, they are not criminal, they have done no injury because they perceived it not."-" Nec reputantur infantiæ anni qui sensu carent," saith Pliny; “The years of infancy come not under the notice of laws and judges, of right or wrong, for they have no reason," that is, they use none. So Galenf: Tò μèv dè μnj χρῆσθαι λογισμῷ μήτε τὰ θηρία, μήτε τὰ βρέφη, καὶ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν Χρύσιππον ωμολόγηται, σε All the scholars of Chrysippus constantly affirm, that beasts and babes have no use of reason." And Jamblichus supposed, that the rational soul was not infused into children before the tenth year of their But that is more reasonable which almost all wise mei (excepting the Stoics) affirm, and is thus expressed by Gregory Nyssen, and his contemporary Nemesiusi in the very same words: Εἰ γὰρ καὶ κομιδῇ νέοις οὖσι τοῖς βρέφεσιν ἡ ἄλογος μόνη κίνησις πρόσεστιν, ἀλλὰ ψυχήν λογικήν φαμεν ἔχειν αὐτὰ, ἐπειδήπερ αὐξανόμενα καὶ τὴν λογικὴν ἀναδείκνυσιν ἐνέρ Yaav, "Although in infants there is no action or motion of γειαν, d Lib. 9. ff. de Jur. et Fact. Ignor. et lib. 20. ff. de Aqua et Aquæ Pluvi. e Lib. 3. sect. 2. ff. de Injur. age. De Hippocrat. et Platon. Placit. Apud Stobaum in Physicis Eclogis. h De Anima. iDe Nat. Hom. cap. 2. reason, yet we say that they have a reasonable soul; for they manifest the use of it, when they are growing up. 3. But this occasions a difficulty in this subject. For we see the rational soul exercising its operations in some, sooner, -in some, later; and as the body grows in strength and grandeur, so does the soul in the use of reason and powers of deliberation and choice, Nam velut infirmo puerei teneroque vagantur Consilium quoque majus, et auctior est animi vis h. And Hippocrates adds that the soul does grow; ȧr0ρwπov ψυχὴ ἀεὶ φύεται ἄχρι θανάτου, « A man's soul is born every day of a man's life," it always receives some increment. Now the question is, 4. How long shall infant ignorance or childishness excuse so far, as that the actions they do, shall be reckoned neither to virtue nor to vice? To this it will not be possible to give a strict and definite answer, but a rule and a measure may be given. Posidonius said, Μικρὸν μὲν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἀσθενὲς ὑπάρχειν τοῦτο [λογιστικὸν], μέγα δὲ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ἀποτελεῖσθαι περὶ τὴν τεσσαρεσ καιδεκαετῆ ἡλικίαν, "The rational faculty is at first very weak, but it is great and strong about the age of fourteen years;" and Plutarchi says that the Stoics affirmed ἄρχεσθαι τελειότητος περὶ τὴν δευτέραν ἑβδομάδα, σε about the second septennary, or the fourteenth year, they begin to be perfect:"—but Zeno k said that from that year complete, TEXTα "it is perfect," that is, as to all capacities of reward and punishment. But in this there was great variety. For some laws would punish boys after twelve years, not before: so the Salic1 law: "Si quis puer infra duodecim annos aliquam culpam commiserit, fredum ei non requiratur :" " A boy before he is twelve years old committing a fault, is not tied to make amends or composition." Servius upon that of Virgilm, Alter ab undecimo tum me jam ceperat annus, says "the thirteenth year is meant, because that was next to puberty; for (says he) the law judges of maturity not only Lucret. lib. 3. 448. Eichstadt, pag.116. * Diog. Laert. in Zenonc. In 8. Eclog. Virgil. i De Placit. Philos. 5. cap. 24. I Tit. 26. by years, but by the habit and strength of the body." But though this be less by one year than that of the Stoical account, and more by one year than that of the Salic law; yet we find in the law of the Greeks and Romans, that after seven years complete, boys were punishable; so the Basilica", Michael Attaliotes", and some others. 5. But this variety was not only arbitrary, but it was commonly established upon reason; for the differences were made by the different nature of the crimes, of which boys were not equally capable in every year; but although, in every crime, some were forwarder than others, yet all were capable of some sooner than of others. Spite and malice come sooner than lust: and therefore, if a boy, after seven years old, killed a man, he was liable to the lex Cornelia de sicariis;' but not so if he were a pathic, and a correspondent in unnatural lusts, as appears in Matthæus Blastares and Leo: if he were under twelve years, he had impunity, "quum ætas ipsa argumento sit, nescire eum quid patiatur," said the emperor; "his age is an argument of his ignorance, that he knows not what he suffers." For in these things it was reasonable that Galen said of Hippocrates, Νήπια λέγει Tà μéxons, "Infancy is to be reckoned until youth," or a power of generation: and that was it which I observed before out of Servius: "Bene cum annis jungit habitum corporis; nam et in jure pubertas ex utroque colligitur." The strength of body must be supposed before you allow them strength of reason, that is, a power to deliberate and choose those sins, to which they cannot be tempted before they have natural capacities. But this, I say, relates only to the crime of uncleanness. Now because this was commonly the first of our youthful sins, malice in infancy being prodigious and unnatural, which caused that advice of St. Paul, "In malice be children;" therefore wise men and the laws did usually reckon that age to be the first beginning of their choice, as well as of their strength. But this rule is very far from being certain, and therefore St. Austin blames those, that do not impute any sins to boys before the age of fourteen: "Merito crederemus, (saith he), si nulla essent peccata, nisi quæ n Lib. 60. tit. 39. • Tit. 71. membris genitalibus admittuntur ;""We might well do so, if there were no sins, but the sins of lust:" but they can steal sooner, and they can lie, and, as unnatural and as unusual as it is, they can be malicious, some sooner, some later, according to the baseness of their disposition, their pregnancy, and education. A. Gellius' tells, that the decemviri, who wrote the laws of the Twelve Tables, "ex cæteris manifestis furibus liberos verberari, addicique jusserunt ei cui factum furtum esset,' 66 they caused thieving boys to be whipped and given up to them from whom they had stolen:" and if they cut corn by night and stole it, they were to be chastised by the discretion of the prætor; which also Pliny notes3. But then this also is to be added, that even in these things although they did not esteem them innocent, yet because their understanding was but little, and their choice proportionable, they inflicted but easy punishment; which Theophanes expressed by δι' άβηνῶν μαστιγώσαι, they were "beaten with thongs, or rods, or ferulas." t 6. From hence we may take an estimate, how it is in this affair, as to the question and relation of conscience. For then these wise men and wise lawgivers, did declare them punishable, when they did suppose them criminal; though in the sanction of laws they were to proceed by rule, and determine ws Tì Tò Toù, as things were most commonly.'ἐπὶ πολὺ, But then it is to be considered, that since they, being to make a rule, could not at all take in extraordinaries, and there would many particulars and hasty instances be passed, before it could come to a just measure and regular establishment, we must therefore proceed something otherwise in the court of conscience. For, as Libanius ", speaking concerning boys, said, τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τοὔνομα τῆς οὐ πάντα ἀναμαρτήτου καὶ Tóppw μéμYews †λxias, "this is not a name of age, that cannot sin and cannot be punished." But Anastasius Sinaita says, that sometimes God imputes sins to boys from twelve years old and upwards.'-But St. Austin confessed the sins of his first years, the peevishness of his infancy, his wrangling with his nurses, his very envying for the nurse's milk and fondnesses: this was indeed a greater piety than reason. * Lib. 18. cap. 3. Lib. 11. cap. 18. Lib. 1. sect. Impuberi, ff. de Senat. Silan. Habena. Epist. 57. |